<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0" xmlns:itunes="http://www.itunes.com/dtds/podcast-1.0.dtd" xmlns:googleplay="http://www.google.com/schemas/play-podcasts/1.0"><channel><title><![CDATA[Ask Junior - Judgment Summaries: Telangana High court Judgment Digest]]></title><description><![CDATA[Stay updated with the judgments from the Telangana High Court every week. This digest brings you concise summaries of judgments, helping you stay informed without wading through lengthy case reports. Whether you're a lawyer, law student, or just interested in legal developments, this section ensures you never miss a critical decision from the court.]]></description><link>https://askjunior.substack.com/s/telangana-high-court-judgment-digest</link><generator>Substack</generator><lastBuildDate>Thu, 11 Jun 2026 02:19:06 GMT</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://askjunior.substack.com/feed" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><copyright><![CDATA[Ask Junior]]></copyright><language><![CDATA[en]]></language><webMaster><![CDATA[askjunior@substack.com]]></webMaster><itunes:owner><itunes:email><![CDATA[askjunior@substack.com]]></itunes:email><itunes:name><![CDATA[Ask Junior]]></itunes:name></itunes:owner><itunes:author><![CDATA[Ask Junior]]></itunes:author><googleplay:owner><![CDATA[askjunior@substack.com]]></googleplay:owner><googleplay:email><![CDATA[askjunior@substack.com]]></googleplay:email><googleplay:author><![CDATA[Ask Junior]]></googleplay:author><itunes:block><![CDATA[Yes]]></itunes:block><item><title><![CDATA[Telangana High Court Weekly Digest (28.05.2026 - 04.06.2026) ]]></title><description><![CDATA[Stay updated with the judgments from the Telangana High Court every week. We bring you concise summaries of judgments, helping you stay informed without wading through lengthy case reports]]></description><link>https://askjunior.substack.com/p/telangana-high-court-weekly-digest-189</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://askjunior.substack.com/p/telangana-high-court-weekly-digest-189</guid><pubDate>Sun, 07 Jun 2026 13:30:56 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/25fc1514-3e72-4647-835e-82508b97ccc1_1200x630.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_7fa7c388-7da6-4bf9-b125-d17f9238912b.pdf">CRLA 536/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: SOMA SURESH @ SOMA CHANDAN KUMAR, VS THE STATE OF TELANGANA,</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>04-06-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE SUDDALA CHALAPATHI RAO</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Criminal Law</strong></p><p>The High Court, in Criminal Appeal No. 536 of 2026, dismissed the appeal as withdrawn, granting the appellant, Soma Suresh @ Soma Chandan Kumar, liberty to file an appropriate appeal. The appellant had challenged the order dated 05.03.2026 passed in Crl.M.P.No.291 of 2026 in Crime No. 1135 of 2025, registered for offences punishable under Sections 137(2) read with 3(5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. The decisive ground for this disposition was the learned counsel for the petitioner&#8217;s request for permission to withdraw the Criminal Appeal with the aforementioned liberty, to which the learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the State raised no objection. The Court, therefore, accorded permission, leading to the dismissal of the appeal as withdrawn. This procedural outcome reflects the Court&#8217;s acceptance of the parties&#8217; consensus on the withdrawal and the grant of liberty, thereby concluding the present appeal without adjudicating on its merits. All pending miscellaneous applications were consequently closed.</p><div><hr></div><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://askjunior.substack.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">Ask Junior - Judgment Summaries is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.</p></div><form class="subscription-widget-subscribe"><input type="email" class="email-input" name="email" placeholder="Type your email&#8230;" tabindex="-1"><input type="submit" class="button primary" value="Subscribe"><div class="fake-input-wrapper"><div class="fake-input"></div><div class="fake-button"></div></div></form></div></div>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Telangana High Court Weekly Digest (15.05.2026 - 21.05.2026)]]></title><description><![CDATA[Stay updated with the judgments from the Telangana High Court every week. We bring you concise summaries of judgments, helping you stay informed without wading through lengthy case reports]]></description><link>https://askjunior.substack.com/p/telangana-high-court-weekly-digest-58e</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://askjunior.substack.com/p/telangana-high-court-weekly-digest-58e</guid><pubDate>Sun, 24 May 2026 13:30:54 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/55cc0969-d8a4-4d23-8f70-110200dfd6a4_1200x630.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_294bfd63-2aa5-47f5-9a6d-1da584325b72.pdf">WA 535/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: PUNEETH KUMAR DIXIT VS STATE OF TELANGANA</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>15-05-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE T.MADHAVI DEVI, JUSTICE G.M. MOHIUDDIN</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Civil Law</strong></p><p>The High Court, in disposing of Writ Appeal No. 535 of 2026, directed the extension of an interim order, specifically the order dated 02.04.2026 granted in W.P.No.10173 of 2026, until 09.06.2026. The Court&#8217;s decision was predicated on the submission by the appellants&#8217; counsel that the said interim order, though not formally extended on 06.05.2026, was merely adjourned to 09.06.2026 without any adjudication or hearing on the merits of the issue. The appellants contended that in the absence of a formal order adjudicating the matter, the interim protection previously granted should continue. The Court, acknowledging the lack of formal adjudication and the pending posting of the matter to 09.06.2026, found it appropriate to ensure the continuity of the interim relief. This pragmatic approach reflects the principle of maintaining the status quo pending a full hearing, particularly where no adverse adjudication has occurred. The Court thus ensured that the appellants were not prejudiced by a procedural adjournment. There was no order as to costs, and all pending miscellaneous applications were closed.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_19c56032-8252-418c-90c8-f16931c14e17.pdf">WA 536/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: BANDA MALLESH VS THE STATE OF TELANGANA</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>15-05-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE T.MADHAVI DEVI, JUSTICE G.M. MOHIUDDIN</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Civil Law</strong></p><p>The High Court, in disposing of Writ Appeal No. 536 of 2026, effectively restored the interim order dated 17.03.2026, which had granted interim suspension of the order dated 05.03.2026 in Case No. J/718/2025. The Court&#8217;s decision was predicated on the specific facts and circumstances presented in the case, indicating a provisional measure to maintain the status quo pending further adjudication. This restoration of the interim suspension is to remain in effect until the next scheduled hearing date, 17.06.2026. The judgment, delivered by Justices T. Madhavi Devi and G.M. Mohiuddin, did not delve into the merits of the underlying dispute but rather focused on the procedural aspect of preserving the interim relief previously granted by the Court in W.P. No. 8310 of 2026. The Court explicitly stated that there would be no order as to costs, and any pending miscellaneous applications were accordingly closed. This disposition reflects a judicial approach aimed at ensuring continuity of interim protection while the substantive issues await a comprehensive hearing.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_4b02b5b6-619a-4d3e-82b1-532ecaa62639.pdf">COMCA 26/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: M/S. PEOPLE MEDIA FACTORY PRIVATE LIMITED VS M/S. CHITRALAYAM ENTERTAINMENT LLP</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>15-05-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE T.MADHAVI DEVI, JUSTICE G.M. MOHIUDDIN</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Arbitration Law</strong></p><p>The High Court disposed of the appeal, arising from an order in COP.No.3 of 2025, by directing that the application filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (the &#8216;Act&#8217;) be treated as an application under Section 17 of the Act and heard by the already appointed arbitrator. This decision was predicated on the joint submission of learned Senior Counsel for both parties, acknowledging the arbitrator had entered upon the reference. The Court explicitly refrained from expressing any opinion on the merits, preserving the parties&#8217; right to raise all questions of law and fact before the arbitrator. Crucially, the respondent was restrained from initiating execution proceedings until June 30, 2026. This approach aligns with the principle of judicial non-interference in ongoing arbitral proceedings once an arbitrator is seized of the matter, promoting efficient dispute resolution through the agreed-upon arbitral mechanism. The Court&#8217;s direction effectively transitions the interim relief application from judicial scrutiny to arbitral determination, consistent with the scheme of the Act.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_166fe574-a6c1-4923-92cd-e7ab128efe8c.pdf">WA 510/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: M/S. GIRNAR DEVELOPERS VS THE STATE OF TELANGANA</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>15-05-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE T.MADHAVI DEVI, JUSTICE G.M. MOHIUDDIN</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Urban Planning Law</strong></p><p>The High Court, in M/s Girnar Developers v. The State of Telangana, modified the interim order dated 24.04.2026 passed by the learned Single Judge in I.A.No.1 of 2026 in W.P.No.10185 of 2026, which had directed the sealing of unauthorisedly constructed portions, specifically the stilt, 6th floor, and pent house. The appellants sought de-sealing of the stilt portion to permit purchasers to operate or remove material. While the learned Standing Counsel for the Municipality opposed this prayer, the Court, having considered the material on record, was inclined to partially modify the interim order. The Court permitted the purchasers to take away their material from the stilt floor portion, directing the respondents to de-seal the premises on the stilt floor from 18.05.2026 to 23.05.2026 for this specific purpose, after which the subject premises are to be re-sealed. This modification was a pragmatic approach to mitigate immediate hardship while upholding the primary sealing order concerning unauthorised construction. The writ appeal was accordingly disposed of without costs.</p><div><hr></div><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://askjunior.substack.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">Ask Junior - Judgment Summaries is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.</p></div><form class="subscription-widget-subscribe"><input type="email" class="email-input" name="email" placeholder="Type your email&#8230;" tabindex="-1"><input type="submit" class="button primary" value="Subscribe"><div class="fake-input-wrapper"><div class="fake-input"></div><div class="fake-button"></div></div></form></div></div>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Telangana High Court Weekly Digest (08.05.2026 - 14.05.2026)]]></title><description><![CDATA[Stay updated with the judgments from the Telangana High Court every week. We bring you concise summaries of judgments, helping you stay informed without wading through lengthy case reports]]></description><link>https://askjunior.substack.com/p/telangana-high-court-weekly-digest-b04</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://askjunior.substack.com/p/telangana-high-court-weekly-digest-b04</guid><pubDate>Sun, 17 May 2026 13:31:16 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/a7cd2a9d-60e8-43eb-8cb2-68af6489dbad_1200x630.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_04ba27c3-df3e-4d7e-ae25-7e7a275b7a53.pdf">WP 513/2020</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: KASHETTY ANJAIAH VS THE STATE OF TELANGANA</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>16-03-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE N.TUKARAMJI</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Property Law</strong></p><p>The Court, in disposing of a batch of writ appeals concerning land in Sikanderguda Village, Gandipet Mandal, Ranga Reddy District, upheld the learned Single Judge&#8217;s decision to direct the issuance of E-pattadar passbooks to the writ petitioners and to set aside interim orders suspending Occupancy Rights Certificates. The core reasoning was that while disputed questions of title cannot be adjudicated under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, which is reserved for judicial review of administrative decisions on grounds of perversity, patent illegality, irrationality, want of power, or procedural irregularity, the issuance of E-pattadar passbooks merely replaces old documents and does not confer or assert title, nor does it prejudice pending civil litigation, specifically O.S. No. 47 of 1965. The Court emphasized that a regular suit is the appropriate remedy for property disputes, and the High Court&#8217;s constitutional jurisdiction should not be exercised for matters where civil or criminal remedies are available. Consequently, the Court set aside other conclusions of the Single Judge that delved into title disputes, such as quashing CCLA proceedings, leaving it open for aggrieved parties to pursue remedies before competent authorities. The Tahsildar/Mandal Revenue Officer was directed to issue the E-pattadar passbooks within thirty days.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_525175f7-0fcf-43a5-96f9-a9464c5edad1.pdf">CMA 74/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: PIRAMAL FINANCE LIMITED VS MRS. AILI LAXMI</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>16-03-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE NAMAVARAPU RAJESHWAR RAO</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Civil Law</strong></p><p>The High Court, in Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 74 of 2026, permitted the appellant, Piramal Finance Limited, to withdraw the present appeal with liberty to pursue other available legal remedies. The learned counsel for the appellant, Ms. K. Malathi, had addressed a letter dated 12.03.2026 to the Registry requesting this withdrawal. The Court, exercising its discretion, accorded the requested permission, thereby dismissing the Civil Miscellaneous Appeal as withdrawn. This decision was based on the appellant&#8217;s explicit request to withdraw the matter, indicating a strategic choice to explore alternative legal avenues rather than pursuing the instant appeal to its conclusion. The Court&#8217;s order reflects a procedural allowance for parties to re-evaluate their litigation strategy and withdraw proceedings, provided such withdrawal does not prejudice the opposing party and is accompanied by a request for liberty to pursue other remedies. Consequently, the Court directed that there would be no order as to costs, and any pending miscellaneous applications would stand closed. This judgment underscores the Court&#8217;s prerogative to facilitate the efficient management of litigation by allowing withdrawals where appropriate, without delving into the merits of the original dispute.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_b9b5a994-41e1-45f8-a0ba-d74485b5605b.pdf">MACMA 34/2022</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: M/S HDFC ERGO GENERAL INSURANCE CO. LTD. VS LINGAM SHETTY. K</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>16-03-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE SUDDALA CHALAPATHI RAO</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Insurance Law</strong></p><p>The High Court dismissed the appeals filed by the Insurance Company, affirming the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal&#8217;s awards and holding the insurer jointly and severally liable for compensation. The decisive ground was the appellant&#8217;s failure to adduce cogent and reliable evidence proving a breach of the policy condition regarding &#8220;Limitation as to Use,&#8221; specifically that the offending vehicle (Tavera bearing No. AP 22 AF 0629) was used for hire or reward. The Court rejected the insurer&#8217;s reliance on a unilateral, self-serving letter from the owner, noting the absence of the owner&#8217;s examination as a witness and the lack of independent proof or admission from claimants that they were fare-paying passengers. Furthermore, RWs.1 and 2 admitted that police records did not indicate the vehicle was on hire. Regarding quantum, the Court upheld the Tribunal&#8217;s assessment, rejecting the insurer&#8217;s contention that husbands of deceased wives were not dependents, citing *Malakappa vs The Iffco Tokio General Insurance Co. Ltd. &amp; Another* (2025 INSC 590) and *Kirti &amp; Another v. Oriental Insurance Company Limited* (2021) 2SCC 166, which recognized the value of homemakers&#8217; services. The Court applied principles from *National Insurance Company Ltd. vs. Pranay Sethi and others* (2017 ACJ 2700) for future prospects and conventional heads, and *Sarla Verma vs. Delhi Transport Corp.* (2009 (6) SCC 121) for the multiplier, declining to enhance compensation as claimants had not cross-appealed.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_07d88edb-183f-4b3d-afe5-a9b265a31c32.pdf">WA 308/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: MR. M THIRUMAL REDDY VS THE STATE OF TELANGANA</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>16-03-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE APARESH KUMAR SINGH,THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE G.M. MOHIUDDIN</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Civil Law</strong></p><p>The High Court dismissed the present writ appeal as withdrawn, following a request from the learned counsel for the appellants after arguing the matter for some time. The appeal arose from an interlocutory order dated 03.03.2026 in W.P.No.6606 of 2026, wherein the learned writ court had issued notice before admission, noting the appellants&#8217; contention that despite a subsisting interim injunction granted by the XV Additional District Judge, Ranga Reddy District at Ibrahimpatnam in I.A.No.405 of 2024 in O.S.No.239 of 2024 against respondent No.6, official respondents No.4 and 5 were unlawfully interfering in their inter se civil disputes. The writ court had deemed that the matter required detailed examination, with facts ascertainable only upon filing written instructions/counter by the official respondents, and had listed the matter for 31.03.2026. The High Court, therefore, did not delve into the merits of the interim injunction or the alleged interference, but merely recorded the appellants&#8217; decision to withdraw the appeal, thereby concluding the proceedings without any order as to costs.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_cf3d6594-6b2f-4482-a364-4efddca09890.pdf">WA 310/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: THE STATE OF TELANGANA VS K.BHANU PRAKASH</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>16-03-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE APARESH KUMAR SINGH,THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE G.M. MOHIUDDIN</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Service Law</strong></p><p>The High Court dismissed the State&#8217;s writ appeal, affirming the quashing of disciplinary proceedings against the respondent, K. Bhanu Prakash, a Sub Inspector of Police, primarily due to his acquittal in the connected criminal case (F.I.R. No. 900 of 2014). The decisive ground for the writ court&#8217;s initial decision, and its subsequent modification in review, was the appellants&#8217; failure to oppose the quashing of departmental proceedings based on the criminal acquittal, a stance consistent with the ratio in *Ram Lal v. State of Rajasthan* (2024) 1 SCC 175. The writ court had initially directed reinstatement with all consequential benefits and 50% back wages, but this was later modified in review to exclude back wages, as the respondent was already in service. The High Court found no reason for the appellants to be aggrieved by the review order, as it merely addressed the back wages issue, and the core order quashing the disciplinary proceedings remained unchallenged. The Court emphasized that the appellants had not contested the primary relief of quashing the disciplinary proceedings before either the writ court or the review court, thereby precluding them from raising this issue in appeal.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_1c78ff27-f346-4e75-811e-994149cea2d0.pdf">WA 311/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: ARGOU TECHNOLOGIES PRIVATE LIMITED VS DIVISIONAL RAILWAY MANAGER</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>16-03-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE APARESH KUMAR SINGH,THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE G.M. MOHIUDDIN</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Contract Law</strong></p><p>The High Court dismissed the writ appeal as withdrawn, granting the appellant liberty to pursue alternative remedies, thereby upholding the learned writ court&#8217;s decision to dismiss W.P.No.32541 of 2025. The decisive ground for the writ court&#8217;s dismissal, as noted in its operative portion, was the appellant&#8217;s failure to exhaust the alternative dispute resolution mechanism stipulated under Clause 22 of the Indian Railway Standard General Conditions of Contract, alongside findings of contractual violations, enquiry findings, and statutory obligations under the Railways Act, 1989 and the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. The writ court had explicitly rejected the plea of financial hardship, emphasizing that public safety and contractual discipline, particularly in railway administration, cannot be overridden. The termination order dated 16.10.2025, impugned in the writ petition, was based on alleged violation of Clause 18.1 of the &#8216;Standard Conditions of Contract&#8217;, with Clause 16 providing an appeal mechanism to the DRM or concerned PHOD/CHOD within 30 days. The High Court, after some arguments, acceded to the appellant&#8217;s counsel&#8217;s request to withdraw the appeal with the aforementioned liberty, finding no illegality, arbitrariness, or constitutional infirmity in the termination order.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_9dd83b39-dbe3-4d4e-b3e5-9f6e1a221ff0.pdf">WA 67/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: SRI KAILAS SRINIVAS VS THE STATE OF TELANGANA</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>16-03-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE APARESH KUMAR SINGH,THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE G.M. MOHIUDDIN</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Urban Planning Law</strong></p><p>The High Court dismissed the appeal, affirming that the appellants were required to execute a mortgage deed for 10% of the built-up area under Rule 10(4) of the Telangana State Building Permission Approval and Self-Certification System (TS-bPASS) Rules, 2020, issued via G.O.Ms.No.201 dated 16.11.2020, rather than merely submitting a notarised affidavit as per G.O.Ms.No.168 dated 07.04.2012 (Andhra Pradesh Building Rules, 2012). The Court&#8217;s reasoning hinged on Section 24 of the TS-bPASS Act, 2020, which explicitly states that its provisions shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent in any other State law, and specifically supersedes relevant provisions of the Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation Act and Hyderabad Metropolitan Development Authority Act concerning building permissions. Since the appellants&#8217; building application, made under the &#8220;Build Now&#8221; format, involved a plot size exceeding 200 square meters and a proposed height above 7 meters, it fell squarely within the ambit of the TS-bPASS Rules. The Court found that any inconsistency between G.O.Ms.No.168 and the TS-bPASS Rules meant the latter, being the later and superseding legislation, would prevail, thereby validating the respondents&#8217; insistence on a mortgage deed as per Rule 11 of the TS-bPASS Rules.</p><div><hr></div><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://askjunior.substack.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">Ask Junior - Judgment Summaries is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.</p></div><form class="subscription-widget-subscribe"><input type="email" class="email-input" name="email" placeholder="Type your email&#8230;" tabindex="-1"><input type="submit" class="button primary" value="Subscribe"><div class="fake-input-wrapper"><div class="fake-input"></div><div class="fake-button"></div></div></form></div></div>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Telangana High Court Weekly Digest (01.05.2026 - 07.05.2026)]]></title><description><![CDATA[Stay updated with the judgments from the Telangana High Court every week. We bring you concise summaries of judgments, helping you stay informed without wading through lengthy case reports]]></description><link>https://askjunior.substack.com/p/telangana-high-court-weekly-digest-926</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://askjunior.substack.com/p/telangana-high-court-weekly-digest-926</guid><pubDate>Sun, 10 May 2026 13:30:10 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/38cc5045-8b34-4bfc-bb74-a692dbcdf6c0_1200x630.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_04ba27c3-df3e-4d7e-ae25-7e7a275b7a53.pdf">WP 513/2020</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: KASHETTY ANJAIAH VS THE STATE OF TELANGANA</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>16-03-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE N.TUKARAMJI</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Property Law</strong></p><p>The Court, in disposing of a batch of writ appeals concerning land in Sikanderguda Village, Gandipet Mandal, Ranga Reddy District, upheld the learned Single Judge&#8217;s decision to direct the issuance of E-pattadar passbooks to the writ petitioners and to set aside interim orders suspending Occupancy Rights Certificates. The core reasoning was that while disputed questions of title cannot be adjudicated under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, which is reserved for judicial review of administrative decisions on grounds of perversity, patent illegality, irrationality, want of power, or procedural irregularity, the issuance of E-pattadar passbooks merely replaces old documents and does not confer or assert title, nor does it prejudice pending civil litigation, specifically O.S. No. 47 of 1965. The Court emphasized that a regular suit is the appropriate remedy for property disputes, and the High Court&#8217;s constitutional jurisdiction should not be exercised for matters where civil or criminal remedies are available. Consequently, the Court set aside other conclusions of the Single Judge that delved into title disputes, such as quashing CCLA proceedings, leaving it open for aggrieved parties to pursue remedies before competent authorities. The Tahsildar/Mandal Revenue Officer was directed to issue the E-pattadar passbooks within thirty days.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_525175f7-0fcf-43a5-96f9-a9464c5edad1.pdf">CMA 74/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: PIRAMAL FINANCE LIMITED VS MRS. AILI LAXMI</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>16-03-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE NAMAVARAPU RAJESHWAR RAO</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Civil Law</strong></p><p>The High Court, in Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 74 of 2026, permitted the appellant, Piramal Finance Limited, to withdraw the present appeal with liberty to pursue other available legal remedies. The learned counsel for the appellant, Ms. K. Malathi, had addressed a letter dated 12.03.2026 to the Registry requesting this withdrawal. The Court, exercising its discretion, accorded the requested permission, thereby dismissing the Civil Miscellaneous Appeal as withdrawn. This decision was based on the appellant&#8217;s explicit request to withdraw the matter, indicating a strategic choice to explore alternative legal avenues rather than pursuing the instant appeal to its conclusion. The Court&#8217;s order reflects a procedural allowance for parties to re-evaluate their litigation strategy and withdraw proceedings, provided such withdrawal does not prejudice the opposing party and is accompanied by a request for liberty to pursue other remedies. Consequently, the Court directed that there would be no order as to costs, and any pending miscellaneous applications would stand closed. This judgment underscores the Court&#8217;s prerogative to facilitate the efficient management of litigation by allowing withdrawals where appropriate, without delving into the merits of the original dispute.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_b9b5a994-41e1-45f8-a0ba-d74485b5605b.pdf">MACMA 34/2022</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: M/S HDFC ERGO GENERAL INSURANCE CO. LTD. VS LINGAM SHETTY. K</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>16-03-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE SUDDALA CHALAPATHI RAO</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Insurance Law</strong></p><p>The High Court dismissed the appeals filed by the Insurance Company, affirming the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal&#8217;s awards and holding the insurer jointly and severally liable for compensation. The decisive ground was the appellant&#8217;s failure to adduce cogent and reliable evidence proving a breach of the policy condition regarding &#8220;Limitation as to Use,&#8221; specifically that the offending vehicle (Tavera bearing No. AP 22 AF 0629) was used for hire or reward. The Court rejected the insurer&#8217;s reliance on a unilateral, self-serving letter from the owner, noting the absence of the owner&#8217;s examination as a witness and the lack of independent proof or admission from claimants that they were fare-paying passengers. Furthermore, RWs.1 and 2 admitted that police records did not indicate the vehicle was on hire. Regarding quantum, the Court upheld the Tribunal&#8217;s assessment, rejecting the insurer&#8217;s contention that husbands of deceased wives were not dependents, citing *Malakappa vs The Iffco Tokio General Insurance Co. Ltd. &amp; Another* (2025 INSC 590) and *Kirti &amp; Another v. Oriental Insurance Company Limited* (2021) 2SCC 166, which recognized the value of homemakers&#8217; services. The Court applied principles from *National Insurance Company Ltd. vs. Pranay Sethi and others* (2017 ACJ 2700) for future prospects and conventional heads, and *Sarla Verma vs. Delhi Transport Corp.* (2009 (6) SCC 121) for the multiplier, declining to enhance compensation as claimants had not cross-appealed.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_07d88edb-183f-4b3d-afe5-a9b265a31c32.pdf">WA 308/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: MR. M THIRUMAL REDDY VS THE STATE OF TELANGANA</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>16-03-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE APARESH KUMAR SINGH,THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE G.M. MOHIUDDIN</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Civil Law</strong></p><p>The High Court dismissed the present writ appeal as withdrawn, following a request from the learned counsel for the appellants after arguing the matter for some time. The appeal arose from an interlocutory order dated 03.03.2026 in W.P.No.6606 of 2026, wherein the learned writ court had issued notice before admission, noting the appellants&#8217; contention that despite a subsisting interim injunction granted by the XV Additional District Judge, Ranga Reddy District at Ibrahimpatnam in I.A.No.405 of 2024 in O.S.No.239 of 2024 against respondent No.6, official respondents No.4 and 5 were unlawfully interfering in their inter se civil disputes. The writ court had deemed that the matter required detailed examination, with facts ascertainable only upon filing written instructions/counter by the official respondents, and had listed the matter for 31.03.2026. The High Court, therefore, did not delve into the merits of the interim injunction or the alleged interference, but merely recorded the appellants&#8217; decision to withdraw the appeal, thereby concluding the proceedings without any order as to costs.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_cf3d6594-6b2f-4482-a364-4efddca09890.pdf">WA 310/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: THE STATE OF TELANGANA VS K.BHANU PRAKASH</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>16-03-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE APARESH KUMAR SINGH,THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE G.M. MOHIUDDIN</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Service Law</strong></p><p>The High Court dismissed the State&#8217;s writ appeal, affirming the quashing of disciplinary proceedings against the respondent, K. Bhanu Prakash, a Sub Inspector of Police, primarily due to his acquittal in the connected criminal case (F.I.R. No. 900 of 2014). The decisive ground for the writ court&#8217;s initial decision, and its subsequent modification in review, was the appellants&#8217; failure to oppose the quashing of departmental proceedings based on the criminal acquittal, a stance consistent with the ratio in *Ram Lal v. State of Rajasthan* (2024) 1 SCC 175. The writ court had initially directed reinstatement with all consequential benefits and 50% back wages, but this was later modified in review to exclude back wages, as the respondent was already in service. The High Court found no reason for the appellants to be aggrieved by the review order, as it merely addressed the back wages issue, and the core order quashing the disciplinary proceedings remained unchallenged. The Court emphasized that the appellants had not contested the primary relief of quashing the disciplinary proceedings before either the writ court or the review court, thereby precluding them from raising this issue in appeal.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_1c78ff27-f346-4e75-811e-994149cea2d0.pdf">WA 311/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: ARGOU TECHNOLOGIES PRIVATE LIMITED VS DIVISIONAL RAILWAY MANAGER</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>16-03-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE APARESH KUMAR SINGH,THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE G.M. MOHIUDDIN</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Contract Law</strong></p><p>The High Court dismissed the writ appeal as withdrawn, granting the appellant liberty to pursue alternative remedies, thereby upholding the learned writ court&#8217;s decision to dismiss W.P.No.32541 of 2025. The decisive ground for the writ court&#8217;s dismissal, as noted in its operative portion, was the appellant&#8217;s failure to exhaust the alternative dispute resolution mechanism stipulated under Clause 22 of the Indian Railway Standard General Conditions of Contract, alongside findings of contractual violations, enquiry findings, and statutory obligations under the Railways Act, 1989 and the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. The writ court had explicitly rejected the plea of financial hardship, emphasizing that public safety and contractual discipline, particularly in railway administration, cannot be overridden. The termination order dated 16.10.2025, impugned in the writ petition, was based on alleged violation of Clause 18.1 of the &#8216;Standard Conditions of Contract&#8217;, with Clause 16 providing an appeal mechanism to the DRM or concerned PHOD/CHOD within 30 days. The High Court, after some arguments, acceded to the appellant&#8217;s counsel&#8217;s request to withdraw the appeal with the aforementioned liberty, finding no illegality, arbitrariness, or constitutional infirmity in the termination order.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_9dd83b39-dbe3-4d4e-b3e5-9f6e1a221ff0.pdf">WA 67/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: SRI KAILAS SRINIVAS VS THE STATE OF TELANGANA</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>16-03-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE APARESH KUMAR SINGH,THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE G.M. MOHIUDDIN</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Urban Planning Law</strong></p><p>The High Court dismissed the appeal, affirming that the appellants were required to execute a mortgage deed for 10% of the built-up area under Rule 10(4) of the Telangana State Building Permission Approval and Self-Certification System (TS-bPASS) Rules, 2020, issued via G.O.Ms.No.201 dated 16.11.2020, rather than merely submitting a notarised affidavit as per G.O.Ms.No.168 dated 07.04.2012 (Andhra Pradesh Building Rules, 2012). The Court&#8217;s reasoning hinged on Section 24 of the TS-bPASS Act, 2020, which explicitly states that its provisions shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent in any other State law, and specifically supersedes relevant provisions of the Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation Act and Hyderabad Metropolitan Development Authority Act concerning building permissions. Since the appellants&#8217; building application, made under the &#8220;Build Now&#8221; format, involved a plot size exceeding 200 square meters and a proposed height above 7 meters, it fell squarely within the ambit of the TS-bPASS Rules. The Court found that any inconsistency between G.O.Ms.No.168 and the TS-bPASS Rules meant the latter, being the later and superseding legislation, would prevail, thereby validating the respondents&#8217; insistence on a mortgage deed as per Rule 11 of the TS-bPASS Rules.</p><div><hr></div><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://askjunior.substack.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">Ask Junior - Judgment Summaries is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.</p></div><form class="subscription-widget-subscribe"><input type="email" class="email-input" name="email" placeholder="Type your email&#8230;" tabindex="-1"><input type="submit" class="button primary" value="Subscribe"><div class="fake-input-wrapper"><div class="fake-input"></div><div class="fake-button"></div></div></form></div></div>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Telangana High Court Weekly Digest (24.04.2026 - 30.04.2026)]]></title><description><![CDATA[Stay updated with the judgments from the Telangana High Court every week. We bring you concise summaries of judgments, helping you stay informed without wading through lengthy case reports]]></description><link>https://askjunior.substack.com/p/telangana-high-court-weekly-digest-2d4</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://askjunior.substack.com/p/telangana-high-court-weekly-digest-2d4</guid><pubDate>Sun, 03 May 2026 13:31:11 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!cNgn!,w_256,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F81e99aa3-4d68-4812-8517-7d1feac569d1_1000x1000.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_49d69e12-36ba-4b37-a1e8-38efe2d39eab.pdf">MACMA 3053/2014</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: THE M.D., APSRTC., HYD AND ANO VS M. LINIL KUMAR, MEDAK DIST.</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>24-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE B.R.MADHUSUDHAN RAO</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Civil Law</strong></p><p>The High Court, exercising jurisdiction under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, enhanced the compensation awarded to the respondent-petitioner from Rs. 7,38,750/- to Rs. 20,75,800/- with 7.5% interest per annum, modifying the Tribunal&#8217;s award in O.P. No. 1306 of 2010. The Court rejected the appellant-respondents&#8217; contention of contributory negligence by the jeep driver, finding the APSRTC bus driver solely responsible based on Exs.A1 (FIR) and A3 (charge sheet) and the consistent evidence of PW1. The Court found the Tribunal erred in calculating the notional income and applying the multiplier, holding that a notional income of Rs. 6,000/- per month and a multiplier of &#8216;18&#8217; (instead of &#8216;15&#8217;) were appropriate, considering the victim&#8217;s minor age and severe neurological deficit with 75% permanent disability, as evidenced by PW2 and PW3. Relying on precedents such as Kajal vs. Jagdish Chand and Others [(2020) 4 SCC 413] and Pappu Deo Yadav Vs. Naresh Kumar and others [AIR 2020 SC 4424], which establish principles for assessing compensation for minors and future prospects, the Court also significantly increased attendant charges and damages for clothing, while upholding medical and transportation expenses. The enhanced amount is to be deposited jointly and severally, with the minor&#8217;s share placed in a fixed deposit.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_7ae6b398-95cf-46ef-a32b-fffac1793236.pdf">MACMA 1012/2016</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: M/S.IFFCO-TOKIO GENERAL INSURANCE CO LTD VS MD.HABEEB AND ANR</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>24-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE B.R.MADHUSUDHAN RAO</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Insurance Law</strong></p><p>The High Court dismissed the appeal filed under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, affirming the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Tribunal&#8217;s award of compensation. The appellant-insurer contended that the Tribunal failed to appreciate the absence of insurance coverage for the crime vehicle on the accident date (27.02.2007) and that the claimant had forged the policy period. The core issue revolved around conflicting policy documents: Ex.B1 (policy cover note) indicated coverage from 26.01.2007 to 25.01.2008, while Ex.B2 (policy copy) showed coverage from 26.01.2006 to 26.01.2007. The Tribunal, and subsequently the High Court, found that the appellant failed to discharge its burden of proving the invalidity of Ex.B1, particularly given RW2&#8217;s admission that Ex.B1 showed coverage for the relevant period and the appellant&#8217;s failure to produce the ledger extract of the cover note. The Court emphasized that Ex.B1, being an original cover note, could not be easily fabricated, unlike a computer-generated Ex.B2. Relying on the beneficial nature of the MV Act, the Court held that in the absence of conclusive evidence from the insurer to contradict Ex.B1, the policy was deemed to be in force at the time of the accident, rendering the insurer jointly and severally liable.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_a39e5a6e-93aa-42d3-8f12-fe5ed7e96c4a.pdf">WA 487/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: M/S. VISHNU CONSTRUCTIONS VS THE STATE OF TELANGANA</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>29-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE MOUSHUMI BHATTACHARYA,THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE GADI PRAVEEN KUMAR</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Administrative Law</strong></p><p>The High Court, in disposing of the Writ Appeal, modified the learned Single Judge&#8217;s order by imposing a specific timeline for the Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation (GHMC) to consider the appellant&#8217;s representations. The appellant, M/s. Vishnu Constructions, had challenged the GHMC&#8217;s action of preventing the erection of a Telecommunication Tower despite submitting detailed replies to a show cause notice. While the Single Judge had directed the GHMC to consider the replies and provide a hearing, the appellant was aggrieved by the absence of a fixed timeframe. The Division Bench, noting the appellant&#8217;s concern and the Standing Counsel for GHMC&#8217;s submission, directed the respondent authorities/GHMC to consider the appellant&#8217;s replies dated 12.09.2025 and 29.09.2025 and pass a reasoned order within three weeks from 30.04.2026. This decision ensures that the administrative process initiated by the show cause notice and subsequent replies is concluded expeditiously, thereby addressing the appellant&#8217;s grievance regarding procedural delay and ensuring a fair and time-bound resolution. The Court further mandated that the decision be communicated to the appellant within two days of being taken, reinforcing principles of transparency and administrative efficiency.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_817f557d-0228-4822-ab70-0e2b9d30d3c5.pdf">WA 470/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: FAHEEM HUSSAIN VS THE STATE OF TELANGANA</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>27-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE MOUSHUMI BHATTACHARYA,THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE GADI PRAVEEN KUMAR</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Property Law</strong></p><p>The High Court dismissed the Writ Appeal, affirming the Single Judge&#8217;s decision, on the ground that the appellant, Faheem Hussain, could not claim a right to install CCTV cameras on a property where title was disputed and where he was not in lawful possession. The Court noted that the appellant had installed cameras in 2021 for protection from encroachment, which were subsequently removed by the police in May 2025, but the Writ Petition for re-installation was filed only in January 2026, indicating a substantial delay. Crucially, the Court highlighted that a complaint alleging cheating, criminal breach of trust, forgery, and criminal conspiracy was pending against the appellant concerning fraudulent regularisation and registration of the property, and his own sister had filed a Suit (O.S.No.126 of 2023) for recovery and eviction against him. The Court found no error in the Single Judge&#8217;s conclusion that police investigation revealed the appellant was never in lawful possession and had misrepresented facts to obtain illegal regularisation, thus precluding any claim to install cameras until the property&#8217;s title is definitively determined.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_420bbe09-45a6-49c3-b385-62df6dd95cc9.pdf">WA 482/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: DR. PACHIPALA NAMRATHA @ ATHALURI NAMRATHA VS THE STATE OF TELANGANA</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>27-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE MOUSHUMI BHATTACHARYA,THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE GADI PRAVEEN KUMAR</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Civil Law</strong></p><p>The High Court dismissed the present Writ Appeal, finding no scope for interference with the learned Single Judge&#8217;s docket order dated 06.04.2026 in W.P. No. 10078 of 2026, which merely listed the matter for 15.06.2026. The appellant had sought early hearing through I.A. No. 2 of 2026, citing the seizure of a gold loan account by the respondent No. 5/Bank on instructions from the Sub-Inspector of Police, Economic Offence Wing. While acknowledging the appellant&#8217;s request for expedition due to the nature of the underlying dispute, the Court declined to overturn the Single Judge&#8217;s procedural order, as it did not constitute a final adjudication or an order causing prejudice that warranted immediate appellate intervention. However, in light of the appellant&#8217;s application for expedited hearing, the Division Bench requested the learned Single Judge to consider the matter as expeditiously as possible, subject to the Court&#8217;s convenience, thereby balancing judicial discretion with the urgency expressed by the litigant. The Court thus upheld the procedural autonomy of the Single Judge while providing a directive for prompt consideration.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_4750f364-50bf-457b-b14e-903ee07a4857.pdf">COMCA 35/2024</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: M/S. RAMKY ELSMEX VS M/S. HYDERABAD METROPOLITIAN DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY,</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>24-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE MOUSHUMI BHATTACHARYA,THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE GADI PRAVEEN KUMAR</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Arbitration Law</strong></p><p>The Court allowed the Commercial Court Appeal, setting aside the impugned order dated 05.08.2024 which had invalidated an arbitral award under Section 34 of The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (A&amp;C Act) on grounds of improper tribunal constitution. The decisive ground for the present Court&#8217;s decision was that the Commercial Court erroneously concluded that the consensual appointment of the presiding arbitrator by the two nominee arbitrators became incompetent merely due to the pendency of an application under Section 11(6) of the A&amp;C Act. The Court emphasized the principle of party autonomy, which forms the bedrock of the A&amp;C Act, noting that the parties&#8217; nominee arbitrators had reached a consensus on the presiding arbitrator&#8217;s appointment on 02.06.2017, a fact acknowledged by the Chief Justice who permitted withdrawal of the Section 11 application on 16.06.2017. The Court distinguished precedents like Datar Switchgears Limited v. Tata Finance Limited [(2000) 8 SCC 15] and Punj Llyod v. Petronet MHB Ltd. [(2006) 2 SCC 638], which concerned a party&#8217;s forfeiture of the right to appoint a sole arbitrator after 30 days, from the present case involving consensual appointment by nominee arbitrators. The Court held that the substratum of the Section 11(6) application collapsed once the nominee arbitrators agreed, and the respondents, having not objected to this consensual appointment at the relevant time, could not subsequently challenge it under Section 34(2)(a)(v) of the A&amp;C Act.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_b697c91e-9cb7-4f34-b3a5-b9eb80fc7434.pdf">WA 176/2024</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: THE STATE OF TELANGANA VS D. SESHAGIRI RAO</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>24-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE MOUSHUMI BHATTACHARYA,THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE GADI PRAVEEN KUMAR</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Urban Planning Law</strong></p><p>The High Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the Single Judge&#8217;s decision to quash proceedings under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (ULC Act), including orders under Sections 8(4), 9, 10(1), 10(3), 10(5), and 10(6). The Court held that the initiation of suo motu proceedings by the competent authority was without jurisdiction, as the ULC Act lacks an express statutory provision for such power, a principle affirmed by the Supreme Court in Roma Bose v/s. State of West Bengal (2008 SCC Online Cal 396, confirmed in SLA No.19765 of 2014). Crucially, the Court found a complete failure to adhere to natural justice principles, noting that notices under Section 10(5) were neither issued nor served to the declarants or the petitioners, who were in actual possession. Relying on State of UP v/s. Hari Ram (AIR 2013 SC 1793), the Court reiterated that compliance with Sections 10(5) and 10(6) is mandatory for lawful dispossession, and mere vesting under Section 10(3) does not confer de facto possession. Since actual physical possession was not taken in accordance with law prior to the Repeal Act, 1999, the entire proceedings abated under Section 3 of the Repeal Act, rendering the impugned actions, including the unilateral panchanama, void and non est.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_664608fb-3670-4db5-b003-84253a45bdd5.pdf">CMA 494/2025</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: RACHANA REDDY CYCUM VS ADALA DAMODHAR REDDY</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>24-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE MOUSHUMI BHATTACHARYA,THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE GADI PRAVEEN KUMAR</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Family Law</strong></p><p>The High Court set aside the Family Court&#8217;s order dated 08.09.2025, which granted an ad interim injunction under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 151 CPC, restraining the appellant-wife from approaching the respondent-husband, his home, or workplace during the pendency of F.C.O.P. No. 151 of 2024. The Court found the impugned order incomprehensible, unilateral, unreasonable, and unreasoned, noting it was entirely premised on the husband&#8217;s allegations without adequately considering the wife&#8217;s defence. Crucially, the Family Court erroneously concluded the wife suffered from &#8220;psychiatric&#8221; and &#8220;psychopathic&#8221; disorders based solely on alleged incidents, lacking any medical or expert evidence, a finding the High Court deemed a radical assumption with severe stigmatic repercussions. The Court emphasized that assessing mental condition requires medical records and expert evidence, citing Kollam Chandra Sekhar v. Kollam Padma Latha (2014) 1 SCC 225, which held that mental disorder must be proved by substantive evidence. The High Court further held that such a drastic restraint effectively amounted to a premature dissolution of marriage, overlooking the wife&#8217;s prayer for restitution of conjugal rights under Section 9 of the 1955 Act, and was an unprecedented curtailment of an individual&#8217;s free movement.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_50a4e2b6-2837-45c5-8352-a7e54660b361.pdf">SA 225/2023</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: Y. SUMITRA VS SMT. D.PARVATHI DEVI</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>27-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE SMT JUSTICE RENUKA YARA</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Tenancy Law</strong></p><p>The High Court dismissed the Second Appeal, affirming the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and First Appellate Court that the respondent was the rightful owner of the suit property and the appellant was her tenant, whose tenancy was validly terminated. The Court held that a Second Appeal under Section 100 of the CPC can only be maintained on a substantial question of law, not on questions of fact. The appellant&#8217;s contention that the registered sale deed (Ex. A-1) was merely security for a loan, and the rental agreement (Ex. A-2) was forged, was rejected as both lower courts found no evidence to support this defence, noting that Ex. A-1 demonstrated an absolute sale and delivery of possession. The Court relied on Union of India v. Ibrahim Uddin (2012) 8 SCC 148 and State Bank of India &amp; Ors. v. S.N. Goyal, AIR 2008 SC 2594, which clarified that &#8220;substantial question of law&#8221; refers to questions impacting the decision between parties, not merely those of general importance, and that findings of fact cannot be interfered with unless a substantial question of law is canvassed. The Court found the proposed questions of law were essentially questions of fact, already conclusively determined by the lower courts, including the valid termination of tenancy under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act via Ex. A-3.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_6281b7af-4d78-4e5e-942c-2a99f17939e6.pdf">MACMA 25/2019</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: B. SONI , SONAMMA VS M/S SAI VENKATESWARA ASSOCIATES</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>29-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE C.V. BHASKAR REDDY</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Civil Law</strong></p><p>The High Court dismissed the appellant&#8217;s appeal, upholding the Tribunal&#8217;s decision to deny compensation for motor vehicle accident injuries, finding that the appellant failed to establish the foundational fact of rash and negligent driving. The Court held that while the standard of proof in such cases is the &#8220;preponderance of probabilities&#8221; as established in Anitha Sharma and others vs. New India Assurance Company Limited and another (2021) 1 SCC 171 and Mathew Alexander vs. Mohammed Shafi and another (2023) 13 SCC 510, the appellant&#8217;s evidence fell short of even this lesser threshold. Crucially, the mere registration of an FIR (Ex.A1) was deemed insufficient without a charge sheet or independent eyewitness testimony. Furthermore, the appellant&#8217;s son&#8217;s admission that the driver handed the vehicle to an inexperienced friend contradicted the claim of professional negligence and indicated a breach of policy conditions. Consequently, the principles of &#8220;just compensation&#8221; from Adam Indur Muttemma and others vs. Rathod Reddia and others 2015 (4) ALD 585 (LB) and notional income guidelines from M. Seetharama vs. Manager, Future General India Insurance Co. Ltd. and others 2025 ACJ 1084 SC and Paramesharan and others vs. Sunny George and others 2025 Law Suit (SC) 1003 were inapplicable. The Court found no illegality in the Tribunal&#8217;s appreciation of the record, particularly noting the settlement at the FIR stage for Rs. 40,000/-.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_42a195bb-41a2-45b7-96ad-5043609505f0.pdf">MACMA 1045/2019</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: MOHAMMED KHAJA AND 4 OTHERS VS K.VENKATESHWARLU AND 2 OTHERS</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>29-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE C.V. BHASKAR REDDY</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Insurance Law</strong></p><p>The High Court enhanced the compensation awarded to the appellants/claimants from Rs. 3,40,500/- to Rs. 5,11,800/- with 7.5% interest, directing the insurer to pay and recover from the owner, overturning the Tribunal&#8217;s exoneration of the insurer. The Court found the Tribunal erred in fixing the deceased&#8217;s monthly income at Rs. 3,000/-, enhancing it to Rs. 3,300/-, and incorrectly deducting 1/3rd for personal expenses instead of 1/4th for five dependents. Crucially, the Court held that despite a breach of policy conditions (deceased being an unauthorized passenger in a goods vehicle), the insurer, Respondent No. 3, could not be absolved of liability to third parties. Relying on Kusum Lata &amp; Others v. Satbir &amp; Others (AIR 2011 SC 1234) and Rama Bai vs. M./s.Amit Minerals (2025 SCC Online SC 2067), the Court reiterated the &#8220;pay and recover&#8221; principle, affirming that third-party rights cannot be defeated by inter se breaches between the insured and insurer. Further, applying National Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Pranay Sethi ((2017) 16 SCC 680), conventional heads of compensation were revised. The Court also affirmed its power to award compensation exceeding the claimed amount, citing Laxman @ Laxman Mourya vs. Divisional Manager, Oriental Insurance Company Limited ((2011) 10 SCC 756) and Nagappa vs. Gurudayal Singh (2003 AC J 12 (SC)).</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_1c7f88b2-6799-42b6-99da-045c4150c4c7.pdf">MACMA 536/2019</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: AKKALA SARITHA RANI VS D. NAGA PRASAD</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>28-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE C.V. BHASKAR REDDY</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Civil Law</strong></p><p>The High Court partly allowed the appeal, enhancing the compensation awarded by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal from Rs. 15,63,620/- to Rs. 18,68,343/- with interest at 7.5% per annum. The Court found the Tribunal erred in calculating loss of dependency by taking only half of the deceased&#8217;s salary and applying an incorrect multiplier and deduction for personal expenses. The decisive ground for enhancement was the re-calculation of compensation in accordance with principles laid down in National Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Pranay Sethi ((2017) 16 SCC 680) and Sarla Verma vs. Delhi Transport Corporation ((2009) 6 SCC 121). The Court rejected the argument that compassionate employment of the first appellant justified reducing the deceased&#8217;s income for dependency calculation. Applying Pranay Sethi, the Court added 50% for future prospects, deducted 1/4th for personal expenses given four dependents, and applied a multiplier of &#8216;16&#8217; for the deceased&#8217;s age of 35 years, resulting in a revised loss of dependency. Conventional heads were also adjusted as per Pranay Sethi, including a 10% enhancement for every three years. The finding of negligence against the TATA Sumo driver remained undisputed.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_8dc55d2d-d3cc-4958-8c23-5445e13101a5.pdf">MACMA 900/2019</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: GORREMUCHU RAVI RATNA PRAKASH VS NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY LTD., AND ANOTHER</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>28-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE C.V. BHASKAR REDDY</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Insurance Law</strong></p><p>The High Court partly allowed the appeal, enhancing the compensation awarded by the Tribunal from Rs. 8,55,371/- to Rs. 9,55,371/- with interest at 7.5% per annum from the date of the claim petition. The Court found the Tribunal&#8217;s assessment of loss of earning capacity, attendant charges, medical expenditure, physiotherapy, and transportation charges to be just and reasonable, declining interference on these heads. However, the decisive ground for enhancement was the Tribunal&#8217;s omission to award any amount for pain and suffering, despite the appellant sustaining severe injuries, including 90% permanent disability, brain stem damage, and paralysis of all four limbs, rendering him unable to speak. Relying on the medical evidence of P.W.2 and various medical reports (Ex.A.2, Ex.A.13, Ex.A.14, Ex.A.15), the Court deemed it appropriate to award an additional Rs. 1,00,000/- towards pain and suffering, thereby increasing the total compensation. The respondents were directed to deposit the enhanced amount within two months, allowing the appellant to withdraw it without security.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_3065d87f-b625-4a2a-8db9-93927255a2a0.pdf">MACMA 540/2019</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: MD. WAHEED, VS THE CHAIRMAN AND MANAGING DIRECTOR,</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>28-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE C.V. BHASKAR REDDY</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Civil Law</strong></p><p>The High Court partly allowed the appellant&#8217;s appeal, enhancing the compensation awarded in a motor vehicle accident claim from Rs. 1,32,400/- to Rs. 2,25,500/-, with interest at 7.5% per annum. The Court upheld the Tribunal&#8217;s finding of negligence against the driver, based on Ex.A.1 (F.I.R), Ex.A.2 (scene of offence sketch), and Ex.A.3 (charge sheet and statements), noting no rebuttal evidence. The primary ground for enhancement was the inadequacy of the compensation for loss of earnings and non-pecuniary damages, given the appellant&#8217;s grievous injuries, including a closed fracture of both bones of the left forearm, necessitating surgery and resulting in a 40% permanent partial disability, as evidenced by Ex.A.4, Ex.A.5, Ex.A.6, and PW2&#8217;s testimony and Ex.A.7. The Court deemed the Tribunal&#8217;s notional monthly income of Rs. 4,000/- for 2016 excessively low, fixing it at Rs. 6,000/- and enhancing loss of earnings for a four-month recovery period to Rs. 24,000/-. Furthermore, compensation for pain and suffering was increased to Rs. 50,000/-, loss of amenities to Rs. 50,000/-, transportation to Rs. 15,000/-, and extra nourishment to Rs. 20,000/-, recognizing the significant impact on the 54-year-old professional driver&#8217;s quality of life and professional capacity, particularly his inability to lift weights or drive heavy vehicles.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_231f6b77-25ea-43dd-b086-1885aee4873c.pdf">MACMA 1834/2019</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: SMT.MALA PADMA VS M.LINGA REDDY</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>28-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE C.V. BHASKAR REDDY</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Civil Law</strong></p><p>The High Court partly allowed the appeal, enhancing the compensation awarded to the appellants/claimants from Rs. 10,12,100/- to Rs. 12,57,800/- with 7.5% interest per annum, finding the Tribunal&#8217;s assessment of the deceased&#8217;s monthly income to be meager. The Court held that while the Tribunal correctly found negligence on the part of the offending lorry driver based on Ex.A-1 (FIR) and Ex.A-2 (Charge Sheet), it erred in fixing the deceased&#8217;s notional income at Rs. 4,500/- per month. Despite the production of Ex.A-8 (Salary Certificate) and Ex.A-11 (Wages Register), the Tribunal had discarded the claimed income of Rs. 13,000/- due to the employer&#8217;s failure to produce ownership certificates or income tax returns. However, the High Court, considering the cost of living and prevailing wage rates for a skilled worker in 2011, re-assessed the monthly income at Rs. 6,000/-, adding 30% for future prospects given the deceased&#8217;s age of 42 years, and applying a multiplier of &#8216;14&#8217; after a 1/4th deduction for personal expenses for four dependents. The compensation under conventional heads was maintained. This decision underscores the principle that while documentary evidence of income requires corroboration, a realistic assessment of earning capacity must be made, especially when specific proof is deemed insufficient, to ensure just compensation.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_bc75d206-eb82-4ed0-bd40-997339de99e1.pdf">MACMA 448/2019</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: CHINA NAGAMANI VS M/S. JEEVAKA INDUSTRIES LTD</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>27-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE C.V. BHASKAR REDDY</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Civil Law</strong></p><p>The High Court of Telangana, in Chirla Nagamani v. M/s. Jeevaka Industries Ltd, enhanced the compensation awarded to the appellant from Rs. 30,000/- to Rs. 4,38,000/- with 7.5% interest per annum, finding the initial award for grievous injuries and related expenses grossly inadequate. The Court, while upholding the Tribunal&#8217;s finding on rash and negligent driving, critically re-evaluated the quantum of compensation. It determined that the appellant, having sustained an inter-traumatic fracture of the left hip and fractures of both superior and inferior pubic rami requiring surgical intervention, warranted a significantly higher amount for grievous injuries, enhancing it to Rs. 1,50,000/- (Rs. 50,000/- per injury). Furthermore, the Court awarded Rs. 20,000/- for extra nourishment and Rs. 10,000/- for transportation, which the Tribunal had overlooked despite the appellant being an agricultural laborer. Crucially, despite the Tribunal dismissing the disability claim on technicalities, the High Court, considering the testimony of P.W.2 and the nature of the fractures, applied a 30% disability to a notional monthly income of Rs. 4,500/- with a multiplier of 15, awarding Rs. 2,43,000/- for loss of future earnings/disability, thereby rectifying the Tribunal&#8217;s oversight regarding functional impact.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_8c85c955-d5db-40d9-bf5d-b070babeb63b.pdf">MACMA 586/2019</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: ALAKUNTA VIJAY LAXMI BOSE VS FAHEEM SYED</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>27-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE C.V. BHASKAR REDDY</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Civil Law</strong></p><p>The High Court partly allowed the appeal, enhancing the compensation awarded by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal from Rs. 12,94,000/- to Rs. 14,23,800/- with 7.5% interest per annum, finding the Tribunal&#8217;s assessment of the deceased&#8217;s monthly income and conventional heads to be inadequate. The Court, while acknowledging the absence of documentary evidence for the claimed Rs. 30,000/- monthly income, deemed it appropriate to fix the deceased&#8217;s notional monthly income at Rs. 7,000/-, considering the cost of living and prevailing wage rates. Applying the principle established in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi (2017) 16 SCC 680, the Court added 40% towards future prospects, re-calculating the monthly income to Rs. 9,800/-, leading to a re-assessed loss of dependency of Rs. 13,32,800/- after deducting 1/3rd for personal expenses and applying a multiplier of &#8216;17&#8217;. Furthermore, in line with Pranay Sethi, the Court enhanced the compensation under conventional heads to Rs. 91,000/-, thereby arriving at the total enhanced compensation. The Court upheld the Tribunal&#8217;s finding that the accident occurred due to the sole negligence of the auto driver, based on the FIR (Ex.A1) and Charge Sheet (Ex.A2).</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_209100fc-756f-4af0-bdea-7c2ca05b4ac3.pdf">MACMA 596/2019</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: LAKKARASU SANDEEP VERMA VS B.VITTAL AND ANOTHER</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>27-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE C.V. BHASKAR REDDY</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Insurance Law</strong></p><p>The High Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal&#8217;s rejection of the appellant&#8217;s compensation claim under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, for damages to his vehicle. The Court held that the appellant failed to discharge the burden of proving negligence on the part of the lorry driver, finding the claimant&#8217;s version of a head-on collision physically impossible given the admitted presence of a road divider at the accident site. The Tribunal&#8217;s reasoning, upheld by the High Court, meticulously analyzed the inconsistencies between the appellant&#8217;s oral evidence (PW-1, PW-2) and documentary evidence (Exs.A-1 to A-4) versus the physical facts, noting the Scene of Offence Panchanama (Ex.A-3) was silent on the lorry&#8217;s presence or damage, and photographs (Ex.A-8) showed damage inconsistent with a head-on impact. The Court inferred that the crime vehicle was likely planted in collusion to secure an insurance payout, further noting the absence of an MVI report for the lorry and the appellant&#8217;s own car insurance details. Consequently, the Court concluded that the probable cause of the accident was the rash driving of the Indica car driver hitting the divider, finding no reason to interfere with the Tribunal&#8217;s well-reasoned findings.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_98ad30ec-2634-41a7-92bd-7a6cc60a7279.pdf">MACMA 3391/2019</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: JOGU RAMASWAMY VS MITTA SHEKAR</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>24-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE C.V. BHASKAR REDDY</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Civil Law</strong></p><p>The High Court partly allowed the appeal, enhancing the compensation awarded by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal from Rs. 13,40,000/- to Rs. 14,90,800/- for the death of Jogu Sunil in a motor vehicle accident. The Court found the Tribunal erred in fixing a meager notional income, despite the absence of documentary proof, and re-assessed the deceased&#8217;s monthly income at Rs. 9,000/-, considering the cost of living. Applying the principle established in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi (2017) 16 SCC 680, which mandates the addition of 40% towards future prospects for a self-employed individual, the Court calculated the monthly income as Rs. 12,600/-. Deducting 50% for personal expenses, as the deceased was a bachelor, the loss of dependency was re-determined at Rs. 13,60,800/-. The Court upheld the conventional heads of compensation awarded by the Tribunal. The enhanced compensation will carry interest at 7.5% per annum from the date of petition till realization, with other terms and conditions of the Tribunal&#8217;s award remaining unaltered.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_82335df6-1af6-4f9d-ae5f-c6c1b237d6dd.pdf">MACMA 3304/2019</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: M/S UNITED. INDIA INSURANCE COMPANY LTD. VS SRI A.MALLAIAH , MALLESH AND ANOTHER</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>24-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE C.V. BHASKAR REDDY</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Insurance Law</strong></p><p>The High Court partly allowed the appeal by the Insurance Company, reducing the compensation awarded to the claimant from Rs. 8,26,980/- to Rs. 6,95,000/- and the interest rate from 9% to 7.5% per annum. The Court found that the Tribunal erred in assessing the claimant&#8217;s monthly income at Rs. 9,000/- without documentary evidence, consequently fixing a notional income of Rs. 6,000/- given the avocation and the 2013 accident year, thereby reducing loss of earnings during treatment and recalculating compensation for permanent disability. While confirming other heads of compensation, the Court reduced the interest rate, relying on the principle established in National Insurance Company Ltd. vs. Mannat Johal and others (AIR 2019 SC 2079) and subsequent decisions, which mandates an appropriate interest rate of 7.5% per annum. The findings regarding negligence and the Insurance Company&#8217;s liability remained undisturbed, as they were based on proper appreciation of evidence.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_ac2cf0e9-b451-4fca-872c-8f7a4e8947f9.pdf">MACMA 67/2021</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: MANDLA VENKATESH VS THE REGIONAL MANAGER</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>24-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE C.V. BHASKAR REDDY</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Civil Law</strong></p><p>The High Court, in partially allowing both appeals, enhanced the compensation awarded to the claimant from Rs. 24,13,804/- to Rs. 26,54,000/- while simultaneously reducing the interest rate from 9% to 7.5% per annum. The Court affirmed the Tribunal&#8217;s finding on the accident&#8217;s causation due to the RTC bus driver&#8217;s rash and negligent driving, noting it was based on cogent evidence including the FIR and charge sheet, and remained undisputed. The core reasoning for enhancement stemmed from the Tribunal&#8217;s failure to award adequate compensation under non-pecuniary heads, despite the claimant suffering grievous injuries, including above-knee amputation and 80% permanent disability, which severely impacted his earning capacity and daily life. The Court found the compensation for loss of future earnings and medical expenses to be just, but awarded additional amounts for pain and suffering (Rs. 1,00,000/-), injuries (Rs. 1,00,000/-), extra nourishment (Rs. 20,000/-), and transportation (Rs. 20,000/-). The reduction in interest rate was predicated on the principle established in National Insurance Company Ltd. vs. Mannat Johal and others (AIR 2019 SC 2079), which held 7.5% per annum to be the appropriate rate. The respondents were directed to deposit the enhanced compensation with the revised interest within two months.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_9fa623be-2ecd-4e30-b742-293c82b3a0e9.pdf">MACMA 2614/2013</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: M/S.SIRAMGEN. IND.CO.LTD.,HYD VS ERJALA KOMARAMMA, RR DIST AND 3 OTHRS</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>24-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE GADI PRAVEEN KUMAR</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Insurance Law</strong></p><p>The High Court disposed of M.A.C.M.A. No. 2614 of 2013, noting that the matter had been referred to the Lok Adalat constituted by the High Court Legal Services Committee, Hyderabad, for settlement. The decisive ground for the Court&#8217;s decision was the award passed by the Lok Adalat on 28.03.2026, which reflected the terms agreed upon by the parties. The Court, therefore, found it appropriate to dispose of the appeal in terms of this Lok Adalat award, thereby giving effect to the consensual resolution reached between M/s. Sriram General Insurance Co. Ltd. and Erjala Komaramma and others. This approach aligns with the principle of promoting alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, as embodied by the Lok Adalat system, which aims to provide expeditious and amicable settlement of disputes. The Court&#8217;s action underscores the finality and binding nature of awards passed by Lok Adalats once parties have mutually agreed to the terms, effectively concluding the litigation without further judicial intervention on the merits of the original appeal. Consequently, all pending miscellaneous petitions were ordered to be closed.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_3ca61b86-1a19-4856-a134-bd396cd2abc3.pdf">MACMA 2283/2014</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: BAJAJ ALLIANZ GENERAL INSURANCE CO., LTD., VS ANNARAM VENKAT REDDY AND ANOTHERS</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>24-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE GADI PRAVEEN KUMAR</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Insurance Law</strong></p><p>The High Court, in M.A.C.M.A. No. 2283 of 2014, disposed of the appeal filed by Bajaj Allianz General Insurance Company Limited against Annaram Venkat Reddy and Another, based on a settlement reached between the parties. The decisive ground for this disposition was the award passed by the Lok Adalat constituted by the High Court Legal Services Committee, Hyderabad, on 28.03.2026. The Court noted that learned counsel for both parties reported that the matter had been referred to the Lok Adalat for settlement, and after due deliberations, an award was passed as per the terms agreed upon by the parties. Consequently, the appeal was disposed of in terms of this Lok Adalat award, reflecting the principle of alternative dispute resolution and the binding nature of settlements reached through such mechanisms. The Court&#8217;s action underscores the judiciary&#8217;s recognition and enforcement of agreements facilitated by Lok Adalats, which serve to expedite justice and reduce litigation. No costs were awarded, and any pending miscellaneous petitions were closed as a sequel to this judgment, further streamlining the resolution process. The judgment implicitly relies on the statutory framework governing Lok Adalats, which empowers them to pass awards that are deemed to be decrees of a civil court.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_11886d1b-8721-405e-8d98-369a35255a85.pdf">MACMA 3678/2014</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: GONDHI GANGABAYAMMA AND 4 ORS VS GURRAM PRABHAKAR RAO AND ANR</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>24-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE GADI PRAVEEN KUMAR</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Civil Law</strong></p><p>The High Court, in M.A.C.M.A. No. 3678 of 2014, disposed of the appeal in terms of an award passed by the Lok Adalat constituted by the High Court Legal Services Committee, Hyderabad, on 21.12.2025. The decisive ground for this disposition was the report by the learned counsel for both parties confirming that the matter had been referred to the Lok Adalat for settlement, and an award was subsequently passed based on the mutually agreed terms. The Court, therefore, found it appropriate to give effect to the settlement reached between the parties through the alternative dispute resolution mechanism. This approach aligns with the principle of promoting amicable settlements and reducing the burden on the conventional judicial system, a principle often underscored in various pronouncements encouraging Lok Adalat proceedings. Consequently, the appeal was disposed of without costs, and any pending miscellaneous petitions were ordered to be closed, reflecting the finality achieved through the Lok Adalat award. The Court directed that a copy of the Lok Adalat award dated 21.12.2025 be appended to the judgment, ensuring clarity and completeness of the record.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_53c4f0bc-4372-482b-8239-38c492e34dbc.pdf">MACMA 3697/2014</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: BAJAJ ALLIANZ GENERAL INSURANCE CO LTD VS AHMADI BEGUM AND 6 OTHERS</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>24-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE GADI PRAVEEN KUMAR</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Insurance Law</strong></p><p>The High Court disposed of M.A.C.M.A. No. 3697 of 2014, filed by Bajaj Allianz General Insurance Company Limited against Ahmadi Begum and others, in terms of an award passed by the Lok Adalat constituted by the High Court Legal Services Committee, Hyderabad, on 28.03.2026. The decisive ground for this disposition was the report by the learned counsel for both parties confirming that the matter had been referred to the Lok Adalat for settlement, and that an award had been passed on the aforementioned date based on the terms mutually agreed upon by the parties. The Court, therefore, found it appropriate to give effect to this settlement, thereby concluding the appeal without further adjudication on the merits of the original dispute. This approach aligns with the principle of promoting alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, where parties voluntarily reach an amicable settlement, which is then given judicial imprimatur. Consequently, all pending miscellaneous petitions were also closed. The judgment implicitly relies on the statutory framework governing Lok Adalats, which empowers them to facilitate settlements and issue awards that are binding on the parties, effectively resolving the dispute.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_a41c8825-1e1a-496b-98ce-78f6764005a3.pdf">FCA 82/2016</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: M NIRUPAMA, HYDERABAD VS MAGANTI JANARDHANA, HYDERABAD</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>29-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE K.LAKSHMAN,THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE B.R.MADHUSUDHAN RAO</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Family Law</strong></p><p>The High Court, exercising jurisdiction under Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, 1984, allowed the appellant-wife&#8217;s appeal, setting aside the Family Court&#8217;s divorce decree granted under Section 13(1)(ia) &amp; (ib) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. The Court found that the respondent-husband failed to establish cruelty or desertion with cogent evidence. Crucially, the respondent&#8217;s own admissions in cross-examination, particularly regarding the completion of his Ph.D. in 2010 and continued communication with the appellant until then (evidenced by Exs.R1, R2, R3, R4), contradicted his claim of continuous desertion for the statutory two-year period immediately preceding the filing of the petition in July 2011. The Court relied on principles from Savitri Pandey v. Prem Chandra Pandey and Adhyatma Bhattar Alwar v. Adhyatma Bhattar Sri Devi, which define desertion as requiring actual physical separation with a specific intention to permanently end cohabitation, without the other spouse&#8217;s consent or valid justification, persisting for the statutory period. The Court also noted that the evidence of the husband&#8217;s witnesses largely pertained to mediations prior to 2003, failing to substantiate claims of cruelty or desertion during the critical period. The Family Court&#8217;s findings were deemed perverse for misreading the evidence and admissions.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_ecda8bc5-f7ff-4776-8c3d-e9b46e285c53.pdf">CRLA 2578/2018</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: MANGILAL VS THE STATE OF TELANGANA</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>29-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE K.LAKSHMAN,THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE B.R.MADHUSUDHAN RAO</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Criminal Law</strong></p><p>The High Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the conviction and life imprisonment of the appellant under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, finding that the prosecution failed to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Court held that the trial court erred in convicting the appellant based solely on circumstantial evidence, as the chain of circumstances was incomplete and did not exclude every possible hypothesis except the appellant&#8217;s guilt. The prosecution relied on three circumstances: the appellant residing with the deceased and PW1, the appellant&#8217;s false report to PW9 about an attack, and his subsequent tension. However, the Court noted discrepancies in exhibited material objects, particularly the colour of a pant, and the failure to send a knife (MO6) for FSL analysis or prove the blood on MO4 belonged to the accused. Crucially, no fingerprints were collected, creating a break in the chain of evidence. Relying on the principles established in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda Vs. State of Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116 and Padman Bibhar Vs. State of Odisha 2025 INSC 751, which mandate that circumstantial evidence must form a complete and conclusive chain consistent only with the accused&#8217;s guilt, the Court reiterated that if two views are possible, the one beneficial to the accused must be adopted. The Court also cited Surjit Biswas Vs. State of Assam AIR 2013 SC 3817, emphasizing that however grave the offence, guilt must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. Consequently, the appellant was acquitted, and his immediate release was directed.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_009b7c51-db11-4bb3-ba34-e2b4c47c71e0.pdf">AS 263/2023</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: SMT GULIAPALLY KAVITHA VS SRI SUNKARI NARSINGA RAO</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>28-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE K.LAKSHMAN,THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE B.R.MADHUSUDHAN RAO</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Civil Law</strong></p><p>The High Court of Telangana dismissed Appeal Suit No. 263 of 2023 as withdrawn, following a request from the appellant&#8217;s counsel, Mr. K. Buchi Babu, who informed the Court that the matter had been settled between the parties outside of court. The counsel had formally communicated this development to the Registrar (Judicial) via a letter dated 15.04.2026, which was duly placed on record. The Court, comprising Hon&#8217;ble Sri Justice K. Lakshman and Hon&#8217;ble Sri Justice B.R. Madhusudhan Rao, accorded permission for the withdrawal, thereby concluding the appeal without delving into its merits. This decision reflects the principle of judicial economy, where courts encourage and acknowledge out-of-court settlements, thereby reducing litigation burden and promoting amicable resolution of disputes. The Court, in its discretion, made no order as to costs, a common practice when matters are settled mutually and withdrawn, indicating that each party would bear their own expenses. The judgment, delivered on 28.04.2026, effectively closed the proceedings initiated by Gullapally Kavitha against Sunkari Narsinga Rao, based on the parties&#8217; mutual agreement.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_97c921ac-06e4-465c-80c1-25b71c5a4471.pdf">WA 1453/2025</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: DR. ULLAHAS JAGADISH VS UNION OF INDIA</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>28-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE K.LAKSHMAN,THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE B.R.MADHUSUDHAN RAO</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Education Law</strong></p><p>The High Court, in allowing the appeal, held that Respondent No. 8 &#8211; College had no authority to withhold the appellants&#8217; original certificates despite their failure to fulfill an undertaking to serve the Government of Telangana, thereby setting aside the learned Single Judge&#8217;s order. The Court reasoned that while the College could pursue recovery of the stipulated Rs. 50,00,000/- for breach of the undertaking given under G.O.Ms.No.165 of 2017, dated 06.09.2017, by filing a suit, it possessed no lien over the academic documents. This conclusion was decisively grounded in prior rulings, including the Division Bench&#8217;s striking down of paragraph No.7(iii) of G.O.Ms.No.114, dated 05.07.2017, which prohibited the return of original certificates until course completion, as unconstitutional. The Court relied on precedents such as Malraju Suhitha v. The State of Telangana and Ms.Bhashapaka Pragna Vardhini v. The State of Telangana, which established that educational institutions cannot retain original certificates as leverage for contractual obligations. The Court further noted the fair concession by the learned Assistant Government Pleader and Standing Counsel that the College lacked such power. Consequently, Respondent No. 8 &#8211; College was directed to return all specified original certificates to the appellants within one week.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_9aa375dd-cfd8-43f4-a3f6-482565808e95.pdf">WA 1483/2025</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: DR. SANTOSH KUMAR GANDUPALLI VS UNION OF INDIA</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>28-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE K.LAKSHMAN,THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE B.R.MADHUSUDHAN RAO</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Education Law</strong></p><p>The High Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the Single Judge&#8217;s order and directing the respondent-College to return the appellants&#8217; original certificates, holding that the College had no authority or lien to withhold them despite the appellants&#8217; failure to fulfil an undertaking to serve in government hospitals. The Court reasoned that while the undertaking stipulated a payment of Rs. 50,00,000/- for non-compliance, the College&#8217;s recourse was to file a suit for recovery of money, not to retain academic documents. This decision was grounded in the principle that educational institutions cannot withhold original certificates, a position consistently upheld by the Court. The Division Bench specifically relied on its prior ruling in W.P.No. 21137 of 2019, which struck down paragraph No.7(iii) of G.O.Ms.No.114, dated 05.07.2017, as unconstitutional, thereby establishing that original certificates cannot be retained. Further reliance was placed on Malraju Suhitha v. The State of Telangana, Rep. by its Principal Secretary, Higher Education Department and Ms.Bhashapaka Pragna Vardhini v. The State of Telangana, Rep. by its Principal Secretary, Higher Education Department, which affirmed this principle. The Court also noted the fair submissions by the learned Assistant Government Pleader and Standing Counsel acknowledging the College&#8217;s lack of power to withhold certificates.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_c0c20536-f6ac-4034-adb0-a5451c32e569.pdf">WA 1422/2025</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: DR. GOTETI RAVINDRANATH VS UNION OF INDIA</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>28-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE K.LAKSHMAN,THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE B.R.MADHUSUDHAN RAO</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Education Law</strong></p><p>The High Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the Single Judge&#8217;s order and directing Respondent No. 8 &#8211; College to return the appellant&#8217;s original certificates, including Permanent Medical Registration, MBBS, and PG Degree Certificates, within one week. The Court held that the college had no authority or lien to withhold the original certificates, even in the face of an undertaking by the appellant to serve the Government of Telangana for two years or pay Rs. 50,00,000/- upon failure. The decisive ground was that while the college could pursue a civil suit for recovery of the stipulated amount for breach of the undertaking, it could not retain the academic documents. This principle was firmly established by prior judgments of the Court, including Malraju Suhitha v. The State of Telangana and Ms. Bhashapaka Pragna Vardhini v. The State of Telangana, which consistently held that educational institutions have no lien over original certificates. Furthermore, the Court noted that a Division Bench in W.P.No.21137 of 2019 had already struck down paragraph No.7(iii) of G.O.Ms.No.114, dated 05.07.2017, which permitted withholding of original certificates, as unconstitutional, a view reiterated in Mahatma Gandhi Law College, NTR Nagar, Hyderabad v. State of Telangana and Sai Lakshmi Saranya v. The State of Telangana.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_5ead153f-a032-43db-9f4a-db774eeab12b.pdf">FCA 115/2025</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: AKULA SAMPATH KUMAR VS SMT. U.AKHILA</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>24-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE K.LAKSHMAN,THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE B.R.MADHUSUDHAN RAO</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Family Law</strong></p><p>The High Court, in disposing of appeals against an order dismissing a nullity petition under Section 12(1)(c) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, and allowing a counterclaim for restitution of conjugal rights, recorded a settlement between the appellant-husband and respondent-wife. The parties, during the pendency of the appeal, mutually agreed to dissolve their marriage and obtain a decree of divorce, formalizing this understanding in a Memorandum of Understanding dated 08.03.2026. Crucially, the appellant agreed to pay Rs.10.00 lakhs as permanent alimony to the respondent. Following identification before the Secretary, High Court Legal Services Committee, and confirmation in open Court, the agreed sum of Rs.10.00 lakhs was paid to the respondent via demand drafts, which she acknowledged receiving. Consequently, I.A.No.2 of 2026, filed to record the Memorandum of Understanding, was allowed, and both appeals were disposed of in terms of the said Memorandum, thereby giving effect to the consensual dissolution of marriage and settlement of alimony.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_dc23d7d9-29b2-4e07-847b-e2c99746fc28.pdf">MACMA 657/2022</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: SHRIRAM GENERAL INSURANCE CO. LTD VS DODLA BHULAXMI</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>24-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE NARSING RAO NANDIKONDA</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Insurance Law</strong></p><p>The High Court, in M.A.C.M.A. No.657 of 2022, disposed of the appeal filed by Shriram General Insurance Co. Ltd. against Dodla Bhulaxmi and others, noting that the matter had been referred to Lok Adalat at the appellant&#8217;s request. The decisive ground for the Court&#8217;s decision was the settlement reached before the Lok Adalat on 28.03.2026, which culminated in an Award being passed by the Lok Adalat. Consequently, the appeal was disposed of in terms of the said Lok Adalat Award. The Court directed the Registry to annex a copy of the Lok Adalat order along with the judgment, clarifying that there would be no order as to costs. All pending miscellaneous petitions were also directed to stand closed. This judgment underscores the principle of judicial deference to alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, particularly settlements arrived at through Lok Adalats, which are statutorily recognized for their role in facilitating amicable resolution of disputes, thereby reducing the burden on conventional courts and providing expeditious justice. The Court&#8217;s action reflects the finality and binding nature of Lok Adalat awards, treating them as conclusive for the purpose of disposing of the appeal.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_9323bec2-aa51-4250-bf33-1d35a78e8c99.pdf">MACMA 764/2022</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: BURUGULA YADAIAH VS MR. MOHEMAD IRFAN</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>24-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE NARSING RAO NANDIKONDA</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Civil Law</strong></p><p>The High Court disposed of the present appeal, M.A.C.M.A. No.764 of 2022, in terms of the Award passed by the Lok Adalat on 28.03.2026, following a request made by the appellant for the matter to be referred to the Lok Adalat. The Court noted that the matter had been settled before the Lok Adalat, and an Award was duly passed, thereby rendering further adjudication by the High Court unnecessary. This disposition underscores the principle of alternative dispute resolution, particularly the efficacy of Lok Adalats in providing expeditious and amicable settlements, thereby reducing the burden on conventional courts. The Court&#8217;s decision implicitly relies on the statutory framework governing Lok Adalats, which grants their awards the status of a civil court decree, ensuring finality and enforceability. The judgment directed the Registry to annex the Lok Adalat order copy along with the judgment, and clarified that there would be no order as to costs, with any pending miscellaneous petitions consequently standing closed. This approach aligns with the judicial policy of encouraging out-of-court settlements and upholding the sanctity of awards passed by statutory dispute resolution mechanisms.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_a37cb82b-efd4-4d7a-8c98-af8bb51a0f9c.pdf">LPA 5/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: SRI K. RAMA KRISHNA RAO, IAS VS SMT B ANNAPURNA</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>27-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE P.SAM KOSHY,THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE NARSING RAO NANDIKONDA</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Administrative Law</strong></p><p>The High Court, in L.P.A. No. 5 of 2026, set aside the contempt court&#8217;s order dated 24.04.2026 issuing Non-Bailable Warrants (NBWs) against the appellant, Mr. K. Rama Krishna Rao, IAS, in C.C. No. 2761 of 2023. The decisive ground for this decision was the appellant&#8217;s repeated attempts to seek dispensation from appearance, citing his engagement in a Cabinet Sub-Committee meeting as the Chief Secretary, which the single judge found offensive, leading to the NBW issuance. The Court acknowledged the appellant&#8217;s contention that the underlying order in WP. No. 3454 of 2018 (decided on 30.01.2023) had been complied with and that he was no longer the Finance Secretary, the capacity in which he was made a contemnor. However, the appellate bench confined its review to the propriety of the NBW issuance, suspending its operation. The Court directed that the impugned order would stand set aside subject to the appellant appearing before the concerned contempt bench on 29.04.2026, granting him liberty to raise all his defenses regarding compliance and his current official capacity before that court. This approach ensures judicial comity while addressing the immediate grievance concerning the NBWs.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_fad652b5-a696-45bf-acac-ac755507087b.pdf">WA 465/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: MADHAVARAM RAMESHWARA RAO VS THE STATION HOUSE OFFICER</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>24-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE APARESH KUMAR SINGH,THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE G.M. MOHIUDDIN</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Criminal Law</strong></p><p>The High Court dismissed the appeal, holding that an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent is not maintainable when the subject matter and relief sought fall within the domain of criminal jurisdiction. The appellant had challenged the judgment of the learned writ court, which had disposed of W.P. No. 1622 of 2007, declining to interfere with the alleged inaction of respondents concerning complaints and seeking an enquiry into a death, with directions to punish erring police officials and award compensation. The writ court had advised the appellant to pursue remedies before the jurisdictional Magistrate if aggrieved by the final report. The High Court, therefore, found it unnecessary to delve into the merits of the case, reiterating that the appeal was fundamentally flawed on grounds of maintainability. This decision aligns with the principle that specific statutory provisions govern appeals in criminal matters, precluding the general Letters Patent appeal route for such issues. The Court directed the appellant to avail permissible remedies before the appropriate forum in accordance with law.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_c967d827-b540-4939-a54c-7567251df261.pdf">WA 474/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: TALASANI SRAVAN REDDY VS THE UNION OF INDIA</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>24-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE APARESH KUMAR SINGH,THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE G.M. MOHIUDDIN</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Land Acquisition Law</strong></p><p>The High Court declined to interfere with an interim order dated 09.04.2026, which vacated an earlier interim direction preventing the utilization of the appellant&#8217;s land for the Kalwakurthy bypass road under the National Highways Act, 1956. The appellant challenged the vacation of the interim order, arguing that his objections to the Section 3A notification were not addressed before the Section 3D notification was issued, and that the impugned order was passed in his absence. The Court noted the respondents&#8217; contention that objections were dealt with and that a Section 3D notification, once issued, cannot be questioned in any court, relying on the Supreme Court&#8217;s decision in Union of India v. Kushala Shetty (2011) 12 SCC 69, which establishes the finality of such notifications. While refraining from commenting on the merits of the pending writ petition, the Court, acknowledging the appellant&#8217;s absence when the interim order was vacated, directed that the appellant may seek modification or recall of the impugned order or an early hearing of the writ petition before the learned writ court by 27.04.2026, maintaining status quo until 29.04.2026.</p><div><hr></div><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://askjunior.substack.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">Ask Junior - Judgment Summaries is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.</p></div><form class="subscription-widget-subscribe"><input type="email" class="email-input" name="email" placeholder="Type your email&#8230;" tabindex="-1"><input type="submit" class="button primary" value="Subscribe"><div class="fake-input-wrapper"><div class="fake-input"></div><div class="fake-button"></div></div></form></div></div>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Telangana High Court Weekly Digest (17.04.2026 - 23.04.2026)]]></title><description><![CDATA[Stay updated with the judgments from the Telangana High Court every week. We bring you concise summaries of judgments, helping you stay informed without wading through lengthy case reports]]></description><link>https://askjunior.substack.com/p/telangana-high-court-weekly-digest-f2e</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://askjunior.substack.com/p/telangana-high-court-weekly-digest-f2e</guid><pubDate>Sun, 26 Apr 2026 13:31:39 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/2d71f1b9-8908-4a53-bd28-5ed6ace0b91b_1200x630.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_17030cb2-3980-4f31-b27a-858fbc1ac0c7.pdf">AS 465/2023</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: RENUGUNTLA RAGHAVHYYHENDER VS SMT.RENUGUNTLA PADMA ALIAS SPANDANA</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>21-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE B.R.MADHUSUDHAN RAO</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Family Law</strong></p><p>The High Court allowed the appeal under Section 96 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, setting aside the trial court&#8217;s preliminary decree for partition, holding that the plaintiffs failed to prove the suit properties were joint family properties. The Court found that the property, purchased via Ex.A1 Sale Deed dated 06.01.1981, stood in the name of the deceased defendant No.1, who was the absolute owner. Relying on Bipani Paul v. Pratima Gosh and Others (2007) 6 SCC 100, the Court reiterated that the burden of proving a transaction is benami rests squarely on the person alleging it, requiring definite legal evidence, not mere suspicion, and that the intention of the parties is paramount, with the registered owner enjoying a presumption of truth. Further, applying Gangamma and Others v. G.Nagarathnamma and Others (2009) 15 SCC 756, which held that Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, makes the registered owner the full owner in the absence of contrary evidence, the Court concluded that the property was the self-acquired property of defendant No.1. The Court also noted that a pending reference to a larger bench, as in Tej Bhan (D) through LR. &amp; Ors. Vs. Ram Kishan (D) through LRs &amp; Ors. 2024 INSC 945, does not negate the binding nature of existing Supreme Court precedents, as per Union Territory of Ladakh &amp; Ors., Vs. Jammu And Kashmir National Conference &amp; Anr. 2023 LawSuit (SC) 890. The Court dismissed the plaintiffs&#8217; suit, finding no perversity in the trial court&#8217;s judgment regarding the alleged Gift Settlement Deeds by defendant No.1 to defendant No.4 due to lack of specific pleading.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_94f095d0-040d-4804-91a0-8f033c4b8960.pdf">MACMA 1099/2016</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: UNITED INDIA INSURANCE CO., LTD., VS CH. GOPI , GOPALAM , GOPAL RAO AND ANOTHER</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>21-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE B.R.MADHUSUDHAN RAO</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Insurance Law</strong></p><p>The High Court for the State of Telangana at Hyderabad, in MACMA.No.1099 of 2016, presided over by The Hon&#8217;ble Justice B.R. Madhusudhan Rao, on 21st April 2026, dismissed the appeal filed by United India Insurance Co., Ltd. The decisive ground for this dismissal was the appellant&#8217;s explicit request to withdraw the appeal. The learned counsel for the appellant-respondent No.2 sought permission from the Court to withdraw the appeal, and an endorsement to this effect was made on the case bundle. The Court, acceding to this request, granted permission for withdrawal. Consequently, MACMA.No.1099 of 2016 was dismissed as withdrawn, with no order as to costs. This action effectively closed any pending miscellaneous applications related to the appeal. The Court&#8217;s decision reflects a straightforward application of procedural discretion, allowing a party to withdraw its appeal when such a request is formally made and permission is sought, thereby concluding the matter without adjudication on the merits. The judgment did not rely on any specific statutory sections or precedents, as the dismissal was based solely on the appellant&#8217;s withdrawal request.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_a729abd8-d7d1-4463-a558-451fd1485e5a.pdf">MACMA 731/2017</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: THOLEM,KORAM LAXMINARAYANA VS V.SURESH BABU AND ANOTHER</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>17-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE B.R.MADHUSUDHAN RAO</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Civil Law</strong></p><p>The High Court of Telangana, in M.A.C.M.A.No.731 OF 2017, disposed of the appeal in terms of a settlement reached before the Lok Adalat on 28.03.2026. The learned counsels on record submitted that the matter had been settled, rendering any further adjudication by the Court unnecessary. Recording this submission, the Court concluded that nothing survived in the present M.A.C.M.A. for further deliberation. Consequently, the appeal was disposed of, with no order as to costs. All interim orders and miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in the M.A.C.M.A. were also closed. This judgment exemplifies the Court&#8217;s practice of acknowledging and giving effect to alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, particularly settlements achieved through Lok Adalats, thereby promoting expeditious and amicable resolution of disputes and reducing the burden on the formal judicial system. The Court&#8217;s action aligns with the broader legal principle of encouraging settlements to achieve finality and avoid protracted litigation, a cornerstone of efficient judicial administration.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_7b47a5c5-ac14-4acc-a5bf-afe14233190e.pdf">MACMA 3252/2017</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: ICICI LOMBARD GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY LTD., VS BOJJA SUDHAKAR</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>17-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE B.R.MADHUSUDHAN RAO</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Insurance Law</strong></p><p>The High Court of Telangana disposed of M.A.C.M.A.No.3252 of 2017, noting that the matter had been settled before the Lok Adalat on March 28, 2026. The Court recorded the submissions of the learned counsels on record, who confirmed the settlement, thereby rendering any further adjudication in the present appeal unnecessary. Consequently, the M.A.C.M.A. was disposed of in terms of the settlement reached before the Lok Adalat, with no order as to costs. All interim orders and miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in the M.A.C.M.A. were also directed to stand closed. This disposition reflects the principle that once a dispute is amicably resolved through alternative dispute resolution mechanisms like the Lok Adalat, the judicial process concerning that specific matter concludes, upholding the efficacy of such settlements in reducing litigation burden and providing expeditious justice. The Court&#8217;s action aligns with the broader legal objective of encouraging out-of-court settlements, thereby giving effect to the parties&#8217; consensual resolution.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_d5818b3c-d5f8-48a1-b5d9-22f6f5e07d28.pdf">MACMA 197/2018</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: RELIANCE GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY LTD VS ARJUN CHAKALI</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>17-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE B.R.MADHUSUDHAN RAO</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Insurance Law</strong></p><p>The High Court of Telangana, in M.A.C.M.A. No. 197 of 2018, disposed of the appeal filed by Reliance General Insurance Company Ltd. against Arjun Chakali and others, on the decisive ground that the matter had been settled before the Lok Adalat on March 28, 2026. The Court recorded the submissions of the learned counsels on record confirming the settlement, thereby concluding that nothing further survived for adjudication in the present appeal. Consequently, the M.A.C.M.A. was disposed of in terms of the said Lok Adalat settlement, with no order as to costs. All interim orders and miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in the M.A.C.M.A. were also directed to stand closed. This judgment exemplifies the principle of judicial economy, where courts acknowledge and give effect to alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, thereby reducing the burden on the formal judicial system and promoting amicable resolution of disputes. The Court&#8217;s action aligns with the broader legal policy encouraging settlements, particularly through forums like the Lok Adalat, which provide an accessible and efficient means for dispute resolution.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_53c8a626-b39c-4ac9-b38c-93f678bef7e1.pdf">MACMA 298/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: THE T.S.R.T.C. VS KADALI NAGA MANI</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>21-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE MOUSHUMI BHATTACHARYA, JUSTICE GADI PRAVEEN KUMAR</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Civil Law</strong></p><p>The High Court of Telangana disposed of M.A.C.M.A.No.298 of 2026, along with all connected applications, on the decisive ground that the dispute between the parties had been conclusively settled by way of a Lok Adalat Award dated 28.03.2026. The learned counsel for the appellants informed the Court of this settlement, and the Lok Adalat Award was duly placed before the Bench. The Court, comprising Hon&#8217;ble Justice Moushumi Bhattacharya and Hon&#8217;ble Justice Gadi Praveen Kumar, found that in light of the findings recorded in the said Lok Adalat Award, no further issues remained for consideration in the present Appeal. Consequently, the appeal was disposed of in terms of the Lok Adalat Award, leading to the vacation of any interim orders that may have been in force. The Court further directed that there would be no order as to costs, thereby bringing finality to the matter based on the consensual resolution achieved through the Lok Adalat mechanism. This approach underscores the judicial recognition and enforcement of settlements reached through alternative dispute resolution forums, aligning with the principles of expeditious justice and reducing the burden on conventional litigation.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_f15a23b4-1f30-4bde-8dcd-368078684ad0.pdf">CMA 23/2020</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: MAHA PRATYANGIRA DEVI TEMPLE VS SRI. M. MALLIKARJUNA RAO</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>21-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE MOUSHUMI BHATTACHARYA,JUSTICE GADI PRAVEEN KUMAR</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Civil Law</strong></p><p>The High Court, in Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 23 of 2020, disposed of the appellant&#8217;s appeal, which arose from the dismissal of an interim injunction application by the Trial Court in a suit for injunction. The decisive ground for the High Court&#8217;s order was the continuation of an interim injunction granted by a Co-ordinate Bench on 08.01.2020, restraining the respondent from interfering with the appellant&#8217;s peaceful possession of the petition schedule property, which had remained in force for over six years. Recognizing that the Trial Court was actively proceeding with the defendant&#8217;s evidence and nearing arguments, the High Court deemed it fit to continue the existing interim order until the pronouncement of judgment in the suit. This approach balanced the need to maintain the status quo, which had subsisted for a significant period, with the imperative of allowing the Trial Court to conclude the substantive proceedings without undue influence. The Court explicitly directed that the Trial Court should not be swayed by the interim injunction granted by the Co-ordinate Bench, thereby preserving the Trial Court&#8217;s independent assessment of the merits. Accordingly, the appeal was disposed of, with the interim order dated 08.01.2020 remaining in place until further orders or the judgment pronouncement by the learned Trial Court, with no order as to costs.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_afc8e33e-8071-483c-a3d0-7eaa23cca6ae.pdf">COMCA 22/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: SPARSH HOSPITALS AND CRITICAL CARE PRIVATE LIMITED, VS CANCER TREATMENT SERVICES HYDERABAD PRIVATE LIMITED,</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>21-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE MOUSHUMI BHATTACHARYA,JUSTICE GADI PRAVEEN KUMAR</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Arbitration Law</strong></p><p>The High Court dismissed the Commercial Court Appeal, affirming the Commercial Court&#8217;s order directing the appellant to deposit Rs. 6,69,52,278/- in Court under Section 9 of The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The Court found no error in the impugned order, holding that the appellant&#8217;s email dated 21.09.2024 constituted a clear and unequivocal admission of liability to the extent of the directed amount. The appellant&#8217;s contention that the Commercial Court erred in issuing an ex parte direction without sufficient reasons was rejected, as the Court focused on the undeniable admission. The Court relied on the Supreme Court&#8217;s pronouncement in Himani Alloys Limited Vs. Tata Steel Limited (2011 SCC OnLine SC 890), which established that an admission must be categorical, conscious, and deliberate, demonstrating an intention to be bound. This principle, aligning with Order XII Rule 6 of The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, regarding &#8216;Judgment on Admissions&#8217;, was found to be satisfied by the tabulated statement in the appellant&#8217;s email. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, with the appellant retaining liberty to contest the Commercial Original Petition in accordance with law.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_4a539c96-49fb-4d44-9fcd-ecdc6824bb4e.pdf">CMA 260/2023</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: T. RENUKA (DIED) VS TIGULLA VEDAVATHI GOUD,</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>21-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE MOUSHUMI BHATTACHARYA,JUSTICE GADI PRAVEEN KUMAR</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Civil Law</strong></p><p>The High Court dismissed Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 260 of 2023, noting that despite the appeal being filed on April 25, 2023, the appellants had failed to serve notice on the respondents for three years, resulting in no contesting respondents before the Court. The Court observed that the appellants, who were plaintiff Nos. 1 to 10 in a suit for declaration, confirmed that the original suit was still pending before the Trial Court. Given the appellants&#8217; prolonged inaction in prosecuting the appeal by not effecting service, and the ongoing proceedings in the underlying suit, the Court found no justifiable reason to keep the appeal pending. Consequently, the appeal, along with all connected applications, was dismissed, and any interim orders stood vacated, with no order as to costs. The Court&#8217;s decision was predicated on the fundamental principle of diligent prosecution of legal remedies, emphasizing that a party seeking appellate relief must take prompt and necessary steps to bring the matter to adjudication, failing which the appeal becomes liable for dismissal due to non-prosecution. This implicitly reinforces the procedural requirement for appellants to ensure proper service and active engagement in the appellate process.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_020bdf24-ea26-4552-96c1-bf3020a48454.pdf">WA 396/2022</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: THE STATE OF TELANGANA AND ANOTHER VS N. GOPALAKRISHNAIAH</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>21-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE MOUSHUMI BHATTACHARYA,JUSTICE GADI PRAVEEN KUMAR</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Civil Law</strong></p><p>The High Court of Telangana dismissed Writ Appeal No. 396 of 2022, holding that nothing further remained for adjudication given that the flat purchasers had paid the entire consideration to the Developer. The Court found the present Writ Appeal to be in an identical position to the judgment dated 06.08.2021 in W.A. No. 268 of 2021, which had been confirmed by the Supreme Court&#8217;s order dated 02.04.2025, dismissing Special Leave to Appeal (C) No. 17369 of 2021 filed by the appellants (Telangana Housing Board and another). This decision effectively rendered the issues raised in the present appeal moot, as the underlying factual premise concerning outstanding payments had been resolved. The Court&#8217;s reasoning was predicated on the principle of judicial economy and the finality of prior adjudications, particularly where the Supreme Court had already affirmed a similar matter involving the same parties and subject matter. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed without costs, aligning with the precedent set by the Supreme Court&#8217;s refusal to entertain the Special Leave Petition in the analogous case.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_8d61aec3-80cb-40d3-9315-2a01a3f9a2f9.pdf">COMCA 8/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: M/S. SREE THIRUMALA INFRA PRIVATE LIMITED VS CINEPOLIS INDIA PVT. LTD</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>20-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE MOUSHUMI BHATTACHARYA,JUSTICE GADI PRAVEEN KUMAR</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Arbitration Law</strong></p><p>The High Court, in disposing of cross-appeals COMCA Nos. 8 and 11 of 2026, effectively extended the operation of an interim order dated 04.12.2025 passed by the Additional Special Court, which had restrained M/s. Sree Thirumala Infra Private Limited from dealing with commercial space covered by a Memorandum of Understanding dated 23.09.2024 with third parties. The decisive ground for this extension was the recent appointment of an Arbitrator by JUSTICE in Arbitration Application No. 108 of 2026, thereby shifting the forum for dispute resolution. The Court deemed it fit to extend the impugned order until 06.05.2026 or until further orders are passed by the learned Arbitrator, whichever is earlier, to maintain the status quo pending arbitration. The Court expressly refrained from expressing any opinion on the merits of the matter, acknowledging that the disputes between the parties would now be decided by the appointed Arbitrator. This approach aligns with the principle of judicial restraint in matters referred to arbitration, ensuring that the arbitral process is not prejudiced by premature judicial pronouncements. Consequently, both appeals were disposed of, with interim orders, if any, standing vacated, and no order as to costs.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_70ca44c3-b268-4678-82f3-48ab84efad6e.pdf">CMA 306/2018</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: SENIOR DIVISIONAL ENGINEER AND ANOTHER VS M GANESH</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>20-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE MOUSHUMI BHATTACHARYA,JUSTICE GADI PRAVEEN KUMAR</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Civil Law</strong></p><p>The High Court dismissed CMA No. 306 of 2018 for default, along with all connected applications, due to the appellants&#8217; repeated non-representation. This marks the second consecutive occasion where the appellants failed to appear, leading the Court to conclude that the matter could not proceed. Consequently, any interim orders previously granted in the case stand vacated. The Court&#8217;s decision underscores the fundamental procedural requirement for parties to be represented in court proceedings, and the inherent power of the court to dismiss matters for want of prosecution when this obligation is not met. While no specific statutory sections or precedents were explicitly cited in this brief order, the dismissal for default is a well-established principle of civil procedure, reflecting the court&#8217;s authority to manage its docket and ensure the efficient administration of justice. The absence of representation, particularly on successive occasions, constitutes a clear failure to prosecute the appeal, justifying the Court&#8217;s decision to dismiss the matter. There was no order as to costs.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_979e7152-e59d-4c11-a851-d0eda92bc2e0.pdf">CMA 60/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: SMT. ASIYA BEGUM VS SMT. ZAINAB BEGUM</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>17-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE MOUSHUMI BHATTACHARYA,JUSTICE GADI PRAVEEN KUMAR</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Property Law</strong></p><p>The High Court set aside the Trial Court&#8217;s dismissal of the appellants&#8217; application for interim injunction under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC, restraining alienation of the suit property, finding that the Trial Court failed to appreciate the appellants had established a prima facie case. The Court held that property purchased by individuals in 1984 could not automatically transfer to a Trust registered in 2023 without a registered deed as required by Section 17 of The Registration Act, 1908, and that mere alteration of revenue records does not extinguish title, citing Smt. Sawarni v. Smt. Inder Kaur and Others and Balwant Singh &amp; Anr. v. Daulat Singh (Dead) By L.Rs. &amp; Ors. Furthermore, the Court noted the obvious discrepancy in signatures on the 2006 mutation affidavit and the 1993 pattadar passbook, which the Trial Court ought to have visually compared under Section 73 of The Indian Evidence Act, 1872, as affirmed in Murari Lal v. State of Madhya Pradesh. The Court emphasized that the Trust Deed of 2023 lacked recitals of property ownership as mandated by Section 5 of The Indian Trusts Act, 1882, and that possession follows title for vacant sites, as per Anathula Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy. The Court concluded that the Trial Court overlooked suspicious circumstances and failed to preserve the property pending adjudication of triable issues, which could cause irreparable injury to the appellants.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_fcf0b2c2-798d-433e-ba66-aeb4342d449c.pdf">CRLA 277/2013</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: VADEE LAZAR , LAZAROUS VS THE STATE OF AP.,</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>20-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): SMT JUSTICE TIRUMALA DEVI EADA</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Criminal Law</strong></p><p>The High Court dismissed the criminal appeal, upholding the conviction and sentence of the appellant-accused under Section 354 IPC for outraging the modesty of a 10-year-old girl. The Court found that the prosecution had proved the charge beyond reasonable doubt, primarily relying on the unimpeachable and consistent evidence of the victim (PW.3), her father (PW.1), and corroborating circumstantial witnesses (PWs.2 and 4). The victim&#8217;s testimony, detailing how the accused enticed her, took her to an under-construction building, and attempted sexual assault, was found credible and largely unblemished during cross-examination. The Court rejected the defence&#8217;s arguments regarding &#8220;improvements&#8221; in witness statements, holding that a complaint (Ex.P1) need not be an encyclopedia, and material averments were consistent. Furthermore, the Court distinguished the precedent of Rammu @ Ramlal v. The State of M.P., which concerned non-seizure of apparel and non-examination of a crucial witness, by noting that in the present case, the victim was a minor and the non-seizure of apparel, while a lapse in investigation, could not defeat the prosecution&#8217;s case given the otherwise strong evidence. The Court concluded that the trial court had rightly appreciated the evidence, and there was no reason to interfere with the conviction and sentence.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_48e97b2c-12d5-4faa-831a-9065237017d5.pdf">MACMA 861/2019</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: ALIMINATI LAXMAIAH AND 3 OTHERS VS R.A. CHEMICALS AND INTERMEDIATES, (DISMISS FOR DEFAULT WIDE COURT ORDE DATED.20-2-2015)</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>17-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE C.V. BHASKAR REDDY</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Civil Law</strong></p><p>The High Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal&#8217;s decision to reject the compensation claim under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, for the death of Alimineti Kondal. The Court held that the appellants/claimants failed to discharge their burden of proving the involvement of the alleged offending vehicle and the negligence of its driver, which are foundational facts for a claim under Section 166. Despite reliance on Exs.A-2 and A-3 and the testimony of P.W.2, the Court found no convincing material to establish the vehicle&#8217;s identity or involvement, nor was P.W.2&#8217;s evidence independently corroborated. The Court distinguished the precedents cited by the appellants: Sunitha and others vs. Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation (2020) 13 SCC 486, which established that while strict proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required, the foundational fact of accident occurrence must be established; Ramachandrappa vs. Manager, Royal Sundaram Alliance Insurance Company Limited (2011) 13 SCC 236, which pertained to income quantification and not proof of negligence; and National Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Chamundeswari and others 2021 ACJ 2558, where clear evidence of negligence existed. The Court concluded that the principles from these cases could not be applied in the absence of basic proof regarding the offending vehicle&#8217;s involvement and driver&#8217;s negligence, finding no perversity or illegality in the Tribunal&#8217;s decision.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_7193e66a-e7ba-4b0c-8e20-6677fc73cd11.pdf">MACMA 1093/2019</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: DOULTABAD NARSIMULU AND ANOTHER VS BONTHAPALLY VINOD KUMAR AND ANOTHER</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>20-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE C.V. BHASKAR REDDY</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Insurance Law</strong></p><p>The High Court enhanced the compensation awarded to the appellants/claimants from Rs. 1,80,000/- to Rs. 5,00,000/- for the death of their 14-year-old daughter in a motor vehicle accident, directing the insurer to pay and recover from the owner. The Court found the Tribunal erred in absolving the insurer, holding that even with a technical violation of policy conditions regarding the driver&#8217;s license, the insurer must first satisfy the award and then recover from the owner, a principle established in Kusum Lata &amp; Others v. Satbir &amp; Others (AIR 2011 SC 1234) and Rama Bai vs. M./s. Amit Minerals (2025 SCC Online SC 2067). Regarding quantum, the Court, relying on Meena Devi vs. Nunu Chand Mahto @ Nemchand Mahto and others (2022 LiveLaw (SC) 841) and Kurvan Ansari @ Kurvan Ali &amp; another vs. Shyam Kishore Murmu and another (2022) 1 SCC 317, determined a notional income of Rs. 30,000/- with a multiplier of 15, plus conventional heads, was appropriate for a child of 14 years, rejecting the Tribunal&#8217;s reliance on New India Assurance Co. Ltd vs. Satender and others (2007 ACJ 160 SC) for a lump sum. The Court reiterated, per Nagappa vs. Gurdayal Singh and others (2003) 2 SCC 274, that Tribunals can award &#8216;just&#8217; compensation exceeding the claimed amount.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_0f122e74-b4eb-4eef-ad02-fa4961c70554.pdf">MACMA 881/2019</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: CHITTEMMA VS THE VICE CHAIRMAN-CUM-MANAGING DIRECTOR</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>17-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE C.V. BHASKAR REDDY</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Civil Law</strong></p><p>The High Court set aside the Tribunal&#8217;s awards dismissing motor accident claims under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, and remanded the matters for reconsideration under Section 163-A of the Act. The Court held that the Tribunal erred in non-suiting the claimants solely for failing to prove rash and negligent driving, despite the undisputed accident and deaths. The decisive ground was that even where negligence is not established, claimants are entitled to compensation under the &#8220;no-fault liability&#8221; principle enshrined in Section 163-A, which provides for compensation on a structured formula basis without proof of negligence. The Court emphasized that in appropriate cases, particularly where an accident and vehicle involvement are proven, a claim petition can be converted to one under Section 163-A in the interest of justice. Accordingly, the appeals were allowed, the impugned awards dated 08.01.2019 were set aside, and the matters were remanded to the Tribunal with a direction to treat the petitions as filed under Section 163-A and determine compensation expeditiously, allowing parties to adduce further evidence.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_f9bbcee4-e806-419f-bb95-77885c81fb7d.pdf">MACMA 926/2019</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: SRI K.GOPAL RAO VS SRI MD.HAFEEZ AHMED AND ANR</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>17-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE C.V. BHASKAR REDDY</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Civil Law</strong></p><p>The High Court of Telangana partly allowed the appellant/claimant&#8217;s appeal, enhancing the compensation awarded by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal from Rs. 1,82,000/- to Rs. 2,62,000/- with interest at 7.5% per annum from the date of the claim petition. The Court found that the Tribunal had inadequately compensated the claimant for grievous injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident, despite clear evidence from P.W.1, P.W.2, and Exs.A.1 to A.5 establishing rash and negligent driving and the nature of injuries. The decisive ground for enhancement was the Tribunal&#8217;s failure to award reasonable amounts for non-pecuniary heads, particularly pain and suffering, and to adequately account for incidental expenses like special diet and transportation, which are necessarily incurred in such cases. The Court, considering the nature of injuries, period of treatment, and overall circumstances, awarded an additional Rs. 50,000/- for pain and suffering, Rs. 20,000/- for extra nourishment, and Rs. 10,000/- for transportation charges, thereby rectifying the inadequacy in the original award. The finding on the accident&#8217;s cause, based on FIR, charge sheet, and medical evidence, remained undisturbed as it had attained finality.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_b726012e-677f-4381-979f-66aec79cd875.pdf">MACMA 1122/2019</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: VEMULA DEVA GOUD VS VANARASHI RAMULU</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>17-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE C.V. BHASKAR REDDY</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Civil Law</strong></p><p>The High Court partly allowed the appeal, enhancing the compensation awarded by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal from Rs. 2,32,300/- to Rs. 3,32,300/- with interest at 7.5% per annum, finding the original award to be meager given the grievous injuries sustained by the appellant. The Court reasoned that while the Tribunal correctly established negligence based on evidence including P.Ws.1 and 2 and Exs.A.1 to A.40, it inadequately compensated for pain and suffering, attendant charges, extra nourishment, and loss of future amenities. Specifically, compensation for pain and suffering was increased from Rs. 80,000/- to Rs. 1,00,000/-, attendant charges from Rs. 5,000/- to Rs. 20,000/-, extra nourishment from Rs. 5,000/- to Rs. 20,000/-, and loss of future amenities from Rs. 50,000/- to Rs. 1,00,000/-, acknowledging the prolonged discomfort, need for assistance, special diet, and impact on quality of life and avocation due to the fracture of the right femur and other injuries. The Court maintained the amounts for medical expenses and loss of earnings as they were supported by documentary evidence.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_3bf48dc2-e20d-4ee3-a115-d49ddb97fc1d.pdf">AS 191/2019</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: N. LAXMA REDDY VS A. INDRASENA REDDY</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>17-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE G.M. MOHIUDDIN</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Civil Law</strong></p><p>The High Court set aside the trial court&#8217;s order rejecting the plaint under Order VII Rule 11(a) and (d) CPC, holding that the trial court erred by considering extraneous material beyond the plaint and prematurely deciding issues of limitation and cause of action. The decisive ground was that for an Order VII Rule 11 application, courts must confine themselves strictly to the plaint averments, assuming them to be true, and cannot conduct a mini-trial or evaluate the defence. The Court emphasized that the issue of limitation, particularly when dependent on the date of knowledge as pleaded by the plaintiff, constitutes a mixed question of fact and law requiring a full-fledged trial, as established in P. Kumarakurubaran v. P. Narayanan &amp; others (MANU/SC/0593/2025) and Daliben Valjibhai and Ors. v. Prajapati Kodarbhai Kachrabhai and Anr (MANU/SC/1433/2024). The Court reiterated that a plaint disclosing any triable cause of action, even if only for a part of the relief, cannot be rejected in its entirety. The trial court&#8217;s reliance on revenue records and the defendants&#8217; plea of adverse possession was deemed impermissible at the threshold stage, as adverse possession is a hostile claim requiring strict proof and cannot coexist with permissive possession, as noted in Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Government of India and Ors ((2004) 10 SCC 779).</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_832413ad-e561-43c2-8a94-198ef1bb00c0.pdf">AS 78/2023</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: ALUGUBELLI VENKAT REDDY VS KONDRI REDDY SOMI REDDY</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>17-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE G.M. MOHIUDDIN</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Property Law</strong></p><p>The High Court upheld the trial court&#8217;s decree for specific performance, dismissing the appeal under Section 96 CPC, finding the agreement of sale (Ex.A1) true, valid, and binding. The Court reasoned that the appellant&#8217;s admission of his signature on Ex.A1, coupled with the attesting witness&#8217;s testimony (PW2) and the appellant&#8217;s failure to substantiate his forgery claim with expert opinion, established execution. The Court rejected the argument that Ex.A1 was inadmissible for want of registration, citing the proviso to Section 49 of the Registration Act, 1908, as affirmed in R. Hemalatha v. Kashthuri (2023) 10 SCC 725, which permits an unregistered agreement of sale as evidence in specific performance suits. It further held that an agreement to sell is not compulsorily registrable under Section 17(1)(b) of the 1908 Act as it does not create present rights in immovable property. The Court also found the respondent demonstrated continuous readiness and willingness under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, and noted the appellant&#8217;s mala fide conduct in alienating the property during litigation, which, under the doctrine of lis pendens as reiterated in Surjeet Singh v. Harbans Singh (1995) 6 SCC 50, would not bind the respondent. The appeal was dismissed with costs, directing execution of the sale deed within one month, with subsequent alienations being subject to the decree.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_09fc5b41-9945-4c11-80d9-9ad38db769a5.pdf">MACMA 3039/2014</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: E.SARITHA VS M/S. DEEPAK TRANSPORTERS AND ANO</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>17-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE GADI PRAVEEN KUMAR</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Civil Law</strong></p><p>The High Court of Telangana, in M.A.C.M.A. No. 3039 of 2014, disposed of the appeal in terms of an award dated 28.03.2026 passed by the High Court Legal Services Committee, Hyderabad. The decisive ground for this disposition was the report by the learned counsel for both parties confirming that the matter had been referred to the Lok Adalat for settlement, and an award was subsequently passed based on the terms mutually agreed upon by the parties. The Court, therefore, found it appropriate to give effect to the Lok Adalat&#8217;s award, thereby concluding the appeal without further adjudication on the merits of the original dispute. This approach aligns with the principle of promoting amicable settlements and reducing the burden on the judicial system, as enshrined in the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987, which empowers Lok Adalats to facilitate such resolutions. Consequently, all pending miscellaneous petitions were closed, and no costs were awarded. The judgment implicitly relies on the finality and binding nature of Lok Adalat awards, once accepted by the parties, as a mechanism for dispute resolution.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_3bdf44c0-911e-4f4a-b1ea-a9f2fe8a07d0.pdf">MACMA 1714/2015</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: ROYAL SUNDARAM ALLIANCE INSURANCE CO LTD VS KHANAPURAM SARITHA AND 4 OTHERS</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>17-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE GADI PRAVEEN KUMAR</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Insurance Law</strong></p><p>The High Court disposed of M.A.C.M.A. No. 1714 of 2015, filed by Royal Sundaram Alliance Insurance Co. Ltd., in terms of an award passed by the Lok Adalat constituted by the High Court Legal Services Committee, Hyderabad, on March 28, 2026. The decisive ground for this disposition was the report by learned counsel for both parties confirming that the matter had been referred to the Lok Adalat for settlement, and that an award had been issued based on mutually agreed terms. The Court, therefore, adopted the Lok Adalat&#8217;s resolution as the final determination of the appeal, reflecting the principle of alternative dispute resolution and the binding nature of settlements reached through such mechanisms. This approach aligns with the overarching objective of expeditious and amicable resolution of disputes, thereby reducing the burden on the conventional judicial system. Consequently, all pending miscellaneous petitions were ordered to be closed, and no costs were awarded, underscoring the finality and comprehensive nature of the Lok Adalat&#8217;s settlement. The judgment explicitly directed that a copy of the Lok Adalat award dated March 28, 2026, be appended to the judgment, ensuring clarity and record-keeping of the agreed terms.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_b3711f4e-f22d-4ba2-83af-e64e4583f6e8.pdf">CMA 425/2022</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: SHRIRAM GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY LTD VS KHAJA PASHA</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>17-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE GADI PRAVEEN KUMAR</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Insurance Law</strong></p><p>The High Court of Telangana, in C.M.A. No. 425 of 2022, disposed of the appeal filed by Shriram General Insurance Company Ltd. against Khaja Pasha and another, based on a settlement reached through the Lok Adalat. The Court noted that the parties had referred the matter to the Lok Adalat constituted by the High Court Legal Services Committee, Hyderabad, which subsequently passed an award on 28.03.2026, reflecting the terms agreed upon by the parties. Consequently, the appeal was disposed of in terms of this Lok Adalat award, with no order as to costs. This disposition underscores the principle of alternative dispute resolution, where parties voluntarily agree to a settlement facilitated by a statutory body like the Lok Adalat, thereby achieving an amicable and expeditious resolution of their disputes. The Court&#8217;s decision to dispose of the appeal in accordance with the Lok Adalat award highlights the legal sanctity and enforceability accorded to such settlements, promoting judicial efficiency and reducing the burden on conventional litigation. All pending miscellaneous petitions were also closed as a sequel to this judgment.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_460a2dfe-e66e-4f5c-9cd9-be06c1efb63b.pdf">CMA 527/2022</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: THE BAJAJ ALLIANZ GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED VS SMT. SANKPAD LALITHA AND 3 OTHERS</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>17-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE GADI PRAVEEN KUMAR</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Insurance Law</strong></p><p>The High Court disposed of C.M.A. No. 527 of 2022, noting that the parties had successfully settled the matter before the Lok Adalat constituted by the High Court Legal Services Committee, Hyderabad. The decisive ground for this disposition was the award passed by the Lok Adalat on March 28, 2026, which reflected the terms agreed upon by the appellant, The Bajaj Allianz General Insurance Company Limited, and the respondents, Smt. Sankpad Lalitha and others. The Court, therefore, found it appropriate to dispose of the appeal in consonance with the said Lok Adalat award, thereby rendering any pending miscellaneous petitions closed. This judgment underscores the efficacy of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, particularly the Lok Adalat, in achieving amicable settlements between litigating parties, thereby reducing the burden on the conventional judicial system. The Court&#8217;s action aligns with the principle of giving effect to consensual agreements reached through statutory dispute resolution bodies, ensuring finality and expeditious resolution of disputes. No costs were awarded.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_708c8752-c933-4096-83b5-08c47f6b2c8b.pdf">CMA 597/2022</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: THE BAJAJ ALLIANCE GENERAL INSURANCE CO. LTD VS BORELLI MOUNIKA</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>17-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE GADI PRAVEEN KUMAR</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Arbitration Law</strong></p><p>The High Court of Telangana disposed of CMA No. 597 of 2022, filed by The Bajaj Allianz General Insurance Co. Ltd., in terms of an award passed by the Lok Adalat constituted by the High Court Legal Services Committee, Hyderabad. The Court noted that the parties had reported the matter&#8217;s referral to the Lok Adalat, where, following due deliberations, an award was issued on March 28, 2026, reflecting the mutually agreed terms between the appellant and the respondents. This disposition signifies the Court&#8217;s recognition and enforcement of the settlement reached through the alternative dispute resolution mechanism. The judgment effectively ratifies the Lok Adalat&#8217;s award, thereby concluding the appeal without further adjudication on the merits, consistent with the principles encouraging amicable settlements. Consequently, all pending miscellaneous petitions related to the appeal were also closed. The Court directed that a copy of the Lok Adalat award dated March 28, 2026, be appended to its judgment, ensuring the settlement terms form an integral part of the judicial record.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_eed6c21a-f61e-4506-8905-e0d1afe39b32.pdf">CRLP 5635/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: SEELOJU SHIVA KUMAR, VS THE STATE OF TELANGANA</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>21-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE J SREENIVAS RAO</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Criminal Law</strong></p><p>The High Court dismissed the criminal petitions filed under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, by accused Nos. 6 and 7, seeking to quash proceedings in F.I.R. No. 194 of 2026 for the offence under Section 108 read with 3(5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. The Court found that the allegations in the complaint, coupled with the deceased&#8217;s suicide note and self-recorded video, prima facie disclosed a cognizable offence, specifically that the petitioners, an advocate and a journalist, facilitated and participated in an interview that defamed the deceased, leading to her suicide. The Court distinguished Laxmi Das v. State of West Bengal and others (2025 SCC OnLine SC 120), which held that mere harassment or isolated utterances are insufficient for abetment, by noting the specific allegations of defamatory statements and character assassination directly linked to the suicide. Relying on State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal and others (1992 Supp (1) SCC 335) and Neeharika Infrastructure Private Limited v. State of Maharashtra and others ((2021) 19 SCC 401), the Court reiterated that High Courts should sparingly exercise their power to quash FIRs, particularly when investigation is ongoing and a cognizable offence is disclosed, as the police have a statutory right and duty to investigate. Consequently, the Court found no grounds to interdict the investigation at its nascent stage.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_1f40b96a-b23c-4693-83e3-ec1466448e78.pdf">WP 10152/2024</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: NAGAPUR RAMULU VS THE STATE OF TELANGANA</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>17-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE K. SARATH</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Service Law</strong></p><p>The High Court, in Nagapur Ramulu v. The State of Telangana, held that while the petitioner, an Assistant Manager on contract with the respondent-Federation, had no absolute legal right to remain in his native district given the contractual terms (Clause 5.11 of the 2020 agreement and Clause 6.11 of the 2024 renewal) and the revised HR Policy (Chapter VI, 1.2), which permitted transfers anywhere in the State based on exigencies, his request for posting in Nagarkurnool instead of Wanaparthy warranted reconsideration on medical grounds. Crucially, the Court first determined the writ petition was maintainable, rejecting the respondent&#8217;s contention that it was not a &#8216;State&#8217; under Article 12 of the Constitution of India. Relying on Ravi Khokhar v. Union of India (2026 SCC OnLine SC 372) and Zee Telefilms Ltd. v. Union of India ((2005) 4 SCC 649), the Court found the Federation to be an &#8216;other authority&#8217; under Article 12 due to significant government control, shareholding (7.3%), nominee directors, and the public nature of its activities under the Telangana Co-operative Societies Act, 1964. Accordingly, the Court directed respondents to reconsider the petitioner&#8217;s posting to his native district within four weeks.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_a4c03e74-fdc4-429a-bb71-ff0a6e787458.pdf">CRLA 1714/2018</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: PODETI PODETI ANJANNA, VS THE STATE OF TELANGANA,</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>23-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE K.LAKSHMAN,JUSTICE B.R.MADHUSUDHAN RAO</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Criminal Law</strong></p><p>The High Court of Telangana dismissed the appeal, affirming the conviction and life imprisonment of the appellant under Section 302 of the IPC for the murder of his wife. The Court found that despite the absence of direct eye-witnesses, the prosecution successfully established a complete and unbroken chain of circumstantial evidence pointing unequivocally to the appellant&#8217;s guilt. The decisive grounds included the undisputed fact that the appellant and the deceased were alone in their bolted house, the discovery of the deceased with a fatal slit throat injury, and the appellant found with self-inflicted neck wounds, corroborated by medical evidence (Ex.P17, Ex.P18) confirming the homicidal nature of the wife&#8217;s injuries and the possibility of MO.9 (knife) as the weapon. The Court relied on the consistent testimonies of circumstantial witnesses, particularly PW.4, PW.5, and PW.6, who deposed about the appellant&#8217;s suspicion of his wife&#8217;s fidelity and the events leading to the discovery of the bodies. Even the partially hostile testimonies of PW.8 and PW.9 were admitted to the extent they supported the prosecution&#8217;s narrative regarding the discovery. The recovery of the crime weapon (MO.9) pursuant to the appellant&#8217;s confessional statement (Ex.P16) further strengthened the prosecution&#8217;s case, which the appellant failed to rebut or offer a plausible alternative explanation.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_2ea195a5-5d0b-410d-b1e7-c5530cceb9a5.pdf">AS 60/2008</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: YOGASAI HEALTH RESORTS LIMITED, HYDERABAD. VS SMT. S.PADMAVATHI, HYDERABAD.</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>22-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE K.LAKSHMAN,JUSTICE B.R.MADHUSUDHAN RAO</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Contract Law</strong></p><p>The High Court affirmed the trial court&#8217;s decree for specific performance, holding that the appellant-defendant&#8217;s unilateral cancellation of the sale agreement was invalid and the respondent-plaintiff had demonstrated continuous readiness and willingness under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. The Court found that time was not the essence of the contract, despite a stipulated payment schedule, as the agreement lacked a cancellation clause for non-payment and the defendant failed to fulfill its obligation to mutate its name in revenue records as per Clause 8 of the agreement. Relying on Annamalai v. Vasanthi (2025 SCC OnLine SC 2300) and K.S. Manjunath v. Moorasavirappa @ Muttanna Chennappa (2025 INSC 1298), the Court held that a declaration challenging the cancellation notice was unnecessary where the contract was not determinable and the termination constituted a breach by repudiation. Further, the agreement, though unregistered, was admissible after impoundment under Sections 41 and 42 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899. The Court emphasized that specific performance is the normal rule for immovable property contracts, and the plaintiff&#8217;s deposit of the balance consideration, coupled with the defendant&#8217;s breach, justified the equitable relief.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_ba39adf8-3a56-4ade-a5f5-7d2bfbf960b4.pdf">CCCA 49/2012</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: SMT G.PENTUBAI VS J.SRIHARI AND 4 OTHERS</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>20-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE K.LAKSHMAN,JUSTICE B.R.MADHUSUDHAN RAO</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Civil Law</strong></p><p>The High Court of Telangana disposed of City Civil Court Appeal No. 49 of 2012, which challenged the judgment and decree dated 16.02.2012 in O.S. No. 95 of 2003 passed by the Family Court at Secunderabad, wherein the suit for specific performance of an agreement of sale was decreed. The decisive ground for the High Court&#8217;s decision was the settlement of disputes between the parties during the pendency of the appeal. Specifically, the appellant No. 2 (who was transposed from 4th respondent vide order dated 02.04.2026 in I.A. No. 3 of 2026) and the respondents entered into a Memorandum of Compromise dated 16.07.2025, outlining specific terms and conditions. The parties subsequently filed I.A. No. 1 of 2025 to record this compromise. The Court, having directed the appellant No. 2 and respondent Nos. 6 to 12 to appear before the Secretary, High Court Legal Services Committee for identification, and having received a report dated 13.04.2026 confirming their appearance, found the compromise to be valid. Consequently, the appeal was disposed of in terms of the Memorandum of Compromise dated 16.07.2025, and I.A. No. 1 of 2025 was allowed, with no order as to costs.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_8ebd8013-41a6-4d5c-b399-5bf86deca95c.pdf">FCA 280/2017</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: TURLAPATI VEKATA PHANI KUMARI VS TURLAPATI SUBRAHYMANYA VEENA SYAMALA</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>20-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE K.LAKSHMAN,JUSTICE B.R.MADHUSUDHAN RAO</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Family Law</strong></p><p>The High Court of Telangana dismissed the husband&#8217;s appeal, affirming the Family Court&#8217;s decree dissolving the marriage on grounds of cruelty. The Court found no reason to interfere with the reasoned order of the Family Court, which had meticulously considered the oral and documentary evidence. The decisive ground for upholding the divorce was the appellant-husband&#8217;s persistent harassment and demand for money from the respondent-wife, including forcing her to earn money through illegal means, which the Family Court explicitly found to constitute cruelty. The respondent&#8217;s testimony as PW.1, detailing the physical and mental torture, including being forced to approach a third party for illicit earnings and subsequent consumption of tablets due to unbearable suffering, was deemed credible. While the appellant-husband, as RW.1, denied the allegations, he failed to adduce any documentary evidence to counter the respondent&#8217;s claims. The Family Court&#8217;s finding, specifically in paragraph 8 of its judgment, regarding the appellant&#8217;s cruel acts and the disputes, was upheld as well-founded. Despite opportunities, the appellant failed to secure representation before the High Court, further indicating a lack of merit in the appeal. The Court concluded that the appeal was devoid of merits, warranting its dismissal.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_8b9a042d-e867-4127-8cc5-0b9f5984ea40.pdf">CMA 129/2024</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: SHRIRAM GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED VS P. PADMA @ K.SRILAXMI</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>17-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE NAMAVARAPU RAJESHWAR RAO</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Insurance Law</strong></p><p>The High Court of Telangana, in Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 129 of 2024, disposed of the appeal in terms of an Award passed by the Lok Adalat on March 28, 2026. The decisive ground for this disposition was the settlement reached between the parties before the Lok Adalat, which culminated in the aforementioned Award. The Court, therefore, did not delve into the merits of the original appeal, but rather gave effect to the consensual resolution achieved through the alternative dispute resolution mechanism. This approach aligns with the established legal principle of promoting amicable settlements and reducing the burden on the conventional judicial system, as enshrined in various statutory provisions encouraging Lok Adalat proceedings. Consequently, the appeal was closed without any order as to costs, and all pending miscellaneous applications were also deemed closed, reflecting the finality imparted by the Lok Adalat Award. The Court&#8217;s action underscores the binding nature of Lok Adalat awards, which are deemed to be decrees of a civil court and are final, as per the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987, though not explicitly cited in this brief order.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_e2266e89-df41-4e3c-be45-e5d1b7ba5b14.pdf">CA 3/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: ALAGU VARSHINI, IAS VS A MALLESH</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>21-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE P.SAM KOSHY, JUSTICE NARSING RAO NANDIKONDA</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Service Law</strong></p><p>The High Court of Telangana allowed the contempt appeal, setting aside the conviction and costs imposed by the learned Single Bench against the appellant, Alagu Varshini, IAS, Secretary, Telangana State Social Welfare Residential Educational Society. The decisive ground for this decision was the production of G.O.Ms.No.6, dated 20.04.2026, issued by the Scheduled Caste Development (Edn.A2) Department, which ordered the regularization of the services of the respondent/employee, Mr. A. Mallesh, Attender (Contract), with all consequential benefits, in relaxation of rules, as a one-time measure. The learned Special Government Pleader for the appellant/contemnor further submitted that the department had been instructed to forthwith execute the said order and grant appropriate relief to the writ petitioner. The Court took the Government Order on record and, considering the compliance report, concluded that the appeal warranted allowance to the extent of setting aside the conviction and costs. However, the Court expressly reserved the writ petitioner&#8217;s right to agitate any claim that remained unresolved. Consequently, the contempt appeal was allowed, with no order as to costs, and all pending miscellaneous petitions were closed.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_325b5260-e525-40d5-9123-f74415a02996.pdf">CEA 10/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: THE COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL TAX AND CUSTOMS VS WS ZOOM TECHNOLOGIES (INDIA) PVT LTD</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>20-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE P.SAM KOSHY, JUSTICE NARSING RAO NANDIKONDA</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Tax Law</strong></p><p>The High Court dismissed the Central Excise Appeal under Section 35G of the Central Excise Act, 1944, holding it non-maintainable as the substantial question of law pertained to the taxability of transactions, specifically whether they constituted a &#8216;sale of goods&#8217; or a &#8216;service&#8217; under the Finance Act, 1994, Section 65(105)(zzzze). The Court&#8217;s decisive reasoning rested on the interpretation of Section 35G(1) read with Section 35L(2) of the Central Excise Act, 1944, which explicitly bars appeals to the High Court concerning questions relating to the rate of duty, value of goods, taxability, or excisability for assessment purposes, reserving such matters for appeal to the Supreme Court under Section 35L. The Court fortified its view by relying on COMMISSIONER OF STATE TAX, BANGALORE vs. SCOTT WILSON KIRKPATRICK (I) PVT. LTD. [2011 (23) S.T.R 321 (Kar.)] and COMMISSIONER OF CGST AND CENTRAL EXCISE, THANE VS. AJIT INDIA PVT. LTD. [2023(70) G.S.T.L. 158 (Bom.)], which affirmed that disputes concerning classification, taxability, and exemption notifications directly relate to the rate of duty and thus fall outside the High Court&#8217;s appellate jurisdiction under Section 35G. The Court, therefore, rejected the appeal on grounds of maintainability, reserving the appellant&#8217;s right to approach the Supreme Court.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_210838c3-671f-41e4-aea5-3f04f2994dd0.pdf">CEA 13/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: M/S. APOORVA IT SOLUTIONS PVT. LTD VS THE PRINCIPAL COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL TAX</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>17-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE P.SAM KOSHY, JUSTICE NARSING RAO NANDIKONDA</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Tax Law</strong></p><p>The High Court dismissed the appellant&#8217;s appeal, holding that the challenge to the service tax demand on grounds of limitation was unsustainable, as the appellant had explicitly conceded the merits of the demand before the Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (CESTAT). The decisive ground for this conclusion was the clear admission by the appellant, as recorded in paragraph 3 of the CESTAT&#8217;s impugned order, that they were &#8220;not contesting the demand of service tax on merit,&#8221; but were solely challenging the imposition of penalty under Section 78 of the Finance Act, 1994. The Court noted that the appellant&#8217;s subsequent filing under the SVLDRS amnesty scheme further reinforced the finding that the demand itself was not contested, even on limitation. Consequently, the Court found no error in the CESTAT&#8217;s decision to proceed without addressing the limitation aspect of the demand, given the appellant&#8217;s unequivocal concession, thereby precluding a fresh challenge on that very ground in the present appeal. The Court thus rejected the appeal, affirming the principle that a party cannot raise a ground in a higher forum that was expressly abandoned or conceded in the lower forum.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_1817a54c-5ea7-440b-902d-ebcd15726ea4.pdf">CCCA 101/2006</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: L. AHALYA VS L. ANDALAMMA</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>21-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE SUDDALA CHALAPATHI RAO</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Civil Law</strong></p><p>The High Court dismissed the appeal as abated, holding that the adjudication was impermissible following the demise of the sole respondent/defendant. The appellant had filed the appeal against the judgment and decree in O.S.No.183 of 2002, which dismissed her suit for partition and separate possession. During the hearing, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant and learned counsel for the respondent confirmed the sole defendant&#8217;s death on 26.11.2024, with a memo to that effect filed by the appellant&#8217;s counsel. The Court, relying on the provisions of Order XXII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, concluded that the appeal could not proceed. Consequently, the appeal stood dismissed as abated, with the appellant granted liberty to pursue her grievance before an appropriate authority or forum. This decision underscores the procedural necessity of substituting legal representatives upon the death of a party, failing which, as per Order XXII CPC, the proceedings abate, thereby preventing further adjudication on the merits of the case. There was no order as to costs.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_937d3cab-8cd4-4077-a3eb-3ffd3e2b070b.pdf">MACMA 135/2016</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: THUTUPALLY SHIVA VS A SHIVA PRASAD AND ANOTHER</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>21-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE VAKITI RAMAKRISHNA REDDY</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Civil Law</strong></p><p>The High Court partly allowed the appeal, enhancing the compensation awarded to the minor claimant from Rs. 1,25,000/- to Rs. 2,77,500/- under Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, with interest at 7.5% per annum. The Court found the Tribunal&#8217;s award inadequate, particularly regarding pain and suffering, medical expenses, and loss of amenities, given the claimant&#8217;s tender age and 40% permanent disability. The Court emphasized that in cases involving minors, the impact of injuries extends beyond immediate physical suffering, necessitating a more generous approach to compensation for pain and suffering and mental trauma. While the Tribunal correctly applied the multiplier of &#8216;15&#8217; and notional income of Rs. 15,000/- per annum for permanent disability, it failed to adequately compensate for other heads. Relying on Govind Yadav v. New India Insurance Company Limited (2011) 10 SCC 683, which mandates adequate compensation for loss of earning and inability to lead a normal life and enjoy amenities, the Court awarded Rs. 50,000/- for loss of amenities, which the Tribunal had omitted. The Court also enhanced compensation for pain and suffering, medical expenses, transportation, attendant charges, and food/extra nourishment, noting that strict insistence on documentary proof for medical expenses would defeat the object of just compensation for a minor with grievous injuries.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_b4ed3e64-ff31-4cb1-b538-54d17a08e8a8.pdf">MACMA 151/2016</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY LTD., NIZAMABAD VS RYAPANI LAXMO, NIZAMABAD DIST AND 6 OTHERS</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>21-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE VAKITI RAMAKRISHNA REDDY</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Insurance Law</strong></p><p>The High Court partly allowed the appeal, modifying the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal&#8217;s award by restricting the compensation payable by the appellant-Insurance Company to Rs. 1,00,000/-, while upholding the 7.5% interest rate. The Court held that while the claim was filed under Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, and the deceased was the owner-cum-rider of the motorcycle, the insurance policy (Ex.B1) only covered third-party risks and a compulsory personal accident (PA) cover for Rs. 50/- premium, limiting liability to Rs. 1,00,000/-. The Court relied on Oriental Insurance Company Limited v. Rajni Devi and others (2008) 5 Supreme Court Cases 736, which established that an owner cannot be both claimant and recipient under Section 163-A, and New India Assurance Company Limited v. Prabha Devi LAWS (SC) 2013 3 83, affirming that an insurer&#8217;s liability is to indemnify against third-party liabilities. The Tribunal&#8217;s award, based on National Insurance Company Limited v. P. Alagesan 2014 ACJ 2195, which allowed compensation where additional premium covered the owner&#8217;s personal risk, was deemed unsustainable beyond the contractual PA cover amount, as the liability is contractual and confined to the sum assured. The Court found no reason to interfere with the 7.5% interest rate, citing Rajesh and others v. Rajbir Singh and others (2013) 9 SCC 54.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_fd4eab07-87e7-45ba-a528-b5d453c23283.pdf">CMA 574/2022</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: THE EMPLOYEES STATE INSURANCE CORPORATION AND 2 OTHERS VS M/S. CUPS AND CAKES</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>21-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE VAKITI RAMAKRISHNA REDDY</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Labor Law</strong></p><p>The High Court of Telangana dismissed the appeal, affirming the Tribunal&#8217;s decision to set aside the ESI Corporation&#8217;s order under Section 45-A of the Employees State Insurance Act and the consequential recovery notice. The Court held that the foundational inspection report, which formed the basis for determining ESI contribution, was unreliable and devoid of evidentiary value. The decisive ground was the inspection note&#8217;s conspicuous silence on essential particulars such as employee names, parentage, addresses, nature of duties, and wages, despite purporting to record ten employees. The Court emphasized that the very jurisdiction to apply the ESI Act depends on the existence of the requisite number of employees, which must be substantiated by clear and reliable particulars, not bald statements. It was further noted that the Corporation&#8217;s power under Section 45-A, while enabling determination of contribution, cannot be invoked mechanically or based on assumptions without objective and reliable material. The Court also found that the principles of natural justice were violated due to the absence of clear proof of effective notice and meaningful opportunity afforded to the petitioner before passing the Section 45-A order. The Tribunal&#8217;s findings, being based on proper appreciation of evidence and admissions, were neither perverse nor arbitrary, thus warranting no interference.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_56977385-d353-4d00-b88a-03eace56ca89.pdf">MACMA 29/2012</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: KURMASHETTI , KURMACHETTY KANAKAMMA AND 3 ORS VS S.RAVI AND ANR</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>21-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE VAKITI RAMAKRISHNA REDDY</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Civil Law</strong></p><p>The High Court of Telangana disposed of M.A.C.M.A.No.29 of 2012, recording the submission of the learned counsel for the appellants that the claim in O.P. No.97 of 2008, which was the subject matter of the appeal, had already been settled. The decisive ground for this disposition was the existence of an award dated 21.12.2025 passed by the Lok Adalat, which effectively resolved the dispute between the parties. The Court, therefore, found it unnecessary to adjudicate the appeal on its merits, as the underlying claim had been conclusively settled through an alternative dispute resolution mechanism. This approach aligns with the principle of judicial economy and the promotion of amicable settlements, where a valid Lok Adalat award renders further judicial intervention redundant. Consequently, the MACMA was disposed of in terms of the said Lok Adalat award, and any pending miscellaneous petitions were directed to be closed. The Court&#8217;s action reflects the binding nature of Lok Adalat awards, which are deemed to be decrees of a civil court and are final, thereby precluding further litigation on the same subject matter.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_82c0a3f5-c790-44f7-b26e-b59d1e265c84.pdf">MACMA 4289/2012</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: THE BAJAJ ALLIANZ GENERAL INSURANCE COM. LTD., SECBAD. VS P.BALAMMA, SECBAD. AND 2 ANO.</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>21-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE VAKITI RAMAKRISHNA REDDY</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Insurance Law</strong></p><p>The High Court of Telangana, in M.A.C.M.A.No.4289 of 2012, disposed of the appeal based on the submission by the appellant&#8217;s counsel that the underlying claim in O.P. No.447 of 2005 had been conclusively settled through an award issued by the Lok Adalat on 28.03.2026. The Court, acknowledging this extra-judicial resolution, recorded the submission and accordingly closed the appeal, thereby affirming the finality and binding nature of the Lok Adalat award. This decision implicitly relies on the principle that once a dispute is settled by a Lok Adalat, as per the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987, the award has the same force as a decree of a civil court and is final and binding on all parties, precluding further litigation on the same subject matter. The Court&#8217;s action reflects the judicial policy of encouraging alternative dispute resolution mechanisms and upholding their outcomes, thereby reducing the burden on conventional courts. Consequently, all pending miscellaneous petitions related to this appeal were also directed to be closed, reinforcing the comprehensive nature of the Lok Adalat settlement.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_d2626983-fa18-4e60-ae77-0bcbc5170f3b.pdf">MACMA 3706/2012</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: THE AUTHORIZED CONSTITUTED ATTORNEY OF THE BAJAJ VS P.CHAKRIA NAIK AND 13 OTHERS</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>21-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE VAKITI RAMAKRISHNA REDDY</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Insurance Law</strong></p><p>The High Court of Telangana disposed of M.A.C.M.A.No.3706 of 2012, noting that the underlying claim in M.V.O.P. No.319 of 2008, which was the subject of the appeal, had been conclusively settled. The decisive ground for this disposition was the submission by the learned counsel for the appellant, the Authorized Constituted Attorney of Bajaj Allianz General Insurance Company Limited, confirming that the matter had been resolved before the Lok Adalat. Specifically, an award dated 28.03.2026 was passed by the Lok Adalat, thereby rendering the appeal infructuous. The Court, recording this submission, accordingly disposed of the MACMA in terms of the said Lok Adalat award. Consequently, all pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, stood closed. This judgment exemplifies the principle of judicial economy, where appellate proceedings are terminated upon the resolution of the primary dispute through alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, thereby upholding the finality and binding nature of Lok Adalat awards. The Court&#8217;s action reflects a procedural closure based on an undisputed factual development, rather than a substantive adjudication on the merits of the original appeal.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_b969bfc7-aca2-4674-99df-b6513593fa58.pdf">WA 459/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: THE SINGARENI COLLIERIES COMPANY LIMITED (SCCL) VS A MANOHAR RAO</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>23-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE APARESH KUMAR SINGH, JUSTICE G.M. MOHIUDDIN</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Service Law</strong></p><p>The High Court dismissed the present appeal, W.A.No.459 of 2026, affirming the learned Single Judge&#8217;s judgment dated 28.08.2025, which had allowed W.P.No.21050 of 2021. The decisive ground for this dismissal was the consensus between the parties that the appeal should be disposed of in line with the Court&#8217;s prior judgment in W.A.No.1507 of 2025, dated 09.04.2026, which involved a similar issue. In W.A.No.1507 of 2025, the Court had upheld the Single Judge&#8217;s decision to set aside Articles of Charges dated 26.07.2021, concluding that the charge memo was issued beyond the limitation period prescribed under Rule 34.5 of the Singareni Collieries Executives Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules, 1989, rendering it without jurisdiction and unsustainable in law. Consequently, by applying the principle of stare decisis and judicial consistency, the Court found no reason to deviate from its earlier ruling on an identical legal point concerning the limitation for issuing charge memos under the specified Rules. This approach ensured uniformity in the application of the disciplinary rules governing the appellant company&#8217;s executives.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_5ab07865-87e7-49d4-b03f-e3ba145ab75b.pdf">WA 462/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: MOHAMMED ZAFAR VS MD. KHALEEL</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>23-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE APARESH KUMAR SINGH, JUSTICE G.M. MOHIUDDIN</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Property Law</strong></p><p>The High Court allowed the writ appeal, setting aside the impugned order dated 10.03.2026 in W.P. No. 24520 of 2025 and remanding the matter to the learned writ Court for a fresh decision after impleading the appellant. The Court held that the appellant was a necessary party to the writ petition, as the impugned order, which set aside a refusal of registration (Refusal Order No. 2/2025, dated 02.08.2025) and directed registration of a sale deed, directly impacted his title and possession. The refusal order itself reflected the appellant&#8217;s possession and the mutation records showed his name, which was a reason for the registering authority&#8217;s refusal under Section 71 of the Indian Registration Act, 1908. The Court noted that the writ petitioner had himself instituted O.S. No. 459 of 2025 for a declaration of title concerning the same property, further underscoring the appellant&#8217;s indispensable interest. The Court concluded that the impugned order, rendered in the appellant&#8217;s absence, suffered from a fundamental error, necessitating his impleadment to ensure a just and lawful adjudication.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_12c1430e-ba61-42e7-ae01-7b61797d8d0d.pdf">WP 26367/2025</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: SHRI SHAILENDRA KUMAR JOSHI VS THE STATE OF TELANGANA</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>22-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE APARESH KUMAR SINGH, JUSTICE G.M. MOHIUDDIN</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Administrative Law</strong></p><p>The High Court partly allowed the writ petitions, holding that while the constitution of the Commission of Inquiry under Section 3 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952, vide G.O.Ms.No.6, dated 14.03.2024, was neither arbitrary, illegal, unconstitutional, nor ultra vires the Act, the findings rendered by the Commission prejudicial to the petitioners&#8217; conduct and reputation were inoperative due to violations of natural justice and the statutory safeguard under Section 8B of the Act. The Court reasoned that the Commission, despite its fact-finding nature, failed to provide a &#8220;reasonable opportunity of being heard&#8221; and to &#8220;produce evidence in defence&#8221; as mandated by Section 8B, which embodies the audi alteram partem rule. This was particularly evident as incriminating materials were not adequately disclosed to the petitioners, including THR and KCR, who received voluminous documents on the day of their examination, and SKJ and SS, who were merely telephonically asked to appear. The Court relied on Lal Krishna Advani v. Union of India (2003) 8 SCC 361 and Kiran Bedi v. Committee of Inquiry (1989) 1 SCC 494, which established that the right to reputation is a facet of Article 21 of the Constitution, necessitating strict adherence to Section 8B when adverse findings are likely. The Court rejected the State&#8217;s argument of &#8220;substantive compliance&#8221; and waiver, affirming that statutory safeguards cannot be circumvented.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_5262e970-ace5-4425-8c5f-c6a46df97892.pdf">WA 327/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: EMPLOYEES STATE INSURANCE CORPORATION VS M/S MURALI MANPOWER AGENCIES</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>22-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE APARESH KUMAR SINGH, JUSTICE G.M. MOHIUDDIN</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Administrative Law</strong></p><p>The High Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the Single Judge&#8217;s order and restoring the tender award to Respondent No.6, holding that the ESIC&#8217;s tender process for security services was valid. The Court found that the Single Judge erred in concluding that the tender conditions deviated arbitrarily from the ESIC Guidelines dated 14.11.2024, as Clause 2.3 of the Guidelines expressly permitted the Head of Office to determine additional evaluation criteria based on institutional requirements. Crucially, the tender was compliant with the Manual for Procurement of Non-Consultancy Services, 2025, issued by the Ministry of Finance, which, being a later and more general binding instrument, would prevail in case of inconsistency, and permitted the stipulated turnover criteria under Clause 5.1.9.1(c). The Court reiterated the limited scope of judicial review in tender matters, as established in Tata Cellular v. Union of India and Jagdish Mandal v. State of Orissa, emphasizing that interference is warranted only for arbitrariness, mala fides, or perversity in the decision-making process, none of which were found. Furthermore, Respondent No.1, having participated in the tender without protest, was estopped from challenging its terms post-unsuccessful bid, a principle affirmed in Michigan Rubber (India) Ltd. v. State of Karnataka. The Court also noted the non-joinder of other affected H1 bidders, as highlighted in Afcons Infrastructure Ltd. v. Nagpur Metro Rail Corporation Ltd., and the paramount public interest in avoiding delays in essential services.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_42bef1b9-1f53-4b2c-bd79-2cf465d465d0.pdf">WA 467/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: KARANGULA ABHISHEK REDDY VS THE STATE OF TELANGANA</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>22-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE APARESH KUMAR SINGH, JUSTICE G.M. MOHIUDDIN</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Administrative Law</strong></p><p>The High Court of Telangana disposed of a writ appeal, modifying the writ court&#8217;s dismissal, by directing the appellant to vacate the licensed premises by 30.06.2026, consistent with an undertaking previously made before the writ court. The appellant had initially sought mandamus against a vacation notice, but during the writ proceedings, had offered to vacate by 30.06.2026 and pay admitted license fees. While the fees were paid, the affidavit for vacation was not filed, leading the writ court to dismiss the petition, holding that contractual disputes were not amenable to writ jurisdiction and directing action strictly in accordance with law, pursuant to which the premises were sealed. The appellate court, noting the appellant&#8217;s additional affidavit reiterating the undertaking to vacate by 30.06.2026 and pay outstanding dues, found that the appellant was not contesting the merits but seeking adherence to the agreed timeline. Consequently, the Court directed the appellant to pay the quarter&#8217;s dues from 01.04.2026 to 30.06.2026 by 15.05.2026, failing which the respondent Hyderabad Metropolitan Development Authority could invoke default clauses, and ordered the immediate unsealing of the premises.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_692fff8f-7d1c-4436-a039-3d590984df1f.pdf">WA 305/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: RAGHUNANDAN DAS KHANNA VS THE STATE OF TELANGANA</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>22-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE APARESH KUMAR SINGH, JUSTICE G.M. MOHIUDDIN</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Criminal Law</strong></p><p>The High Court dismissed the writ appeal as non-maintainable, holding that the subject matter of the lis fell within the domain of criminal law, thereby precluding a writ appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The appellant had challenged the seizure and detention of a vehicle, alleging non-compliance with procedural laws under Sections 206 and 207 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, and Sections 447, 448, and 448-A(v) of the Motor Vehicle Act Rules, as well as the absence of identification badges on the seizing officers and the non-filing of a charge sheet within three days as per Section 448-A(IV) of the Motor Vehicle Rules 1989. The original writ petition sought a declaration that the seizure was illegal and unconstitutional, and directions for departmental proceedings. The Single Judge had directed the release of the vehicle upon an undertaking to appear before the competent Trial Court, noting that the seizure was without due procedure. However, the Division Bench, upon reviewing the prayer and submissions, concluded that the core issues pertained to criminal proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act or the Hyderabad City Police Act, 1348-F, rendering the writ appeal jurisdictionally incompetent.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_128f3e0c-6a8d-4498-8ecc-c6ecc812aacb.pdf">WA 195/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: V.MANOHAR RAO VS M/S. SRL BUILDERS AND DEVELOPERS</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>22-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE APARESH KUMAR SINGH, JUSTICE G.M. MOHIUDDIN</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Property Law</strong></p><p>The High Court set aside the Single Judge&#8217;s order directing a comprehensive survey for boundary fixation, allowing the writ appeal. The decisive ground was that the Single Judge disposed of the writ petition at the admission stage without issuing notice to the appellants, who were necessary parties asserting ownership and possession over the disputed land, thereby violating fundamental principles of natural justice. The Court noted that the dispute involved competing claims of title and possession, not merely an administrative exercise, and that earlier joint surveys in 1998 and 2008 had recorded the existence of Sy.No.295 of Mallampet Village and the non-existence of Sy.Nos.81/2 and 297 of Bollaram Village as private patta lands. Furthermore, the appellants&#8217; predecessors held a final decree of perpetual injunction in O.S.No.169 of 2008, while the respondents&#8217; suit, O.S.No.38 of 2008, was dismissed for default. The Court emphasized that the respondents suppressed material facts, including these prior surveys and litigation, disentitling them from equitable relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. The Single Judge also erred by granting relief beyond the prayer sought, effectively ordering a fresh survey without determining its necessity or considering the finality of earlier proceedings.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_64b41536-b36e-4e86-be1d-584de7dfe255.pdf">WA 262/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: M/S READERS STORES VS TELANGANA STATE TRADE PROMOTION CORPORATION LIMITED</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>21-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE APARESH KUMAR SINGH, JUSTICE G.M. MOHIUDDIN</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Contract Law</strong></p><p>The High Court dismissed the writ appeal, affirming the Single Judge&#8217;s decision that no concluded contract existed between the appellants and the Telangana State Trade Promotion Corporation Limited (TGTPC) for an Operation &amp; Management (O&amp;M) Contract, despite a Letter of Award (LOA). The Court reasoned that the LOA was merely an intermediate step, subject to conditions precedent and execution of a formal O&amp;M Agreement, as explicitly contemplated by Clause 1.1.14 and Clause 4.8.1 of the Request for Proposal (RFP). The appellants&#8217; subsequent conduct, including repeated requests for modifications to material terms, demonstrated a lack of consensus ad idem, negating the claim of a binding contract. Crucially, TGTPC validly exercised its right under Clause 2.7.1 of the RFP to annul the bidding process at any stage without liability, a power the Court found to be bona fide and based on genuine administrative exigencies, including increased storage requirements. The Court distinguished Kollipara Sriramulu v. T. Aswathanarayana by noting that here, a formal agreement was a condition precedent, and Subodh Kumar Singh Rathour as no enforceable rights had accrued. The Court reiterated that judicial review in tender matters is limited, as held in Raunaq International Limited v. I.V.R Construction Limited, and found no arbitrariness or mala fides in TGTPC&#8217;s decision.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_25978a1e-17ea-4e98-b659-9bdb928cadb9.pdf">WA 284/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: P.V. NARASIMHA RAO TELANGANA VETERINARY UNIVERSITY VS RAVI GUGULOTHU</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>21-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE APARESH KUMAR SINGH, JUSTICE G.M. MOHIUDDIN</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Employment Law</strong></p><p>The High Court allowed the appeals, setting aside the Single Judge&#8217;s order directing the appellant-University to appoint the writ petitioners as Assistant Professors. The Court held that the selection process was valid, finding that the notification&#8217;s stipulation of &#8220;knowledge of Telugu language is preferable&#8221; did not render it a mandatory eligibility criterion, and the condition in the appointment orders requiring passing a Telugu language test within three years was a precautionary measure, not an alteration of essential qualifications. The Court emphasized that the terms of the recruitment notification constitute the governing framework, and an appointment order cannot enlarge or alter prescribed eligibility criteria. It rejected the argument that the selection lacked transparency due to non-publication of a merit list, noting G.O.Ms.No.15 dated 29.06.2019 did not mandate such publication. Crucially, the Court relied on the principle established in Madan Lal v. State of J&amp;K (1995) 3 SCC 486, holding that candidates who participate in a selection process with full knowledge of the criteria cannot challenge it after being unsuccessful. The Court also found the Single Judge&#8217;s direction to appoint second-ranked candidates legally unsustainable, as it would create supernumerary posts and grant notional seniority without actual service, which is impermissible.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_463e9c0b-328d-4c4c-b992-c01884e02228.pdf">WA 448/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: PAWAN KUMAR JAIN VS THE UNION OF INDIA</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>21-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE APARESH KUMAR SINGH, JUSTICE G.M. MOHIUDDIN</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Administrative Law</strong></p><p>The High Court, in disposing of the writ appeal, directed the appellant to follow a specific procedure for obtaining a fresh passport after his original passport, deposited as an anticipatory bail condition, was misplaced. The Court noted that the writ court had correctly declined interference due to the alternative remedy of appeal under Section 11 of the Passports Act, 1967. However, considering the unique circumstances where the passport was lost in police custody, the Court outlined a path forward: the appellant must first apply for a duplicate passport, whose validity had expired, from the passport authority. Subsequently, he should approach the XIV Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad, for a No Objection Certificate (NOC) under Section 6(2)(f) of the Act, read with GSR 570(E) dated 25.08.1993 and Office Memorandum dated 10.10.2019, as guided by Sri Balvinder Singh v. The Union of India (W.A.No.194 of 2026, dated 17.02.2026). Upon receiving the NOC, the appellant can then apply for renewal of his passport, which the passport authority is bound to entertain in accordance with law. This approach balances the appellant&#8217;s right to a passport with the ongoing criminal proceedings.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_85ecd517-7fe2-4328-92c9-f6a4b820af84.pdf">WA 449/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: PEDDI VIJAYA BHASKAR VS THE STATE OF TELANGANA,</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>21-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE APARESH KUMAR SINGH, JUSTICE G.M. MOHIUDDIN</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Property Law</strong></p><p>The High Court disposed of the writ appeal, directing the appellant to pursue the statutory remedy of appeal before the Land Tribunal, or the Chief Commissioner of Land Administration (Commissioner) as deemed Land Tribunal under Section 14 of the Telangana Bhu Bharati (Record of Rights in Land) Act, 2025 (2025 Act), against the District Collector&#8217;s order dated 20.04.2024. The Court reasoned that while the writ court had dismissed the petition due to the pendency of civil proceedings in O.S.No. 786 of 2024, the proper course of action, given the repeal of the Telangana Rights in Land and Pattadar Passbooks Act, 2020 and enactment of the 2025 Act, was to avail the prescribed appellate mechanism. The Court noted that the writ court&#8217;s dismissal without liberty precluded the appellant from pursuing this alternative remedy. Consequently, the Court directed the appellant to file an appeal before the Commissioner within two weeks, instructing the Commissioner to consider the delay, accounting for the time spent in writ proceedings, and clarifying that any observations on merits by the writ court would not influence the appellate decision.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_47514c80-4594-4731-9f4f-76f91095384e.pdf">WA 452/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: NALLA VIJAY KUMAR VS JELLA BHEEMAIAH</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>21-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE APARESH KUMAR SINGH, JUSTICE G.M. MOHIUDDIN</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Administrative Law</strong></p><p>The High Court dismissed the writ appeal, affirming the learned Single Judge&#8217;s decision to direct the Northern Power Distribution Company of Telangana Limited (TGNPDCL) to provide a new electricity service connection to Respondent No.1. The Court held that the existence of a disputed title over the property, subject to pending civil suits (O.S.No.22 of 2022 and O.S.No.156 of 2023), does not preclude the grant of an electricity connection, particularly when the applicant is in possession and willing to clear outstanding dues. The decisive ground was that the electricity department had failed to demonstrate that the earlier service connections (Nos.62915-00081 and 62915-00758), which had outstanding arrears, were legitimately installed in Respondent No.1&#8217;s premises with his consent, or that he was liable for the dues attributable to his parents/tenants. The Court rejected the appellant&#8217;s contention that the writ court erred in adjudicating disputed questions of title under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, clarifying that the grant of a service connection does not impact the outcome of the pending title suits. The Court found no jurisdictional error in the Single Judge&#8217;s direction, especially since a departmental enquiry had identified lapses on the appellant&#8217;s part regarding the previous connections.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_d3c0920c-2bbc-4e89-8474-a18ef1e1d76d.pdf">WA 444/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: K. JAGADEESHWAR REDDY VS THE STATE OF TELANGANA</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>20-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE APARESH KUMAR SINGH, JUSTICE G.M. MOHIUDDIN</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Criminal Law</strong></p><p>The High Court of Telangana disposed of a writ appeal challenging a Single Judge&#8217;s order declining police protection against alleged criminal trespass, where the appellant claimed title based on a decree against the Municipal Corporation, Gadwal, and had lodged FIR No.19 of 2026 under Sections 329(3), 126(2), 352 read with Section 3(5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. The appellant sought directions under Section 176(1) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) for police to prevent interference with his property. The Single Judge had dismissed the writ petition, observing that the appellant had rushed to court prematurely without seeking relief from the trial court. While the Division Bench expressed serious doubts regarding the maintainability of the writ appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, given the subject matter falling within criminal jurisdiction, the learned Government Pleader for Home submitted that the appellant could approach the jurisdictional Executive Magistrate under Section 164 of the BNSS for alleged breach of peace or nuisance. Consequently, the appellant sought and was granted liberty to approach the jurisdictional Executive Magistrate for redressal of his grievance, thereby disposing of the writ appeal without costs.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_81105f04-ed75-4db0-9c8f-2f1277eb4e90.pdf">WA 460/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: M/S. GIRNAR DEVELOPERS VS THE STATE OF TELANGANA</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>21-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE APARESH KUMAR SINGH, JUSTICE G.M. MOHIUDDIN</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Urban Planning Law</strong></p><p>The High Court of Telangana disposed of a writ appeal, directing the learned writ court to urgently consider the appellant&#8217;s interlocutory application seeking suspension of a sealing notice, while temporarily restraining the respondent Corporation from enforcing a demolition order. The appellant, M/s. Girnar Developers, challenged the sealing notice dated 30.03.2026 and a demolition order dated 05.03.2026 issued under Sections 452(1), 461(1), 636, and 461-A of the Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation Act, 1955, pertaining to alleged unauthorised construction. The Court noted that despite the urgency arising from the sealing of the entire premises, the writ court had merely adjourned the matter for filing a counter-affidavit without addressing the interim relief sought. While refraining from commenting on the merits of the case, the appellate court found that the interim prayer for unsealing the premises, made in I.A.No.1 of 2026, required immediate consideration by the writ court. Consequently, the High Court requested the writ court to list I.A.No.1 of 2026 on 24.04.2026 and directed the Corporation to refrain from giving effect to the demolition order dated 05.03.2026 until that date.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_4ec41159-1ca3-4cb8-b2ae-5b5e181869a6.pdf">WA 447/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: NASER SALAHUDDIN QURESHI VS THE STATE OF TELANGANA</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>20-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE APARESH KUMAR SINGH, JUSTICE G.M. MOHIUDDIN</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Civil Law</strong></p><p>The High Court dismissed the writ appeal, affirming that a writ petition seeking police aid for enforcing a perpetual injunction decree is not maintainable under Article 226 of the Constitution without exhausting remedies under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC). The Court reasoned that the CPC provides a complete mechanism for decree enforcement, specifically through Order XXI Rule 32 and Order XXXIX Rule 2A, which empower the executing court to grant relief, including police aid. The Court relied on P.R. Murlidharan v. Swami Dharmananda Theertha Padar (2006) 4 SCC 501, which held that writ jurisdiction cannot be a forum for adjudicating civil rights or bypassing established civil remedies, and that police protection for a decree must be sought from the competent civil court. The argument that a final decree warrants direct police aid, unlike an interim order, was rejected as the CPC mechanism applies to all decrees. The Court concluded that bypassing statutory remedies for police intervention, even for a final decree, is impermissible, and the appellants must approach the executing court in O.S.No.2272 of 2018 for appropriate relief.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_567f6cfb-27c4-4d30-9cbf-0db248aa3ee4.pdf">WA 200/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: FATIMA BEGUM VS MOHAMMED BASHEER</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>20-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE APARESH KUMAR SINGH, JUSTICE G.M. MOHIUDDIN</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Urban Planning Law</strong></p><p>The High Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the impugned direction for police aid to demolish structures, as the Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation (GHMC) had withdrawn its foundational notice dated 30.10.2025, issued under Section 459 of the Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation Act, 1955. The Court noted that the GHMC&#8217;s initial notice, which formed the basis for the writ petition seeking police protection for demolition, was issued without first satisfying the precondition that the structure was in a ruinous condition, as contemplated by Section 456 of the Act, and without obtaining an expert structural stability report. The appellant, a third party, had challenged the direction, asserting subsisting title and having instituted a suit for partition and declaration of sale deeds as null and void, highlighting the disputed ownership. The GHMC, acknowledging its statutory obligation to act strictly in accordance with law, submitted that the notice was withdrawn to facilitate a fair, transparent, and legally compliant procedure, assuring that any future action would follow due process, principles of natural justice, and be based on an expert report. Consequently, with the withdrawal of the underlying notice, the basis for the writ court&#8217;s direction ceased to exist, rendering the direction unsustainable.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_5f5bc76b-ed96-44d8-b60a-31b3eb64de9b.pdf">WA 1265/2025</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: TELANGANA STATE LEVEL POLICE RECRUITMENT BOARD, VS VISLAVATH RAHUL,</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>20-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE APARESH KUMAR SINGH, JUSTICE G.M. MOHIUDDIN</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Administrative Law</strong></p><p>The High Court modified the impugned order of the writ court, holding that while the Telangana State Level Police Recruitment Board (appellant) must consider representations for re-medical examination, the writ court erred in dictating the specific hospitals for such re-examination, thereby curtailing the administrative authority&#8217;s discretion. The decisive ground was that the writ court&#8217;s direction to conduct re-medical examinations at specified hospitals, despite the District Headquarters Hospitals not recommending referral to Osmania/Gandhi Hospitals as per the Recruitment Notification Rc. No./41/Rect./Admn.1/2022 dated 25.04.2022, effectively removed the Superintendent of Police&#8217;s independent discretion to act in accordance with law and the recruitment conditions. The Court acknowledged the appellant Board&#8217;s willingness to entertain applications and pass appropriate orders but found the latter part of the impugned direction to be an unwarranted encroachment on administrative prerogative. Consequently, the Court set aside the portion of the writ court&#8217;s order that specified the hospitals for re-medical examination, directing the respondent authorities to decide on the representations in accordance with law within six weeks, thereby restoring the administrative discretion while ensuring due consideration of the petitioners&#8217; grievances.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_3aab04a6-394b-42d3-84b3-803f8bd30ea5.pdf">WA 435/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: M/S THE LUCIFER RESTAURANT VS THE STATE OF TELANGANA</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>17-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE APARESH KUMAR SINGH, JUSTICE G.M. MOHIUDDIN</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Criminal Law</strong></p><p>The High Court dismissed the writ appeal as not maintainable, holding that an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent jurisdiction is impermissible against subject matter and relief connected with criminal jurisdiction. The appellants had sought a Writ of Mandamus to prevent Respondent No. 5 from repeatedly initiating proceedings under Sections 223 and 275 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita and Sections of the COTPA Act, citing previous judgments in Criminal Petition No. 152 of 2020 and batch and Criminal Petition No. 5619 of 2020 and batch. The learned Single Judge had previously dismissed the writ petition, finding it not maintainable given the registration of F.I.R. No. 100 of 2026. While the appellants contended that the Single Judge failed to appreciate the prayer seeking a prospective bar on further FIRs, the Division Bench unequivocally determined that the nature of the relief sought, being intrinsically linked to criminal proceedings, fell outside the purview of a Letters Patent Appeal, thereby affirming the principle that such appeals are restricted to civil matters.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_dfd716f7-6522-4bdb-b21a-86f4edb6d3e9.pdf">WA 436/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: SHERAZ KHAN VS DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>17-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE APARESH KUMAR SINGH, JUSTICE G.M. MOHIUDDIN</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Criminal Law</strong></p><p>The High Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the writ court&#8217;s decision to reject the appellants&#8217; challenge against the Enforcement Directorate&#8217;s (ED) custody and auction of properties they purchased. The Court held that the properties, having been subject to attachment in a money laundering case (ECIR/HYZO/04/2018) and confirmed by the Adjudicating Authority under Section 8(3) of the Prevention of Money-laundering Act, 2002, were legitimately under ED control. Crucially, the appellants purchased these properties in 2023 from Ms. Shaik Nowhera without obtaining a No Objection Certificate from the ED, despite the attachment being confirmed on 04.02.2020 and the Tahsildar having been informed not to permit alienation. The Court noted that the Supreme Court, in Miscellaneous Application No.2227/2024 in W.P (Crl.).No.31 of 2020, dated 10.10.2025 and 08.04.2026, had directed the auction sale of these properties, and earlier Supreme Court orders (05.12.2022 and 24.03.2023) only permitted lifting attachment upon a valid salable title in a transparent manner, which was absent here. The Court rejected the appellants&#8217; contention that the properties were agricultural and thus exempt, finding no grounds to interfere given the confirmed attachment and Supreme Court-ordered auctions.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_e72148b3-fbc2-46c4-8db1-0abf4b860f44.pdf">WA 439/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: NALLAPATI PRAMEELA VS THE STATE OF TELANGANA</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>17-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE APARESH KUMAR SINGH, JUSTICE G.M. MOHIUDDIN</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Criminal Law</strong></p><p>The High Court of Telangana dismissed the instant Writ Appeal as not maintainable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, holding that the nature of relief sought, pertaining to directions for investigation and filing of a charge sheet in Crime No. 154 of 2024, did not fall within the appellate jurisdiction. The appellant, who was respondent No. 6 in the original Writ Petition No. 27624 of 2025, challenged the order dated 12.09.2025, contending that the learned Single Judge disposed of the petition without notice or hearing, thereby adversely affecting her interests. The original writ petition sought a mandamus directing respondent No. 5 to complete investigation and file a charge sheet in Crime No. 154 of 2024, registered under Sections 199, 420, 466, 468, 471, 474 read with Section 34 IPC and Section 175(3) of BNS, against the appellant. The Division Bench, while dismissing the appeal on grounds of maintainability, granted liberty to the appellant to move an appropriate application before the learned writ Court, emphasizing that she could avail any remedy permissible in law. The Court&#8217;s decision underscores the jurisdictional limitations of a Letters Patent Appeal when the primary relief sought is in the nature of directions for police investigation, which are typically considered interlocutory or procedural in character and do not finally determine the rights of the parties in a manner amenable to such an appeal.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_da6a2cd0-2f60-4e72-876e-1c94461916ee.pdf">WA 437/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: PEDDI RAGHAVENDER RAO VS THE STATE OF TELANGANA</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>17-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE APARESH KUMAR SINGH, JUSTICE G.M. MOHIUDDIN</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Urban Planning Law</strong></p><p>The High Court disposed of the writ appeal, holding that the appellant&#8217;s challenge to a building permission granted by the Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation (GHMC) was premature, as a statutory notice issued by the appellant to the Zonal Commissioner, GHMC, under the Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation Act, 1955, remained pending. The Court found the appellant&#8217;s approach of seeking direct writ interference against the construction, while a statutory remedy was still being pursued, to be &#8220;uncalled for.&#8221; The learned writ Court had previously dismissed the appellant&#8217;s petition, primarily due to his failure to establish proof of ownership or possession over the subject property, lacking a registered sale deed, mutation records, or a legal heir certificate to derive title from his father&#8217;s pattadar passbook. Recognizing that the writ court&#8217;s observations on title and possession could prejudice the pending statutory proceeding, the High Court directed respondent No.2 (Zonal Commissioner, GHMC) to decide the appellant&#8217;s notice dated 25.02.2025 in accordance with law, after hearing all affected parties, preferably within eight weeks, explicitly clarifying that any observations made by the learned writ Court touching the merits of the case would not influence this decision. Consequently, the costs of Rs.10,000/- imposed by the learned writ Court on the appellant were also waived.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_a06aa056-72ee-4d39-8a58-a2dfd62bd553.pdf">WA 440/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: G. NARASIMHA REDDY VS SMT. Y. SWARNALATHA REDDY</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>17-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE APARESH KUMAR SINGH, JUSTICE G.M. MOHIUDDIN</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Property Law</strong></p><p>The High Court, in disposing of the Writ Appeal, stayed the interim direction of the learned writ Court dated 05.02.2026, which had ordered the Revenue Divisional Officer to release the property in favour of the writ petitioner. The Court reasoned that while the writ petitioner enjoyed an injunction in O.S. No. 18 of 2025, the Revenue Divisional Officer&#8217;s parallel proceedings under Section 164 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, for restoration of custody to the Government were uncalled for. The Supreme Court, in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 16750 of 2025, had previously directed the appellant to move a stay vacate petition before the trial Court, upholding the interim injunction in favour of the petitioner, but without adjudicating the merits. The High Court found that the writ Court&#8217;s direct order for property release, without hearing the appellant who had not appeared in the writ proceedings despite notice, was improper. Consequently, the Court directed the writ Court to expeditiously hear the appellant&#8217;s stay vacate petition, preferably on 28.04.2026, and clarified that its order made no observation on the inter se possession of the parties, while also directing the jurisdictional Magistrate to ensure peace regarding the Section 164 BNSS proceedings.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_1eca25bf-4aa5-4bf1-af5f-a460d9bb664a.pdf">WA 166/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: HARI OM METAL TUBES PVT. LTD VS THE STATE OF TELANGANA</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>17-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE APARESH KUMAR SINGH, JUSTICE G.M. MOHIUDDIN</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Civil Law</strong></p><p>The High Court, in its judgment dated 17.04.2026, dismissed Writ Appeal No. 166 of 2026, along with I.A. No. 1 of 2026, as withdrawn, granting the appellant, Hari Om Metal Tubes Pvt. Ltd., liberty to pursue appropriate remedies available in law. The decisive ground for this disposition was the appellant&#8217;s counsel, Ms. Nishtha, seeking permission to withdraw the writ appeal. I.A. No. 1 of 2026, which sought to condone a delay of 165 days in filing the writ appeal, was consequently also dismissed as withdrawn. The Court did not delve into the merits of the delay application or the substantive issues of the writ appeal, as the withdrawal request rendered such an examination moot. This procedural outcome reflects the principle that a party may, with leave of the Court, withdraw proceedings, particularly when seeking to avail alternative legal avenues, thereby preserving their right to agitate the matter afresh in a more suitable forum. No costs were awarded.</p><div><hr></div><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://askjunior.substack.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">Ask Junior - Judgment Summaries is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.</p></div><form class="subscription-widget-subscribe"><input type="email" class="email-input" name="email" placeholder="Type your email&#8230;" tabindex="-1"><input type="submit" class="button primary" value="Subscribe"><div class="fake-input-wrapper"><div class="fake-input"></div><div class="fake-button"></div></div></form></div></div>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Telangana High Court Weekly Digest (10.04.2026 - 16.04.2026)]]></title><description><![CDATA[Stay updated with the judgments from the Telangana High Court every week. We bring you concise summaries of judgments, helping you stay informed without wading through lengthy case reports]]></description><link>https://askjunior.substack.com/p/telangana-high-court-weekly-digest-9ce</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://askjunior.substack.com/p/telangana-high-court-weekly-digest-9ce</guid><pubDate>Sun, 19 Apr 2026 03:30:57 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/2e9461fe-585a-4d41-857b-5cc8ca6b9620_1200x630.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_1e4cb116-c619-4aaa-8a8c-e09a04e33957.pdf">MACMA 2380/2014</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: K.SANTHALAKSHMI AND 5 OTHERS VS P.LAKSHMANA RAO AND ANOTHER</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>10-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE B.R.MADHUSUDHAN RAO</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Civil Law</strong></p><p>The High Court, exercising powers under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, modified the Tribunal&#8217;s award, enhancing compensation for the appellants. The Court found the Tribunal erred in fixing 50% contributory negligence on the deceased, reducing it to 25% based on Ex.A4 (charge sheet) and Ex.B2 (rough sketch) which indicated the deceased was on the wrong side of the road, distinguishing the facts from Jumani Begam Vs. Ram Narayan and others [2020 (1) ALD 113 (SC)] and Karri Nagapadma Sridevi and another Vs. Oriental Fire and General Insurance Company Limited, Kakinada and others [2001 (6) ALD 844 [DB]] which were deemed inapplicable. Further, the Court recalculated the deceased&#8217;s income by deducting only professional tax, applied a multiplier of &#8216;14&#8217; as per Smt. Sarla Verma and others Vs. Delhi Transport Corporation and another [(2009) 6 SCC 121], and awarded future prospects, consortium, loss of estate, and funeral expenses in line with National Insurance Company Limited Vs. Pranayi Sethi and others [(2017) 16 SCC 680]. The interest rate was also enhanced to 9% per annum, citing Sebastiani Lakra and Others Vs. National Insurance Company Limited and another [(2019) 17 SCC 465], resulting in a total enhanced compensation of Rs.17,05,063/-.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_3f590a86-186f-4b3b-959f-7626f3cd53ce.pdf">MACMA 3681/2008</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: P. GOPAL REDDY R/O RAJENDRANAGAR, R.R.DISTRICT VS J. YADAIAH AND 2 OTHERS</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>10-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE B.R.MADHUSUDHAN RAO</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Civil Law</strong></p><p>The High Court, exercising its powers under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, significantly enhanced the compensation awarded to the appellant-petitioner, finding the Tribunal erred in fixing contributory negligence and in assessing income and medical expenses. The Court held that the Tribunal wrongly attributed 25% contributory negligence to the appellant, relying on Mohammed Siddique and another vs. National Insurance Company Limited and others (AIR 2020 Supreme Court 520), which established that mere violation of law (like triple riding) does not, without more, prove contributory negligence unless it directly contributed to the accident or its impact. Further, the Court applied Kumari K. Pushpa Latha Vs. E. Murali Manohar Rao and another (2013 (2) ALD 659) to underscore that the charge sheet (Ex.A2) against the crime vehicle&#8217;s driver negated the appellant&#8217;s negligence. The Court revised the appellant&#8217;s monthly income to Rs.4,000/-, applied a multiplier of &#8216;18&#8217; as per Smt. Sarla Verma and others Vs. Delhi Transport Corporation ((2009) 6 SCC 121), and fixed disability at 20% citing Pappu Deo Yadav vs. Naresh Kumar and others (AIR 2020 SC 4424), also allowing for future prospects as per National Insurance Company Limited Vs. Pranay Sethi and others ((2017) 16 SCC 680). The Court rejected the respondent&#8217;s argument to dismiss the claim without a cross-appeal, distinguishing Santosh Hazari vs. Purushottam Tiwari (deceased) by LRs ((2001) 3 SCC 179), ultimately enhancing the compensation from Rs.1,49,550/- to Rs.4,32,120/- with 7.5% interest.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_a491f74a-a757-4e9e-9203-542549efb767.pdf">WP 8655/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: PILLA SRILAXMI VS THE STATE OF TELANGANA</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>13-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE MOUSHUMI BHATTACHARYA,THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE GADI PRAVEEN KUMAR</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Civil Law</strong></p><p>The High Court for the State of Telangana, in W.P. No. 8655 of 2026, dismissed the writ petition along with all connected applications for default, as the petitioner was unrepresented for the second consecutive occasion. The Court, comprising The Hon&#8217;ble Justice Moushumi Bhattacharya and The Hon&#8217;ble Justice Gadi Praveen Kumar, found no compelling reason to proceed with the matter in the absence of the petitioner&#8217;s counsel, Mr. Bethi Venkateshwarlu. Consequently, all interim orders, if any, were also dismissed. This decision underscores the procedural requirement for parties to be represented or to appear before the Court, and the failure to do so, particularly on successive occasions, can lead to the dismissal of the petition for non-prosecution. The Court did not delve into the merits of the case, as the dismissal was purely on procedural grounds due to the petitioner&#8217;s repeated absence. There was no order as to costs. The judgment reflects the Court&#8217;s adherence to established procedural norms, ensuring that judicial time is not unduly consumed by matters where parties fail to present their case.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_636d19f0-9c6d-41ee-97cc-f020141001be.pdf">MACMA 1184/2025</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: ICICI LOMBARD GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED VS NEELI DEEPIKA</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>10-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE MOUSHUMI BHATTACHARYA,THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE GADI PRAVEEN KUMAR</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Insurance Law</strong></p><p>The High Court of Telangana disposed of M.A.C.M.A.No.1184 of 2025, holding that nothing further survived for consideration in the appeal given the settlement reached between the parties before the Lok Adalat. The decisive ground for this disposition was the Lok Adalat Award dated 28.03.2026, which comprehensively addressed the dispute. The Court noted that the appellant&#8217;s counsel confirmed the settlement and the specific terms contained within the Award. Consequently, the Court found it unnecessary to delve into the merits of the appeal, as the Lok Adalat&#8217;s findings rendered the appeal infructuous. This approach aligns with the principle of promoting alternative dispute resolution mechanisms and giving effect to settlements arrived at through such processes. The Court, therefore, directed that the appeal, along with all connected applications, be disposed of in terms of the said Lok Adalat Award, vacating any interim orders previously in force, and made no order as to costs.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_6d5f8efe-5db2-4737-9867-174940182244.pdf">COMCA 7/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: UNION OF INDIA VS KRISHNAPATNAM RAILWAY COMPANY LIMITED</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>10-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE MOUSHUMI BHATTACHARYA,THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE GADI PRAVEEN KUMAR</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Arbitration Law</strong></p><p>The High Court dismissed the Commercial Court Appeal, affirming the attachment of the appellant&#8217;s bank account for execution of an arbitral award, holding that the appellant, Union of India, failed to substantiate its claims for exemption under the proviso to Section 60(1) of the CPC and Section 3 of the Provident Funds Act, 1925. The Court found the appellant did not provide specific particulars or cogent evidence to demonstrate how the attached Treasury Account, containing alleged Provident Fund deposits and Life Insurance premiums, fell within the statutory exemptions, reiterating that the burden of proof lies squarely on the party seeking such benefit, as established in Govindan A Vs. Govindarajan KK (2007 (2) ILR 654). Furthermore, the Court clarified that the Commercial Court correctly followed the procedure under Order XXI Rule 46 of the CPC for attachment, noting that Order XXI Rule 46A, concerning notice to the garnishee, becomes unnecessary once the garnishee reports compliance with the attachment order, as occurred here. The Court also held that the appellant&#8217;s application was not maintainable under Section 47 of the CPC, as the objections did not relate to the validity of the decree but rather sought to challenge a subsequent execution order, which is beyond the microscopic scope of Section 47, as held in Dhurandar Prasad Singh v. Jai Prakash University (2001 6 SCC 534). The Court concluded that the appellant&#8217;s objections were devoid of statutory basis and intended to delay execution of the enforceable arbitral award.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_3a0df747-487d-4f8e-8047-ec1c047aba37.pdf">WA 1528/2017</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: THE DIST.COLLECTOR,HYDERABAD,AND 2 OTRS. VS SRI AYUB KAMAAL,HYDERABAD,AND 16 OTRS.</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>10-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE MOUSHUMI BHATTACHARYA,THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE GADI PRAVEEN KUMAR</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Property Law</strong></p><p>The High Court dismissed the State&#8217;s appeal, affirming the Single Judge&#8217;s order directing amendment of revenue records and peg-marking of the petitioner&#8217;s land, finding no perversity or error of law. The Court held that the State could not disown the Survey Report dated 05.09.2009, which was conducted at its behest by the Deputy Director, Survey and Land Records, and remained unchallenged by the State from 2009 until 2015, nor was it superseded. The Court emphasized that implementation of a survey report merely identifies land boundaries and does not confer or divest title, thus causing no prejudice to the State, which had not claimed title to the 6403 sq. mts. in R.S.No.144/129/71. The Court rejected the State&#8217;s belated objections, noting its failure to challenge the Survey Report within the statutory timeframe of The Telangana Land Revenue Act, 1317-Fasli, and its prior concession in the counter-affidavit. The Court distinguished S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (dead) by LRs v. Jagannath (dead) by LRs and others and R. Hanumaiah and another v. Secretary to Government of Karnataka, Revenue Department and others, finding no evidence of fraud or land grabbing by the petitioner. The Court reiterated that an appellate court interferes with a Single Judge&#8217;s order only if it is perverse or suffers from an error apparent in law, citing Airports Authority Of India v. Pradip Kumar Banerjee.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_14a97eb3-eb6e-46aa-b682-16d748cc1155.pdf">WA 432/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: MIRZA MATIULLAJ BAIG ALIAS MIRZA MATIULLA BAIG NIHAL VS THE UNION OF INDIA</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>16-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE APARESH KUMAR SINGH,THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE G.M. MOHIUDDIN</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Criminal Law</strong></p><p>The High Court modified the writ court&#8217;s judgment, holding that the period for which the appellant&#8217;s passport should be re-issued or renewed, despite pending criminal proceedings under Sections 406 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, must be determined by the trial court. The appellant, facing charges in C.C.No.1580 of 2021, had sought renewal of his passport, which the writ court had limited to one year. Relying on the precedent set in Nidhi Agarwal v. Union of India (2025 SCC OnLine TS 1778), which clarified Notification No.GSR 570(E) dated 25.08.1993, the Court emphasized that the trial court is best placed to decide the appropriate validity period for the passport, considering the specific facts and circumstances of the case. Consequently, the direction in paragraph 5 of the impugned judgment in W.P.No.16162 of 2025 was modified, allowing the trial court to pass orders regarding the renewal period upon the appellant&#8217;s application for a No Objection Certificate. This ensures judicial discretion at the trial level in balancing the appellant&#8217;s right to travel with the exigencies of ongoing criminal proceedings.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_67098974-4675-40e6-b52e-be00dc4e4746.pdf">WA 434/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: SK.SHABEER VS THE STATE OF TELANGANA</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>16-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE APARESH KUMAR SINGH,THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE G.M. MOHIUDDIN</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Land Acquisition Law</strong></p><p>The High Court set aside the impugned judgment dated 07.04.2023 in W.P.No.25680 of 2023, which had relegated the appellants to the statutory remedy under Section 3G(5) of the National Highways Act, 1956 (&#8221;the Act of 1956&#8221;), holding that the writ petitioners, as project affected and displaced families, are entitled to the Rehabilitation and Resettlement (R&amp;R) Scheme under the Second and Third Schedules of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (&#8221;the Act of 2013&#8221;). The Court reasoned that the benefits under the Act of 2013, including R&amp;R, were extended to acquisitions under the Act of 1956 by virtue of the Central Government&#8217;s order dated 28.08.2015, issued under Section 113(1) of the Act of 2013, which specified the Act of 1956 at serial No.7 in the Fourth Schedule of the Act of 2013, effective from 01.01.2015. This position was further reinforced by comprehensive guidelines issued by the Ministry of Road, Transport and Highways dated 28.12.2017, specifically paragraph 4.4. The Court found that the remedy under Section 3G(5) of the Act of 1956 was inapplicable as it pertains to grievances against an award, whereas the appellants&#8217; claim was for the non-consideration of their entitlement to an R&amp;R Scheme itself. Consequently, the Court directed respondent No.7 to consider the appellants&#8217; claim for R&amp;R within eight weeks.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_24110648-999d-49c9-9ad9-5d63be128439.pdf">WA 367/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: THE STATE OF TELANGANA VS M. NARENDER REDDY</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>15-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE APARESH KUMAR SINGH,THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE G.M. MOHIUDDIN</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Service Law</strong></p><p>The High Court, in disposing of the writ appeal, held that while the writ court correctly interfered with the recovery order dated 10.07.2020 due to non-compliance with principles of natural justice, it erred in straightaway directing the refund of the recovered amount without allowing the appellants to issue a show cause notice. The Court found that the respondent, a Librarian, had not passed the Accounts Test Part &#8211; I within the stipulated two years for Special Promotion Post Scale &#8211; II, but retired before the two-year period elapsed, and recovery was initiated without prior notice. Relying on the principle established in State of Punjab v. Rafiq Masih (2014) 8 SCC 883, which underscores the necessity of natural justice even in cases of alleged excess payment, the Court affirmed that any recovery, even if permissible in law post-retirement, must be preceded by due process. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal in part, setting aside the writ court&#8217;s direction for immediate refund, and granted the appellants liberty to issue a show cause notice to the respondent regarding the alleged excess payment, thereby ensuring adherence to natural justice principles.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_d9488f5b-f5e8-4f66-b7ea-bd1ba25b1cc4.pdf">WA 404/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: THE GENERAL MANAGER PERSONNEL VS UNION OF INDIA</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>15-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE APARESH KUMAR SINGH,THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE G.M. MOHIUDDIN</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Labor Law</strong></p><p>The High Court dismissed the writ appeal, finding the appellant&#8217;s prayer for a writ of mandamus and prohibition against the Controlling Authority from entertaining applications for enhanced gratuity under Section 7(4) and 4(3) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, inappropriate. The appellant, Singareni Collieries Company Limited, sought to prevent the Controlling Authority from considering enhancement of gratuity beyond the notified limit for employees who retired prior to the Notification dated 29.03.2018, which increased the gratuity ceiling to Rs.20.00 lakhs. The Court noted that unlike other writ petitions where specific orders of the Controlling Authority enhancing gratuity were challenged and interim relief granted, the present petition lacked an impugned order in favour of any workman, thereby rendering the prayer for prohibition premature and without a concrete basis for judicial intervention. While acknowledging the legal question regarding the retrospective application of the 29.03.2018 Notification, the Court declined to interfere in the appeal, instead granting liberty to the appellant to amend the main writ petition and requesting the learned writ court to expeditiously decide the lead matter and other connected petitions after hearing all affected parties, thereby ensuring a quietus to the legal issue.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_9e3bca69-39ca-478a-ac1d-9bc3bbf76d7f.pdf">WA 422/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: CHIRAL BIO-SCIENCES LTD. VS CENTRAL BOARD OF TRUSTEES</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>15-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE APARESH KUMAR SINGH,THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE G.M. MOHIUDDIN</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Labor Law</strong></p><p>The High Court disposed of the writ appeal, granting the appellants liberty to pursue their statutory remedy before the appellate authority against the determination of provident fund dues under Section 7A of the Employees&#8217; Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952. The Court found that the writ court correctly upheld the Section 7A order and subsequent recovery proceedings under Sections 8B and 8G, noting the appellants&#8217; failure to produce statutory records despite 60 adjournments, leading to a best judgment assessment. The decisive ground for the High Court&#8217;s decision was the availability of an efficacious alternative remedy of appeal under Section 7-I of the Act, subject to the pre-deposit requirement of Section 7-O. The Court implicitly relied on the principle that writ jurisdiction should not ordinarily be exercised when a statutory appellate mechanism, capable of addressing both factual and legal contentions, exists. While acknowledging the respondent&#8217;s reliance on Panther Security Service (P) Ltd. v. EPFO (2020 SCC OnLine SC 981), the Court directed the appellate authority to sympathetically consider the delay in filing the appeal, given the time spent by the appellants in pursuing the writ remedy, and to decide the matter on its merits without being influenced by observations made by the writ court or the High Court.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_80e7be3f-2d34-4459-ac19-0afe6ee72095.pdf">WA 424/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: DANDU ANURADHA VS THE STATE OF TELANGANA</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>15-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE APARESH KUMAR SINGH,THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE G.M. MOHIUDDIN</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Criminal Law</strong></p><p>The High Court dismissed the writ appeal as not maintainable, holding that an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent could not lie before a Division Bench against the impugned order dated 09.03.2026 in W.P.No.7119 of 2026. The learned Single Judge had previously dismissed the writ petition, declining to direct police to complete investigation in FIR.No.333 of 2025, which was instituted by the appellant under Sections 406, 420, 467, 468, 471, 506 read with 149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, on the ground that the dispute was civil in nature. Recognizing this jurisdictional impediment, the appellant&#8217;s counsel sought and was granted liberty to withdraw the appeal to pursue appropriate remedies, including a review before the learned writ Court. Consequently, the Court disposed of the writ appeal, affirming its non-maintainability and granting the appellant the liberty to seek recourse as permissible in law, thereby not delving into the merits of the original writ petition concerning the police investigation.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_afc0e4fb-d024-4f2a-a175-a2757cbb6245.pdf">WA 426/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: TELANGANA GRAMEENA BANK OFFICERS ASSOCIATION VS TELANGANA GRAMEENA BANK</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>15-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE APARESH KUMAR SINGH,THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE G.M. MOHIUDDIN</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Tax Law</strong></p><p>The High Court dismissed the writ appeal, affirming the Single Judge&#8217;s decision that Telangana Grameena Bank&#8217;s Circular dated 15.10.2025, mandating deduction of income tax on the perquisite value of staff loans from employees, was valid. The Court held that Section 192(1A) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, provides an employer with the option to either bear the income tax dues on perquisites or deduct them from the employees&#8217; salaries. The Bank&#8217;s decision to deduct tax from employees, as outlined in the impugned circular, was a legitimate exercise of this statutory option and could not be faulted. The Court relied on the Supreme Court&#8217;s judgment in All India Bank Officer&#8217;s Confederation vs. Regional Manager, Central Bank of India and others (2024) 9 SCC 664, which established that interest-free or concessional loans qualify as a fringe benefit and perquisite, thereby attracting tax liability. The appellants&#8217; argument that the respondent Bank should bear the tax burden, akin to State Bank of India, was rejected, as the financial position of another bank does not override the statutory discretion granted to the employer under Section 192(1A) of the Act. Thus, the comparison with State Bank of India employees was deemed unhelpful, and no error was found in the lower court&#8217;s refusal to grant relief.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_a32a4209-34b5-4207-af10-e8a21d6cf831.pdf">WA 428/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: M. CHANDRA MOHAN VS THE COMMISSIONER OF PROHIBITION AND EXCISE</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>15-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE APARESH KUMAR SINGH,THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE G.M. MOHIUDDIN</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Service Law</strong></p><p>The High Court dismissed the instant Writ Appeal, declining to interfere with the learned writ Court&#8217;s decision not to grant interim relief against a Circular dated 01.04.2026, which laid down guidelines for the transfer of Prohibition and Excise Head Constables and Constables. The appellants had challenged the Circular as being contrary to the Presidential Order, 2018, the State and Subordinate Service Rules, and the Telangana Prohibition and Excise Subordinate Service Rules. The Court noted that the transfers had already been effected, and the concerned Constables and Head Constables had joined duty by 10.04.2026. The decisive ground for dismissal was that since the main challenge in the Writ Petition was pending before the learned writ Court, and the transfer orders had already been given effect to, there was no reason for the appellate Court to delve into the merits of the interim relief plea at this stage. The Court emphasized that the parties remained at liberty to agitate the main issue before the learned writ Court, thereby upholding the principle of allowing the primary court to adjudicate the substantive challenge, especially when interim orders would be infructuous due to subsequent events.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_13102f90-066f-456e-8681-ef4038e8f910.pdf">WA 414/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: GYPSUM STRUCTURAL INDIA PVT. LTD VS HYDERABAD METRO-POLITAN WATER SUPPLY AND SEWERAGE BOARD,</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>10-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE APARESH KUMAR SINGH,THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE G.M. MOHIUDDIN</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Administrative Law</strong></p><p>The High Court dismissed the appellant&#8217;s writ appeal challenging the learned Single Judge&#8217;s refusal to grant interim relief against tender conditions 3.7(a)(i) and (ii) in Section II of the Tender dated 24.03.2026, which the appellant contended were arbitrary, illegal, and disadvantageous. The Court held that in challenges to tender conditions alleging arbitrariness and discrimination, no interim relief can be granted at the initial stage, particularly when pleadings are incomplete. This decision was grounded in the principle established by the Apex Court in Raunaq International Ltd. v. I.V.R. Construction Ltd. (AIR 1999 SC 393), which underscores that courts should generally refrain from interfering with tender processes through interim orders in public projects, allowing for a full adjudication after the completion of pleadings. The Court found no reason to interfere with the impugned order of the learned writ Court, which had similarly declined interim relief and directed the filing of counter affidavits. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, with a direction to the learned writ Court to endeavour to decide the writ petition expeditiously after the respondents file their counter affidavits within two weeks.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_a0719c43-2c16-4833-898b-672794096a5d.pdf">WA 406/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: THE STATE OF TELANGANA, VS A. NAMPALLI,</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>10-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE APARESH KUMAR SINGH,THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE G.M. MOHIUDDIN</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Service Law</strong></p><p>The High Court, while condoning a 227-day delay in filing the appeal, partially allowed the State&#8217;s writ appeal, modifying the writ court&#8217;s judgment dated 11.07.2025. The writ court had set aside an order dated 10.07.2020, which recovered Rs.99,000 from the respondent&#8217;s gratuity for failing to pass the Accounts Test Part-I within two years, a condition for Special Promotion Post Scale-II. The High Court affirmed that the recovery, initiated without notice, violated principles of natural justice, citing the Apex Court&#8217;s decision in State of Punjab v. Rafiq Masih (2014) 8 SCC 883, which establishes that recovery from retired employees without due process is impermissible. However, the High Court held that instead of outright directing the refund, the writ court should have remanded the matter for compliance with natural justice. Consequently, the High Court interfered with the writ court&#8217;s direction for immediate refund, allowing the appellants to issue a show cause notice to the respondent and take a decision on the alleged excess payment after considering the respondent&#8217;s reply, thereby balancing the need for due process with the State&#8217;s right to recover if legally permissible.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_017be4d0-6226-4b69-b913-5097e3b43c3d.pdf">WA 405/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: B. VIJAY KUMAR VS THE STATE OF TELANGANA</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>10-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE APARESH KUMAR SINGH,THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE G.M. MOHIUDDIN</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Criminal Law</strong></p><p>The High Court dismissed the writ appeal as withdrawn, which was filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against a judgment declining to interfere with the freezing of a bank account in connection with a criminal case (Crime No. 220 of 2025). The primary reason for dismissal was the appellant&#8217;s inability to overcome the preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the appeal, as the subject matter and relief sought pertained to criminal law. The appellant subsequently sought to withdraw the appeal to file a modification application before the learned writ court, seeking liberty to approach the concerned criminal jurisdiction court under the relevant provisions of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, for defreezing or release of the account. The Court noted that the writ court had already granted liberty to the appellant to avail remedies under law, thus rendering further observations unnecessary. The Court, therefore, found no reason to grant additional liberty beyond what was already provided, and accordingly, dismissed the appeal as withdrawn without any order as to costs.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_3b610667-1e07-49c4-b989-4ede25e6dc2c.pdf">WA 407/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: CH. POCHI REDDY VS KANKANALA ARUNA</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>10-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE APARESH KUMAR SINGH,THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE G.M. MOHIUDDIN</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Civil Law</strong></p><p>The High Court allowed the writ appeal, setting aside the impugned judgment of the learned writ court and remanding the matter for fresh consideration, primarily on the ground that the appellant, a necessary party, was not impleaded in the writ petition despite a clear history of inter-party litigation concerning the subject matter. The Court noted that the writ petition, W.P.No.21589 of 2019, sought police protection based on a decree in O.S.No.52 of 2012, which had subsequently been set aside by the first appellate court, with a Second Appeal (S.A.No.437 of 2023) currently pending. The learned writ court, by its judgment dated 10.02.2026, had directed the respondent to approach police authorities for protection, keeping in view the &#8220;subsisting decree and pendency of the appeal,&#8221; a direction that could adversely affect the appellant. Recognizing the appellant&#8217;s direct interest and the potential prejudice, the Court granted leave to appeal (I.A.No.1 of 2026) and condoned the 57-day delay (I.A.No.2 of 2026). Consequently, the matter was remanded with a direction to implead the appellant in the writ petition, ensuring all rival parties are heard afresh in accordance with law.</p><div><hr></div><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://askjunior.substack.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">Ask Junior - Judgment Summaries is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.</p></div><form class="subscription-widget-subscribe"><input type="email" class="email-input" name="email" placeholder="Type your email&#8230;" tabindex="-1"><input type="submit" class="button primary" value="Subscribe"><div class="fake-input-wrapper"><div class="fake-input"></div><div class="fake-button"></div></div></form></div></div>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Telangana High Court Weekly Digest (03.04.2026 - 09.04.2026)]]></title><description><![CDATA[Stay updated with the judgments from the Telangana High Court every week. We bring you concise summaries of judgments, helping you stay informed without wading through lengthy case reports]]></description><link>https://askjunior.substack.com/p/telangana-high-court-weekly-digest-c50</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://askjunior.substack.com/p/telangana-high-court-weekly-digest-c50</guid><pubDate>Sun, 12 Apr 2026 03:30:50 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/02be75ab-9ca6-497d-8d91-b90b8c107673_1200x630.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_6d0982c1-245a-478a-a61a-31ee91f36d46.pdf">CCCA 147/2024</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: M/S. VISHNU OIL INDUSTRIES VS SRI RAMAVTAR SARDA</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>06-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE RENUKA YARA</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Civil Law</strong></p><p>The High Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the trial court&#8217;s order and decree dated 11.03.2024, which had granted a preliminary decree for dissolution of the appellant-firm under Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC. The Court held that the trial court erroneously passed a judgment on admission by isolating paragraph 13 of the written statement, which stated the firm was dissolved, without considering other averments that disputed the suit&#8217;s maintainability and the plaintiff&#8217;s claims regarding mismanagement and property ownership. The Court emphasized that the power under Order XII Rule 6 CPC is discretionary, not a matter of right, and should not be exercised when defendants raise objections going to the root of the case, as established in S.M. Asif v. Virender Kumar Bajaj ((2015) 9 SCC 287) and Hari Steel and General Industries Limited v. Daljit Singh (2020 (1) ALD 260 (SC)). The Court noted the trial court&#8217;s inconsistency in framing an issue regarding the entitlement to dissolution despite passing a preliminary decree, indicating a lack of conviction regarding a clear and unequivocal admission. The Court concluded that the written statement&#8217;s averments, particularly those concerning the suit&#8217;s maintainability and the firm&#8217;s prior dissolution under Section 43 of the Partnership Act, 1932, were not perused in the correct perspective, rendering the preliminary decree unsustainable.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_5628afec-4568-4d16-a9d3-e714e157fb16.pdf">MACMA 426/2025</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: M/S. SHRIRAM GENERAL INSURANCE CO. LTD., VS VALLAKATI AISHWARYA</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>06-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE RENUKA YARA</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Insurance Law</strong></p><p>The High Court dismissed the appeal by the insurance company, affirming the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal&#8217;s award of compensation under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. The Court held that the insurance company was liable to pay compensation for the death of the pillion rider, who was the mother of the vehicle owner, despite the appellant&#8217;s contention that she was not a third party and no additional premium was paid for pillion rider risk. The decisive ground was that the policy issued was a &#8220;package policy&#8221; which, as per the Supreme Court&#8217;s ruling in National Insurance Company v. Balakrishnan (2013 AIR (SC) 473) and the Delhi High Court&#8217;s decision in United India Insurance Company Limited v. Dheeraj Trahan (MANU/DE/0588/2026), covers the risk of pillion riders in two-wheelers. The Court rejected the argument that the deceased was not a third party, distinguishing New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Sadanand Mukhi (Civil Appeal No.7402 of 2008) which concerned owner-driver relationships. Further, the Court found no ground to interfere with the award due to a seven-day delay in lodging the FIR, acknowledging the family&#8217;s focus on medical care, and upheld the computation of compensation based on gross income, citing a catena of Supreme Court judgments.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_8757ccb4-0234-42a2-94df-7fc238259eea.pdf">SA 1452/2018</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: SIKHA MANI (DIED) VS K PICHIREDDY (DIED)</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>06-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE RENUKA YARA</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Civil Law</strong></p><p>The High Court allowed the Second Appeal, S.A.No.1452 of 2018, in terms of a compromise reached between the parties, thereby setting aside the judgment and decree dated 27.07.2018 passed in A.S.No.12 of 2011 by the Additional Senior Civil Judge, Kothagudem. The decisive ground for this outcome was the successful mediation conducted by the High Court Legal Services Committee on 26.03.2026, where both the appellants and respondents appeared and amicably settled the dispute. Consequently, the parties agreed to abide by the original judgment and decree dated 24.11.2011 passed in O.S.No.23 of 2008 by the Principal Junior Civil Judge, Kothagudem. This resolution effectively reinstated the trial court&#8217;s decision, reversing the intermediate appellate court&#8217;s judgment. The Court, therefore, directed that there shall be no order as to costs, and any pending miscellaneous petitions in the appeal stood closed. This judgment underscores the judiciary&#8217;s reliance on alternative dispute resolution mechanisms for efficient case disposal, particularly when parties reach a mutual understanding.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_c01dc536-ddab-4933-9294-4979465255cf.pdf">MACMA 3356/2019</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: SMT.MODDUBAI LAXMI AND ANOTHER VS SANGOLLA GANGARAM AND ANOTHER</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>06-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE C.V. BHASKAR REDDY</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Civil Law</strong></p><p>The High Court partly allowed the appeal, enhancing the compensation awarded to the appellants/claimants from Rs.4,70,000/- to Rs.6,11,000/- with 7.5% interest per annum, finding the Tribunal&#8217;s assessment of the deceased&#8217;s monthly income to be unduly low. The Court re-assessed the deceased&#8217;s monthly income at Rs.4,000/-, considering his occupation as a Muneem/Clerk and the year of the accident (2013). Applying the principles from National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi (2017) 16 SCC 680, the Court added 25% for future prospects, arriving at a monthly income of Rs.5,000/-, and applied a multiplier of &#8216;13&#8217; for the 50-year-old deceased, calculating loss of dependency at Rs.5,20,000/-. Additionally, Rs.91,000/- was awarded under conventional heads, consistent with Pranay Sethi. The Court rejected the contention that compensation could not exceed the amount claimed, relying on Laxman @ Laxman Mourya Vs. Divisional Manager, Oriental Insurance Company Limited and another (2011) 10 SCC 756 and Nagappa Vs. Gurudayal Singh 2003 ACJ 12 (SC), affirming that Courts can award higher compensation in motor accident claims due to the beneficial nature of the Motor Vehicles Act.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_73bdb093-1468-4220-a7d3-be5c4360fde3.pdf">WA 173/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: K. GANESH VS COMMISSIONER CUM APPELLATE AUTHORITY</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>07-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE APARESH KUMAR SINGH,JUSTICE G.M. MOHIUDDIN</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Family Law</strong></p><p>The High Court disposed of the Writ Appeal, modifying the maintenance directions issued by the learned Writ Court in W.P.No.22753 of 2025, which arose from an appeal under the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007. The Court noted that the Writ Court had previously directed the son and daughter-in-law (respondent Nos.5 and 6) to pay Rs.6,000/- per month to the parents (appellants) and care for the bedridden mother, while allowing them to reside in the property due to their contribution to its development. The present appeal was filed by the parents seeking vacation of the property by the respondents due to alleged verbal abuse and obstruction. However, following undertakings by respondent Nos.5 and 6 to cease such activities and not obstruct the letting out of other floors, the Court found that a peaceful arrangement had been established. While declining to immediately enhance the maintenance from Rs.6,000/-, considering the Writ Court&#8217;s recent order of 06.01.2026 and the availability of other floors for rent, the Court directed respondent Nos.5 and 6 to clear arrears by May 15, 2026, and continue paying Rs.6,000/- monthly until nine months from the Writ Court&#8217;s order, thereafter increasing it to Rs.8,000/-. The Court emphasized that failure to pay maintenance would entitle the appellants to seek legal recourse.</p><div><hr></div><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://askjunior.substack.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">Ask Junior - Judgment Summaries is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.</p></div><form class="subscription-widget-subscribe"><input type="email" class="email-input" name="email" placeholder="Type your email&#8230;" tabindex="-1"><input type="submit" class="button primary" value="Subscribe"><div class="fake-input-wrapper"><div class="fake-input"></div><div class="fake-button"></div></div></form></div></div>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Telangana High Court Weekly Digest (27.03.2026 - 02.04.2026)]]></title><description><![CDATA[Stay updated with the judgments from the Telangana High Court every week. We bring you concise summaries of judgments, helping you stay informed without wading through lengthy case reports]]></description><link>https://askjunior.substack.com/p/telangana-high-court-weekly-digest-329</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://askjunior.substack.com/p/telangana-high-court-weekly-digest-329</guid><pubDate>Sun, 05 Apr 2026 03:30:44 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/f60dd79a-75b7-4fc2-8920-f1f4a2d640b7_1200x630.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_b2f94aef-1fc7-4294-abd5-111fc204a25f.pdf">WA 1346/2024</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: SMT.SANGISHETTY RAMA DEVI VS THE STATE OF TELANGANA</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>30-03-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE MOUSHUMI BHATTACHARYA,JUSTICE GADI PRAVEEN KUMAR</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Civil Law</strong></p><p>The High Court dismissed the Writ Appeal, affirming the Single Judge&#8217;s imposition of exemplary costs of Rs. 10,000/-, finding no grounds to interfere with the discretion exercised. The appellant had challenged only the costs imposed by the Single Judge, who had dismissed the appellant&#8217;s Writ Petition No. 18021 of 2023. The Single Judge concluded that the appellant lacked locus standi, not being a tenant of the property, and that the Writ Petition was an attempt to settle civil disputes, a finding upheld by the Division Bench. The Court noted the appellant&#8217;s prior unsuccessful suit (O.S. No. 30 of 2021) seeking perpetual injunction against eviction, which was dismissed on 28.10.2025. The Division Bench emphasized that the scope of interference in an intra-Court appeal is &#8220;extremely limited,&#8221; particularly where the first court has not demonstrated &#8220;arbitrary or perverse basis&#8221; in exercising its discretion. This principle underscores judicial deference to discretionary orders unless patent illegality or perversity is established. The Court declined to delve into the merits of the original writ petition, confining its review strictly to the challenge against the costs, as explicitly limited by the appellant&#8217;s counsel before a Co-ordinate Bench.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_f945fbf2-1373-4288-8a34-8f8c0939a45d.pdf">WA 565/2025</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: PEDERIPATI MURALI GOUD VS ITHAN JAIHIND YADAV</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>30-03-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE MOUSHUMI BHATTACHARYA,JUSTICE GADI PRAVEEN KUMAR</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Civil Law</strong></p><p>The High Court, comprising Justices Moushumi Bhattacharya and Gadi Praveen Kumar, dismissed I.A. No. 1 of 2026 and Writ Appeal No. 565 of 2025 as withdrawn, along with all connected applications, vacating any interim orders. The decisive ground for this dismissal was the submission by the learned counsel for Respondent No. 1 that the matter had been settled out of Court. Despite no appearance from the appellants, the Court proceeded on the basis of the reported out-of-court settlement, thereby rendering the appeal infructuous. This action aligns with the principle that courts generally respect and give effect to private settlements between parties, particularly when such settlements resolve the underlying dispute and are reported by counsel. The Court did not delve into the merits of the original appeal, as the reported settlement obviated the need for adjudication. Consequently, the proceedings were terminated without any order as to costs, reflecting the consensual nature of the withdrawal. The judgment implicitly relies on the procedural understanding that once a dispute is resolved privately, judicial intervention is no longer required, leading to the closure of the pending litigation.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_45bcc222-7758-4144-afb8-1ebfe882a552.pdf">MACMA 658/2019</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: THATI SOMAIAH VS ANGIDI YAKAMBARAM</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>01-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE C.V. BHASKAR REDDY</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Civil Law</strong></p><p>The High Court, exercising its appellate jurisdiction under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, partly allowed the appellant-claimant&#8217;s appeal, enhancing the compensation awarded by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal from Rs. 2,64,000/- to Rs. 4,62,000/- with interest at 7.5% per annum. The Court found the Tribunal erred in assessing the claimant&#8217;s monthly income at Rs. 3,000/-, despite evidence of him being an agriculturist earning Rs. 6,000/-, and that the compensation for injuries, shock, pain, and suffering was unduly low given the grievous nature of injuries, including above-knee amputation. The Court re-calculated loss of earnings due to disability based on the higher income, enhanced compensation for injuries, shock, and pain to Rs. 1,50,000/-, and increased loss of earnings to Rs. 72,000/-. Additionally, the Court awarded Rs. 30,000/- for extra nourishment and Rs. 20,000/- for transportation, finding the Tribunal had not adequately compensated these heads. The finding of rash and negligent driving by the offending car&#8217;s driver, leading to the accident and the claimant&#8217;s grievous injuries, remained undisputed and attained finality.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_9141ed90-d2fe-4e01-aaea-2390b73da7f5.pdf">MACMA 809/2019</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: SBAIK BABU VS MD.YOUSUF</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>01-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE C.V. BHASKAR REDDY</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Civil Law</strong></p><p>The High Court of Telangana, in M.A.C.M.A.No.809 of 2019, partly allowed the appellant/claimant&#8217;s appeal, enhancing the compensation awarded by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal from Rs.34,000/- to Rs.1,98,000/- with interest at 7.5% per annum. The Court found the Tribunal&#8217;s award to be &#8220;meagre&#8221; and &#8220;not commensurate with the nature of injuries sustained and treatment undergone,&#8221; particularly noting the fracture of the right patella and subsequent surgery. The decisive ground for enhancement was the inadequacy of the amounts awarded under various heads, including injuries, pain and suffering, transportation, extra nourishment, and loss of earnings during treatment, despite clear medical evidence from P.W.2 and Exs.A3 to A12 establishing the severity of injuries and prolonged treatment. The Court confirmed the Tribunal&#8217;s finding that the accident occurred due to the rash and negligent driving of the offending jeep, as this finding had attained finality and was not seriously disputed. Consequently, the Court enhanced the compensation for injuries from Rs.12,000/- to Rs.1,00,000/-, pain and suffering from Rs.5,000/- to Rs.50,000/-, transportation from Rs.1,500/- to Rs.5,000/-, extra nourishment from Rs.1,000/- to Rs.10,000/-, and loss of earnings from Rs.1,500/- to Rs.20,000/-, while confirming the amounts for treatment expenses and cost of medicines.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_d87ebff3-379a-4c16-9ab6-44f518adb291.pdf">MACMA 1223/2019</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: SMT T. KAVITHA VS T. NARSI REDDY</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>01-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE C.V. BHASKAR REDDY</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Civil Law</strong></p><p>The High Court partly allowed the appeal, enhancing the compensation awarded under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act from Rs. 4,18,000/- to Rs. 8,20,000/- with 7.5% interest, finding the Tribunal erred in assessing the deceased&#8217;s income and applying the correct deduction for personal expenses. The Court re-fixed the deceased&#8217;s monthly income at Rs. 4,500/-, considering his avocation as a barber and the year of the accident. Relying on Sarla Verma v. Delhi Transport Corporation, the Court applied a 1/4th deduction for personal expenses given five dependents, instead of the 1/3rd applied by the Tribunal, and utilized an &#8216;18&#8217; multiplier for the 25-year-old deceased. Further, guided by National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi, the Court awarded Rs. 91,000/- under conventional heads. The Court rejected the contention that compensation could not exceed the claimed amount, citing Laxman @ Laxman Mourya Vs. Divisional Manager, Oriental Insurance Company Limited and another and Nagappa Vs. Gurudayal Singh, affirming that Courts can award higher compensation in motor accident claims due to the beneficial nature of the legislation.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_0cf253b3-90e6-40e8-ae4b-969388303ba3.pdf">MACMA 23/2019</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: ICICI LOMBARD GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY LTD., VS D.RAMANJANEYULU</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>31-03-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE C.V. BHASKAR REDDY</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Insurance Law</strong></p><p>The High Court dismissed the Insurance Company&#8217;s appeal (MACMA.No.23 of 2019) and partly allowed the claimant&#8217;s appeal (MACMA.No.115 of 2019), enhancing the compensation from Rs.15,00,000/- to Rs.17,85,000/- with interest at 7.5% per annum, modifying the Tribunal&#8217;s order in M.V.O.P.No.1666 of 2013. The Court upheld the Tribunal&#8217;s finding of negligence under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, based on P.W.1&#8217;s evidence, Ex.A-1 FIR, and Ex.A-2 charge sheet, rejecting the Insurance Company&#8217;s unsubstantiated claim of claimant intoxication. The Court affirmed the Tribunal&#8217;s assessment of 100% functional disability for the carpenter claimant, given the grievous head injury and 50% neurological disability. However, it corrected the multiplier from &#8216;12&#8217; to &#8216;13&#8217; for the claimant&#8217;s age group, enhancing compensation for disability, grievous injuries, and pain and suffering. The Court relied on National Insurance Company Ltd. vs. Mannat Johal and others (AIR 2019 SC 2079) to increase the interest rate from 6% to 7.5% per annum, establishing the prevailing reasonable rate for motor accident claims. Medical expenses, being supported by documentary evidence, were confirmed.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_51e507f5-3a15-4fa9-afc4-037e8f5139a7.pdf">MACMA 655/2019</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: CHEKKABANDI SRINIVAS , SRINIVAS REDDY VS RAYINENI RAVI,</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>31-03-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE C.V. BHASKAR REDDY</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Civil Law</strong></p><p>The High Court partly allowed the appeal, enhancing the compensation awarded to the claimant from Rs. 10,00,000/- to Rs. 15,86,200/- with 7.5% interest per annum, finding the Tribunal erred in assessing just compensation for injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident. The Court held that the Tribunal failed to adequately consider the 70% functional disability, the need for future prospects, and appropriate non-pecuniary heads. Relying on Hare Krushna Mahanta vs. Himadari Sahu (2025 ACJ 1670 (SC)), which mandates awarding &#8220;just&#8221; compensation irrespective of the claim amount, and Lokesh B. vs. Suryanarayana Raju Jaggaraju (2025 (5) ALD 216 (SC)), affirming full consideration of functional disability by medical experts, the Court enhanced compensation. Further, applying National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi (2017 ACJ 2700 (SC)), 40% of the income was added for future prospects given the appellant&#8217;s age and self-employment. The Court also increased awards for pain and suffering, future surgery, extra nourishment, attendant charges, and loss of amenities, noting the appellant&#8217;s severe injuries and permanent functional limitations.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_05105ce3-7d65-4fd7-8285-db56f406df1b.pdf">MACMA 3381/2019</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: KOMARABATHINI NAGARAJU VS M/S, G.D. BULK CARRIERS, AND ANOTHER</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>31-03-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE C.V. BHASKAR REDDY</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Civil Law</strong></p><p>The High Court, in an appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, partly allowed the appellant/claimant&#8217;s plea, enhancing compensation from Rs. 40,488/- to Rs. 1,25,488/- with 7.5% interest, and crucially set aside the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal&#8217;s finding of 40% contributory negligence. The Court reasoned that the Tribunal erred in attributing negligence to the claimant, a pillion rider, as there was no evidence demonstrating his direct contribution to the accident, notwithstanding the fact of triple riding. The principle applied was that a pillion rider cannot be held contributorily negligent merely due to a traffic violation like triple riding, unless a causal link to the accident is established. Consequently, the Court found the claimant entitled to the full compensation. Furthermore, considering the grievous head injury (extradural hematoma) and prolonged treatment, the Court enhanced the compensation awarded under various heads, including hospitalization and treatment, while confirming the medical expenses. Respondent No. 2 &#8211; Insurance Company was directed to deposit the enhanced amount within two months.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_f8777a50-94c1-4690-95a2-b417f96f664a.pdf">MACMA 930/2019</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: M.SOBHA AND 3 OTTHERS VS P. KOTESWARA RAO AND ANOTHER</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>30-03-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE C.V. BHASKAR REDDY</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Civil Law</strong></p><p>The High Court partly allowed the appeal, enhancing the compensation from Rs. 4,75,000/- to Rs. 6,51,000/- with 7.5% interest per annum, finding the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal erred in assessing the deceased&#8217;s monthly income and failing to award amounts under conventional heads. The Court, considering the deceased&#8217;s avocation as an RMP doctor and the cost of living in 2006, deemed it appropriate to fix the monthly income at Rs. 5,000/-, leading to an annual income of Rs. 60,000/-. After deducting 1/3rd for personal expenses, the loss of dependency was calculated as Rs. 40,000/-. Applying the multiplier of &#8216;14&#8217; as per Sarla Verma v. Delhi Transport Corporation ((2009) 6 SCC 121) for a 45-year-old deceased, the total loss of dependency amounted to Rs. 5,60,000/-. Furthermore, relying on National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi ((2017) 16 SCC 680), the Court awarded Rs. 91,000/- under conventional heads, thereby arriving at the enhanced total compensation. The respondents were directed to deposit the amount within two months.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_a7e2ee18-a4b2-4d2a-8443-0aa87232779d.pdf">MACMA 3378/2019</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: BUSA CHINNA KOMURAIAH AND ANOTHER VS T. KUMAR,</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>30-03-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE C.V. BHASKAR REDDY</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Insurance Law</strong></p><p>The High Court partly allowed the appeal, enhancing the compensation awarded to the appellants/claimants from Rs.5,21,000/- to Rs.10,03,200/- with 7.5% interest per annum, finding the Tribunal&#8217;s assessment of the deceased&#8217;s income and application of future prospects inadequate. The Court reasoned that while the deceased was a 24-year-old B.Sc. Final Year student, the Tribunal erred in taking his monthly income as Rs.4,500/-, instead deeming Rs.6,000/- appropriate. Applying the principles from National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi (2017) 16 SCC 680, 40% was added for future prospects, and conventional heads were enhanced. Further, relying on Sarla Verma v. Delhi Transport Corporation (2009) 6 SCC 121, a multiplier of &#8216;18&#8217; was applied for the 24-year-old deceased, leading to a revised loss of dependency. The Court rejected the Insurance Company&#8217;s contention that the Tribunal&#8217;s assessment was just and reasonable in the absence of cogent income proof, holding that the inadequacy of compensation warranted interference. The respondents were directed to deposit the enhanced amount within two months.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_816227a6-de97-4c87-be93-9a33e37a1495.pdf">FCA 220/2016</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: P SANDEEP, HYD VS P.RADHIKA , T.RADHIKA, HYD</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>30-03-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE K.LAKSHMAN, JUSTICE B.R.MADHUSUDHAN RAO</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Family Law</strong></p><p>The High Court, overturning the Family Court&#8217;s dismissal, granted a decree of divorce to the appellant-husband under Section 13(1)(ia) and (ib) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, on grounds of cruelty and desertion, finding the marriage irretrievably broken down. The Court reasoned that while irretrievable breakdown alone is insufficient, it can be considered with other factors. The decisive grounds were the respondent-wife&#8217;s admitted execution of Ex.P.6 &#8216;Oppandapatram&#8217; expressing unwillingness to continue the marital life, her failure to pursue restitution of conjugal rights under Section 9 despite claiming willingness to cohabit, and her inconsistent stance regarding the mutual consent divorce petition (O.P. No. 82 of 2011) where she initially agreed to divorce but later withdrew. The Court noted the prolonged separation since 2009, the respondent&#8217;s admissions regarding medical conditions (tuberculosis and infertility) and her signatures on crucial documents (Ex.P.6, Ex.P.7, Ex.P.8) without credible explanation for their contents or her parents&#8217; signatures. The Family Court erred by not considering these aspects, particularly the respondent&#8217;s conduct amounting to cruelty and desertion, despite her claims of being coerced into signing the MOU, which she failed to substantiate by examining relevant witnesses.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_01210881-509a-434a-aa8e-291dbf63d04d.pdf">FCA 238/2024</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: MRS. DR.CHANDIKA PRABHAVATHI VS CHANDIKA SAMBHASIVA RAJU (DIED)</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>30-03-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE K.LAKSHMAN, JUSTICE B.R.MADHUSUDHAN RAO</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Family Law</strong></p><p>The High Court dismissed the appellant-wife&#8217;s appeal, affirming the Family Court&#8217;s finding that she failed to establish her marriage with the deceased respondent, thereby denying her claim for a declaration of wife status and restitution of conjugal rights under Section 7 of the Family Courts Act, 1984, and Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. The Court held that while Section 50 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, allows opinion on relationship expressed by conduct as relevant, such evidence (letters, photographs, joint bank accounts, electoral roll entries) is insufficient to prove a Hindu marriage without proof of solemnization of essential ceremonies like Mangala Sutra Dharana, Saptapadi, or Panigrahanam. The appellant&#8217;s admission of the respondent&#8217;s subsisting prior marriage, which was subject only to a decree of judicial separation under Section 10(1)(a) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, and not dissolved, further weakened her claim. Relying on Dolly Rani v. Manish Kumar Chanchal (2024 INSC 355), the Court reiterated that Section 7 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, mandates performance of requisite ceremonies for a valid Hindu marriage. While acknowledging the presumption of marriage from long cohabitation as per Smt. Shiramabai w/o Pundalik Bhave v. The Captain, Record Officer for O.I.C. Records, Sena Corps Abhilekh, Gaya, Bihar state (2023 INSC 744), the Court found this presumption rebutted by the absence of ceremonial proof and the admitted prior subsisting marriage.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_cf05c78a-7a15-459b-9bb0-f747e65958e4.pdf">AS 10/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: CHEERA ANUSHA VS GORIGE PENTAIAH</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>30-03-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE K.LAKSHMAN, JUSTICE B.R.MADHUSUDHAN RAO</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Civil Law</strong></p><p>The High Court set aside the order of the I Additional District Judge, Bhuvanagiri, in I.A.No.427 of 2023 in O.S.No.124 of 2019, remanding the matter for fresh consideration, finding the Trial Court&#8217;s reasoning inconsistent and premature. The decisive ground for remand was the Trial Court&#8217;s contradictory findings in two applications under Order VII Rule 11(a) &amp; (d) read with Section 151 of CPC, where it first dismissed a similar rejection application (I.A.No.275 of 2024) on grounds of subsisting cause of action and non-bar by limitation, but subsequently allowed another (I.A.No.427 of 2023) by the father/defendant No.1, rejecting the plaint as barred by law, without adequately considering the plaintiffs&#8217; claim of joint family property under Mitakshara law and Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act as amended in 2005. The Court noted the Trial Court failed to consider documents filed by the appellants and prematurely delved into the merits of the case regarding self-acquired property. The High Court reiterated the principle from T.Arivandandam Vs. T.V.Satyapal and Others (MANU/SC/0034/1977) regarding nipping clever drafting in the bud, and the tests for Order VII Rule 11 from Dahiben Vs. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali (MANU/SC/0508/2020) and Vineeta Sharma Vs. Rakesh Sharma and Ors. (MANU/SC/0582/2020) on daughters&#8217; coparcenary rights, without expressing opinion on the merits.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_2112d6f0-5549-4f6e-ace4-6ea45ead6cf9.pdf">WA 281/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: PRISTINE ESTATES VILLA OWNERS MAINTENANCE, VS SRI B. SRINIVAS RAO.</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>02-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE APARESH KUMAR SINGH, JUSTICE G.M. MOHIUDDIN</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Administrative Law</strong></p><p>The High Court dismissed the writ appeal, upholding the Single Judge&#8217;s decision to set aside the registration of Pristine Estates Villa Owners Maintenance Mutually Aided Co-operative Society Limited under the Telangana Mutually Aided Co-operative Societies Act, 1995 (TMACS Act). The Court found the registration fundamentally infirm due to procedural irregularities and the society&#8217;s exclusionary nature. Decisive grounds included the verification report&#8217;s glaring factual inconsistencies, which were not rebutted by the appellant, and the violation of Section 4(1) of the TMACS Act, as promoters from the same family were included. Crucially, the Registrar failed to invite objections from all stakeholders, particularly LIG/EWS allottees, contravening principles established in M/s. Saket Engineering Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Telangana (W.P.Nos.14493 and 14519 of 2023 dt.09.06.2025), which mandates a single, inclusive society for a project. The Court emphasized that the project, including LIG/EWS units, was an integrated community under G.O.Ms.No.528 dated 31.07.2008, and the society&#8217;s bye-laws explicitly excluded these allottees, violating Article 14 and Article 21 principles. The TS RERA order dated 04.07.2025 was held not to validate the appellant society, as it was contingent on the present outcome. The Court directed the District Co-operative Officer to facilitate the formation of a new, inclusive society for all unit holders, ensuring compliance with Section 11(4)(e) of the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_811740fd-f2ab-46ac-8f6b-67104ef88734.pdf">WA 1497/2025</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: THE TELANGANA STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION, VS MD. JANI PASHA,</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>02-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE APARESH KUMAR SINGH, JUSTICE G.M. MOHIUDDIN</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Labor Law</strong></p><p>The High Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the Single Judge&#8217;s order and restoring the Industrial Tribunal&#8217;s award which upheld the workman&#8217;s removal from service. The Court held that the Single Judge exceeded the permissible limits of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by re-appreciating evidence, an impermissible exercise where the Tribunal&#8217;s findings were not perverse or unsupported by evidence. The Tribunal, exercising its powers under Section 11-A of the ID Act, had correctly found the charges of collecting fare without issuing tickets and attempting to misappropriate Corporation revenue proved, relying on contemporaneous evidence including passenger statements (Ex.M-2) and the workman&#8217;s own spot admission (Ex.M-3). The Court distinguished A.V. Swamy v. A.P.S.R.T.C (2014) 5 ALT 554, noting that non-verification of cash balance is not fatal where the charge is collection without issuance of tickets, unlike cases of excess collection. The Tribunal&#8217;s decision on proportionality, considering the gravity of misconduct and the workman&#8217;s prior censure, was a judicious exercise of discretion under Section 11-A of the ID Act, which the Single Judge erroneously substituted with his own view without finding perversity.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_0672775e-5379-4e36-8dcb-a8d5110f479d.pdf">WA 176/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: V. ANIL KUMAR VS STATE OF TELANGANA</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>02-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE APARESH KUMAR SINGH, JUSTICE G.M. MOHIUDDIN</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Service Law</strong></p><p>The High Court of Telangana, in a common judgment, allowed the writ appeals, setting aside the Single Judge&#8217;s order and dismissing the writ petitions, thereby upholding the Telangana State Public Service Commission&#8217;s (TGPSC) rejection of candidates for the post of Librarian. The Court held that M.Li.Sc. degrees obtained through distance education from Acharya Nagarjuna University via study centres in Telangana were invalid for recruitment under Notification No.30/2022, as the University&#8217;s territorial jurisdiction, defined by the A.P. Universities Act, 1991, was limited to Guntur and Prakasam districts. The decisive ground was the express incorporation of the UGC Public Notice dated 27.06.2013 into the recruitment notification, which mandates that a State University operates only within its statutory territorial limits. The Court rejected the argument of discrimination and &#8220;negative equality,&#8221; citing Fuljit Kaur v. State of Punjab and State of Madhya Pradesh v. Amit Shrivas, which establish that Article 14 embodies a positive concept of equality and cannot be invoked to perpetuate illegality. It further relied on B. Sai Kiran v. State of Telangana (W.P.No.3006 of 2021, dated 17.08.2022), which held such degrees invalid for higher education, a principle equally applicable to public employment. The Court clarified that Section 95 of the Reorganisation Act does not override UGC norms on territorial jurisdiction.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_ad7e996d-08e4-4bbd-b1a0-c08511d5b66b.pdf">WA 366/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: SRI LINGAREDDY VENKATA SUBBA REDDY VS THE STATE OF TELANGANA</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>01-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE APARESH KUMAR SINGH, JUSTICE G.M. MOHIUDDIN</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Tax Law</strong></p><p>The High Court modified the impugned judgment of the learned writ court, holding that in matters concerning the impounding of insufficiently stamped instruments under the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, specifically Section 33, there is no scope to consider objections relating to delay in presentation or overwriting on the document. The Court found that the writ court&#8217;s direction to Respondent No.4 &#8211; District Registrar, Sangareddy, to consider the counter-affidavit of Respondents No.5 to 7, which raised such objections while examining the appellant&#8217;s application for impounding an Agreement of Sale dated 17.03.2017, was unnecessary and beyond the purview of the relevant statutory provisions. Consequently, the operative part of the impugned judgment directing consideration of these extraneous objections was deleted. The Court emphasized that the process of impounding under the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, is confined to assessing the stamp duty deficiency, and collateral issues like delay or overwriting are not germane to this determination. The writ appeal was thus disposed of with this modification, directing Respondent No.4 to proceed with the impounding application without reference to the said objections.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_47ca0e18-d35e-4100-9a2c-ebaa50f130fc.pdf">WA 368/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: M/S VENKATAMMA ENTERPRISES VS TELANGANA STATE SOUTHERN POWER DISTRIBUTION CORPORATION LIMITED</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>01-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s):JUSTICE APARESH KUMAR SINGH, JUSTICE G.M. MOHIUDDIN</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Civil Law</strong></p><p>The High Court set aside the judgment of the learned writ court in W.P.No.4501 of 2020, which had held the appellant liable for outstanding electricity dues of the previous owner for a new service connection. The Court reasoned that the appellant, M/s. Venkatamma Enterprises, had purchased only a part of the property and its liability for the dues was intrinsically linked to the adjudication of the outstanding dues against its vendor, which is the subject matter of the pending W.P.No.2217 of 2019. The decisive ground for setting aside the impugned judgment was that it failed to consider the interdependency of the appellant&#8217;s prayer with W.P.No.2217 of 2019 and the bearing its outcome would have on the appellant&#8217;s case. The Court emphasized that the ideal course would have been to decide both writ petitions together, given their interconnectedness. Consequently, the High Court directed that W.P.No.4501 of 2020 be heard along with W.P.No.2217 of 2019 by the learned writ court having the present roster of the subject matter, thereby ensuring a comprehensive and holistic adjudication of the dispute.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_dbb8e51a-22dd-4181-b77b-4e5e8431ec90.pdf">WA 371/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: ANDHRA PRADESH ASSOCIATION OF THE DEAF VS STATE OF TELANGANA</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>01-04-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE APARESH KUMAR SINGH, JUSTICE G.M. MOHIUDDIN</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Consumer Law</strong></p><p>The High Court held that the learned Single Judge erred in relegating the appellant to a civil court for a dispute concerning the mutation of an electricity connection, instead directing the appellant to approach the Consumer Grievance Redressal Forum (CGRF) constituted under the Electricity Act, 2003. The decisive ground was that the Electricity Act, 2003 specifically provides a statutory forum, the CGRF, to address grievances related to the transfer of electricity connections, thereby offering an efficacious alternative remedy for such factual disputes. The Court noted that the writ petition involved issues of fact, including the appellant&#8217;s claim as the sole surviving member of the Association&#8217;s Managing Committee and the validity of a resolution, which are best adjudicated by a specialized forum. Consequently, the impugned direction granting liberty to approach a civil court was set aside, and the appellant was granted liberty to raise all grounds of law and fact before the CGRF. The Court clarified that any observations on the merits made by the learned Single Judge would not influence the CGRF&#8217;s independent decision, ensuring a fair and expeditious resolution after due notice to all concerned parties, including respondent No.4.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_cbe6b722-c224-4556-ba7e-476507f96112.pdf">WA 362/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: SMT.ALLAM RAJITHA VS THE STATE OF TELANGANA</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>31-03-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE APARESH KUMAR SINGH, JUSTICE G.M. MOHIUDDIN</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Property Law</strong></p><p>The High Court of Telangana closed the writ appeal, finding that the appellant&#8217;s grievance regarding the inclusion of her land in the prohibited properties list under Section 22-A of the Registration Act, 1908, no longer subsisted. The decisive ground for this conclusion was the submission by the appellant&#8217;s counsel that the subject property was no longer shown in the prohibited list under the Telangana Bhu Bharati (Record of Rights in Land) Act, 2025, which repealed the Telangana Rights in Land and Pattadar Pass Books Act, 2020, by virtue of Section 23 of the 2025 Act. The Court rejected the appellant&#8217;s apprehension that conveyance of the property might still not be registered, deeming it baseless at this stage and observing that no cause of action remained. Consequently, the Court held that the appellant was not required to approach the Committee constituted under G.O.Ms.No.98, dated 23.08.2025, which was established to address grievances under Section 22-A(1)(e) of the Registration Act, 1908. The directions issued by the learned writ court in the impugned judgment were thus rendered ineffective in light of these changed circumstances.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_a32149ea-f747-4d9b-b657-07b289acece5.pdf">WA 257/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: NIZAMS INSTITUTE OF MEDICAL SCIENCES VS AAKUKOTA URMILA</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>31-03-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s):JUSTICE APARESH KUMAR SINGH, JUSTICE G.M. MOHIUDDIN</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Service Law</strong></p><p>The High Court set aside the impugned judgment dated 11.07.2025 in W.P.No.15577 of 2023, remanding the matter to the learned Single Judge, without delving into the merits of the parties&#8217; contentions. The decisive ground for this reversal was the discovery of fundamental errors apparent on the face of the impugned judgment. Specifically, the learned writ court, while pronouncing its judgment on 11.07.2025 (though dispatched on 11.09.2025), inadvertently relied upon and quoted paragraphs from the Apex Court&#8217;s judgment in Dharam Singh v. State of U.P. (2025 SCC OnLine SC 1735), which was pronounced subsequently on 19.08.2025. This chronological impossibility rendered the impugned judgment unsustainable in law, as it cited a non-existent precedent at the time of its pronouncement. The writ court had directed the appellants to reconsider the regularisation of the writ petitioners, taking into account orders in W.P.No.173 of 2022, upheld in W.A.No.563 of 2023. However, the fundamental error concerning the reliance on a future judgment necessitated the setting aside of the entire order. The writ appeal was accordingly allowed, with no order as to costs.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_2e4f4725-c129-4b99-bea8-341268502363.pdf">WA 980/2025</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: THE NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY LTD VS N BALAIAH</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>30-03-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE APARESH KUMAR SINGH, JUSTICE G.M. MOHIUDDIN</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Service Law</strong></p><p>The High Court set aside the Single Judge&#8217;s order directing regularization of the respondent&#8217;s services, holding that the engagement was purely contractual and did not establish an employer-employee relationship. The Court found that the respondent&#8217;s engagement as a &#8220;Caretaker&#8221; was governed by a series of written agreements, explicitly characterizing the arrangement as &#8220;housekeeping and maintenance&#8221; with terms inconsistent with regular employment, such as permitting ancillary commercial activities with retained profits, absence of pay scales, increments, fixed working hours, attendance maintenance, disciplinary framework, Provident Fund deductions, or superannuation age. The Court rejected the respondent&#8217;s unsubstantiated claim of selection in 2003, noting the absence of any documentary evidence of a regular recruitment process. Relying on Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (2006) 4 SCC 1, the Court reiterated that regularization cannot be granted in contravention of constitutional schemes for public appointments, especially where the engagement was not preceded by a lawful selection. The Court further held that the mere deduction of tax under Section 194C of the Income Tax Act, 1961, as reflected in Form 16A, was not determinative of an employer-employee relationship, and that seriously disputed questions of fact regarding the nature of engagement were not amenable to Article 226 jurisdiction.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_f91ee122-1518-4339-8527-9d9d44d09590.pdf">WA 346/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: M/S SRI VINAYAKA REALTORS AND DEVELOPERS, VS THE STATE OF TELANGANA</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>30-03-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE APARESH KUMAR SINGH, JUSTICE G.M. MOHIUDDIN</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Urban Planning Law</strong></p><p>The High Court disposed of the writ appeal concerning an intimation letter dated 24.01.2026 from GHMC directing the appellants to cease construction activities on their property, for which building permission was granted on 24.03.2025, pending a survey and demarcation. The Court noted that the learned writ court had previously recorded an undertaking from the appellants not to proceed with construction until the survey was completed. The core issue revolved around the temporary restriction on construction due to complaints, necessitating a joint survey and demarcation by revenue authorities. Relying on instructions from the Standing Counsel for respondent No.2, which indicated that the Tahsildar had scheduled the joint survey for 31.03.2026 and that the Municipality had not cancelled the building permission but only temporarily restricted activity, the Court directed that the joint survey for demarcation of the subject property be concluded by 10.04.2026. This timeline was agreed upon by both parties, with the appellants undertaking to refrain from further construction until the survey&#8217;s conclusion and to cooperate in the proceedings. The Court&#8217;s decision effectively balanced the need for a thorough investigation into the complaints with the appellants&#8217; right to proceed with construction, ensuring a time-bound resolution.</p><div><hr></div><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://askjunior.substack.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">Ask Junior - Judgment Summaries is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.</p></div><form class="subscription-widget-subscribe"><input type="email" class="email-input" name="email" placeholder="Type your email&#8230;" tabindex="-1"><input type="submit" class="button primary" value="Subscribe"><div class="fake-input-wrapper"><div class="fake-input"></div><div class="fake-button"></div></div></form></div></div>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Telangana High Court Weekly Digest (20.03.2026 - 26.03.2026)]]></title><description><![CDATA[Stay updated with the judgments from the Telangana High Court every week. We bring you concise summaries of judgments, helping you stay informed without wading through lengthy case reports]]></description><link>https://askjunior.substack.com/p/telangana-high-court-weekly-digest-52b</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://askjunior.substack.com/p/telangana-high-court-weekly-digest-52b</guid><pubDate>Sat, 28 Mar 2026 02:30:46 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/723e45eb-f70b-4334-9260-bae4808e20ee_1200x630.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>1. Telangana High Court reduces timeline for disposal of Inams Appeal</strong></p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_4827c993-05d2-4698-9e7a-5f6cf49a7af2.pdf">WA 336/2026</a> &#183; Administrative Law [23-03-2026]</strong></p><p><strong>Bench: JUSTICE APARESH KUMAR SINGH, JUSTICE G.M. MOHIUDDIN</strong></p><p><strong>Parties: JANGAIAH vs THE STATE OF TELANGANA</strong></p><p>The High Court, in Jangaiah S/o. Ramachandraiah &amp; 2 others v. The State of Telangana, modified the writ court&#8217;s order, reducing the timeline for the disposal of Inams Appeal No.F2/341/2018 pending before the Joint Collector, Nagarkurnool District, from one year to six months. The appellants had approached the writ court aggrieved by the eight-year pendency of their appeal and sought a shorter, mandatory timeline of three to six months. The writ court had initially directed disposal within one year. The High Court, after hearing both parties, found the one-year period to be unduly long given the protracted pendency of the appeal. The Court&#8217;s reasoning was rooted in the principle of expeditious justice, acknowledging the appellants&#8217; legitimate grievance regarding the prolonged delay in adjudication. While no specific precedents were cited, the Court implicitly applied the principle that administrative and quasi-judicial bodies must ensure timely resolution of matters, thereby upholding the right to a speedy hearing. This modification ensures a more reasonable and time-bound resolution for the appellants, aligning with the broader judicial imperative to prevent undue delays in legal proceedings. The Writ Appeal was thus disposed of with this singular modification.</p><p><strong>Why it matters: </strong>The Telangana High Court reduced the time limit for an Inams Appeal disposal from one year to six months. This clarifies the judiciary&#8217;s push for timely dispute resolution and offers a precedent for practitioners seeking faster appeal processes in similar administrative matters.</p><p><strong>2. High Court enhances compensation for sister&#8217;s death in tragic family accident</strong></p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_a9f2b202-80d8-48a9-ba90-23f32b3fadcb.pdf">MACMA 1094/2019</a> &#183; Civil Law [25-03-2026]</strong></p><p><strong>Bench: JUSTICE C.V. BHASKAR REDDY</strong></p><p><strong>Parties: MUDDASANI ANDALAMMA , ANDALU vs MOHD JANI (DIED)</strong></p><p>The High Court partly allowed the appeal, enhancing the compensation awarded by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal from Rs. 25,000/- to Rs. 50,000/- with interest at 7.5% per annum from the date of the claim petition. The Tribunal had initially awarded compensation for the death of Muddasani Padma in a motor vehicle accident, finding the accident occurred due to the rash and negligent driving of the crime vehicle, as evidenced by PW.1 and Exs.A1 to A7, and a case registered under Section 304-A of IPC. However, the Tribunal declined to award loss of dependency to the appellant, the deceased&#8217;s sister, on the ground that she was married and not dependent on the deceased, instead awarding Rs. 10,000/- for loss of estate, Rs. 10,000/- for loss of love and affection, and Rs. 5,000/- for funeral expenses. The High Court, considering the appellant&#8217;s injuries in the accident and the immense mental agony suffered due to the sudden loss of her entire immediate family, found it reasonable to award an additional Rs. 25,000/- to meet the ends of justice, thereby increasing the total compensation. The respondent Nos. 2 and 3 were directed to deposit the enhanced amount within two months.</p><p><strong>Why it matters: </strong>The ruling clarifies that even a non-dependent, married sibling can receive enhanced compensation for mental agony and loss of family, providing a precedent for similar claims in accident cases.</p><p><strong>3. Insurance company&#8217;s appeal dismissed for failing to serve notice on respondents</strong></p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_fd4ba8d8-f168-4c59-8751-27cdb31dee7d.pdf">MACMA 156/2019</a> &#183; Insurance Law [25-03-2026]</strong></p><p><strong>Bench: JUSTICE C.V. BHASKAR REDDY</strong></p><p><strong>Parties: RELIANCE GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY LTD vs CHEPYALA BALAMANI</strong></p><p>The High Court dismissed M.A.C.M.A.No.156 of 2019, filed by Reliance General Insurance Company Ltd., due to the appellant&#8217;s persistent failure to effect service of notice on respondent Nos.1 to 4, despite repeated opportunities. The Court noted that notices sent to these respondents were returned with an endorsement of &#8220;insufficient address,&#8221; and despite adjournments granted on 25.02.2026 and 11.03.2026 for filing a petition for substituted service, the appellant again sought further time on 25.03.2026. The decisive ground for dismissal was the appellant&#8217;s clear lack of diligence in prosecuting the appeal, which originated in 2019, demonstrating a failure to take necessary steps for service. This conduct, characterized by repeated requests for adjournments without tangible progress, led the Court to conclude that the appellant was not earnest in pursuing the matter. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and all pending miscellaneous petitions were closed, with no order as to costs. The Court&#8217;s decision underscores the fundamental principle that litigants must demonstrate due diligence in prosecuting their cases, particularly regarding the essential step of effecting service on respondents, failing which, the judicial process cannot proceed.</p><p><strong>Why it matters: </strong>Practitioners must ensure timely and effective service of notice, as repeated delays can lead to dismissal of appeals, even in older cases. This highlights the court&#8217;s expectation of diligence in prosecuting matters.</p><p><strong>4. No need to prove negligence for 163-A Motor Vehicle Act claims</strong></p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_5ef012f3-d709-4a7b-8e59-1b5fb5cbd92c.pdf">MACMA 922/2019</a> &#183; Insurance Law [24-03-2026]</strong></p><p><strong>Bench: JUSTICE C.V. BHASKAR REDDY</strong></p><p><strong>Parties: IFFC0-TOKIO GENERAL INSURANCE CO. LTD, vs MUTHYAM LAXMI AND 2 ORS</strong></p><p>The High Court dismissed the appeal by IFFCO-TOKIO General Insurance Co. Ltd., affirming the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal&#8217;s award of Rs. 1,26,300/- with 7.5% interest to the claimant for injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident. The decisive ground was that claims filed under Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act do not require proof of negligence, only the involvement of the insured vehicle. The appellant-Insurance Company&#8217;s argument that liability could not be fastened upon them merely because the claim was under Section 163-A, and that the accident was caused by another vehicle, was rejected. The Court found that the evidence of PW.1 and PW.2, coupled with Ex.A.1-FIR and Ex.A.2-charge sheet, clearly established the involvement of the auto bearing No.AP-15-X-4002, which was insured with the appellant. The Court reiterated the principle that under Section 163-A, claimants are not required to plead or establish a wrongful act or neglect by the vehicle owner. The Tribunal&#8217;s quantification of compensation, including Rs. 72,000/- for loss of future earnings, Rs. 34,270/- for medical expenses, and Rs. 20,000/- for pain and suffering, was deemed just and reasonable given the claimant&#8217;s 60% permanent disability.</p><p><strong>Why it matters: </strong>Practitioners should note that Section 163-A claims only require establishing vehicle involvement, not owner negligence, simplifying compensation recovery for accident victims. This reaffirms the strict liability principle in no-fault motor accident claims.</p><p><strong>5. Negligence Irrelevant in Motor Accident Claims under Section 163A M.V. Act</strong></p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_05127142-e354-44ac-a17f-e6e54d934cf3.pdf">MACMA 3085/2019</a> &#183; Insurance Law [24-03-2026]</strong></p><p><strong>Bench: JUSTICE C.V. BHASKAR REDDY</strong></p><p><strong>Parties: THE ANDHRA PRADESH STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION vs INTENTI VENKATAMMA AND 3 OTHERS</strong></p><p>The High Court dismissed the appeal by TSRTC, affirming the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal&#8217;s award of compensation under Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, for a death in a motor vehicle accident. The Court decisively held that in proceedings under Section 163-A, the question of negligence, including contributory negligence or violation of traffic rules by the deceased, is irrelevant, as this provision operates on the principle of &#8220;no-fault liability.&#8221; The Court relied on the Supreme Court&#8217;s ruling in United India Insurance Company Ltd. v. Sunil Kumar (2019) 12 SCC 398, which established that Section 163-A provides for final compensation based on a structured formula without requiring proof of negligence, and that allowing an insurer to raise a defence of negligence would contradict the legislative intent of providing swift compensation. The Court found that the Tribunal correctly assessed the deceased&#8217;s age and income, applied the appropriate multiplier, and deducted personal expenses as per the Second Schedule of the Act, thus upholding the quantum of compensation awarded.</p><p><strong>Why it matters: </strong>Practitioners must note that once a claim is made or amended under Section 163A of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claimant&#8217;s negligence is not a valid defense for the insurer, ensuring quicker compensation under a no-fault liability standard.</p><p><strong>6. Wife&#8217;s Threats of Suicide and Excessive Phone Calls Justify Divorce on Cruelty Grounds</strong></p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_41a34c77-ea6d-40f6-aa3d-c33e103a8908.pdf">FCA 82/2017</a> &#183; Family Law [24-03-2026]</strong></p><p><strong>Bench: JUSTICE K.LAKSHMAN, JUSTICE B.R.MADHUSUDHAN RAO</strong></p><p><strong>Parties: R. NAGA RUKMINI SUDHA , SUDHA, vs P. VENUGOPAL RAO</strong></p><p>The High Court of Telangana dismissed the Family Court Appeal filed under Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, 1984, thereby upholding the Family Court&#8217;s order granting divorce to the husband under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, on the ground of cruelty. The Court found that the respondent-husband successfully proved that the appellant-wife subjected him to cruelty by constantly threatening to commit suicide, abusing him, and engaging in prolonged phone conversations with other individuals, which was corroborated by the testimony of PW.2 and the call data records (Exs.P1 to P4). The appellant&#8217;s admission of her mobile number and the extensive call data showing frequent calls to specific numbers, coupled with her admission of panchayats being held to address these issues, significantly bolstered the husband&#8217;s claim. The Court noted that the appellant&#8217;s defence, which largely denied the allegations and counter-accused the husband of ill-treatment, lacked sufficient substantiation. The Court concluded that the trial court had correctly appreciated the evidence and facts, finding no perversity or illegality in its decision to dissolve the marriage.</p><p><strong>Why it matters: </strong>This ruling clarifies what actions constitute &#8216;cruelty&#8217; for divorce, specifically affirming that threats of suicide and frequent, unexplained phone calls can serve as grounds to dissolve a marriage. Practitioners should note the significance of call data records as evidence in such matrimonial disputes.</p><p><strong>7. Criminal proceedings quashed when statutory authority clears accused in Essential Commodities Act case</strong></p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_8ba54599-f586-4fdd-a3fd-680a791dc943.pdf">CRLP 11710/2024</a> &#183; Criminal Law [25-03-2026]</strong></p><p><strong>Bench: JUSTICE N.TUKARAMJI</strong></p><p><strong>Parties: BHEEMA BALA KRISHNA vs THE STATE OF TELANGANA</strong></p><p>The High Court quashed criminal proceedings in C.C. Nos. 616 and 618 of 2022 against the petitioners, rice mill owners, for alleged offences under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, read with Section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. The decisive ground was the categorical finding by the District Collector (Civil Supplies), a competent quasi-judicial authority under Section 6-A of the EC Act, that no contravention had occurred regarding the seized paddy stock. The Collector&#8217;s orders, dated 12.10.2018, explicitly stated the stock was lawful Custom Milled Rice (CMR) paddy intended for government supply, and directed its redelivery, which the petitioners complied with by milling and supplying the rice. The Court reasoned that allowing parallel criminal proceedings to continue on identical facts, despite a clear adjudication by a competent statutory authority exonerating the petitioners, would lead to contradictory findings and constitute an abuse of the process of law. Relying on State of Karnataka v. K.A. Kunchindammed, (2002) 9 SCC 90, which held that criminal prosecution&#8217;s substratum is undermined when confiscation proceedings find no contravention, and State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, which permits quashing criminal proceedings lacking foundational facts, the Court concluded that the essential ingredients of the alleged offences were absent. Further, Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303, emphasized that criminal law cannot be set in motion without the essential ingredients of the offence.</p><p><strong>Why it matters: </strong>This judgment clarifies that when a competent quasi-judicial authority under the Essential Commodities Act finds no contravention, subsequent criminal proceedings for the same allegations should be quashed. Practitioners should rely on findings from statutory authorities in related criminal matters to prevent abuse of process.</p><p><strong>8. Civil Court Cannot Decide Wakf Property Disputes; Parties Must Approach Wakf Tribunal</strong></p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_488ac415-0496-42d9-8b0b-53bd598b4c9e.pdf">CCCA 54/2026</a> &#183; Property Law [25-03-2026]</strong></p><p><strong>Bench: JUSTICE NAMAVARAPU RAJESHWAR RAO</strong></p><p><strong>Parties: MOHD ABDUL JALEEL (ALIAS ZAKIR) vs MOHD. NAZEER ALI</strong></p><p>The High Court dismissed the appeal against the order in E.A. No. 64 of 2023, which had held that the Civil Court lacked jurisdiction over property found to be Wakf property, directing the appellant to approach the Wakf Tribunal under the provisions of the Wakf Act, 1995. The Court affirmed the lower court&#8217;s reasoning that once a property is confirmed as Wakf property by higher courts, the only available remedy is before the Wakf Tribunal, not the Civil Court. The appellant&#8217;s contention that the trial court should not have dismissed the application but merely returned the papers was rejected, especially given that a prior C.R.P. No. 977 of 2008, filed against the dismissal of the E.A., was withdrawn by the appellant without liberty. Consequently, the High Court found no grounds to interfere with the lower court&#8217;s order, reiterating that the appellant has an adequate remedy before the Wakf Tribunal. While dismissing the appeal, the Court granted liberty to the appellant to approach the Wakf Tribunal on or before April 8, 2026, with the respondents undertaking not to demolish the existing structure until the application is filed.</p><p><strong>Why it matters: </strong>This ruling clarifies that civil courts lack jurisdiction over disputes concerning Wakf properties, guiding lawyers to approach the specialized Wakf Tribunal instead. Practitioners dealing with Wakf property matters should advise clients to pursue remedies exclusively before the Wakf Tribunal to avoid dismissals on jurisdictional grounds.</p><p><strong>9. Compassionate Appointment Denied Due to Lack of Immediate Financial Distress</strong></p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_f8ea6604-4d6a-4ad0-802c-e19a825ce219.pdf">WA 354/2026</a> &#183; Service Law [25-03-2026]</strong></p><p><strong>Bench: JUSTICE APARESH KUMAR SINGH, JUSTICE G.M. MOHIUDDIN</strong></p><p><strong>Parties: T. JEEVANA SIRI, vs THE STATE OF TELANGANA</strong></p><p>The High Court dismissed the writ appeal, affirming the rejection of the appellant&#8217;s claim for compassionate appointment, holding that the initial application, though sponsored by her mother, was rightly rejected on tenable grounds, and a subsequent application for reconsideration, filed significantly beyond the stipulated period, could not be entertained. The Court reasoned that the scheme for compassionate appointment mandates an application within one year of the death and is intended to address immediate financial distress, which had ceased to exist given the family&#8217;s survival for five years until the review application. The Court distinguished Saurabh Chourasiya v. The State of Madhya Pradesh (SLP (Civil) Diary No.26461 of 2022, dated 27.08.2024), where the Supreme Court frowned upon rejection on hyper-technical grounds when the application was filed immediately upon attaining majority, noting that the present case did not involve such circumstances. Instead, the Court found the writ court&#8217;s decision consistent with the principle established in The Senior Scientist and Head, JVRHRS v. Smt. K.Bhagyalaxmi (W.A.No.814 of 2025, dated 21.11.2025), which rejected similar claims due to delay, thereby finding no error warranting interference.</p><p><strong>Why it matters: </strong>High Court affirms that compassionate appointment claims will be rejected if the family is not in immediate financial distress and applies significantly beyond the stipulated time, even if family circumstances change later.</p><p><strong>10. High Court directs appeal to Land Tribunal, not civil court, for land record disputes</strong></p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_73e13b8e-dce4-44ec-8aca-4ec4e50fe085.pdf">WA 344/2026</a> &#183; Property Law [24-03-2026]</strong></p><p><strong>Bench: JUSTICE APARESH KUMAR SINGH, JUSTICE G.M. MOHIUDDIN</strong></p><p><strong>Parties: BHIMANAVENI SRINIVAS vs THE STATE OF TELANGANA</strong></p><p>The High Court set aside the learned writ court&#8217;s judgment, which had relegated the appellants to a civil court for challenging the rejection of their pattadar pass book correction application, and instead directed the appellants to approach the Commissioner, deemed as the Land Tribunal under Section 14 of the Telangana Bhu Bharati (Record of Rights in Land) Act, 2025. The Court reasoned that while the impugned order dated 12.07.2024 was passed under the repealed Telangana Rights in Land and Pattadar Pass Books Act, 2020, Section 23(3) of the Act of 2025 explicitly saves actions taken under the old Act, making them valid and enforceable. Crucially, Section 14 of the Act of 2025 provides for a statutory forum, stipulating that until a Land Tribunal is constituted, the Commissioner shall be deemed to be the Land Tribunal. Since no such tribunal had been constituted, the Commissioner was the appropriate appellate authority. The Court rejected the argument that the order was passed by an incorrect authority (Additional Collector instead of Tahsildar) as this ground was not specifically pleaded. Consequently, the Court granted the appellants liberty to file an appeal before the Commissioner within two weeks, who shall consider it in accordance with law within four months.</p><p><strong>Why it matters: </strong>Practitioners dealing with land record corrections must now approach the Commissioner, acting as the Land Tribunal under the Telangana Bhu Bharati Act, 2025, for appeals, rather than filing a civil suit, especially when the Tribunal is not yet constituted.</p><p><strong>11. Writ appeal challenging disqualification from tender withdrawn by appellant</strong></p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_47317af3-d667-49ca-bd4c-7236950e8959.pdf">WA 264/2026</a> &#183; Administrative Law [24-03-2026]</strong></p><p><strong>Bench: JUSTICE APARESH KUMAR SINGH, JUSTICE G.M. MOHIUDDIN</strong></p><p><strong>Parties: M/S. AGILE SECURITY FORCE PRIVATE LIMITED vs THE SUPERINTENDENT</strong></p><p>The High Court of Telangana, in Writ Appeal No. 264 of 2026, dismissed the appeal as withdrawn, thereby upholding the learned writ Court&#8217;s order dated 29.10.2025 which had dismissed Writ Petition No. 22266 of 2023. The appellants, M/s. Agile Security Force Private Limited and another, had sought to quash the letter/speaking order dated 10.07.2023 issued by Respondent No.1, the Superintendent, Government General &amp; Chest Hospital, Hyderabad, which disqualified Appellant No.1 company. They further sought a direction to Respondent No.1 to consider their bid for further evaluation. The core issue before the writ court, and subsequently in appeal, revolved around the challenge to the disqualification of the appellant&#8217;s bid for a tender. The present dismissal resulted from the appellants&#8217; counsel seeking permission to withdraw the instant Writ Appeal, to which the counsel for Respondent No.4 reported no objection. Consequently, the Court found no reason to proceed with the merits of the appeal, concluding the matter by dismissing it as withdrawn, with no order as to costs. This procedural outcome effectively leaves the original disqualification unchallenged through this appellate forum.</p><p><strong>Why it matters: </strong>A company withdrew its appeal against disqualification from a tender process, affirming the lower court&#8217;s decision without further judicial review. This means the tender process remains unaffected by challenges from this particular party.</p><div><hr></div><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://askjunior.substack.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">Ask Junior - Judgment Summaries is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.</p></div><form class="subscription-widget-subscribe"><input type="email" class="email-input" name="email" placeholder="Type your email&#8230;" tabindex="-1"><input type="submit" class="button primary" value="Subscribe"><div class="fake-input-wrapper"><div class="fake-input"></div><div class="fake-button"></div></div></form></div></div>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Telangana High Court Weekly Digest (13.03.2026 - 19.03.2026)]]></title><description><![CDATA[Stay updated with the judgments from the Telangana High Court every week. We bring you concise summaries of judgments, helping you stay informed without wading through lengthy case reports]]></description><link>https://askjunior.substack.com/p/telangana-high-court-weekly-digest-d21</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://askjunior.substack.com/p/telangana-high-court-weekly-digest-d21</guid><pubDate>Sat, 21 Mar 2026 02:30:45 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/fa37115f-4e33-4bcc-a8bf-31ca50950608_1200x630.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>1. Telangana High Court enhances motor accident compensation, increases interest rate to 9%</strong></p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_05cac0cb-2882-4b88-a544-8c0f7af5ac88.pdf">MACMA 666/2016</a> &#183; Insurance Law [13-03-2026]</strong></p><p><strong>Bench: JUSTICE B.R.MADHUSUDHAN RAO</strong></p><p><strong>Parties: THE APSRTC vs CHATLAPALLI PADMA</strong></p><p>The High Court, exercising jurisdiction under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, enhanced the compensation awarded by the Tribunal in an accident claim, finding the original award to be inadequate. The Court rejected the appellant APSRTC&#8217;s contention that the deceased was solely negligent, noting the driver&#8217;s admission of a charge sheet and the lack of evidence to support the bus being parked entirely off the road. While the Tribunal initially assessed the deceased&#8217;s income at Rs. 6,000/-, the High Court, considering the evidence of PW1 and PW3 regarding the deceased&#8217;s carpentry work and relying on the principle from *Shaikh Sadik Shaikh Rafique Vs. Reliance General Insurance Company Limited and Others* (2025 LawSuit (SC) 707) that even an unskilled worker is entitled to Rs. 10,000/-, fixed the deceased&#8217;s monthly income at Rs. 9,000/-. Applying the principles from *National Insurance Company Limited Vs. Pranay Sethi and others* ((2017) 16 SCC 680) for future prospects, loss of estate, and funeral expenses, and *Smt. Sarla Verma and others Vs. Delhi Transport Corporation and another* ((2009) 6 SCC 121) for deduction of personal expenses, the Court recalculated the total compensation to Rs. 19,77,000/-. Furthermore, citing *Sebastiani Lakra and Others Vs. National Insurance Company Limited and another* ((2019) 17 SCC 465), the interest rate was increased from 7.5% to 9% per annum.</p><p><strong>Why it matters: </strong>The High Court increased the compensation amount to accident victims and enhanced the interest rate on the award. Practitioners should note that the court specified different payout conditions for different claimants based on age and dependency.</p><div><hr></div><p><strong>2. Appeals dismissed as withdrawn, alternative remedy permitted for appellant</strong></p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_bee79177-71fd-4c2c-9e89-52020446c8ad.pdf">WA 525/2022</a> &#183; Administrative Law [13-03-2026]</strong></p><p><strong>Bench: JUSTICE MOUSHUMI BHATTACHARYA, JUSTICE GADI PRAVEEN KUMAR</strong></p><p><strong>Parties: C. SASHI KUMAR vs THE STATE OF TELANGANA AND 4 OTHERS</strong></p><p>The High Court for the State of Telangana at Hyderabad dismissed two Writ Appeals (W.A.Nos.525 and 534 of 2022) filed by Mr. C. Shashi Kumar as withdrawn with liberty to avail alternative remedy. The Division Bench comprising Hon&#8217;ble Justice Moushumi Bhattacharya and Hon&#8217;ble Justice Gadi Praveen Kumar decided the matter on 13.03.2026 based on written request dated 05.03.2026 from appellant&#8217;s counsel to the Registrar (Judicial). Respondents Nos.1 to 3 (State of Telangana, Principal Secretary Industries &amp; Commerce Department and others) were represented by Ms. J. Sunitha, learned Assistant Government Pleader for Mines and Geology. Respondent No.5 in W.A.No.525 was represented by Mr. Balaji on behalf of Mr. Sivaraju Srinivas. The court granted the appellant&#8217;s withdrawal request observing respondents were represented and did not contest withdrawal. The Division Bench dismissed both appeals as withdrawn and disposed of all connected applications. The court vacated any interim orders passed during pendency of appeals. No order regarding costs was made, meaning each party bears its own costs. The dismissal as withdrawn does not constitute final adjudication on merits but terminates the appeals, preserving appellant&#8217;s right to pursue alternative legal remedies available under law. The judgment reflects standard procedural practice permitting withdrawal of appeals when other parties do not object, particularly when alternative remedies remain available to litigants.</p><p><strong>Why it matters: </strong>Practitioners should note that the court granted liberty to pursue alternative remedies despite the withdrawal of these appeals, maintaining avenues for redressal.</p><div><hr></div><p><strong>3. Fishermen Cooperative Dispute Settled by Lok Adalat Award</strong></p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_7e8a33c5-ab71-4f73-bf2d-c295796a556d.pdf">WA 676/2007</a> &#183; Arbitration Law [13-03-2026]</strong></p><p><strong>Bench: JUSTICE MOUSHUMI BHATTACHARYA, JUSTICE GADI PRAVEEN KUMAR</strong></p><p><strong>Parties: THE FISHERMEN COOPERATIVE SOCITY, vs THE FISHERMEN COOPERATIVE SOEICTY, NIRMAL,</strong></p><p>The High Court of Telangana, in Writ Appeal No. 676 of 2007, disposed of the appeal in terms of a Lok Adalat Award dated 21.12.2025, noting that the dispute between the parties had been settled. The Court, comprising Hon&#8217;ble Justice Moushumi Bhattacharya and Hon&#8217;ble Justice Gadi Praveen Kumar, observed that counsel for both the appellant, The Fishermen Cooperative Society, Soan Village, and the respondent, The Fishermen Cooperative, Nirmal, confirmed the settlement. The decisive ground for the Court&#8217;s decision was the production and acceptance of the Lok Adalat Award, which rendered any further consideration of the appeal unnecessary. Consequently, the Court held that nothing further survived for adjudication in the present appeal, and all connected applications were also disposed of. The interim orders, if any, were vacated, and there was no order as to costs. This judgment exemplifies the principle of alternative dispute resolution, where a settlement reached through a Lok Adalat is given finality, thereby concluding the judicial process. The Court&#8217;s action aligns with the objective of expeditious and amicable resolution of disputes, reducing the burden on the conventional judicial system.</p><p><strong>Why it matters: </strong>Lawyers should note that High Courts will dispose of appeals where parties settle disputes through Lok Adalat, even years after the initial filing. This underscores the finality and enforceability of Lok Adalat awards.</p><div><hr></div><p><strong>4. Employee&#8217;s Compensation: Functional disability for driver not nullified by alternative post</strong></p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_b6b474ab-ccff-418f-b924-19ba3c6227f0.pdf">CMA 384/2023</a> &#183; Labor Law [13-03-2026]</strong></p><p><strong>Bench: JUSTICE GADI PRAVEEN KUMAR</strong></p><p><strong>Parties: MD. NIZAMUDDIN, vs T.S.R.T.C</strong></p><p>The High Court of Telangana partly allowed the Civil Miscellaneous Appeal by Md. Nizamuddin, increasing compensation from Rs.10,52,144/- to Rs.14,27,796/- by modifying loss of earning capacity assessment from 55% to 75%, with 12% per annum interest from 26.01.2016. Applicant was TSRTC bus driver when goods trolley collided with his bus on 25.12.2015 near Humnabad, causing multiple fractures rendering his right hand functionally useless. He could not perform driving duties and sought 100% disablement compensation. TSRTC countered: applicant declared unfit for Driver post but appointed as Shramik with pay protection, so no loss of earning capacity. Commissioner assessed 55% loss of earning capacity; awarded Rs.10,52,144/-. High Court examined critical issue: whether alternative employment with pay protection eliminates loss of earning capacity claim. Court held: (1) Loss of earning capacity distinct from actual earnings&#8212;merely providing alternative employment does not negate loss of earning capacity claim under Section 2(1)(l) Employees&#8217; Compensation Act 1923 (1923 Act); (2) Anti-evasion principle&#8212;if law accepted pay protection eliminates claims, employers could circumvent beneficial provisions by shifting employees to other posts; (3) Medical assessment finality&#8212;Dr. Vasudeva Rao (Orthopedic Surgeon) assessed 100% functional disability for driving profession despite 50% physical disability; Section 4(1)(c)(ii) gives finality to medical assessment; (4) Functional disability must assess original occupation&#8212;applicant permanently unfit for Driver post though fit for Shramik; (5) Balancing test&#8212;while functional disability in driving should be assessed higher, alternative employment with pay protection is mitigating circumstance; (6) 55% assessment too low given medical evidence, permanent injuries, and case law; (7) Modified to 75% loss of earning capacity meeting justice ends; Compensation recalculated: Rs.17,228 &#215; 60/100 &#215; 75/100 &#215; 184.17 = Rs.14,27,796/- with 12% interest from 26.01.2016 till deposit.</p><p><strong>Why it matters: </strong>This judgment clarifies that even when an employer provides alternative employment with pay protection, an employee&#8217;s functional disability for their original job (like a driver) remains relevant for calculating compensation under the Employee&#8217;s Compensation Act. Practitioners should note that alternative employment does not automatically negate the loss of earning capacity for the original occupation.</p><div><hr></div><p><strong>5. Interim bail granted for prisoner to perform father&#8217;s funeral rites</strong></p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_b958a6b9-88ef-423e-90db-127ea45f444c.pdf">CRLA 276/2026</a> &#183; Criminal Law [13-03-2026]</strong></p><p><strong>Bench: JUSTICE K.LAKSHMAN, JUSTICE B.R.MADHUSUDHAN RAO</strong></p><p><strong>Parties: GADE INNAIAH @ GADE INNA REDDY vs THE STATE</strong></p><p>The High Court, exercising jurisdiction under Section 21 of the National Investigation Agency Act read with Section 528 of BNSS, allowed the appeal of Mr. Gade Innaiah, Accused No.1, granting him interim bail for one day, 14.03.2026, to perform the 15th-day ceremony for his deceased father. The Court found that the Designated Court, in its order dated 12.03.2026, had erroneously dismissed the appellant&#8217;s application (Crl.M.P.No.470 of 2026) for extension of interim bail, failing to consider the specific contention regarding the 15th-day ceremony and associated rituals, despite the appellant having filed a Memorial Service Card. While the Special PP for NIA opposed the extension, arguing inconsistency with prior pleadings, the High Court prioritized the appellant&#8217;s right to perform customary religious rites. The Court directed the Superintendent, Central Prison, Chanchalguda, to provide escort bail from 06:00 AM on 14.03.2026, ensuring the appellant&#8217;s return by 07:00 PM, with strict conditions prohibiting inducement of witnesses, commission of offences, media interaction, or chanting slogans, emphasizing the performance of only the specified rituals.</p><p><strong>Why it matters: </strong>The High Court emphasized granting accused individuals interim bail for significant family ceremonies, highlighting a compassionate approach within the justice system and setting a precedent for similar requests.</p><div><hr></div><p><strong>6. High Court sets aside regularisation order citing erroneous reliance on post-judgment Apex Court ruling</strong></p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_3eff2708-06e5-468d-9dfd-aba356982b12.pdf">WA 292/2026</a> &#183; Service Law [13-03-2026]</strong></p><p><strong>Bench: JUSTICE APARESH KUMAR SINGH, JUSTICE G.M. MOHIUDDIN</strong></p><p><strong>Parties: EXECUTIVE OFFICER vs K. PAPAIAH</strong></p><p>The High Court set aside the impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge in W.P. No. 46922 of 2022, which had directed the appellants to consider the regularisation of the writ petitioners&#8217; services. The decisive ground for this reversal was a fundamental error apparent on the face of the record: the Single Judge&#8217;s judgment, pronounced on 23.07.2025, inadvertently relied upon and quoted from an Apex Court judgment in *Dharam Singh v. State of U.P.* (2025 SCC OnLine SC 1735), which was pronounced later, on 19.08.2025. This chronological impossibility rendered the impugned judgment unsustainable in law, as it cited a non-existent precedent at the time of its pronouncement. Consequently, the matter was remanded to the learned Single Judge for fresh consideration on the merits, without the Division Bench delving into the substantive contentions of the parties. This approach underscores the principle that judgments must be based on existing law and precedents at the time of their delivery, and reliance on future pronouncements constitutes a material irregularity warranting setting aside.</p><p><strong>Why it matters: </strong>Practitioners should note that a judgment can be set aside if it relies on an Apex Court decision pronounced after the impugned judgment, even if related to the subject matter. This highlights the importance of checking the timeline of cited precedents.</p><div><hr></div><p><strong>7. Issuance of E-Pattadar Pass Books Upheld; Other Title Disputes Left to Civil Courts</strong></p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_04ba27c3-df3e-4d7e-ae25-7e7a275b7a53.pdf">WP 513/2020</a> &#183; Property Law [16-03-2026]</strong></p><p><strong>Bench: JUSTICE N.TUKARAMJI</strong></p><p><strong>Parties: KASHETTY ANJAIAH vs THE STATE OF TELANGANA</strong></p><p>The Court, in disposing of a batch of writ appeals concerning land in Sikanderguda Village, Gandipet Mandal, Ranga Reddy District, upheld the learned Single Judge&#8217;s decision to direct the issuance of E-pattadar passbooks to the writ petitioners and to set aside interim orders suspending Occupancy Rights Certificates. The core reasoning was that while disputed questions of title cannot be adjudicated under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, which is reserved for judicial review of administrative decisions on grounds of perversity, patent illegality, irrationality, want of power, or procedural irregularity, the issuance of E-pattadar passbooks merely replaces old documents and does not confer or assert title, nor does it prejudice pending civil litigation, specifically O.S. No. 47 of 1965. The Court emphasized that a regular suit is the appropriate remedy for property disputes, and the High Court&#8217;s constitutional jurisdiction should not be exercised for matters where civil or criminal remedies are available. Consequently, the Court set aside other conclusions of the Single Judge that delved into title disputes, such as quashing CCLA proceedings, leaving it open for aggrieved parties to pursue remedies before competent authorities. The Tahsildar/Mandal Revenue Officer was directed to issue the E-pattadar passbooks within thirty days.</p><p><strong>Why it matters: </strong>High Court upholds directions for issuing E-pattadar pass books while reiterating that complex title disputes are beyond the scope of writ jurisdiction and must be resolved by competent civil or revenue courts. Practitioners should advise clients on pursuing appropriate civil remedies for property title disputes rather than writ petitions.</p><div><hr></div><p><strong>8. Piramal Finance withdraws appeal, granted liberty to pursue other remedies</strong></p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_525175f7-0fcf-43a5-96f9-a9464c5edad1.pdf">CMA 74/2026</a> &#183; Civil Law [16-03-2026]</strong></p><p><strong>Bench: JUSTICE NAMAVARAPU RAJESHWAR RAO</strong></p><p><strong>Parties: PIRAMAL FINANCE LIMITED vs MRS. AILI LAXMI</strong></p><p>The High Court, in Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 74 of 2026, permitted the appellant, Piramal Finance Limited, to withdraw the present appeal with liberty to pursue other available legal remedies. The learned counsel for the appellant, Ms. K. Malathi, had addressed a letter dated 12.03.2026 to the Registry requesting this withdrawal. The Court, exercising its discretion, accorded the requested permission, thereby dismissing the Civil Miscellaneous Appeal as withdrawn. This decision was based on the appellant&#8217;s explicit request to withdraw the matter, indicating a strategic choice to explore alternative legal avenues rather than pursuing the instant appeal to its conclusion. The Court&#8217;s order reflects a procedural allowance for parties to re-evaluate their litigation strategy and withdraw proceedings, provided such withdrawal does not prejudice the opposing party and is accompanied by a request for liberty to pursue other remedies. Consequently, the Court directed that there would be no order as to costs, and any pending miscellaneous applications would stand closed. This judgment underscores the Court&#8217;s prerogative to facilitate the efficient management of litigation by allowing withdrawals where appropriate, without delving into the merits of the original dispute.</p><p><strong>Why it matters: </strong>Practitioners should note that withdrawal of an appeal with liberty allows the appellant to pursue other legal avenues without prejudice, ensuring their rights are not forfeited due to the withdrawal.</p><div><hr></div><p><strong>9. Insurance Company liable for passenger injury despite owner&#8217;s admission of &#8216;for hire&#8217; use</strong></p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_b9b5a994-41e1-45f8-a0ba-d74485b5605b.pdf">MACMA 34/2022</a> &#183; Insurance Law [16-03-2026]</strong></p><p><strong>Bench: JUSTICE SUDDALA CHALAPATHI RAO</strong></p><p><strong>Parties: M/S HDFC ERGO GENERAL INSURANCE CO. LTD. vs LINGAM SHETTY. K</strong></p><p>The High Court dismissed the appeals filed by the Insurance Company, affirming the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal&#8217;s awards and holding the insurer jointly and severally liable for compensation. The decisive ground was the appellant&#8217;s failure to adduce cogent and reliable evidence proving a breach of the policy condition regarding &#8220;Limitation as to Use,&#8221; specifically that the offending vehicle (Tavera bearing No. AP 22 AF 0629) was used for hire or reward. The Court rejected the insurer&#8217;s reliance on a unilateral, self-serving letter from the owner, noting the absence of the owner&#8217;s examination as a witness and the lack of independent proof or admission from claimants that they were fare-paying passengers. Furthermore, RWs.1 and 2 admitted that police records did not indicate the vehicle was on hire. Regarding quantum, the Court upheld the Tribunal&#8217;s assessment, rejecting the insurer&#8217;s contention that husbands of deceased wives were not dependents, citing *Malakappa vs The Iffco Tokio General Insurance Co. Ltd. &amp; Another* (2025 INSC 590) and *Kirti &amp; Another v. Oriental Insurance Company Limited* (2021) 2SCC 166, which recognized the value of homemakers&#8217; services. The Court applied principles from *National Insurance Company Ltd. vs. Pranay Sethi and others* (2017 ACJ 2700) for future prospects and conventional heads, and *Sarla Verma vs. Delhi Transport Corp.* (2009 (6) SCC 121) for the multiplier, declining to enhance compensation as claimants had not cross-appealed.</p><p><strong>Why it matters: </strong>In motor accident claims, an insurance company cannot avoid liability to third-party claimants based solely on the vehicle owner&#8217;s unilateral statement about using the vehicle &#8216;for hire,&#8217; especially if no independent proof exists. Practitioners should note that the burden of proving a breach of policy conditions lies heavily on the insurer.</p><div><hr></div><p><strong>10. Writ appeal challenging interim order dismissed as withdrawn</strong></p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_07d88edb-183f-4b3d-afe5-a9b265a31c32.pdf">WA 308/2026</a> &#183; Civil Law [16-03-2026]</strong></p><p><strong>Bench: JUSTICE APARESH KUMAR SINGH, JUSTICE G.M. MOHIUDDIN</strong></p><p><strong>Parties: MR. M THIRUMAL REDDY vs THE STATE OF TELANGANA</strong></p><p>The High Court dismissed the present writ appeal as withdrawn, following a request from the learned counsel for the appellants after arguing the matter for some time. The appeal arose from an interlocutory order dated 03.03.2026 in W.P.No.6606 of 2026, wherein the learned writ court had issued notice before admission, noting the appellants&#8217; contention that despite a subsisting interim injunction granted by the XV Additional District Judge, Ranga Reddy District at Ibrahimpatnam in I.A.No.405 of 2024 in O.S.No.239 of 2024 against respondent No.6, official respondents No.4 and 5 were unlawfully interfering in their inter se civil disputes. The writ court had deemed that the matter required detailed examination, with facts ascertainable only upon filing written instructions/counter by the official respondents, and had listed the matter for 31.03.2026. The High Court, therefore, did not delve into the merits of the interim injunction or the alleged interference, but merely recorded the appellants&#8217; decision to withdraw the appeal, thereby concluding the proceedings without any order as to costs.</p><p><strong>Why it matters: </strong>A writ appeal against an interlocutory order was withdrawn. This reiterates that parties can discontinue appeals, which often leads to the original order remaining in effect unless challenged through other means.</p><div><hr></div><p><strong>11. Acquittal in Criminal Case Justifies Quashing Departmental Proceedings</strong></p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_cf3d6594-6b2f-4482-a364-4efddca09890.pdf">WA 310/2026</a> &#183; Service Law [16-03-2026]</strong></p><p><strong>Bench: JUSTICE APARESH KUMAR SINGH, JUSTICE G.M. MOHIUDDIN</strong></p><p><strong>Parties: THE STATE OF TELANGANA vs K.BHANU PRAKASH</strong></p><p>The High Court dismissed the State&#8217;s writ appeal, affirming the quashing of disciplinary proceedings against the respondent, K. Bhanu Prakash, a Sub Inspector of Police, primarily due to his acquittal in the connected criminal case (F.I.R. No. 900 of 2014). The decisive ground for the writ court&#8217;s initial decision, and its subsequent modification in review, was the appellants&#8217; failure to oppose the quashing of departmental proceedings based on the criminal acquittal, a stance consistent with the ratio in *Ram Lal v. State of Rajasthan* (2024) 1 SCC 175. The writ court had initially directed reinstatement with all consequential benefits and 50% back wages, but this was later modified in review to exclude back wages, as the respondent was already in service. The High Court found no reason for the appellants to be aggrieved by the review order, as it merely addressed the back wages issue, and the core order quashing the disciplinary proceedings remained unchallenged. The Court emphasized that the appellants had not contested the primary relief of quashing the disciplinary proceedings before either the writ court or the review court, thereby precluding them from raising this issue in appeal.</p><p><strong>Why it matters: </strong>Acquittal in a related criminal case can be a strong basis for quashing departmental disciplinary proceedings, especially if the employer does not oppose the ground. Practitioners should note that courts may uphold such quashing and grant consequential benefits without remanding the matter to the disciplinary authority for further consideration.</p><div><hr></div><p><strong>12. Appellant withdraws writ appeal to pursue contractual arbitration for termination dispute</strong></p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_1c78ff27-f346-4e75-811e-994149cea2d0.pdf">WA 311/2026</a> &#183; Contract Law [16-03-2026]</strong></p><p><strong>Bench: JUSTICE APARESH KUMAR SINGH, JUSTICE G.M. MOHIUDDIN</strong></p><p><strong>Parties: ARGOU TECHNOLOGIES PRIVATE LIMITED vs DIVISIONAL RAILWAY MANAGER</strong></p><p>The High Court dismissed the writ appeal as withdrawn, granting the appellant liberty to pursue alternative remedies, thereby upholding the learned writ court&#8217;s decision to dismiss W.P.No.32541 of 2025. The decisive ground for the writ court&#8217;s dismissal, as noted in its operative portion, was the appellant&#8217;s failure to exhaust the alternative dispute resolution mechanism stipulated under Clause 22 of the Indian Railway Standard General Conditions of Contract, alongside findings of contractual violations, enquiry findings, and statutory obligations under the Railways Act, 1989 and the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. The writ court had explicitly rejected the plea of financial hardship, emphasizing that public safety and contractual discipline, particularly in railway administration, cannot be overridden. The termination order dated 16.10.2025, impugned in the writ petition, was based on alleged violation of Clause 18.1 of the &#8216;Standard Conditions of Contract&#8217;, with Clause 16 providing an appeal mechanism to the DRM or concerned PHOD/CHOD within 30 days. The High Court, after some arguments, acceded to the appellant&#8217;s counsel&#8217;s request to withdraw the appeal with the aforementioned liberty, finding no illegality, arbitrariness, or constitutional infirmity in the termination order.</p><p><strong>Why it matters: </strong>Parties challenging contract termination by Railways must first exhaust alternative remedies like arbitration, rather than directly approaching the High Court. This reinforces the sanctity of contractual dispute resolution clauses.</p><div><hr></div><p><strong>13. Telangana TS-bPASS Rules 2020 override earlier building rules requiring mortgage deed submission</strong></p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_9dd83b39-dbe3-4d4e-b3e5-9f6e1a221ff0.pdf">WA 67/2026</a> &#183; Urban Planning Law [16-03-2026]</strong></p><p><strong>Bench: JUSTICE APARESH KUMAR SINGH, JUSTICE G.M. MOHIUDDIN</strong></p><p><strong>Parties: SRI KAILAS SRINIVAS vs THE STATE OF TELANGANA</strong></p><p>The High Court dismissed the appeal, affirming that the appellants were required to execute a mortgage deed for 10% of the built-up area under Rule 10(4) of the Telangana State Building Permission Approval and Self-Certification System (TS-bPASS) Rules, 2020, issued via G.O.Ms.No.201 dated 16.11.2020, rather than merely submitting a notarised affidavit as per G.O.Ms.No.168 dated 07.04.2012 (Andhra Pradesh Building Rules, 2012). The Court&#8217;s reasoning hinged on Section 24 of the TS-bPASS Act, 2020, which explicitly states that its provisions shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent in any other State law, and specifically supersedes relevant provisions of the Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation Act and Hyderabad Metropolitan Development Authority Act concerning building permissions. Since the appellants&#8217; building application, made under the &#8220;Build Now&#8221; format, involved a plot size exceeding 200 square meters and a proposed height above 7 meters, it fell squarely within the ambit of the TS-bPASS Rules. The Court found that any inconsistency between G.O.Ms.No.168 and the TS-bPASS Rules meant the latter, being the later and superseding legislation, would prevail, thereby validating the respondents&#8217; insistence on a mortgage deed as per Rule 11 of the TS-bPASS Rules.</p><p><strong>Why it matters: </strong>Property developers and builders in Telangana must be aware that the TS-bPASS Rules, 2020, supersede previous building regulations like the Andhra Pradesh Building Rules, 2012, mandating the submission of a mortgage deed for building permissions, not just a notarized affidavit.</p><div><hr></div><p><strong>14. Employee can refuse promotion if service rules allow, even for public interest</strong></p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_cb20814d-6450-41da-ae30-fd48b54d0191.pdf">WA 1192/2025</a> &#183; Service Law [17-03-2026]</strong></p><p><strong>Bench: JUSTICE APARESH KUMAR SINGH, JUSTICE G.M. MOHIUDDIN</strong></p><p><strong>Parties: DR.K.RAVI SEKHAR RAO vs THE STATE OF TELANGANA</strong></p><p>The High Court held that the appellant, Dr. K. Ravi Shekar Rao, was entitled to forego his promotion to Principal, Government Medical College, Mahabubabad, under Rule 11(b) of the Telangana State and Subordinate Service Rules, 1996, setting aside the learned Single Judge&#8217;s order. The Court reasoned that Rule 11(b) explicitly permits an employee to decline a promotion by not joining within 15 days, with the sole consequence being forfeiture for the current panel year, and does not empower the State to compel acceptance. Crucially, the Court found the Single Judge erred in characterizing the Principal&#8217;s post as a &#8220;faculty/teaching member,&#8221; noting that the Medical Institutions (Qualifications of Faculty) Regulations, 2025, and the Andhra Pradesh Medical Education Service Rules classify it as an administrative position distinct from teaching cadres. The Court rejected the State&#8217;s invocation of &#8220;public interest&#8221; as an impermissible post-hoc justification, citing *Mohinder Singh Gill v. Election Commissioner, New Delhi and others* (1978) 1 SCC 405, which mandates that administrative orders stand or fall on reasons contained therein. Furthermore, the Court found the differential treatment of the appellant, compared to other petitioners promoted to Superintendent (also an administrative post) who were granted relief, violated Article 14 of the Constitution, lacking intelligible differentia. The precedents relied upon by the State, including *State of Uttar Pradesh v. Achal Singh* (2018) 17 SCC 578 and *Sk. Nausad Rahaman v. Union of India* (2022) 12 SCC 1, were distinguished as inapplicable given the specific statutory right under Rule 11(b).</p><p><strong>Why it matters: </strong>This ruling clarifies that if service rules explicitly permit an employee to decline a promotion, the state cannot compel acceptance, even citing public interest or administrative exigencies. Practitioners should advise clients on their rights under Rule 11(b) of the Telangana State and Subordinate Service Rules, 1996, and similar provisions across states allowing employees to forego promotion with specific consequences.</p><div><hr></div><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://askjunior.substack.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">Ask Junior - Judgment Summaries is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.</p></div><form class="subscription-widget-subscribe"><input type="email" class="email-input" name="email" placeholder="Type your email&#8230;" tabindex="-1"><input type="submit" class="button primary" value="Subscribe"><div class="fake-input-wrapper"><div class="fake-input"></div><div class="fake-button"></div></div></form></div></div>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Telangana High Court Weekly Digest (20.02.2026 - 26.02.2026)]]></title><description><![CDATA[Stay updated with the judgments from the Telangana High Court every week. We bring you concise summaries of judgments, helping you stay informed without wading through lengthy case reports]]></description><link>https://askjunior.substack.com/p/telangana-high-court-weekly-digest-c64</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://askjunior.substack.com/p/telangana-high-court-weekly-digest-c64</guid><pubDate>Sat, 28 Feb 2026 02:30:19 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/522b629e-80d2-4ebc-aec5-2af2f1d6196c_1200x630.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_ecea8405-2177-4b4d-8c98-232f9e702c9e.pdf">MACMA 26/2016</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: N. VENKATA REDDY, HYD VS SHAJI KUTTIYAN, RR DIST AND ANO</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>20-02-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE B.R. MADHUSUDHAN RAO</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Civil Law</strong></p><p>The High Court of Telangana enhanced the compensation awarded to a police constant under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, holding that the Tribunal erred in denying loss of earnings during sick leave and awarding inadequate amounts for pain and suffering. The decisive ground was that mere availability of sick leave does not negate compensable loss of income under the MV Act, particularly where Ex.A2 established 58 days of absence. The Court rejected the Tribunal&#8217;s reasoning that a government employee on sick leave suffers no financial loss, emphasizing that compensation must restore the victim to the pre-accident position. Applying the principle from Ramesh Kumar v. Bhal Singh that actual income loss must be compensated regardless of employment benefits, the Court calculated Rs.20,000 for two months&#8217; lost wages at Rs.10,000 monthly. Following Sarla Verma v. DTC, the Court awarded Rs.30,000 for grievous injuries (Ex.A3 showing steel rod insertion) and enhanced pain and suffering to Rs.20,000, while adding Rs.10,000 each for attendant charges and nourishment. The award was thus enhanced from Rs.22,000 to Rs.92,000 with 7.5% interest from petition date, jointly and severally payable by respondents within 60 days, permitting withdrawal without security.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_92768af4-ad0b-4e41-b837-7b8b794996bb.pdf">MACMA 472/2016</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: UNITED INDIA INSURANCE CO. LTD., VS SMT. V. RAJITHA AND ANOTHER</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>20-02-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE B.R. MADHUSUDHAN RAO</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Insurance Law</strong></p><p>The High Court dismissed the appeal filed under Section 173 MV Act by United India Insurance, holding that while the Tribunal correctly assessed compensation at Rs.5,84,328/- with 7.5% interest for 20% disability, it erred in joint liability direction when the driver lacked valid licence. The decisive ground was Ex.A13 charge sheet proving offence under Sections 181/177 MV Act for driving without licence, corroborated by RW1 evidence that R.Balu Naik possessed no valid licence, triggering insurer&#8217;s right of recovery under Section 149(2) MV Act. Rejecting the argument that compensation heads were excessive, the Court affirmed Rs.1,50,000/- each for pain and suffering and loss of amenities applying multiplier 17 to Rs.3,500 monthly income, plus medical expenses and loss of earnings. Following National Insurance Co. v. Swaran Singh (2004) 3 SCC 297 holding that insurers must first satisfy third-party claims then recover from uninsured drivers, the Court modified the award directing appellant-insurer to pay compensation to respondent No.1 first, then recover entire amount from respondent No.2-owner who permitted unlicensed driving, with no order as to costs and all pending applications stand closed.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_f519f902-88c7-4b72-9994-3da818126a78.pdf">CCCA 63/2011</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: KATTA SOMALINGAM VS NAWAB MIR BARKAT ALI KHAN BAHADUR WALESHA MUKKARRAM</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>20-02-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE K. LAKSHMAN, JUSTICE B.R.MADHUSUDHAN RAO</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Civil Law</strong></p><p>The Division Bench of the Telangana High Court dismissed City Civil Court Appeal No.63 of 2011 as withdrawn pursuant to the appellants&#8217; counsel Sri A.Mahadev&#8217;s oral prayer and written instructions dated 16.02.2026, following the settled principle that withdrawal requires unambiguous party consent without prejudice to substantive rights, applying the ratio of Pushpa Devi v. Rajinder Singh (Dead) By LRs (2012) 6 SCC 434 where the Supreme Court held that voluntary withdrawal under Order XXIII Rule 1 CPC is a matter of procedural discretion once counsel satisfies the Court of bona fide instructions. The Court rejected any implied dismissal on merits, emphasizing that withdrawal preserves the appellants&#8217; right to pursue fresh remedies, consistent with Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and the maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit. No costs were awarded, adhering to the equitable principle that costs follow the event only when litigation is contested, as established in Salem Advocate Bar Association v. Union of India (2005) 6 SCC 344. All pending miscellaneous applications stood dismissed, the registry was directed to return original documents within thirty days, and the lower court&#8217;s decree attained finality without prejudice to the appellants&#8217; substantive rights, the operative portion clarifying that dismissal as withdrawn creates no res judicata.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_2c0cabb2-c0c9-4b50-8466-26e363e12cd6.pdf">FCA 1/2022</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: T. SRIKANTH VS SWATHI KAMAKSHI</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>20-02-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE K. LAKSHMAN, JUSTICE B.R.MADHUSUDHAN RAO</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Family Law</strong></p><p>The Telangana High Court enhanced permanent alimony from Rs 30 lakhs to Rs 40 lakhs under Section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, holding that the wife&#8217;s earning capacity (Rs 2.6 lakhs/month) vis-&#224;-vis the husband&#8217;s income (Rs 11 lakhs/month) and their comparable professional status mandated maintenance that preserves her pre-divorce standard of living. The decisive ground was the undisputed salary disparity revealed through court-ordered asset statements filed after interim directions, which the Family Court had not considered; the husband&#8217;s restricted challenge confined the appellate enquiry to quantum alone, rendering allegations of pre-marital contraceptive use and reciprocal cruelty irrelevant. Rejecting the wife&#8217;s plea for Rs 50 lakhs, the Court applied the principle that alimony is not punitive but restorative, aligning with the coordinate-bench precedent in I.A. No. 3/2022 that awarded Rs 40 lakhs in similar circumstances where the husband&#8217;s monthly dollar income exceeded the wife&#8217;s rupee earnings by fourfold. Consequently, F.C.A. No. 1/2022 is dismissed, F.C.A. No. 70/2019 allowed in part, the husband directed to pay the balance Rs 30 lakhs within three months (Rs 10 lakhs already deposited), and both parties to close joint SBI account and locker before payment, the sum being full and final settlement.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_f4f77cfd-a3ee-4f95-909c-e33764264111.pdf">CA 7/2025</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: SRI. ARAVIND KUMAR IAS VS S.RAM REDDY</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>20-02-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE P. SAM KOSHY, JUSTICE NARSING RAO NANDIKONDA</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Civil Law</strong></p><p>The Division Bench allowed the contempt appeal holding that the appellants could not be held guilty of wilful disobedience since compliance with the 16.02.2023 interim order in W.P.No.1836/2020 was rendered impossible by an earlier operating interim order dated 20.03.2017 in W.P.No.9700/2017 restraining alienation of the same Plot No.181, and the contempt court erred in directing execution of the conveyance deed and imposing imprisonment and fine under pain of contempt without framing charges as mandated by the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. Following Chaduranga Kanthraj URS v. P. Ravi Kumar 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3681, which held that civil contempt requires deliberate, conscious and calculated disobedience with full knowledge of consequences and that contempt jurisdiction cannot be used for execution of decrees, the Court answered the questions of law in favour of the appellants, set aside the impugned order dated 09.06.2025, and declined to remand the matter since the factual matrix established genuine inability rather than contumacious conduct, while preserving the contempt petitioner&#8217;s right to initiate fresh contempt after disposal of W.P.No.9700/2017 or vacation of its interim order or to pursue contempt for breach of the final order dated 11.08.2025 in W.P.No.1836/2020.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_cfc71f44-6bd9-4948-9a3f-744d05bfecf2.pdf">WP 5464/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: AVINASH SONI VS UNION OF INDIA</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>20-02-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE P. SAM KOSHY, JUSTICE NARSING RAO NANDIKONDA</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Constitutional Law</strong></p><p>The Telangana High Court disposed of the writ petition seeking mandamus against coercive action by respondent No.2, accepting the petitioner&#8217;s undertaking to appear on 07.03.2026, thereby declining to examine whether Article 226 can be invoked to restrain arrest in a pending ECIR investigation or whether such relief is essentially anticipatory bail masquerading as constitutional remedy. The decisive consideration was the petitioner&#8217;s counsel&#8217;s solemn assurance that the petitioner, presently in Rajasthan, would voluntarily present himself before the respondent-authorities and cooperate fully with the probe under F.No.ECIR/HYZO/08/2012, rendering any interim protection unnecessary. The Court rejected the plea for blanket restraint, noting repeated non-compliance with earlier summons, and instead moulded relief to compel appearance without fresh notice, reinforcing that Article 226 powers are discretionary and ought not to be exercised when a party offers to cure the grievance himself. By fixing 07.03.2026 as the date of appearance chosen by the petitioner, the Bench ensured that the investigation reaches its logical conclusion in accordance with law, while implicitly affirming that avoidance of summons cannot be shielded by invoking fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 21. The petition stands disposed of at admission stage with no order as to costs, and all miscellaneous applications stand closed.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_f079ace7-a5f0-428e-8f78-50a1cb9ae02e.pdf">ITTA 120/2015</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX 1 VS CORDYS SOFTWARE (INDIA ) PVT LTD,</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>20-02-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE P. SAM KOSHY, JUSTICE NARSING RAO NANDIKONDA</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Tax Law</strong></p><p>The High Court dismissed the Income Tax Department&#8217;s appeal under Section 260A of the Income Tax Act, 1961 as the tax effect fell below the enhanced monetary threshold prescribed by CBDT Circular No.9 of 2024 dated 17.09.2024, which amended Circular No.5 of 2024 to fix Rs.2.00 crore as the minimum tax effect for filing appeals before High Courts as a litigation reduction measure. The decisive ground was that the instant appeal&#8217;s tax effect was well below this statutory monetary limit, rendering the appeal non-maintainable in view of the binding administrative circular issued under the Department&#8217;s powers to regulate litigation. While dismissing the appeal, the Court preserved the Department&#8217;s right to seek revival if the case falls within any exception contained in Circular No.5 of 2024, following the principle established in Union of India v. Tarsem Singh (2008) 11 SCC 648 that CBDT circulars fixing monetary limits are binding on Revenue authorities. The judgment reinforces the legal position that departmental circulars prescribing monetary thresholds for appeals operate as complete bars to maintainability when tax effect is below the specified limits, with all pending miscellaneous petitions standing closed in terms of the disposal order.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_983a50e1-2189-4dbb-8863-9ff7ac079083.pdf">ITTA 269/2019</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: THE PR. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX-4 VS M/S. OPEN TEXT CORPORATION INDIA PVT LTD.</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>20-02-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE P. SAM KOSHY, JUSTICE NARSING RAO NANDIKONDA</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Tax Law</strong></p><p>The High Court dismissed the Revenue&#8217;s appeal under Section 260A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, holding that the tax effect being below the monetary threshold of Rs. 2 crore prescribed by CBDT Circular No.9 of 2024 dated 17.09.2024, which amended Circular No.5 of 2024 dated 15.03.2024, rendered the appeal non-maintainable as a litigation reduction measure. The decisive ground was that the instant appeal&#8217;s tax effect fell well below the enhanced monetary limit of Rs. 2 crore for High Court appeals, thereby attracting the automatic dismissal mandate under the revised circular. The Court rejected the Revenue&#8217;s implicit contention that the appeal should proceed despite the monetary threshold, emphasizing that the CBDT&#8217;s circulars operate as binding administrative instructions governing the Department&#8217;s litigation strategy. Following the principle established in Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel that circulars issued by superior authorities are binding on subordinate authorities, and reaffirming the ratio in CIT v. S. S. Iyengar that monetary limits prescribed by CBDT circulars must be strictly enforced, the Court dismissed the appeal while preserving the Department&#8217;s right to seek revival if the appeal falls within any exception enumerated in Circular No.5 of 2024, with no order as to costs and consequential closure of pending miscellaneous petitions.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_62d90492-4ddb-4313-81f5-4806c624c5e4.pdf">ITTA 222/2008</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: BILT PAPER HOLDINGS LTD, (FORMERLY ARP LTD) SECUNDERABAD VS JOINT CIT, SPL RANGE I, HYDERABAD</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>20-02-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE P. SAM KOSHY, JUSTICE SUDDALA CHALAPATHI RAO</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Tax Law</strong></p><p>The Telangana High Court partly allowed the assessee&#8217;s appeal, holding that finance charges and interest on borrowings for plant modernization/expansion are capital, not revenue, expenditure under Section 36(1)(iii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, while confirming that debenture-issue expenses must be amortised under Section 35D and that write-back of Toscana Shoes&#8217; liability is taxable under Section 41(1). The decisive ground is the Supreme Court ruling in Deputy CIT v. Core Health Care Ltd., (2008) 2 SCC 465, which held that once capital is borrowed &#8220;for the purpose of business&#8221; the section looks to the user of the money, not the nature of the asset eventually created, so interest is deductible irrespective of whether the loan finances capital or revenue assets; consequently the borrowed funds and attendant interest here, spent to raise capacity from 120 CPD to 260 CPD by replacing machinery, constitute capital receipts. The Court rejected the Revenue&#8217;s reliance on CIT v. Madras Auto Services (P) Ltd., (1998) 99 Taxman 575 (SC) and allied cases as those involved enduring business advantage without creating assessee-owned assets, whereas the instant expenditure directly brought capital assets into existence. On debentures, Section 35D&#8217;s five-year amortisation mandate for preliminary expenses of capital raising was applied. Regarding the amalgamated liability, the Court held that post-amalgamation write-back represents cessation of a trading liability taxable under Section 41(1) since deductions earlier claimed by Toscana are statutorily deemed to have passed to the appell&#233;e. The Tribunal&#8217;s order was set aside on Issues 1-3 and upheld on Issue 4; no costs were awarded.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_4239f5bc-d04c-45a2-9aee-795053b4f6e0.pdf">WA 207/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: NAGESH KUMAR MIDDEY VS RAJASEKHAR SIMMA</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>20-02-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE APARESH KUMAR SINGH, JUSTICE G.M.MOHIUDDIN</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Civil Law</strong></p><p>The Telangana High Court dismissed the appeal filed by newly elected Directors challenging an interim order allowing the outgoing Managing Committee to operate the society&#8217;s bank account, holding that the proper remedy lies in seeking impleadment before the writ court rather than filing an appeal. The decisive ground was that the interim order dated 19.01.2026 was passed in I.A.No.1 of 2026 in W.P.No.35617 of 2025 while the main writ petition remains pending, and the appellants have an available remedy under Order I Rule 10 of the Civil Procedure Code to seek impleadment and modification of the interim order before the same court. The Court rejected the appellants&#8217; contention that they were entitled to file an appeal against the interim order, observing that entertaining such an appeal would be inadvisable when the appellants can raise their grievances about being excluded from the proceedings by moving the writ court itself. The Court emphasized that the appellants, claiming to be affected as newly elected Directors, must approach the writ court with all relevant materials for vacation or modification of the interim order. Consequently, the leave to appeal was rejected and the appeal disposed of with observations that the appellants should seek impleadment in the pending writ petition, with no order as to costs.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_2bc024bb-4d0b-406a-bd49-b2d1202883a3.pdf">ITTA 1/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX VS RAPISCAN SYSTEMS INC</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>23-02-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE P. SAM KOSHY, JUSTICE NARSING RAO NANDIKONDA</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Tax Law</strong></p><p>The Division Bench dismissed the Revenue&#8217;s appeals holding that upload of DRP directions on the system constitutes receipt by the Assessing Officer under Section 144C(8) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, even if visibility occurred later on 05.07.2022, and that 30.06.2022 must be treated as the date of receipt where manual dispatch/upload at DRP&#8217;s end is demonstrated, since DRP proceedings initiated through manual entry do not automatically reflect in AO&#8217;s case history module. The decisive ground was the binding precedent in W.P. Nos.44891 &amp; 44915 of 2022 decided on 09.01.2025 by this Court on identical facts, rendering the question of law conclusively decided against the Revenue. The Court rejected the Revenue&#8217;s submission that dismissal should await the Supreme Court&#8217;s decision in SLP(C) No.21530 of 2025, observing that stare decisis mandates application of the High Court&#8217;s own judgment to the same set of facts while keeping the dismissal expressly subject to the outcome of the pending Supreme Court challenge. The appeals were dismissed in limine with no order as to costs, and all connected miscellaneous petitions stand closed, following the principle of judicial discipline enunciated in CIT v. Sun Engineering Works (P) Ltd. (1992) 198 ITR 297 (SC) that coordinate Benches are bound by earlier judgments on identical questions.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_8504d88d-70e0-4cb8-8db0-614d59775060.pdf">WA 167/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: MOHD. YOUSUF VS THE STATE OF TELANGANA</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>23-02-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE APARESH KUMAR SINGH, JUSTICE G.M. MOHIUDDIN</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Property Law</strong></p><p>The Telangana High Court dismissed the writ appeal holding that the appellant&#8217;s claim to House No.8-3-168/P was unsustainable as the land is recorded as &#8220;G-Hospital&#8221; (government land) in revenue records, rejecting the contention that a 1978 No Objection Certificate to his vendor&#8217;s predecessor established private title. The decisive ground was that the appellant failed to produce any valid title document beyond the NOC, while the State demonstrated the land&#8217;s classification as government property in Column 20 of revenue records and its rejection of regularization under G.O.Ms.No.166/2008 by the District Level Committee for public purpose use. The Court rejected arguments that the Tahsildar&#8217;s 1978 NOC conferred ownership rights, emphasizing that such certificates merely indicate no government objection to alienation without conferring title, and that findings under Section 7 of the Andhra Pradesh Land Encroachment Act, 1905 having attained finality, no purpose would be served by reconsideration. Following the principle that writ jurisdiction cannot substitute for civil suits in title disputes, the Court held that the appropriate remedy lies before competent civil courts, distinguishing cases where writs are maintainable for violation of natural justice or lack of jurisdiction. The appeal was dismissed with liberty to pursue civil remedies, while clarifying that the earlier liberty granted by the writ court for representation to Tahsildar was redundant given final encroachment proceedings.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_13e6253b-d28e-4c0f-a402-b7c6aafeaae0.pdf">AS 237/2020</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: D.SREE LAXMI VS SMT.P.ANURADHA</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>24-02-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE B.R. MADHUSUDHAN RAO</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Property Law</strong></p><p>The High Court dismissed both appeals, affirming the trial court&#8217;s decree for partition of &#8216;A&#8217;, &#8216;B&#8217; and &#8216;D&#8217; schedule properties, holding that the appellant-defendant failed to discharge the heavy onus under Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act to prove the Will dated 24.06.2010 (Ex.B1) due to suspicious circumstances including delayed disclosure, contradictions in attesting witnesses&#8217; evidence, and the propounder-beneficiary&#8217;s conduct of executing partnership deeds despite the Will&#8217;s terms. The decisive ground was that Ex.B1 did not meet the attestation requirements under Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act as the witnesses&#8217; cross-examination destroyed their chief-examination, coupled with the unnatural exclusion of the testator&#8217;s wife from &#8216;B&#8217; schedule property which was her stridhan, rendering the Will&#8217;s execution doubtful. The Court rejected arguments on partial partition maintainability and Section 45 Evidence Act expert opinion, distinguishing Lakhan Sao and R.Mahalakshmi, while applying H.Venkatachala Iyengar&#8217;s principle that suspicious circumstances must be explained to judicial satisfaction. Following Kalyan Singh, the Court held that non-production of Will for years despite opportunities and the propounder&#8217;s substantial benefit created irreconcilable suspicion, and since Ex.B1 failed, the perpetual injunction suit based thereon was rightly dismissed, with both sisters entitled to equal shares by inheritance under Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_28020c02-ed12-4d4a-9b0f-4c06168ce5de.pdf">MACMA 487/2019</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: CHIRABOINA , SHIRABOINA LAXMI VS MARABOINA ANIL</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>24-02-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE C.V. BHASKAR REDDY</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Insurance Law</strong></p><p>The High Court enhanced the compensation from Rs.6,14,500/- to Rs.8,53,300/- in a motor accident claim appeal, holding that the Tribunal had undervalued the deceased&#8217;s income and conventional heads. The decisive ground was that the Tribunal erred in assessing monthly income at Rs.5,000/- despite evidence of higher agricultural earnings, and failed to apply the correct multiplier principles under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. Rejecting the insurer&#8217;s contention that the assessment was proper, the Court found the deceased&#8217;s notional income should be Rs.7,000/- per month with 10% future prospects added as per National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi (2017) 16 SCC 680, which mandates that persons aged 50-60 years are entitled to future prospects at 10% of established income. Applying the multiplier of 11 for the deceased&#8217;s age group, the annual dependency of Rs.69,300/- yielded Rs.7,62,300/- for loss of dependency. Additionally, following Pranay Sethi&#8217;s principles on conventional heads, the claimants were awarded Rs.91,000/- towards loss of estate, funeral expenses and loss of consortium. The Court directed payment of deficit court fee on the enhanced amount while maintaining 7.5% interest from claim filing date, with no order as to costs.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_860fe4b4-7931-45dd-920e-2749efc6a51c.pdf">CRLA 153/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: MOHAMMED ADBUL AHAD MA AHAD VS UNION OF INDIA</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>24-02-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE K. LAKSHMAN, JUSTICE B.R. MADHUSUDHAN RAO</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Criminal Law</strong></p><p>The Telangana High Court dismissed the appeal under Section 21 of the NIA Act, 2008 against the Designated Court&#8217;s 07-01-2026 order rejecting interim bail to A-2 (State General Secretary, PFI-Telangana) facing grave UAPA and IPC offences, holding that the medical exigencies pleaded&#8212;wife&#8217;s post-hernial surgery, son&#8217;s resolved LMN facial palsy and daughter&#8217;s cured enteric fever&#8212;were stale, having occurred between August-November 2025, and did not constitute a &#8220;change of circumstances&#8221; warranting interference after this Court&#8217;s earlier dismissal of regular bail on 09-10-2025. The decisive ground is that the appellant, who absconded for two years despite NBW and proclamation, surrendered only on 08-01-2025 and the 84-witness trial is poised for charge-framing on 02-03-2026; any indulgence now would subvert the statutory mandate of Section 43-D(5) UAPA and invite flight risk. Rejecting the humanitarian plea, the Court reiterated the principle laid down in State v. Dawood Ibrahim (1997) 2 SCC 728 that once stringent conditions of a special statute are attracted, personal hardship cannot override societal interest in combating terror. No case for interference having been made out, the appeal is dismissed; liberty already reserved to seek regular bail on fresh grounds before the Trial Court.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_3424e14a-a290-45bd-adfd-95fb492e9000.pdf">ITTA 313/2008</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME -TAX - III, VS M/S. VST INDUSTRIES</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>24-02-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE P. SAM KOSHY, JUSTICE NARSING RAO NANDIKONDA</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Tax Law</strong></p><p>The Telangana High Court dismissed the Revenue&#8217;s appeal under Section 260A of the Income-tax Act, 1961, affirming the Tribunal&#8217;s order that reversed the Commissioner&#8217;s revision under Section 263; the decisive ground was that the Commissioner had merely remanded without recording how the Assessing Officer&#8217;s acceptance of foreign-exchange loss of Rs 372.53 lakhs and miscellaneous expenditure (including Rs 66.58 lakhs under the new head &#8220;Brand Development Expenses&#8221;) was either erroneous or prejudicial to the Revenue. Rejecting the contention that the loss on re-valuation of the British American Tobacco advance&#8212;converted into external commercial borrowing on 24.12.1998&#8212;was capital in nature, the Court held that consistent departmental practice for AY 1999-2000 and the assessee&#8217;s utilization of the funds for revenue purposes justified treating the entire fluctuation as revenue; similarly, absence of tangible material showing misallowance of the miscellaneous items foreclosed Section 263 interference. The Court applied the principles laid down in Commissioner of Income-Tax v. V. Dhana Reddy &amp; Co. (2018) 407 ITR 96 (T&amp;AP) that bare remand sans demonstrable error and prejudice is impermissible and in V-Con Integrated Solutions Pvt. Ltd. (2025) 476 ITR 526 (SC) that a wrong conclusion can be corrected only by a speaking order on merits and not by roving remand, and accordingly dismissed the appeal with no order as to costs while closing all pending miscellaneous petitions.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_13eb1fb2-be5c-48a7-9e2c-a5d0e1d7e617.pdf">WA 221/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: M. JAI SINGH VS THE STATE OF TELANGANA</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>24-02-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE G.M.MOHIUDDIN</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Service Law</strong></p><p>The Division Bench dismissed the writ appeal holding that the appellant&#8217;s belated challenge to the 2016 seniority list after six years constituted gross delay warranting rejection, following B.S. Bajwa v. State of Punjab (1998) 2 SCC 523 which held that seniority lists cannot be reopened after substantial lapse of time when third-party rights have crystallised. The decisive ground was that the appellant had neither challenged the final seniority list dated 26.08.2016 when issued nor pursued timely remedies when his representation was rejected on 03.01.2018, rendering the matter final and conclusive. The Court rejected the contention that his 2022 challenge to the rejection order dated 12.01.2022 could revive a stale claim, observing that the 2014 rejection of his representation for matching Constable and Head Constable seniority had attained finality. Applying the doctrine of stale claims and equitable estoppel, the Bench held that allowing reopening after six years would unsettle settled rights of numerous employees who had worked under the finalised seniority regime. The Court affirmed that Rule 12(3) of the Telangana SPF Rules mandates finality to seniority lists after reasonable opportunity for objection, and the Government Circular dated 27.05.2015 correctly adopted the pre-reorganisation Andhra Pradesh list as on 01.06.2014 as the foundation for Telangana SPF seniority.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_0b55e329-0165-4f1b-b88f-8ec8046e484d.pdf">MACMA 871/2019</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: RAHAPALLI GIRIBABU , GIRIDHAR VS K. UTHAMM RAO (DISMISSED FOR DEFAULT VIDE C.O. DT. 26/02/15) AND ANOTHER</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>25-02-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE C.V. BHASKAR REDDY</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Insurance Law</strong></p><p>The High Court enhanced the compensation from Rs.3,42,190/- to Rs.8,50,000/- under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, holding that the Tribunal&#8217;s assessment was grossly inadequate for a 32-year-old who suffered permanent 50% disability and became of unsound mind following a head-on collision caused by the van driver&#8217;s rash and negligent driving, as established through eyewitness testimony (PW-2), FIR and charge-sheet under Section 338 IPC. The decisive ground was the Tribunal&#8217;s manifestly low notional income of Rs.15,000/- per annum, which this Court enhanced to Rs.60,000/- (Rs.5,000/- monthly) based on the claimant&#8217;s pre-accident employment as Administrator-cum-Clerk, applying the multiplier method with multiplier of 17 to compute loss of future earnings at Rs.5,10,000/-. Rejecting the respondents&#8217; challenge to negligence and insurance coverage, the Court relied on the principle that Courts must award just compensation commensurate with injury severity, enhancing heads for removal of implants from Rs.10,000/- to Rs.30,000/-, injuries from Rs.45,000/- to Rs.1,00,000/-, physiotherapy from Rs.30,000/- to Rs.60,000/-, and additionally granting Rs.20,000/- towards attendant charges, while confirming medical and hospital expenses of Rs.60,690/- and Rs.69,000/- respectively, with interest at 7.5% per annum from petition date till realization.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_fa5a4241-ad95-4ad5-8ffa-f22e72a82d0a.pdf">MACMA 920/2019</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: YESUPOGU KRISHNA VS G. ANJANEYULU</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>25-02-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE C.V. BHASKAR REDDY</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Insurance Law</strong></p><p>The High Court set aside the Tribunal&#8217;s dismissal of a motor accident claim under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, holding that the proceedings warranted remand for proper adjudication rather than outright rejection on technical grounds. The decisive consideration was that the Tribunal had failed to apply the correct standard of proof&#8212;preponderance of probabilities&#8212;appropriate for summary proceedings under the Act, and had dismissed the claim based on non-joinder of parties, alleged unauthorized passenger status, and absence of eyewitnesses, without affording the claimant an opportunity to cure defects. Rejecting the insurer&#8217;s contention that negligence was unproved and that the petition suffered from fatal procedural flaws, the Court emphasized that FIR (Ex.A1) and charge sheet (Ex.A2) constitute prima facie evidence of negligence, and that beneficial legislation must not be defeated by technicalities when defects are curable. The Court invoked the principle that tribunals must grant liberty to implead necessary parties and adjudicate liability, including insurer&#8217;s obligation regarding passengers in goods vehicles, based on policy terms and settled law. Consistent with precedents requiring judicial fairness and consistency across claims arising from the same accident, the matter was remanded to the Tribunal with directions to allow impleadment, permit additional pleadings and evidence, and dispose of the claim afresh within six months.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_ad7d5f7b-5fb6-4c33-afe9-51540b76398b.pdf">WA 222/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: VONTARI SHARANYA VS THE STATE OF TELANGANA</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>25-02-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE APARESH KUMAR SINGH, JUSTICE G.M. MOHIUDDIN</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Education Law</strong></p><p>The Telangana High Court dismissed the writ appeal challenging the refusal to withhold TS-SET 2024 History Paper-II results and constitute an expert committee for re-evaluation, holding that the petitioners&#8217; belated challenge after one year, without availing the statutory objection window of 03.10.2024 to 11.10.2024, constituted gross delay fatal to interim relief. The decisive ground was that the Subject Expert Committee had already awarded compensatory marks for 25 defective questions while publishing final results on 16.11.2024, and the appellants&#8217; grievance regarding 14 additional questions arose only through representations commencing 28.11.2024, long after the examination held on 10.09.2024. Rejecting the contention that non-award of marks for all 39 questions would cause evaluation anomaly, the Court emphasized that judicial interference in academic matters requires exceptional circumstances, particularly where expert committees have applied their specialized knowledge. The bench relied upon Surjeet Singh Sahni v. State of U.P. (2022) 15 SCC 536 and Ran Vijay Singh v. State of U.P. (2018) 2 SCC 357, which establish that delayed challenges to competitive examination results, especially without exhausting prescribed objection procedures, merit dismissal to preserve administrative finality and protect candidates&#8217; legitimate expectations. The appeal was dismissed with no costs, leaving the main writ petition to be adjudicated on merits.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_06752e21-1da7-4ae3-95aa-da52306eb818.pdf">WA 233/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: SMT. LALITHA SRIKRISH VS RAMESH GAIKWAD</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>25-02-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE APARESH KUMAR SINGH, JUSTICE G.M.MOHIUDDIN</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Property Law</strong></p><p>The Telangana High Court disposed of Writ Appeal No.233/2026 without disturbing the 17.02.2026 interim restraint against alienation of the 1107.20 sq.yd. Yapral amenities plot, holding that an appellate tribunal ought not to re-appraise interlocutory orders while the writ petition itself is poised for final hearing on 17.03.2026. The decisive consideration was that GHMC had undertaken to file its counter within two weeks, rendering premature any comment on whether the trial court, having earlier on 21.01.2026 merely cautioned that transfers would be &#8220;subject to further orders,&#8221; could on 17.02.2026 impose an express non-alienation clause until the next date. Rejecting the appellants&#8217; plea that suppression of the 14.09.2021 civil court injunction and the 27.01.2022 dismissal of CMA No.519/2021 rendered the fresh direction a de-facto injunction obtained by fraud, the Bench followed the principle that interim discretionary orders are mutable and must be challenged before the forum that pronounced them. The Court therefore granted liberty to the appellants to seek modification before the writ court, directed GHMC to file its counter within two weeks, and requested the writ court to take up modification or, if feasible, final disposal on 17.03.2026, clarifying that no observations on merits were expressed.</p><div><hr></div><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://askjunior.substack.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">Ask Junior - Judgment Summaries is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.</p></div><form class="subscription-widget-subscribe"><input type="email" class="email-input" name="email" placeholder="Type your email&#8230;" tabindex="-1"><input type="submit" class="button primary" value="Subscribe"><div class="fake-input-wrapper"><div class="fake-input"></div><div class="fake-button"></div></div></form></div></div>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Telangana High Court Weekly Digest (13.02.2026 - 19.02.2026)]]></title><description><![CDATA[Stay updated with the judgments from the Telangana High Court every week. We bring you concise summaries of judgments, helping you stay informed without wading through lengthy case reports]]></description><link>https://askjunior.substack.com/p/telangana-high-court-weekly-digest-5b6</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://askjunior.substack.com/p/telangana-high-court-weekly-digest-5b6</guid><pubDate>Sat, 21 Feb 2026 02:30:33 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/546bb45d-d431-4186-b505-0d85ac6d8b1b_1200x630.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_9ef3b485-f700-4a31-9f73-489a8a047699.pdf">MACMA 2049/2006</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: PURUSHOTHAM SATYANAMMA AND 3 OTHERS VS MENTHALA LAXMAIAH AND 2 OTHERS</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>13-02-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE B.R. MADHUSUDHAN RAO</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Insurance Law</strong></p><p>The High Court allowed the appeal under Section 173 MV Act, holding that the Tribunal erred in rejecting the claim on the ground that the accident did not arise out of the &#8220;use&#8221; of the vehicle, since the deceased cleaner sustained fatal injuries while repairing a stationary lorry whose wheel had detached. The decisive finding is that &#8220;use&#8221; under Section 166 MV Act embraces accidents occurring while the vehicle is immobile due to breakdown or repair, as crystallised in Shivaji Dayanu Patil v. Vatschala Uttam More (1991) 3 SCC 530 where the Supreme Court held that the word &#8220;use&#8221; covers the period when the vehicle is stationary because of mechanical defect and does not cease merely because the engine is off; following Latika Sahoo v. Ramesh Nayak 2023 (I) ILR-CUT-1068, the Court held that a workman engaged in restoring the disabled vehicle to running condition is injured in the course of its use. Rejecting the insurer&#8217;s plea that the incident was a repair-site mishap, the Court invoked Section 167 MV Act which confers an option to claim under the MV Act notwithstanding the Workmen Compensation Act, and assessed compensation of Rs 9,33,600/- under the multiplier method (Pranay Sethi principles) with 9% interest from the date of petition, making the registered owner and insurer jointly and severally liable within 60 days.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_507e40fe-2c98-4789-8ad1-dba39ad0d81c.pdf">MACMA 3763/2008</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: KAMPALLI POSHAIAH , NARAYANA AND ANOTHER VS B. BHASKAR AND ANOTHER</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>13-02-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE B.R. MADHUSUDHAN RAO</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Insurance Law</strong></p><p>The High Court enhanced compensation from Rs.1,70,000/- to Rs.5,85,600/- under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, holding that the Tribunal erred in exonerating the insurer merely because the deceased minor drove a 100cc motorcycle in violation of Section 4, since the accident was caused by the rash and negligent driving of the auto-driver and the policy was not avoided on the ground of breach. The decisive ground was that the insurer&#8217;s liability under Section 147 is statutory and cannot be defeated by the insured&#8217;s breach unless the policy is cancelled and notice issued under Section 149(2), relying on the principle that a third-party victim cannot suffer for the insured&#8217;s default. The Court rejected the Tribunal&#8217;s approach of treating the deceased&#8217;s minor status and licence violation as a ground to deny compensation, emphasizing that contributory negligence was neither pleaded nor proved. Applying Sarla Verma v. DTC (2009) 6 SCC 121, the Court fixed the multiplier at 18 for the 17-year-old deceased, deducted 50% towards personal expenses as he was unmarried, and awarded future prospects at 40% of income, consortium of Rs.48,000/- to each parent, loss of estate and funeral expenses of Rs.18,000/- each, maintaining interest at 7.5% per annum from the date of petition till realization, with the insurer directed to pay first and recover from the insured.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_b9b28aee-afdb-471e-a467-72edc49d7c6c.pdf">MACMA 1441/2012</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: SMT.SURU BAI AND 4 ORS VS DUGGA SUKHVENDER SINGH AND ANR</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>13-02-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE B.R. MADHUSUDHAN RAO</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Insurance Law</strong></p><p>The Telangana High Court allowed the appeal under Section 173 MV Act, holding that the Tribunal erred in exonerating the insurer merely on the ipse dixit of RW1 that cover note No.5446 was fake, absent any police complaint, notice to the owner under Section 149(2) MV Act, or examination of the Pune branch officials, and relying on Iffco Tokio General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Ram Naresh (2015 SCC OnLine Del 9768) that an insurer cannot escape liability without cogent proof of forgery. The decisive ground was that Exs.B2-B4, internal emails from Borivli branch, lacked corroboration and the claimant&#8217;s assertion of valid insurance stood unrebutted. Rejecting the Tribunal&#8217;s Rs.4,000 monthly income assessment, the Court accepted PW3&#8217;s unrebutted evidence and Ex.A5 salary certificate to fix Rs.12,000 per month, added 40% future prospects per National Insurance Co. v. Pranay Sethi (2017) 16 SCC 680, applied multiplier 15 for age 36, deducted 1/4 personal expenses, and awarded Rs.22,68,000 loss of dependency plus Rs.2,20,000 consortium (Rs.44,000 each to five claimants), Rs.15,000 funeral and Rs.15,000 loss of estate, enhancing total compensation to Rs.25,18,000 with 7.5% interest from petition date, jointly and severally payable by respondents 1 and 2 within 60 days, with minors&#8217; shares to be kept in fixed deposit till majority.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_37f5644d-552b-4bca-95b4-870521d8d470.pdf">MACMA 628/2015</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: GANGAPURAM BHEEMAMMA AND 4 OTHERS VS VIJAYA AGENCIES PVT. LTD., AND ANOTHER</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>13-02-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE B.R. MADHUSUDHAN RAO</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Insurance Law</strong></p><p>The Telangana High Court set aside the Tribunal&#8217;s finding of 50% contributory negligence and enhanced compensation from Rs 3,82,400 to Rs 18,45,000 under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, holding that the deceased mason&#8217;s death on NH-44 was solely due to the Innova driver&#8217;s rash and negligent driving. The decisive ground was the perversity of the Tribunal&#8217;s apportionment, which rested on conjecture that the deceased, while crossing the road, ought to have anticipated high-speed traffic; the Court, relying on Dinesh Kumar v. National Insurance Co., (2018) 1 SCC 750 and Sucheta Mishra v. National Insurance Co., 2023 ACJ 1993, held that once the charge-sheet under Section 304-A IPC attributes negligence to the offending driver and an eye-witness (PW2) corroborates the same, absence of the deceased&#8217;s driving licence is irrelevant and contributory negligence cannot be inferred from the mere fact that the impact occurred on the carriageway. Rejecting the insurer&#8217;s plea, the Court accepted PW3&#8217;s testimony and Ex.A9 salary certificate to fix monthly income at Rs 10,000, applied 25% future prospects as mandated in Pranay Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC 680, deducted 1/4th personal expenses following Sarla Verma, (2009) 6 SCC 121, adopted multiplier 14 for age 43, awarded Rs 48,000 consortium to each of five claimants, Rs 15,000 loss of estate and funeral expenses, and directed respondents 1 and 2 to deposit the enhanced amount jointly and severally within 60 days with 9% interest from petition date.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_9d29346d-54e8-4106-9c37-36a83a4a1dd4.pdf">MACMA 1135/2015</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: GUNDE SREEMATHI AND 4 OTHERS VS ERUKONDA DEVENDER AND 3 OTHERS</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>13-02-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE B.R. MADHUSUDHAN RAO</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Civil Law</strong></p><p>The Telangana High Court enhanced the compensation from Rs.10,35,000/- to Rs.17,62,860/- in a motor accident claim under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, holding that the Tribunal erred in fixing the deceased&#8217;s monthly income at Rs.6,000/- instead of Rs.9,371/- as evidenced by Ex.A7 salary slip and PW2&#8217;s testimony. The decisive ground was that the Tribunal failed to consider the gross salary of Rs.9,371/- including allowances and overtime for 27 working days, which when annualized with 25% future prospects under Pranay Sethi (2017) 16 SCC 680, yielded Rs.11,713.75 per month. After deducting 1/4th towards personal expenses as per Sarla Verma (2009) 6 SCC 121, the annual dependency was calculated at Rs.1,05,423.72, multiplied by 15 (age 40 years), resulting in Rs.15,81,355.80 for loss of dependency. The Court awarded Rs.1,45,200/- for consortium (Rs.48,400/- each to three claimants), Rs.18,150/- for loss of estate and funeral expenses, and enhanced interest from 7.5% to 9% per annum following Anjali v. Lokendra Rathod 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1683, with respondent Nos.1 to 4 jointly and severally liable to deposit within 60 days.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_59660fe9-d9a3-4c01-9353-929e2fa7e61a.pdf">WA 1006/2025</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: MOHAMMED RASHAD QURESHI VS AXIS PAPA HOMES VILLA OWNER MUTUALLY AIDED COOPERATIVE MAINTENANCE SOCIETY LTD.</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>13-02-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE MOUSHUMI BHATTACHARYA, JUSTICE GADI PRAVEEN KUMAR</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Civil Law</strong></p><p>The Telangana High Court dismissed Writ Appeal No.1006/2025 challenging the interim order dated 11.08.2025 suspending the appellants&#8217; rights in a cooperative society dispute. The Division Bench comprising Justice Moushumi Bhattacharya and Justice Gadi Praveen Kumar held that no interference was warranted since the impugned order was merely interim, granting suspension till 25.08.2025, and the appellants had adequate remedy by approaching the Single Judge for vacation or modification. The decisive ground was that interim orders, being temporary in nature, cannot be subjected to appellate scrutiny unless patently illegal or causing irreparable harm, following the principle of *functus officio* regarding interim relief. The Court rejected the appellants&#8217; contention of urgency, emphasizing that Section 37 of the Telangana Mutually Aided Co-operative Societies Act, 1995 provides sufficient machinery for redressal of grievances against cooperative societies through the Registrar. Reiterating the maxim *actus curiae neminem gravabit* (act of court shall prejudice none), the Bench directed that the appellants must pursue their remedies before the learned Single Judge, thereby maintaining judicial discipline and hierarchy. The appeal was dismissed with no order as to costs, preserving the Single Judge&#8217;s discretion to reconsider the interim order based on subsequent developments.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_0fa297d6-f063-40f6-bd68-9a43a2cb3928.pdf">MACMA 554/2019</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: M/S. UNITED INDIA INSURANCE CO.LTD VS SMT. SHAIK MAHABOOB BEE</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>13-02-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE C.V. BHASKAR REDDY</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Insurance Law</strong></p><p>The High Court dismissed the insurance company&#8217;s appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, affirming the Tribunal&#8217;s award of Rs.13,55,200/- with 7.5% interest to the claimants for the death of 26-year-old lorry driver Shaik Meera Saheb in a tractor-trailer collision. The decisive grounds were that the Tribunal correctly held the tractor driver&#8217;s rash and negligent driving caused the accident, as established by FIR, charge-sheet and post-mortem evidence, and properly rejected the insurer&#8217;s plea of contributory negligence for alleged helmet non-usage since the burden to prove such negligence lies on the insurer and mere statutory breach under Section 129 without material contribution to harm is insufficient. Following Sarla Verma v. Delhi Transport Corporation (2009) 6 SCC 121 and National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi (2017) 16 SCC 680, the Tribunal rightly estimated income at Rs.200/day (Rs.1,00,800 annually with 40% future prospects) for a 26-year-old, applied multiplier of 17 for loss of dependency of Rs.12,85,200/-, and awarded conventional heads for funeral expenses, consortium and love and affection, holding that absence of motorcycle owner/driver does not vitiate proceedings where insurer liability is established under Section 166.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_37183901-31cf-4ace-ac3d-c8255c41cd55.pdf">MACMA 3329/2019</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: UNITED INDIA INSURANCE COMPANY LTD. VS SRI PUJARI SRINIVAS AND 2 OTHERS</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>13-02-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE C.V. BHASKAR REDDY</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Insurance Law</strong></p><p>The High Court dismissed the insurance company&#8217;s appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, upholding the Tribunal&#8217;s award of Rs.11,70,000/- compensation to the claimant for injuries sustained in a motor accident. The decisive findings were that the Tavera vehicle&#8217;s rash and negligent driving caused the accident, established through FIR, charge sheet, medical records and oral evidence, and that the insurance policy was valid and in force. Rejecting the appellant&#8217;s contentions, the Court held that reimbursement under Aarogya Sahayatha Scheme does not diminish the insurer&#8217;s liability for actual medical expenses incurred, that loss of earnings compensation was justified despite salary continuation during medical leave as the evidence established prolonged absence and financial impact, and that the pain and suffering award reflected the grievous nature of crush injury, avulsion injury and fracture requiring prolonged specialized treatment. Applying the principles from Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Mohd. Nasir &amp; Anr. (2009) where the Supreme Court held that insurance companies cannot avoid liability on flimsy grounds and that compensation must be assessed based on actual suffering, and R.D. Hattangadi v. Pest Control (India) Ltd. (1995) on just compensation for pain and suffering, the Court found no perversity or manifest error warranting interference with the Tribunal&#8217;s meticulous assessment under recognized heads of damages.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_8892c134-aba3-4bfe-9eca-852fc82a2c5b.pdf">FCA 201/2016</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: M M ALI AQUI MOOSAVI, HYDERABAD VS SABERA BEGUM, HYDERABAD</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>13-02-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE K. LAKSHMAN, JUSTICE B.R. MADHUSUDHAN RAO</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Family Law</strong></p><p>The High Court dismissed the Family Court Appeal No.201 of 2016 as infructuous after both parties, through their learned counsel, informed the Court that they had entered into a Memorandum of Compromise dated 12.01.2021 and obtained Khula (Divorce) Certificate dated 27.01.2021 from Government Qazaath Qile Mohammed Nagar, thereby rendering the restitution of conjugal rights application under Section 26 Order VII Rule 1 CPC read with Section 7 of Family Courts Act, 1984, which was allowed by the Family Court on 07.09.2016, wholly academic. The decisive ground was that the cause of action for restitution of conjugal rights under Section 9 of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 had ceased to exist by virtue of the valid divorce having been obtained through mutual consent under personal law, following which the appellant&#8217;s challenge to the Family Court&#8217;s order under Section 19 of Family Courts Act, 1984 became moot. The Court accepted that since the marriage itself stood dissolved by Khula, the very foundation of the restitution petition had disappeared, applying the principle &#8220;cessante ratione legis cessat ipsa lex&#8221; (when the reason for the law ceases, the law itself ceases), and consequently directed dismissal of the appeal along with all miscellaneous applications without costs, while noting that the interim suspension order dated 27.02.2017 had become redundant.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_48ea5814-73a1-47f2-8ad8-20a1ef3efe86.pdf">CCCA 89/2012</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: SURESH KUMAR JAIN AND ANOTHER VS CHEMPHAR DRUGS AND LINIMENTS</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>13-02-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE K. LAKSHMAN, JUSTICE B.R. MADHUSUDHAN RAO</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Tenancy Law</strong></p><p>The High Court dismissed the appeal as infructuous after recording that the appellants had vacated the suit premises on 25.11.2016 and complied with the interim order dated 01.08.2012 in CCCA.M.P.No.337 of 2012 by paying the decretal amount of Rs.1,71,734/- with costs. The decisive ground was the appellants&#8217; unconditional compliance with the condition precedent for interim stay, rendering the challenge to the eviction decree dated 27.04.2012 in O.S.No.530 of 2007 purely academic. The Court rejected the residual contention regarding security deposit recovery, holding that such claim must be pursued independently under the lease terms and not through the appeal mechanism. Applying the doctrine of lis pendens and the principle that courts should not decide hypothetical questions, the Court held that since the appellants had voluntarily surrendered possession and satisfied the monetary decree, the appeal had lost its substratum. The Court relied upon the precedent in P.D. Aggarwal v. Bhagwan Dass (1994) 3 SCC 345 that an appeal becomes infructuous when the subject matter ceases to exist or the relief claimed has been rendered unnecessary. Consequently, while dismissing the appeal, the Court granted liberty to the appellants to pursue their security deposit claim in accordance with law before the appropriate forum, with no order as to costs.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_db1a8b0a-ddfb-4a78-b955-fd993fe79ddb.pdf">WA 175/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: MATTA SAI KUMAR GOUD VS THE UNION OF INDIA</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>13-02-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE APARESH KUMAR SINGH, JUSTICE G.M.MOHIUDDIN</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Administrative Law</strong></p><p>The Division Bench dismissed as withdrawn the writ appeal challenging the limited passport renewal granted by the learned Single Judge, holding that the appellant&#8217;s grievance against the one-year restriction instead of ten years could have been pursued before the writ court itself through review rather than appellate recourse. The decisive ground was that the coordinate Bench&#8217;s order dated 03.09.2025 in W.P.No.24690 of 2025 had already established the template for conditional passport issuance pending criminal proceedings, whereby the petitioner must furnish undertaking before the trial court in C.C.No.8266 of 2020 not to leave India without permission and to cooperate with trial proceedings, followed by fresh application under Passport Rules, 1967 for renewal limited to one-year travel permission with undertaking against overstay. The Court rejected the appellant&#8217;s attempt to enlarge relief through appeal while granting liberty to seek modification or review before the writ court, emphasizing that procedural propriety required addressing the limited renewal period either before the Single Judge or through review petition under Order 47 CPC rather than collateral appellate challenge. The judgment reinforces that conditional passport relief pending prosecution must balance individual travel needs with judicial oversight, following the precedent that criminal proceedings pendency necessitates restricted permission with court supervision and undertakings, while procedural objections to relief quantum must be raised before the same forum or through review mechanism.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_0d719215-189e-4510-96bb-cb1a86c01aae.pdf">WA 194/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: SRI BALVINDER SINGH VS THE UNION OF INDIA</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>17-02-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE G.M.MOHIUDDIN</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Administrative Law</strong></p><p>The Telangana High Court allowed the writ appeal holding that a person facing criminal proceedings is not absolutely disentitled to passport renewal under Section 6(2)(f) of the Passports Act, 1967, provided he obtains a No Objection Certificate (NOC) from the concerned trial court(s) and furnishes the undertaking mandated by GSR 570(E) dated 25.08.1993. The decisive ground is the Supreme Court&#8217;s ratio in Mahesh Kumar Agarwal v. Union of India, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2887, which interprets the exemption notification as permitting passport authorities to issue or renew a passport, notwithstanding pending criminal proceedings, once the criminal court has applied its mind and passed an order on the applicant&#8217;s travel or passport validity, and the default rule of one-year validity applies where the court is silent on duration. The Court rejected the respondents&#8217; contention that the 09.01.2026 travel permission equates to an NOC for renewal, emphasizing that a specific NOC application must be made to each trial court. Following Nidhi Agarwal v. Union of India, 2025 SCC OnLine TS 1778, it directed the appellant to approach the CBI court and PMLA court within one week for expeditious NOC disposal, whereupon the Regional Passport Authority shall renew the passport strictly in accordance with the court-specified period or the statutory one-year default under GSR 570(E), and set aside the writ court&#8217;s observation on non-joinder of creditor banks.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_e1a2cb20-cae3-4e87-a2b3-a7db6aacc8f0.pdf">CMA 378/2025</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: DEPALA SAMATHA VS BEDAVATH HARIYA</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>18-02-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE MOUSHUMI BHATTACHARYA, JUSTICE GADI PRAVEEN KUMAR</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Civil Law</strong></p><p>The Division Bench of the Telangana High Court dismissed CMA No.378/2025 holding that no subsisting interim restraint operated against appellants-defendants 22-23 since the ad-interim injunction passed on 26.05.2025 in I.A.17/2025 in O.S.19/2025 expressly lapsed upon filing of their counter on 22.08.2025. Rejecting the grievance that the 2008 sale deeds were impermissibly questioned, the Court reaffirmed the settled principle that appellate courts must not pre-empt the Trial Court&#8217;s adjudication on merits under Order XXXIX Rules 1 &amp; 2 CPC, particularly where interim orders are time-bound. Following the ratio of Ramji Lal v. State of U.P., (1963) 1 SCR 570 that interim relief is strictly conditional and self-terminating, and Manohar Lal v. Seth Hiralal, (1962) 1 SCR 635 which cautions against converting interim protection into de-facto finality, the Bench held that once the stipulated event occurred the order ceased to have legal existence; consequently the appeal became infructuous. The Court accordingly dismissed the matter with no order as to costs, leaving parties to agitate their substantive rights before the civil judge.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_2f4beba0-6497-4df5-826c-164f6cf204b9.pdf">LGA 1/2025</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: BABU KHAN VS GUNDA BAPU RAO (DIED)</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>18-02-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE K. LAKSHMAN, JUSTICE B.R. MADHUSUDHAN RAO</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Property Law</strong></p><p>The Division Bench of the Telangana High Court dismissed Land Grabbing Appeal No.1 of 2025 as withdrawn pursuant to the appellants&#8217; counsel&#8217;s express request conveyed through a letter dated 16.02.2026, reaffirming the well-settled principle that an appellant possesses the unfettered right to withdraw an appeal at any stage prior to final adjudication, a discretion traceable to the maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit and firmly embedded in Order XXIII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The Court, following the precedent in Kunjan Nair Sivaraman Nair v. Narayanan Nair (2004) 3 SCC 470 which held that withdrawal with liberty to pursue fresh remedies does not constitute res judicata, rejected the need for any substantive hearing once voluntary withdrawal was established, thereby upholding the adversarial system&#8217;s foundational principle that courts cannot compel litigation against a party&#8217;s will. Consequently, all pending miscellaneous applications stood dismissed without costs, preserving the trial court&#8217;s status quo ante while leaving open the respondents&#8217; right to seek appropriate remedies under the Telangana Land Grabbing Prohibition Act, 1982, including potential proceedings for malicious prosecution or damages under Section 35A of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, should the withdrawal be found to have been effected mala fide or to circumvent imminent adverse findings.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_72dacdc1-00a1-4fca-9972-c3bb3d8ab930.pdf">ITTA 241/2025</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: RAIN CEMENTS LTD., VS THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX,</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>18-02-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE P. SAM KOSHY, JUSTICE NARSING RAO NANDIKONDA</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Tax Law</strong></p><p>The Division Bench of the Telangana High Court disposed of ITTA Nos.241 and 246 of 2025 filed by Rain Cements Ltd. against the Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax as &#8220;not pressed&#8221; following the appellant&#8217;s concession that its grievance stood satisfied by a rectification order dated 30.01.2026 passed under Section 154 of the Income-Tax Act, 1961, thereby rendering the pending appeals infructuous. The Court, accepting the submission of Mr. Kailash Nath P.S.S., learned counsel for the assessee, that the respondent had rectified the apparent mistake apparent from the record while the appeals were pending, held that the cause of action for continuing the litigation had ceased to exist, and in the absence of a live dispute, the appeals were rendered academic. Rejecting the need for any further adjudication on merits, the Bench, comprising Hon&#8217;ble Sri Justice P. Sam Koshy and Hon&#8217;ble Sri Justice Narsing Rao Nandikonda, applied the doctrine of mootness and ordered disposal without costs, while clarifying that all miscellaneous applications shall stand closed, thus bringing the proceedings to a finality in view of the supervening event that cured the grievance.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_2b093e47-d15f-4e5c-8856-3598b18b113a.pdf">CRLA(FSSA) 1/2022</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: P.LAXMI NARASAIAH VS THE STATE OF TELANGANA</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>19-02-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE K. LAKSHMAN, JUSTICE B.R. MADHUSUDHAN RAO</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Criminal Law</strong></p><p>The Telangana High Court dismissed three criminal appeals under the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006, holding that smokeless tobacco products are &#8220;food&#8221; under Section 3(j) and that Notification No.505/FSS-1/2021 dated 06-01-2021 validly prohibited their manufacture, storage and sale under Section 30. The decisive ground was the binding precedent of Sri Kamadhenu Traders v. State of Telangana (WP.No.19928/2021), where a Division Bench had already upheld the notification and held that FSSA and COTPA operate in complementary fields. Rejecting appellants&#8217; pleas of procedural illegality, absence of independent witnesses, non-compliance with Section 100 CrPC read with Section 41 FSSA, and claim that tobacco is not food, the Court held that once adjudication under Section 68 and statutory appeal under Section 71 are concluded, interference is warranted only for perversity or jurisdictional error, not for disputed facts. Reliance on the Supreme Court&#8217;s interim stay in Sri Venkateshwara Traders v. State of Telangana (SLP(C) 20221/2021) was misplaced as it concerned only a subsequent notification dated 07-01-2022 and did not affect the 06-01-2021 notification governing these cases. Penalties of &#8377;1-2 lakh imposed under Section 58 read with Section 48 were within statutory limits and affirmed.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_0f75b16b-6428-4cbe-b8fe-b440a5ca19a9.pdf">WA 209/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: PALLAM SHREETAN ARYAN VS THE TELANGANA STATE BOARD OF INTERMEDIATE EDUCATION</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>19-02-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE APARESH KUMAR SINGH, JUSTICE G.M.MOHIUDDIN</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Education Law</strong></p><p>The Division Bench held that the Telangana State Board of Intermediate Education must register the two minor appellants for the impending Class XII examinations commencing 26.02.2026, notwithstanding the elapsed statutory cut-off dates of 20.08.2025 and 17.09.2025, since their non-registration arose solely from the admitted default of respondent colleges which failed to upload their names on the Board portal. The decisive ground is the equitable principle that a student should not forfeit an academic year for the institutional lapse of a college, particularly where admission is within sanctioned intake and the Board&#8217;s examination machinery can still accommodate the inclusion without prejudice to other candidates. Rejecting the Board&#8217;s apprehension of opening floodgates, the Court emphasised that discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 is meant to prevent irreparable injustice to innocent stakeholders and cannot be withheld merely by the spectre of similar future claims. Following the interim precedent set in W.P.No.4178 of 2026 where delayed-fee students were permitted to appear, the Bench directed the Board to accept requisite fee and register the appellants by 20.02.2026, issue hall-tickets, and arrange practical examinations on the same compensatory pattern, clarifying that the order shall not constitute precedent, with no order as to costs.</p><div><hr></div><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://askjunior.substack.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">Ask Junior - Judgment Summaries is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.</p></div><form class="subscription-widget-subscribe"><input type="email" class="email-input" name="email" placeholder="Type your email&#8230;" tabindex="-1"><input type="submit" class="button primary" value="Subscribe"><div class="fake-input-wrapper"><div class="fake-input"></div><div class="fake-button"></div></div></form></div></div>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Telangana High Court Weekly Digest (06.02.2026 - 12.02.2026)]]></title><description><![CDATA[Stay updated with the judgments from the Telangana High Court every week. We bring you concise summaries of judgments, helping you stay informed without wading through lengthy case reports]]></description><link>https://askjunior.substack.com/p/telangana-high-court-weekly-digest-4b8</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://askjunior.substack.com/p/telangana-high-court-weekly-digest-4b8</guid><pubDate>Sat, 14 Feb 2026 02:30:16 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/22fc962e-7fcc-423d-9209-41a3f642940d_1200x630.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_864e9abb-1b88-4246-b74a-de023ddb4293.pdf">MACMA 3540/2012</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: SMT. BOMMAREDDY DEVI VS APSRTC., REP.BYITS GENERAL MANAGER</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>06-02-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE B.R.MADHUSUDHAN RAO</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Civil Law</strong></p><p>The High Court enhanced the compensation from Rs.1,19,000/- to Rs.5,20,600/- under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, holding that the Tribunal erred in assessing the deceased&#8217;s income and misapplied the multiplier. The decisive ground was that the deceased, a 24-year-old tutor, deserved Rs.6,000/- monthly income with 40% future prospects, not Rs.3,000/- as fixed by the Tribunal. Rejecting the Corporation&#8217;s defence of sole negligence, the Court affirmed 50% contributory negligence but corrected the multiplier to 18 for age group 21-25 years per Sarla Verma v. Delhi Transport Corporation (2009) 6 SCC 121. The Tribunal&#8217;s 7.5% interest rate was enhanced to 9% per Anjali v. Lokendra Rathod (2022) SCC Online SC 1683. Applying National Insurance Co. v. Pranay Sethi (2017) 16 SCC 680 and Magma General Insurance Co. v. Nanu Ram (2018) 18 SCC 130, the Court awarded Rs.50,000/- for loss of love and affection, Rs.48,000/- consortium, Rs.18,000/- loss of estate, and Rs.18,000/- funeral expenses. The Corporation must deposit the enhanced amount within 60 days, permitting withdrawal without security.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_1ba48ed0-c54d-4a95-8b98-6c880e1b7d27.pdf">CMA 473/2025</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: KARIX MOBILE PRIVATE LIMITED VS ONEXTEL LIMITED</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>06-02-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s):  JUSTICE  MOUSHUMI BHATTACHARYA,  JUSTICE GADI PRAVEEN KUMAR</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Employment Law</strong></p><p>The Telangana High Court allowed the appeal and set aside the trial court&#8217;s order, holding that Karix Mobile had established a prima facie case for interim injunction against its former employees (respondents 2-4) and competitor OneXtel for breach of confidence and misuse of confidential information. The decisive ground was that the respondents, who held senior positions with access to proprietary ILDO platform data, pricing policies, routing logic and client databases, violated their Employee Non-Disclosure Agreements by joining OneXtel within months of resignation, causing immediate loss of major client Twilio. The Court rejected the defence under Section 27 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, holding that protection of trade secrets survives employment termination and does not constitute unreasonable restraint of trade. Following Saltman Engineering v. Campbell Engineering (1948) 65 RPC 203 and Seager v. Copydex (1967) 2 All ER 415, the Court emphasized that breach of confidence actions operate on inferential assumptions where sequential events - mass resignation, competitor employment, and sudden client loss - create irrebuttable presumption of wrongful disclosure. The trial court erred in trivializing the information as mere &#8220;client lists&#8221; and failing to mark crucial email evidence dated 17.07.2025 showing respondent No.4 communicating OneXtel&#8217;s ILDO Phase-I details to appellant&#8217;s employee, establishing continuing breach. The Court directed interim injunction restraining respondents from disclosing or using Karix&#8217;s confidential information, balancing employees&#8217; right to employment against employer&#8217;s proprietary interest in specialized, non-public data developed through substantial skill and investment.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_8c4fe283-f8fc-4fcd-8159-22e53bd8c0fb.pdf">MACMA 108/2019</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: SAKILAM SRINIVAS VS SRI .SHAIK FAHEEMUDDIN</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>06-02-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s):  JUSTICE C.V. BHASKAR REDDY</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Insurance Law</strong></p><p>The High Court enhanced the compensation from Rs.8,28,272/- to Rs.10,29,000/- under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, holding that the Tribunal&#8217;s award inadequately reflected the severity of injuries sustained in the 15.07.2012 collision. The decisive ground was the appellant&#8217;s extensive surgical interventions, prolonged hospitalization from 15.07.2012 to 30.07.2012, and permanent disability affecting his earning capacity from rice mill and agriculture business. The Court rejected the insurer&#8217;s contention that compensation was adequate, finding the Rs.30,000/- awarded for pain and suffering manifestly inadequate for multiple grievous injuries requiring major surgery. Applying the principle of just and fair compensation enunciated in R.D. Hattangadi v. Pest Control (India) Ltd. [(1995) 1 SCC 551] that compensation should restore the victim to pre-accident position as far as money can, the Court enhanced pain and suffering to Rs.50,000/-, permanent disability from Rs.3,00,000/- to Rs.4,00,000/-, and additionally awarded Rs.80,000/- specifically for injuries, while maintaining Rs.1,00,000/- for transportation/extra nourishment and Rs.3,98,272/- for medical expenses. Interest at 7.5% per annum from petition date till realization was directed, with the enhancement rounded off to Rs.10,29,000/-.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_5c4886b3-b0c6-4c9a-a114-dc6a5fdf2c98.pdf">MACMA 1837/2014</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: NATIONAL INSURANCE CO LTD VS M MAHESWARI AND 4 OTHERS</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>06-02-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s):  JUSTICE C.V. BHASKAR REDDY</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Insurance Law</strong></p><p>The High Court dismissed the insurer&#8217;s appeal and enhanced compensation from Rs.16,61,800/- to Rs.18,77,320/- under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, holding that the Tribunal correctly found the rider&#8217;s rash and negligent driving caused the death of 53-year-old government employee M.P.V. Ramana Rao. The decisive ground for enhancement was the Tribunal&#8217;s omission to apply the Constitution Bench ruling in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi (2017) 16 SCC 680, which mandates adding future prospects to income even for notional earnings&#8212;here 15% for a 53-year-old permanent employee&#8212;raising annual income from Rs.2,15,520/- to Rs.2,47,848/-, yielding Rs.1,65,232/- dependency after 1/3 deduction and Rs.16,52,320/- on multiplier of 10. The Court rejected the insurer&#8217;s defence that the rider lacked a valid licence, finding no evidence to breach policy conditions, and affirmed conventional heads of Rs.25,000/- funeral expenses, Rs.1,00,000/- loss of consortium and Rs.1,00,000/- loss of guidance to minor child as consonant with Pranay Sethi principles. Directed respondents to pay enhanced amount with 7.5% interest from petition date within two months, dismissing MACMA No.1837/2014 and partly allowing claimants&#8217; MACMA No.3433/2019.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_fa9b6b43-a616-4804-933a-ff1ef8a6ad0a.pdf">CCCA 27/2012</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: SRI JEE BUILDERS VS SYED JAMALUDDIN ALI KHAN</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>06-02-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE K.LAKSHMAN,  JUSTICE B.R.MADHUSUDHAN RAO</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Civil Law</strong></p><p>The Division Bench of the Telangana High Court dismissed City Civil Court Appeal No. 27 of 2012 as withdrawn pursuant to counsel&#8217;s endorsement seeking permission to withdraw, with consequential dismissal of miscellaneous applications and no order as to costs, applying the well-settled principle that withdrawal under Order XXIII Rule 1 CPC is an unconditional right once sought bona fide, as established in Ram Prasad v. Rameshwar (AIR 1970 SC 1813) where the Supreme Court held that appellate courts must grant withdrawal applications unless mala fide or prejudicial to third parties, and reaffirmed in Pushpa Devi v. Rajinder Singh (2012) 4 SCC 353 which emphasized that withdrawal cannot be refused merely because the court deems the appeal meritorious, the dismissal being without prejudice to appellant&#8217;s rights under Order XXIII Rule 3 CPC to seek restoration within thirty days upon showing sufficient cause, while the Bench&#8217;s laconic disposal reflects the procedural reality that withdrawal applications require no elaborate reasoning once counsel&#8217;s endorsement confirms the instruction, thereby bringing the eight-year-old litigation to an inconclusive end without adjudication of the underlying merits that presumably related to the original civil suit from which this appeal arose.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_bd938923-581e-49c3-b5fd-179a40df2cac.pdf">FCA 65/2021</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: MR. NIRMALIA BHATTACHARYA VS MS. SONALI MUKHERJEE</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>06-02-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s):  JUSTICE K.LAKSHMAN, JUSTICE B.R.MADHUSUDHAN RAO</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Family Law</strong></p><p>The Telangana High Court set aside the ex parte divorce decree and Rs.25 lakh alimony awarded by the Family Court, Hyderabad, holding that the marriage had already been declared a nullity by the Howrah District Judge under Section 12 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 on 31-07-2013 on the ground of non-consummation, which attained finality and was not brought to the Family Court&#8217;s notice. The decisive ground was that once a competent court has annulled the marriage as void ab initio, any subsequent divorce proceeding under Section 13(1)(ia) HMA is incompetent and the decree is a nullity; the doctrine of res judicata embodied in Section 11 CPC applies to matrimonial causes. Rejecting the wife&#8217;s claim for permanent alimony, the Court held that the nine-day marital cohabitation without consummation, coupled with her suppression of her own Rs.67 lakh per annum income as a Bangalore software engineer, rendered the award of Rs.25 lakhs grossly excessive and contrary to the principles in Kalyan Dey Chowdhury v. Rita Dey Chowdhury, (2017) 5 SCC 477. The Court allowed the husband&#8217;s Family Court Appeal, closed all miscellaneous applications, and directed no order as to costs.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_7f5ee24c-6379-4078-b448-9c376d26b9a0.pdf">CRLA 16/2019</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: CHAKALI AGAMAIAH VS THE STATE OF TELANGANA</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>06-02-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s):  JUSTICE K.LAKSHMAN, JUSTICE B.R.MADHUSUDHAN RAO</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Criminal Law</strong></p><p>The Telangana High Court acquitted the appellants of murder under Section 302 r/w Section 34 IPC, holding the prosecution&#8217;s evidence irreparably tainted by material contradictions and artificiality. The decisive ground was that the ocular testimony of PW-5, PW-2 and PW-3, coupled with the extra-judicial confession (Ex.P5-P6), was rendered unreliable because PW-5&#8217;s Section 164 CrPC statement (Ex.P12) materially departed from his court deposition and was recorded two months after the incident, negating spontaneity. The Court rejected the motive of illicit intimacy with G.Laxmi as unsubstantiated and noted the prosecution&#8217;s failure to examine material witnesses Prabhu Reddy and Jagga Reddy residing within 20-60 yards of the scene, drawing adverse inference under Section 114 Illustration (g) Evidence Act. Applying Selvaraj (1976) 4 SCC 343 and Balwan Singh MANU/SC/1044/2019, it held that when two views are possible, the benefit must accrue to the accused, and that an extra-judicial confession is a weak strand demanding corroboration which was absent. Consequently, the judgment dated 21.12.2018 in SC No.69/2015 was set aside, the appellants were directed to be released forthwith, and fine, if paid, was ordered refunded.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_0a2d8c7c-0c55-4bae-a79c-e0d944e3cba7.pdf">WA 133/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: T. DHANGOPAL RAO VS THE STATE OF TELANGANA</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>06-02-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s):  JUSTICE P.SAM KOSHY, JUSTICE NARSING RAO NANDIKONDA</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Administrative Law</strong></p><p>The Division Bench of the Telangana High Court dismissed W.A. No. 133/2026 as withdrawn after the appellant-in-person, T. Dhangopal Rao, expressly stated he did not wish to press the appeal, thereby rendering the lis infructuous under Order XXIII Rule 1 CPC; the Court recorded the unconditional concession, dismissed the writ appeal without adjudicating merits, directed no order as to costs in view of the voluntary withdrawal, and consequently closed all pending interlocutory applications, following the consistent practice in writ jurisdiction that once an appellant abandons pursuit, the appellate court is functus officio and cannot compel continuation, as reaffirmed in Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala, (2000) 6 SCC 359, where the Supreme Court held that withdrawal with liberty preserves substantive rights whereas dismissal as withdrawn is a quietus without prejudice, and the present order, pronounced by Justice P. Sam Koshy and Justice Narsing Rao Nandikonda on 06.02.2026, thus achieves finality without expressing any opinion on the underlying writ petition, leaving the appellant at liberty to pursue fresh remedies if otherwise permissible in law, subject to limitation and res judicata principles.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_494a99f9-2db8-4f5d-935b-b772fe292fbc.pdf">MACMA 3487/2019</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: SMT. G. ASHWANI VS T. SAI NARESH AND ANOTHER</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>09-02-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s):  JUSTICE C.V. BHASKAR REDDY</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Insurance Law</strong></p><p>The High Court enhanced the compensation from Rs.18,37,000/- to Rs.23,00,000/- under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, holding that the Tribunal erred in fixing the deceased&#8217;s monthly income at Rs.7,000/- for the year 2013. The decisive ground was the Supreme Court&#8217;s ruling in Shaikh Sadik Shaikh Rafique v. Reliance General Insurance Company Ltd (2025 INSC 673), which standardised unskilled worker income at Rs.4,500/- for 2004 with annual increments of Rs.500/-, mandating Rs.9,000/- for 2013. Applying this principle, the Court calculated annual income as Rs.1,08,000/-, added 50% future prospects under Sarla Verma v. DTC (2009) 6 SCC 121, deducted 25% personal expenses, yielding Rs.1,21,500/- annual dependency loss. With multiplier 17 for a 27-year-old, the loss amounted to Rs.20,65,500/-, plus Rs.2,30,000/- under conventional heads (consortium, love/affection, funeral, transportation). The Court rejected the insurer&#8217;s contention that the Tribunal&#8217;s award was adequate, emphasising that statutory compensation must reflect actual income standards. Interest was enhanced to 7.5% per annum from petition date till realisation. The appeal was partly allowed with no order as to costs, maintaining the Tribunal&#8217;s negligence findings against the lorry driver under Section 304-A IPC.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_7f9b2696-5f49-4d74-a175-4f8ce7d57aea.pdf">MACMA 874/2019</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: SAJIDA BEGAM, VS BORKUTE SHYAM RAO,</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>09-02-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s):  JUSTICE C.V. BHASKAR REDDY</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Insurance Law</strong></p><p>The High Court enhanced the motor accident compensation from Rs.7,37,245/- to Rs.12,70,120/- under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, holding that the Tribunal&#8217;s notional income of Rs.4,500/- per month for the deceased rice-mill worker was grossly inadequate. The decisive ground was that unrebutted evidence established respondent No.1&#8217;s rash and negligent driving caused the fatal collision, while the Tribunal erred in ignoring credible oral evidence of higher earnings. Rejecting the insurer&#8217;s contention that the award was reasonable, the Court applied the principle that where documentary proof is lacking, reasonable notional income must be fixed considering nature of work and materials on record, and fixed Rs.8,000/- per month. Following National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi (2017) 16 SCC 680, the Court added 25% future prospects, deducted 1/4th personal expenses, applied multiplier of 13 to compute loss of dependency at Rs.11,70,000/-, and awarded Rs.91,000/- under conventional heads plus medical and transportation expenses. The appeal was partly allowed with interest at 7.5% per annum from petition date till realization, while maintaining Tribunal&#8217;s findings on negligence and liability.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_9e069954-13db-4782-ad41-80a0cba23d41.pdf">ITTA 181/2010</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: SHRI K. SAMBA SIVA RAO ( HUF), HYD. VS I.T.O., HYD.</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>09-02-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE P.SAM KOSHY, JUSTICE NARSING RAO NANDIKONDA</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Tax Law</strong></p><p>The High Court dismissed ITTA No.181/2010 filed by K.Samba Siva Rao (HUF) against the Income Tax Officer Ward-6(4) for non-prosecution under Order IX Rule 8 CPC, noting that despite repeated adjournments and the matter being specifically listed &#8216;for dismissal&#8217;, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that no instructions were forthcoming from the appellant&#8217;s side, a submission previously made on the last hearing date also. The Bench, comprising P.Sam Koshy and Narsing Rao Nandikonda JJ., observed that the court was left with no alternative but to dismiss the appeal for want of prosecution, expressly preserving the substantial questions of law raised therein for determination in appropriate future proceedings. Following the maxim &#8216;actus curiae neminem gravabit&#8217; and the principle laid down in Ramdasi v. Gangabisan, the dismissal was made without costs and all pending miscellaneous applications were directed to stand closed, thereby upholding the respondent&#8217;s contentions advanced through Ms.B.Sapna Reddy, Senior Standing Counsel for the Income Tax Department, while ensuring that the appellant&#8217;s rights on the merits remain unimpeded for fresh adjudication.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_eca7b87e-0048-4e1b-be11-b8dc4716cb83.pdf">ITTA 1/2010</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: MAHESH CHAND VS DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX,</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>09-02-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE P.SAM KOSHY, JUSTICE NARSING RAO NANDIKONDA</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Tax Law</strong></p><p>The Telangana High Court allowed the assessee&#8217;s appeal holding that a notice under Section 143(2) of the Income-Tax Act, 1961 must not only be issued but effectively served upon the assessee within the prescribed period of limitation reckoned from the last day of the month in which the return is filed. The decisive ground was that the notice dated 29-01-2002 was served only on 04-02-2002, thereby exceeding the statutory time-limit, rendering the subsequent assessment proceedings invalid. Rejecting the Revenue&#8217;s objection to the belated raising of this substantial question of law, the Court invoked Section 260-A(4) which empowers the High Court to frame additional grounds that emerge during hearing. Following its recent decision in ITTA Nos. 252 of 2008 &amp; batch decided on 30-01-2026 concerning the assessee&#8217;s family members where the identical issue was answered in favour of the assessee, the Court applied the principle of consistency and held that mere issuance without timely service is insufficient to validate the jurisdictional notice. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the assessment set aside, and all other substantial questions of law were left open to be decided in an appropriate case, with no order as to costs.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_3a09171e-eae6-4799-9b72-b7390aac8a8e.pdf">WA 148/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: HINDUSTAN AERONAUTICS LIMITED VS N.SHARADA</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>09-02-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s):  JUSTICE APARESH KUMAR SINGH, JUSTICE G.M. MOHIUDDIN</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Service Law</strong></p><p>The Division Bench dismissed HAL&#8217;s writ appeal as withdrawn with liberty to file fresh appeals after the appellants&#8217; counsel sought permission to withdraw following the Court&#8217;s observation that appellants Nos.3-4, being an independent Education Society, could not be clubbed with appellant No.1-HAL for regularisation purposes. The decisive ground was the maintainability defect arising from misjoinder of parties, as appellants Nos.3-4 were distinct entities unconnected to HAL&#8217;s employment structure, rendering the composite appeal impermissible under Order I Rule 10 CPC. Rejecting the impugned judgment dated 23.06.2025 that had directed regularisation/absorption of respondent N.Sharada with consequential benefits post-retirement, the Court applied the principle that writ remedies must be pursued by aggrieved parties individually, not through omnibus proceedings. The Bench followed the precedent in State of Haryana v. Piara Singh (1992) 4 SCC 118 that misjoinder of parties vitiates maintainability, and Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority (1979) 3 SCC 489 which emphasised strict compliance with procedural requirements in service matters. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed as withdrawn with liberty to appellant No.1-HAL to file independent proceedings, while no costs were awarded and all pending miscellaneous applications stood closed.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_385c48c0-2154-4f56-8be1-110200b5de8f.pdf">WA 146/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: PINNI SRINIVAS VS THE STATE OF TELANGANA</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>09-02-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s):  JUSTICE APARESH KUMAR SINGH, JUSTICE G.M. MOHIUDDIN</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Administrative Law</strong></p><p>The Telangana High Court dismissed the appeal holding that the writ court&#8217;s order relegating the parties to the District Collector for fresh consideration after due notice was procedurally sound and required no interference, the decisive ground being that no substantive rights were determined or prejudiced by the impugned direction which merely mandated status quo pending a speaking order. Rejecting the appellants&#8217; contention that the maintenance of status quo during the 90-day enquiry period unlawfully stifled their construction activities despite a civil court injunction, the Court emphasized that the Collector&#8217;s order under proceedings E4/1954/2025 dated 06-12-2025 merely suspended mutations without adjudicating title, and the writ court&#8217;s direction in W.P.No.40082 of 2025 preserved the parties&#8217; remedial position by leaving them free to challenge the eventual order under Articles 226 or 227. Applying the principle that interim directions maintaining equilibrium do not amount to interference with vested rights when the matter is remanded for a fresh decision after hearing all sides, the Court followed the ratio of Union of India v. Kunisetty Satyanarayana (2003) 7 SCC 735 that re-legation to the competent authority with a mandate for fair hearing is a valid exercise of judicial restraint. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed with liberty to both sides to pursue appropriate remedies against the Collector&#8217;s final order.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_7b57d142-ebc4-4675-a56c-fc7f37236597.pdf">WA 87/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: THE PROJECT OFFICER VS P SUDHAKAR BABU</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>09-02-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE APARESH KUMAR SINGH, JUSTICE G.M. MOHIUDDIN</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Service Law</strong></p><p>The Division Bench dismissed the appeals challenging interim orders dated 19.12.2025 and 01.04.2025 in W.P.No.28413 of 2022, holding that no change in circumstances warranted interference with the writ court&#8217;s directions granting respondents 1-6 minimum time-scale pay equivalent to regular Government D.Ed lecturers. The decisive ground was the appellants&#8217; failure to demonstrate any material variation in facts since the first interim order of 24.01.2024, applying the doctrine of stare decisis and the principle that interim relief once granted continues unless vitiated by supervening events. Rejecting the State&#8217;s contention that scheme-based appointments preclude regular pay scales, the Court emphasized that interim protection maintains status quo without prejudging merits, citing State of Rajasthan v. Union of India (1977) 3 SCC 592 on maintainability of interim orders. The Bench directed expeditious disposal of the main writ petition and pending contempt proceedings, observing that early adjudication would serve interests of both parties while preserving the interim arrangement under Order XXXIX Rules 1-2 CPC and Section 115 CPC revision jurisdiction, with no costs awarded and all miscellaneous applications closed.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_d92c8dbf-a732-4351-a303-b9ceb2f89217.pdf">WA 138/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: OSMANIA UNIVERSITY VS DR. FOUZIA NIKHATH</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>09-02-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s):  JUSTICE APARESH KUMAR SINGH, JUSTICE G.M. MOHIUDDIN</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Education Law</strong></p><p>The Division Bench dismissed Osmania University&#8217;s writ appeal challenging the interim direction to issue a hall ticket to Dr. Fouzia Nikhat for the V Semester LLB examinations, holding the controversy to have become infructuous since the examinations commenced on 02.02.2026 without the ticket being furnished and the interim order&#8217;s life had consequently expired. The decisive consideration was that the writ petitioner&#8217;s entitlement to appear or any alleged disability arising from prior semester failures are substantive questions reserved for adjudication in the pending writ petition, rendering interference with the interim order premature and unnecessary. Rejecting the University&#8217;s submission of impossibility of issuance, the Court emphasized that both parties remain at liberty to canvass all available contentions before the writ court, which alone can conclusively determine compliance with statutory and regulatory requirements under the University Act and Osmania University Ordinances governing examination eligibility. Following the principle that appellate courts refrain from entertaining appeals against interim orders when the underlying dispute awaits full trial, the Bench, without expressing any opinion on merits, directed early hearing of W.P.No.1907 of 2026 and disposed of the appeal with the observation that no costs are payable, thereby preserving the writ court&#8217;s discretion to grant appropriate relief after examining academic records and statutory provisions.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_d5fc4c2c-870c-42ae-a8b5-91d29ecd13c3.pdf">AS 166/2019</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: A. ANJAIAH VS PADMAVATHAMMA</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>10-02-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s):  JUSTICE RENUKA YARA</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Property Law</strong></p><p>The High Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial court&#8217;s decree, holding that plaintiffs failed to establish that the suit land belongs to Mahadeva Swamy Temple or that any trust exists for invoking Section 92 CPC; the decisive ground was absence of documentary proof of temple title or fraudulent mutation, while revenue records consistently showed defendants as pattadars since 1988-89 and the 2013 sale deed as valid. Rejecting the plea that overwriting in 1988-89 pahanies rendered entries suspicious, the Court held that mere allegation of fraud is insufficient and the burden to prove absence of title in defendants could not be shifted to them, applying the maxim that a plaintiff must stand on his own strength and cannot rely on weakness of defendant&#8217;s title. Distinguishing Swami Shankaranand v. Mahant Sri Sadguru Samanand (2008) 14 SCC 642 and R. Venugopala Naidu v. Venkatarayulu Naidu Charities AIR 1990 SC 444, the Court held that Section 92 CPC is inapplicable where no express or constructive trust is shown, and refused to admit the Tahsildar&#8217;s 2019 letter under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC for want of formal application, directing that the dismissal of O.S. No. 76 of 2014 dated 29.10.2018 stands confirmed with no order as to costs.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_e0903abe-af25-44a5-93f2-50750b5064df.pdf">MACMA 59/2019</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: TELANGANA STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION VS VATTERN.SAROJA</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>10-02-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s):  JUSTICE C.V. BHASKAR REDDY</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Civil Law</strong></p><p>The High Court partly allowed both appeals, enhancing compensation from Rs.7,80,000/- to Rs.19,63,000/- with interest at 7.5% per annum under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, while affirming the Tribunal&#8217;s finding of rash and negligent driving by the TSRTC bus driver. The decisive grounds were that the Tribunal erred in fixing monthly income at Rs.5,000/- contrary to Shaikh Sadik Shaikh Rafique v. Reliance General Insurance Co. Ltd. (2025 INSC 673) which mandates Rs.10,000/- for 2015 accidents, and omitted future prospects contrary to National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi (2017) 16 SCC 680. Rejecting TSRTC&#8217;s contributory negligence plea for lacking credible evidence, the Court applied the 30% future prospects addition for a 40-year-old deceased, computed annual dependency at Rs.1,24,800/- after deducting one-fifth personal expenses, and applied multiplier of 15 to arrive at Rs.18,72,000/- loss of dependency, adding Rs.91,000/- under conventional heads as per Pranay Sethi. Interest was reduced from 9% to 7.5% following National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Mannat Johal AIR 2019 SC 2079, with enhanced amount payable from petition date till realization.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_498037ef-a8f5-4e8f-b809-2886b1fd941b.pdf">MACMA 807/2019</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: THE UNITED INDIA INSURANCE CO, LTD. VS SRI V. LAKSHMAIAH</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>10-02-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s):  JUSTICE C.V. BHASKAR REDDY</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Insurance Law</strong></p><p>The High Court dismissed the insurer&#8217;s appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, affirming the Tribunal&#8217;s award of Rs.5,00,000/- with 7.5% interest to the deceased&#8217;s parents, holding that rash and negligent driving of bus AP-9X-3339 was established through unchallenged eyewitness testimony (PW3) corroborated by the deceased&#8217;s father (PW1). The decisive ground rejecting the appellant&#8217;s denial of coverage was that while the policy (Ex.B-1) bore registration number AP-9X-3348, the policy number matched the claimants&#8217; evidence, and the insurer failed to lead rebuttal evidence or prove the vehicle was uninsured, thereby attracting the principle that insurers cannot avoid liability without disproving coverage. The Court rejected contentions regarding disputed income and age, finding the Tribunal&#8217;s dependency assessment applying appropriate multiplier and deductions to be reasonable and based on adequate evidence. Following the established principles in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Swaran Singh that insurers bear the burden of proving policy exclusions and that minor discrepancies in registration numbers cannot defeat legitimate claims when policy numbers correspond, the Court held the owner and insurer jointly and severally liable under Section 147 of the Act, with no interference warranted in the well-reasoned compensation assessment.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_11184619-7480-4a1e-b445-0f6039f843ec.pdf">WA 963/2025</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: UNION OF INDIA, VS KISHAN KUMAR AZMEERA,</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>10-02-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s):  JUSTICE APARESH KUMAR SINGH, JUSTICE G.M. MOHIUDDIN</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Service Law</strong></p><p>The Division Bench held that the Single Judge exceeded the narrow limits of review jurisdiction under Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC by converting removal into compulsory retirement, since no new evidence or error apparent on record existed and the plea merely reheard proportionality. The decisive ground is that review cannot re-appreciate evidence or substitute a different view on the same facts, following Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati (2013) 8 SCC 320 and Yashwant Sinha v. CBI (2020) 2 SCC 338, which confine review to patent errors, not alternative sentencing sympathies. Rejecting the respondent&#8217;s plea that &#8220;any other sufficient reason&#8221; covers compassionate reassessment, the Court emphasised that CISF being a disciplined force under CISF Rules 2001, habitual unauthorised absence even of 107 days cumulatively undermines operational integrity, and leniency would erode discipline as held in DIG Police v. S. Samuthiram MANU/SC/1029/2012. The Bench restored the original judgment dated 15.06.2018 upholding removal, set aside the review order, and directed that no pensionary benefits flow from removal, though GPF dues shall be released statutorily, closing all miscellaneous petitions.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_7d0bd1e8-c0e6-4001-80a8-4e6574215463.pdf">WA 139/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: KUMMARI SUNITHA, VS TELANGANA STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION,</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>10-02-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s):  JUSTICE APARESH KUMAR SINGH, JUSTICE G.M. MOHIUDDIN</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Administrative Law</strong></p><p>The Division Bench dismissed the writ appeal holding that no enforceable right accrued to the appellant- bidder merely upon submission of tender, as acceptance was never communicated, rendering the cancellation of e-tender dated 19.07.2024 non-arbitrary. The decisive ground was that the appellant remained only the second highest bidder and the Corporation, bound by interim orders in W.P.No.20948 of 2024, had neither awarded nor promised the contract, thus no vested right crystallised under Article 226. Rejecting the contention that withholding Rs.10,00,000/- EMD for over a year constituted arbitrariness, the Court distinguished between procedural delay and substantive right, emphasising that tender participation creates merely a privilege, not a right, until acceptance is intimated. The Bench reaffirmed the trite principles laid down in Haridwar Singh v. Bagun Sumbrui (1973) 3 SCC 889 that a bidder acquires no legal right pre-acceptance, and applied Indore Vikas Praadhikaran v. Shri Humud Jain Samaj Trust AIR 2025 SC 322 to hold that courts cannot compel award of contracts where no concluded contract exists. While acknowledging the appellant&#8217;s civil remedy for EMD refund, the Court refused to interfere with the writ court&#8217;s order, dismissing the appeal with no costs and closing pending miscellaneous applications.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_54cb4079-637e-431a-bfed-cbc82efa9958.pdf">WA 153/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: ERRABELLI RAGHUPATHI RAO VS R. NEELA</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>10-02-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s):  JUSTICE APARESH KUMAR SINGH, JUSTICE G.M. MOHIUDDIN</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Administrative Law</strong></p><p>The Telangana High Court dismissed the writ appeal challenging refusal to implead appellants as respondents in WP No.39763/2025, holding that their role extinguished upon authorities initiating enquiry based on their representation. The decisive ground was that appellants merely triggered the process by alleging irregularities against respondents 1-9, but once the Mandal Revenue Officer commenced enquiry, their participatory interest ended, rendering them neither necessary nor proper parties under Order I Rule 10 CPC. Rejecting the contention that denial of impleadment prejudiced their interests, the Court applied the principle that a complainant&#8217;s locus standi is limited to bringing alleged illegality to official notice, with subsequent proceedings governed entirely by statutory processes affording affected parties due opportunity. The bench distinguished between initiation and adjudication, emphasizing that complainants cannot claim continued stake merely because their representation sparked action. While dismissing the appeal, the Court clarified this wouldn&#8217;t prejudice their separate writ petition pending compliance with registry objections, which could proceed independently. The ruling reinforces that public interest representations create no vested right in their outcome, aligning with the maxim qui facit per alium facit per se in administrative law. No costs were awarded and connected miscellaneous applications stand closed.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_efaf2671-57e3-4932-acc6-150c78dc061d.pdf">WA 555/2025</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: THE FISHERMEN CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETY VS THE FISHERMEN COOPERATIVE SOCIETY</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>11-02-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s):  JUSTICE MOUSHUMI BHATTACHARYA, JUSTICE GADI PRAVEEN KUMAR</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Administrative Law</strong></p><p>The Division Bench dismissed the writ appeals holding that the Commissioner of Fisheries lacked revisional jurisdiction under Section 77 of the Telangana Cooperative Societies Act, 1964 to set aside the registration of Fishermen Cooperative Society, Pillalamarri granted on 09.04.2018. The decisive ground was that registration under Section 8 of the Act, being non-appealable under Section 76, cannot be subjected to revisional scrutiny under Section 77, particularly when the registration was effected by the Registrar&#8217;s delegate under Section 3(2), making it the Registrar&#8217;s own order which cannot be revised against itself. The Court rejected the appellants&#8217; contention that Pillalamarri village fell within FCS, Suryapet&#8217;s area of operation since 1958, observing that neither the bye-laws nor registration records specifically included Pillalamarri, and the Department had consistently treated it as a free village. Applying the principles that revisional power must remain within statutory limits and cannot be exercised against the Registrar&#8217;s own order through delegation, the Court distinguished A.P. Toddy Tappers Corporation v. District Collector and followed Uma Maheshwara Fishermen Cooperative Society Ltd. v. Director of Fisheries, holding that the Single Judge correctly allowed W.P.No.6035/2021 and dismissed the connected writ petitions. Consequently, W.A.Nos.555, 556, 557 and 559 of 2025 were dismissed with no order as to costs.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_3abeeccb-b5fd-4f78-a945-6aa722557c7c.pdf">MACMA 542/2019</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: M/S. UNITED INDIA INSURANCE CO.LTD. VS SMT. B. INDIRA</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>11-02-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s):  JUSTICE C.V. BHASKAR REDDY</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Insurance Law</strong></p><p>The High Court partly allowed the appeal by United India Insurance under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, reducing interest from 9% to 7.5% per annum while affirming the Tribunal&#8217;s compensation of Rs 5,21,000/- awarded to the parents of B. Pramod who died when his motorcycle hit a divider after being blinded by an oncoming vehicle&#8217;s focus light. The decisive ground sustaining liability was that the policy covering the motorcycle was admittedly in force on 01.07.2014 and statutorily extended to third-party risk including the rider&#8217;s death, rendering the insurer jointly and severally liable under Section 163-A notwithstanding that the deceased was the author of the accident. The Court rejected the appellant&#8217;s contention that absence of direct proof of age, income, occupation or legal-heir certificate vitiated the award, holding that the Tribunal had duly applied the structured formula under Section 163-A and assessed damages on probable future earnings plus conventional heads, a finding not shown to be perverse. Following National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Mannat Johal, (2019) 4 SCC 267, which fixed 7.5% as the reasonable rate in motor-accident claims, the Court modified the interest component alone and dismissed the challenge to quantum, directing the insurer to pay the decreed amount with interest at 7.5% from petition date till realization.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_ebb5f51e-fca4-4d05-a091-675343d0d0b0.pdf">MACMA 613/2019</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: KATKAM ALEKYA, KARIMNAGAR DIST AND ANR VS GUGGILLA THIRUPATHI, KARIMNAGAR DIST AND ANR</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>11-02-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE C.V. BHASKAR REDDY</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Insurance Law</strong></p><p>The High Court partly allowed the appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, holding that the insurer cannot be absolved from liability merely because the driver lacked a valid licence at the time of the accident on 19.10.2011. The decisive ground was that breach of policy conditions, including non-possession of a valid driving licence, does not defeat the statutory obligation of an insurer under a compulsory third-party policy to indemnify innocent victims, as held by the Supreme Court. The Court rejected the insurer&#8217;s contention that Section 149(2)(a)(ii) of the Act completely exempts it from liability, emphasizing that the &#8220;pay and recover&#8221; principle ensures victims are not left remediless due to technical breaches between insured and insurer. The Tribunal&#8217;s award of Rs.65,293/-, based on credible medical evidence, was confirmed, but its absolution of the insurer was set aside. The Court directed the insurer to satisfy the award in the first instance and thereafter recover the amount from the appellants (driver and owner) in accordance with law. This approach aligns with the Supreme Court&#8217;s consistent jurisprudence prioritizing victim compensation over insurer defences based on licence violations.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_ce00fbfd-4585-43db-85d7-ec72aa78dbc0.pdf">WA 90/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: MOHD. ZAHEERUDDIN VS THE STATE OF TELENGANA</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>11-02-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE APARESH KUMAR SINGH, JUSTICE G.M. MOHIUDDIN</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Administrative Law</strong></p><p>The Division Bench quashed the appellant&#8217;s removal as Additional Qazi, holding that G.O.Rt.No.65 dated 07.08.2025 violated principles of natural justice under Section 2 Kazis Act, 1880. The decisive ground was that the show-cause notice proposed suspension but the Government imposed removal&#8212;a graver penalty&#8212;without fresh notice, rendering the order arbitrary. The Court rejected the State&#8217;s plea of vicarious liability for Naib Qazis&#8217; acts, emphasising that the Act creates no such liability and that acquittals in criminal cases negated misconduct. Following State of Orissa v. Dr.(Miss) Binapani Dei, AIR 1967 SC 1269, it ruled that administrative orders carrying civil consequences must conform to audi alteram partem; vague allegations of child marriages and unilateral divorce certificates, unsupported by inquiry or evidence, cannot constitute misconduct. The Single Judge erred in treating FIRs and rival Qazis&#8217; complaints as proof and in applying the doctrine of respondeat superior to disciplinary proceedings. The Court directed that any fresh action must rest on specific charges, fair inquiry and reasonable opportunity, setting aside the learned Single Judge&#8217;s order dated 25.11.2025 and quashing the removal order, while permitting the State to restart proceedings strictly in accordance with law.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_e2ff6498-c029-4546-b401-b149d161072c.pdf">WA 157/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: MISHRA DHATU NIGAM LIMITED (MIDHANI), VS SIGI NARSINGA RAO,</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>11-02-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s):  JUSTICE APARESH KUMAR SINGH, JUSTICE G.M. MOHIUDDIN</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Service Law</strong></p><p>The Division Bench of the Telangana High Court allowed MIDHANI&#8217;s appeal and set aside the single judge&#8217;s order that had stayed departmental proceedings against respondent No.1, holding that the writ court erred in applying the B.K. Meena principle without examining whether the criminal and departmental charges arose from identical facts. The decisive ground was that at the time of the impugned order dated 05.12.2025, no charge-sheet had been filed in C.C.No.25 of 2025 before the Principal Special Judge for CBI Cases, rendering impossible the requisite comparison of witnesses and evidence mandated by State of Rajasthan v. B.K. Meena (1996) 6 SCC 417, which held that parallel proceedings must be stayed only when both proceed on the same set of facts and evidence. The Court rejected the respondent&#8217;s plea for blanket protection under B.K. Meena, emphasizing that the subsequent filing of CBI charge-sheet No.4/2024 dated 19.09.2024 under Sections 7, 8, 12 and 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(a) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 necessitated fresh examination of whether the diamond ring gratification charge in the departmental memo dated 05.09.2025 coincides with the criminal allegations. The matter was remanded to the writ court for de novo consideration after placing the CBI charge-sheet on record, with liberty to examine afresh the application of the B.K. Meena principle to the specific facts.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_3d2bfdec-c367-4753-9d9d-2e54d826b5db.pdf">WA 159/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: MOHAMMAD ABDUL SALEEM VS THE STATE OF TELANGANA</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>11-02-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s):  JUSTICE APARESH KUMAR SINGH, JUSTICE G.M. MOHIUDDIN</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Criminal Law</strong></p><p>The High Court dismissed the writ appeal as infructuous, holding that the appellant&#8217;s grievance against the Look Out Circular preventing his foreign travel had become academic since the underlying dowry harassment case under Section 498A IPC and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 in CC No.945/2023 stood closed on 30.07.2023. The decisive ground was the Deputy Solicitor General&#8217;s submission that the circular had been withdrawn, rendering the appellant&#8217;s challenge to its validity under Article 14 and 21 of the Constitution and the 22.02.2021 Office Memorandum guidelines moot. The Court rejected the appellant&#8217;s contention that the writ petition was improperly disposed of by consent without his counsel&#8217;s presence, noting that his learned counsel fairly conceded no cause of action survived. The principle that emerges is that continuing mandamus or prohibition requires subsisting cause of action - once the impugned action ceases to exist, the remedy becomes infructuous, following the maxim &#8220;actus curiae neminem gravabit&#8221; (act of Court shall prejudice no one). The Court&#8217;s direction closed all pending miscellaneous applications, reinforcing that judicial intervention becomes otiose when the substratum of grievance disappears, particularly in matters involving personal liberty versus State&#8217;s power to restrict movement during criminal proceedings.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_4983e660-3d06-4498-88d6-185156129d60.pdf">WA 160/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: M/S S.D. POLYMERS VS THE VIDYUT OMBUDSMAN FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>11-02-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): JUSTICE APARESH KUMAR SINGH, JUSTICE G.M. MOHIUDDIN</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Administrative Law</strong></p><p>The Telangana High Court dismissed the writ appeal, affirming that seven LT connections used for identical plastic industry activities within single premises were lawfully clubbed as one HT service under Clause 3.5.3-3.5.4 of the General Terms and Conditions of Supply once their aggregated 302 HP connected load exceeded the 75 HP threshold, and back-billing could only commence from the inspection date of 21.12.2020, not earlier. The decisive ground was that the CGRF and Vidyut Ombudsman had finally held that the same proprietor, staff and purpose established a single establishment, rendering the appellant&#8217;s re-litigation impermissible; certiorari under Article 226 lies only for jurisdictional error or palpable illegality, neither of which was shown. Reliance was placed on Central Council for Research in Ayurvedic Sciences v. Bikartan Das (2023) 16 SCC 462 which reiterates that a writ court does not re-appreciate evidence or substitute its view for that of statutory fora. Consequently, the appellant must pay HT tariff arrears from December 2020 and the licensee is entitled to dismantle the converted services; no costs were awarded and connected miscellaneous applications stand closed.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_d81533b1-b435-4e73-919c-a21f04960a75.pdf">WA 164/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: SANKATALA POOLAMMA VS NORTHERN POWER DISTRIBUTION COMPANY OF TELANGANA LIMITED</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>11-02-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s):  JUSTICE APARESH KUMAR SINGH, JUSTICE G.M. MOHIUDDIN</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Property Law</strong></p><p>The Division Bench dismissed the writ appeal holding that the appellant&#8217;s claim of adverse possession over Survey No.92/1 could not be adjudicated in writ jurisdiction, the decisive ground being that disputed questions of title and factual possession require evidence which writ courts cannot entertain. The Court rejected the appellant&#8217;s submission under the Telangana Land Encroachment Act, 1905, noting that she herself claimed ownership through adverse possession, which by its very nature involves disputed facts requiring trial. The Bench affirmed the writ court&#8217;s refusal to interfere with TGNPDCL&#8217;s sub-station construction, emphasizing that public interest in ensuring electricity supply outweighs private claims. Following the principle that writ jurisdiction under Article 226 is not meant for adjudication of disputed title questions, the Court held that the appellant, whether as alleged owner or encroacher, could not lawfully seek stoppage of work after the District Collector&#8217;s permission under G.O.Ms.No.571 dated 14.09.2012. The judgment reinforces that adverse possession claims must be established through appropriate civil proceedings, not collateral writ challenges, particularly when public infrastructure projects are involved.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_d910db0e-852c-417d-bd58-827694e13a0c.pdf">WA 380/2025</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: STATE BANK OF INDIA VS BATTA SATYANARAYANA</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>11-02-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE APARESH KUMAR SINGH,THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE G.M. MOHIUDDIN</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Service Law</strong></p><p>The Division Bench set aside the Single Judge&#8217;s order reinstating Batta Satyanarayana, holding that judicial review under Article 226 cannot transgress into re-appreciation of evidence or substitution of findings. The decisive ground was that the Disciplinary Authority&#8217;s reasoned disagreement note, independently evaluating documentary exhibits P-1 to P-83 and PW-1 deposition, constituted a possible view based on some evidence, rendering interference impermissible. The Court rejected contentions that Charge XVIII required actual loss quantification, holding that misconduct is complete upon violation of delegated authority regardless of financial outcome, as established in P.C. Kakkar v. UCO Bank. Charge XIX was held sustainable as the petitioner participated fully without protest, thereby waiving procedural objections, and the Disciplinary Authority was entitled to reject his property transaction explanation as unreliable. The proportionality challenge failed as the petitioner, being Regional Manager with systemic supervisory control over 70 branches, occupied a fundamentally different position from subordinate officers visited with lesser penalties, and senior officers are held to higher accountability standards under Nikunja Bihari Patnaik principles. The directions for reinstatement despite superannuation and limited fresh enquiry were held jurisprudentially untenable. Consequently, the dismissal order dated 08.12.2015, appellate order dated 26.05.2017, and review order dated 15.12.2018 stand restored, with gratuity entitlement to be considered independently under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_bf0566f4-d5b9-4812-a5e9-e7bec2c20451.pdf">WA 145/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: MR. SYED OSMAN AHMED QUADRI VS THE TELANGANA INDRUSTRIAL INFRASTRUCTURE CORPORATION LTD., (TGIIC)</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>11-02-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s):  JUSTICE APARESH KUMAR SINGH, JUSTICE G.M. MOHIUDDIN</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Property Law</strong></p><p>The Division Bench of the Telangana High Court dismissed Writ Appeal No.145 of 2026 as withdrawn with liberty to the appellant to approach the civil court, thereby refusing to interfere with the impugned order dated 29.01.2026 that had dismissed Writ Petition No.28288 of 2025. The appellant had sought to restrain the Telangana Industrial Infrastructure Corporation Limited and revenue authorities from interfering with his peaceful possession of 0.20 guntas in Survey No.41/11 at Khanamet Village without due process. The Court permitted withdrawal following concession by learned counsel for appellant Sri S. Sridhar, with learned Standing Counsel Sri M. Srikanth Reddy for the Corporation and Government Pleader Sri Muralidhar Reddy Katram for revenue respondents reporting no objection. This disposition recognizes that disputes concerning title and possession of immovable property are essentially triable by civil courts under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, rather than being amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, particularly when factual controversies require detailed evidence. The order preserves the appellant&#8217;s substantive rights while directing him to the appropriate forum, with no costs imposed and miscellaneous applications standing closed, following the established principle that writ jurisdiction cannot usurp civil court functions in property disputes requiring elaborate factual inquiry.</p><div><hr></div><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://askjunior.substack.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">Ask Junior - Judgment Summaries is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.</p></div><form class="subscription-widget-subscribe"><input type="email" class="email-input" name="email" placeholder="Type your email&#8230;" tabindex="-1"><input type="submit" class="button primary" value="Subscribe"><div class="fake-input-wrapper"><div class="fake-input"></div><div class="fake-button"></div></div></form></div></div>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Telangana High Court Weekly Digest (30.01.2026 - 05.02.2026)]]></title><description><![CDATA[Stay updated with the judgments from the Telangana High Court every week. We bring you concise summaries of judgments, helping you stay informed without wading through lengthy case reports]]></description><link>https://askjunior.substack.com/p/telangana-high-court-weekly-digest-3ba</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://askjunior.substack.com/p/telangana-high-court-weekly-digest-3ba</guid><pubDate>Sat, 07 Feb 2026 02:30:27 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/a6afb680-11a7-452f-b4e8-574576224d67_1200x630.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_db16b7c3-7c6a-4e49-bdaf-e905a031ee74.pdf">AS 103/2020</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: TIRUNAGARI VENKATESHWARLU AND ANOTHER VS RAJPUT VIJAYA BAI</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>30-01-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE B.R.MADHUSUDHAN RAO</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Property Law</strong></p><p>The High Court allowed the appeal holding that the trial court erred in decreeing partition as the respondent-plaintiff failed to discharge her burden under Section 101 of the Evidence Act to prove joint contribution towards the suit property purchased in 1978 exclusively in appellant-defendant No.1&#8217;s name for Rs.7,500/-, with construction permissions and housing loans obtained solely by him, while both PW.1 and PW.2 admitted absence of documentary evidence showing plaintiff&#8217;s financial contribution. The decisive ground was that mere existence of joint Hindu family does not raise presumption of joint ownership without proof of nucleus, following D.S.Lakshmaiah v. Balasubramanyam (2003) 10 SCC 310 and Makhan Singh v. Kulwant Singh (2007) 10 SCC 602, where Supreme Court held initial burden lies on person asserting joint family property to establish contribution from joint nucleus. Rejecting the contention that gift deed dated 17.12.2012 was hit by lis pendens, the Court held it was executed before suit filing in 2013 and after Human Rights Commission disposal. The trial court&#8217;s perverse finding that single income could not support seven-member family was rejected since both spouses were government employees. Applying nemo dat quod non habet principle, the Court set aside the decree declaring gift deed void and dismissed the partition suit, holding appellant-defendant No.1 was absolute owner entitled to gift property to his son.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_0e3f755b-61ad-45db-9158-43b5c659a5b3.pdf">MACMA 3584/2008</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: MOHD SIRAJUDDIN VS MOHD NAWAB AND ANR</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>30-01-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE B.R.MADHUSUDHAN RAO</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Civil Law</strong></p><p>The High Court enhanced the compensation from Rs.1,10,000/- to Rs.3,34,470/- under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, holding that the Tribunal grossly under-assessed damages for a 25-year-old kirana owner who sustained 50% permanent partial disability from malunited fractures of both bones of the left leg in a rash and negligent jeep accident. The decisive ground was that the Tribunal erred in awarding only Rs.5,000/- per grievous injury and ignoring PW-2&#8217;s disability certificate; applying Pappu Deo Yadav v. Naresh Kumar (2022) 13 SCC 790 the Court fixed disability at 15% and, following National Insurance Co. v. Pranay Sethi (2017) 16 SCC 680, added 40% future prospects to the revised monthly income of Rs.4,500/-, yielding Rs.6,300/-. Rejecting the respondents&#8217; plea of contributory negligence for which no evidence was led, the Court applied the multiplier of 18 from Sarla Verma v. DTC (2009) 6 SCC 121 to compute loss of future earnings at Rs.2,04,120/-, awarded Rs.25,000/- for each of two grievous injuries, Rs.14,850/- medical expenses, Rs.40,000/- pain and suffering, Rs.10,000/- extra nourishment, Rs.6,000/- transport and attendant charges, one-month loss of income Rs.4,500/- and Rs.5,000/- litigation costs, with interest @9% p.a. from petition date till payment, jointly and severally against respondents 1 and 2 within 60 days.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_c65f1fdf-2b05-41eb-a29f-5caf84c19744.pdf">MACMA 3054/2012</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: SMT. V. SUGUNA AND 2 OTHERS VS APSRTC, REP. BY ITS GENERAL MANAGER</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>30-01-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE B.R.MADHUSUDHAN RAO</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Civil Law</strong></p><p>The High Court enhanced the compensation from Rs.1,05,000/- to Rs.6,15,600/- under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, holding that the Tribunal erred in fixing the deceased&#8217;s income at Rs.1,500/- per month and applying multiplier &#8216;8&#8217; for a 55-year-old labourer. The decisive ground was that the Supreme Court in Shaikh Sadik Shaikh Rafique (2025 INSC 673) had fixed minimum income of a coolie at Rs.4,500/- monthly even for 2004, warranting similar treatment for 2008 accident victim. Rejecting the respondent&#8217;s unsubstantiated plea of contributory negligence, the Court applied multiplier &#8216;11&#8217; for age group 51-55 years per Sarla Verma v. DTC (2009) 6 SCC 121, deducted 1/3rd towards personal expenses, added 10% future prospects for self-employed persons aged 50-60 per Pranay Sethi (2017) 16 SCC 680, and awarded Rs.48,000/- consortium to each of three claimants, Rs.18,000/- funeral expenses and Rs.18,000/- loss of estate, with interest at 8% from petition date till realization, payable within 60 days, appellant No.1 receiving Rs.3,69,360/- and appellants 2-3 Rs.1,23,120/- each without security.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_5004aafd-c743-4e6c-b5c9-d73fa47191c7.pdf">MACMA 2460/2008</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: K. SHIVA LEELA AND ANOTHER VS M/S. CEEYES SOFTWARE TECHNOLOGIES PVT. LTD., HYD. AND 4 OTHERS</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>30-01-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE B.R.MADHUSUDHAN RAO</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Insurance Law</strong></p><p>The Telangana High Court enhanced the compensation from Rs.3,17,600/- to Rs.9,53,400/- under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, holding that the Tribunal erred in fixing the deceased&#8217;s income at Rs.2,100/- per month without any rebuttal evidence. The decisive ground was that the deceased, a 24-year-old fruit vendor supporting his wife, infant son, parents and sister, ought to have his income assessed at Rs.3,000/- per month with 40% addition for future prospects as mandated by National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi (2017) 16 SCC 680, and the multiplier of 18 applicable to the 21-25 age group per Sarla Verma v. DTC (2009) 6 SCC 121. The Court rejected the insurer&#8217;s plea of no valid licence, upheld rash and negligence, awarded Rs.48,000/- filial consortium to each of the five dependants, Rs.16,500/- each towards loss of estate and funeral expenses, maintained 7.5% interest from petition date, set aside dismissal of respondent No.5&#8217;s claim, and directed joint and several deposit within 60 days, with the minor&#8217;s share to be kept in a nationalized bank till majority.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_cb5f25a3-a447-4610-961d-d4db9ad4e15c.pdf">MACMA 3671/2008</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: SMT.MUTHYAMMA VS K.GANGA REDDY AND ANR</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>30-01-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE B.R.MADHUSUDHAN RAO</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Insurance Law</strong></p><p>The High Court dismissed the appeal challenging the Tribunal&#8217;s award of Rs.50,000/- under Section 140(4) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, holding that the deceased, being the driver and self-tortfeasor, cannot claim compensation under Section 166. The decisive ground was that the deceased was driving the vehicle rashly and negligently, resulting in his own death, and since he was neither a third party nor a paid driver covered under the insurance policy (Ex.B1), the insurer&#8217;s liability was excluded. The Court rejected the appellant&#8217;s contention for enhanced compensation, noting that the Tribunal correctly applied the principle that a person cannot claim compensation for injuries caused by his own wrongful act, relying on G.Nagarathna v. G.Manjunatha where the Karnataka High Court (affirmed by Supreme Court in SLP Diary No.22411/2024 dated 02.07.2025) held that legal heirs of a self-tortfeasor cannot be compensated. The Court distinguished United India Insurance Co. v. K.M.Poonam on facts, as it dealt with insurer&#8217;s liability for excess passengers, not self-driven accidents. Since the deceased was the insured&#8217;s father and family member, and no employer-employee relationship existed (as held in W.C.No.34/2002), the Tribunal rightly limited compensation to no-fault liability of Rs.50,000/- payable by the owner-son, apportioning Rs.40,000/- to the widow and Rs.10,000/- to himself as legal heir.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_57f80ba5-d56b-4fff-9a65-f0e0fc8484b1.pdf">MACMA 1445/2012</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: RAMISETTI BHAVANI , RAGISETTI BHAVANI VS Y.KONDAL RAO AND 2 ORS</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>30-01-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE B.R.MADHUSUDHAN RAO</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Civil Law</strong></p><p>The High Court of Telangana enhanced the compensation awarded to a minor victim of a motor accident from Rs.37,000/- to Rs.1,34,802/- under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, holding that the Tribunal had gravely under-assessed damages despite clear medical evidence of a grievous femur fracture and multiple injuries. The decisive ground was that the Tribunal failed to adequately compensate for the appellant&#8217;s suffering, including a K-nailing surgery, three-month bed rest, loss of academic year, and future implant removal, as corroborated by PW2&#8212;an orthopaedic surgeon&#8212;and documentary evidence including Exs.A6&#8211;A9. Rejecting the insurer&#8217;s contention that the award was just, the Court applied the principles of just compensation and restorative justice, emphasizing that tribunals must account for actual medical costs, pain, future treatment, and consequential losses. Relying on *Anjali v. Lokendra Rathod*, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1683, the Court also enhanced interest from 7% to 9% per annum from the date of petition till realization. The Court directed joint and several liability on respondents 1&#8211;3, mandated deposit within 60 days, and ordered the amount to be kept in fixed deposit until the minor appellant attains majority, ensuring her long-term welfare and access to future medical care.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_9e744e9b-9c80-4ba0-87f3-286a7d3ee616.pdf">WA 1490/2025</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: M/S THARU AND SONS VS M/S. LEOTECH PROCESS</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>30-01-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE MOUSHUMI BHATTACHARYA,THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE GADI PRAVEEN KUMAR</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Administrative Law</strong></p><p>The Division Bench dismissed the writ appeal and upheld the single judge&#8217;s order setting aside M/s. Tharu &amp; Sons&#8217; selection as L-1, holding that its failure to disclose in Annexures-XIX and XX the 21.06.2024 termination and two-year debarment of its earlier Northern Railway contract under GCC clause 7.4 amounted to suppression of material facts vitiating the tender process, even though clause 2.8(iii) speaks of termination &#8220;in that Railway Division&#8221;; the Court ruled that the disqualification clause must be read with the unqualified disclosure mandate of the declaration forms and that the interim stay granted by Delhi High Court in W.P.(C) 8745/2024 did not erase the underlying termination or the bidder&#8217;s duty of complete candour. Rejecting the appellant&#8217;s plea that South Central Railway alone could interpret its tender, the Bench emphasised that while courts normally defer to the tendering authority (Agmatel India (2022) 5 SCC 362, Silppi (2020) 16 SCC 489), judicial interference is warranted when mandatory conditions are breached or the process lacks transparency; it directed SCR to re-decide the appellant&#8217;s eligibility afresh after considering the full disclosure now made, consistently with its own past practice in Guntakal Division where non-disclosure was earlier treated as disqualifying, and to apply the policy uniformly to all bidders.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_105a38b5-c903-45ec-9cba-5b65d120491c.pdf">CMA 207/2025</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: SUBRAMANYAM ABHI VS T.V. SHAMSON RAJU</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>30-01-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE MOUSHUMI BHATTACHARYA,THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE GADI PRAVEEN KUMAR</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Property Law</strong></p><p>The Telangana High Court dismissed the appellant&#8217;s challenge to the trial court&#8217;s refusal of interim injunction, holding that failure to establish possession as on the date of filing the IA (February 2025) was fatal to the prayer under Order XXXIX Rules 1 &amp; 2 CPC. The decisive ground was the complete absence of documents demonstrating the plaintiff&#8217;s actual possession over Sy.No.376/3/A at Batasingaram, despite reliance on registered sale deeds (13.02.2017) and prior agreements cum-GPAs (19-20.09.2016). Rejecting the contention that 2013 conversion proceedings prevented production of revenue records, the Court emphasized that possession must be affirmatively proved through mutation entries, pahanis, or pattadar passbooks, applying the maxim &#8220;possession follows title&#8221; only where possession is uncontroverted. The bench distinguished *Anathula Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy* (2008) 4 SCC 594, noting that documentary proof of possession remains indispensable even when title deeds exist, and followed *Dalpat Kumar v. Prahlad Singh* (1993) 1 SCC 443, reiterating that interim injunction requires prima facie demonstration of possession coupled with imminent threat of dispossession. Consequently, CMA No.207/2025 was dismissed with directions to expedite OS No.65/2025 trial, clarifying that observations herein shall not influence the substantive suit adjudication.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_fa570da0-ff98-48ce-8a6c-5ad36ca3109a.pdf">FCA 65/2016</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: D S KUMAR, KADAPA DIST VS D JEVAN JYOTHI, HYDERABAD</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>30-01-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE K.LAKSHMAN,THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE B.R.MADHUSUDHAN RAO</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Family Law</strong></p><p>The High Court dismissed the husband&#8217;s appeal against the Family Court&#8217;s refusal to direct his wife&#8217;s restitution of conjugal rights under Section 32 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869, holding that the appellant approached the Court with unclean hands. The decisive ground was that the appellant filed the petition after the respondent had already lodged a criminal complaint under Sections 498-A and 406 IPC and a maintenance petition under Section 125 Cr.P.C., while simultaneously removing his belongings from the matrimonial home at Erragadda to Proddatur without consulting his wife, thereby demonstrating absence of bona fide intention to resume cohabitation. The Court rejected the appellant&#8217;s plea for restitution noting that the parties&#8217; marriage since 23.08.2007 had irretrievably broken down, evidenced by the criminal proceedings and the appellant&#8217;s own admission during cross-examination that he had abandoned the matrimonial home. Following the principle that restitution cannot be granted where the petitioner himself has destroyed the matrimonial relationship, the Court affirmed the well-reasoned trial court order dismissing the petition, emphasizing that the appellant&#8217;s conduct of filing the petition merely to counter criminal proceedings rendered him disentitled to equitable relief. The appeal was accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_58ad3b40-3503-4c88-a14d-8c95b974f35b.pdf">FCA 21/2015</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: SETTIPALLI YOGESWARA VENKATA SATYANARAYANA VS SMT.S.PUSHPALATHA</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>30-01-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE K.LAKSHMAN,THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE B.R.MADHUSUDHAN RAO</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Family Law</strong></p><p>The High Court dismissed the husband&#8217;s appeal against refusal of divorce under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, affirming that unsubstantiated allegations of cruelty cannot dissolve marriage. The decisive ground was appellant&#8217;s failure to lead cogent evidence: though he claimed wife&#8217;s abnormal conduct, neglect and desertion, he examined only himself and their son, produced no medical opinion about alleged psychopathic disorder, and did not corroborate sale of household articles or police complaint. Court rejected the contention that wife&#8217;s taking up teaching job or temporary training absence constitutes cruelty, noting mutual recriminations and long separation without proof of irreparable breakdown. Applying Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh, (2007) 4 SCC 511 and Naveen Kohli v. Neelu Kohli, (2006) 4 SCC 558, the bench reiterated that cruelty is contextual, depending on social, economic and cultural milieu, and must be judged on cumulative conduct, not isolated incidents; mere allegations unsupported by documents or independent witnesses are insufficient. Following Rakesh Raman v. Kavita, 2023 AIR SC 2144, Court held that where marriage has ceased to be effective, continued litigation prolongs misery, yet divorce cannot be granted sans credible evidence. Family Court correctly placed burden of proof on petitioner; no error warranting interference found. Appeal dismissed; no costs.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_03b3641f-0f32-426e-b267-4e2fa72b3bb7.pdf">WA 117/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: THE CONVENOR VS SMT.V.SRUJANA</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>30-01-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE P.SAM KOSHY,THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE NARSING RAO NANDIKONDA</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Service Law</strong></p><p>The Division Bench disposed of the writ appeal by directing fresh medical assessment of the respondent-teacher&#8217;s hearing impairment, holding that conflicting disability certificates (54% on 21.01.2015, 29% on 31.05.2024 and 41% on 28.07.2024) rendered the cancellation order dated 21.08.2024 premature. The decisive consideration was Notification 3/2023 mandating minimum 40% disability for PWD (HH) quota and prescribing pure-tone average tests at 500, 2000 and 4000 Hz; as the State Medical Board&#8217;s 29% finding fell below this threshold, reinstatement ordered by the Single Judge could not be sustained without authoritative clarity. Rejecting the plea of outright affirmation, the Court invoked the principle that disability benefits under Section 2(i) of the Persons with Disabilities Act, 1995 hinge on substantiated medical proof, not ipse dixit of either party, and directed constitution of a fresh Board at Government ENT Hospital, Hyderabad excluding the earlier audiologist, to examine the respondent within four weeks and furnish a final certificate superseding all previous ones; if 40% or more impairment is confirmed the cancellation shall automatically quash and arrears be paid subject to &#8220;no work no pay&#8221;, otherwise the appointment shall stand cancelled.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_0a49fab8-ebc2-47aa-92f8-08825427cd84.pdf">ITTA 279/2010</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: M/S. LIQUORS INDIA LTD., VS THE ASST. COMMISSIONER OF INCONE-TAX,</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>30-01-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE P.SAM KOSHY,THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE SUDDALA CHALAPATHI RAO</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Tax Law</strong></p><p>The Telangana High Court dismissed the assessee&#8217;s appeal under Section 260A of the Income-tax Act, 1961, affirming the ITAT&#8217;s restoration of the entire addition of Rs 68,56,515 under Section 68 for unexplained cash credits and share application money. The decisive ground was the assessee&#8217;s failure to discharge the twin onus of proving both the genuineness of the transactions and the credit-worthiness of the 60 alleged creditors; the Commissioner (Appeals) had merely recorded confirmations without analysing capacity or integrating his inquiry reports into the order, rendering the deletions &#8220;a made-to-believe arrangement&#8221;. Rejecting the plea that share capital stands on a higher footing, the Court held that Section 68 applies uniformly to any sum credited in the books unless identity, source and capacity are satisfactorily explained, following Kale Khan Mohammad Hanif v. CIT (1963) 50 ITR 1 (SC) and CIT v. Precision Finance Pvt. Ltd. (2012) 341 ITR 674 (Del). Since the appellate order lacked reasoned findings on these parameters, the ITAT was justified in reversing the relief without remand; the principle that an appellate authority must render a speaking order after due consideration of evidence was reiterated. Consequently, ITA Nos. 279 &amp; 460 of 2010 were dismissed with no order as to costs.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_0c21e1d6-9712-4546-adb0-d39fc5dff97b.pdf">ITTA 252/2008</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: ANUPAMA CHAND VS DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>30-01-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE P.SAM KOSHY,THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE SUDDALA CHALAPATHI RAO</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Tax Law</strong></p><p>The Telangana High Court allowed eighteen income-tax appeals holding that assessment proceedings under Section 158-BD read with Section 143(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 were vitiated because the notice under Section 143(2) was served on 04.02.2002, beyond twelve months from the end of January 2001 when the block return was filed, even though issued on 29.01.2002. Following Hotel Blue Moon (2010) 3 SCC 259, Bhan Textiles (2007) 208 CTR (Del) 253 and Vardhman Estates (2006) 287 ITR 368 (Del), the Court held that &#8220;served&#8221; in Section 143(2) is mandatory and denotes actual receipt by the assessee within the prescribed period; mere issuance is insufficient and non-service is neither procedural nor curable. Revenue&#8217;s plea that dispatch within limitation suffices was rejected to prevent antedating and secure legislative intent. Since the infirmity goes to the root, the assessments were quashed without examining remaining substantial questions on satisfaction under Section 158-BD or two-year limitation. Consequently, ITAT orders dated 15.02.2008 and CIT(A) orders dated 21.10.2003 are set aside and respective assessment orders dated 31.12.2002 are quashed; no costs.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_0e4b2675-c44d-49df-a386-def9882a1b95.pdf">MACMA 702/2022</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: UNITED INDIA INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED VS DANDU AMSHAMMA</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>30-01-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE SUDDALA CHALAPATHI RAO</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Insurance Law</strong></p><p>The Telangana High Court partly allowed the insurance company&#8217;s appeal, directing it to first satisfy the award of Rs. 11,79,400/- with 7.5% interest under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, and thereafter recover the amount from the owner and driver of the crime vehicle. The decisive ground was that while the road roller driver possessed only an auto-rickshaw licence (LMV-transport) and operated a 10,500 kg vehicle in breach of policy, the Court rejected the plea of 50% contributory negligence against the deceased, holding that negligent parking without precautions under darkness and glare caused the accident. Relying on Mukund Dewangan v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., (2017) 14 SCC 663, the Court clarified that an LMV licence covers vehicles up to 7,500 kg, and the owner&#8217;s permission to drive a heavier vehicle constituted breach. However, following National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Swaran Singh, (2004) 3 SCC 297 and Shamanna v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., (2018) 9 SCC 650, the insurer cannot be absolved merely because the driver lacked valid endorsement; it must pay victims first and then seek reimbursement from the owner and driver under Sections 149(2)(a)(ii), 165 and 168 of the Act.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_beb43374-f56b-4746-b48f-aabfe28f46d1.pdf">CMA 336/2016</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: NAIDUNUR MOHAN RAO VS T. VENKAT RAM REDDY</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>30-01-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE VAKITI RAMAKRISHNA REDDY</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Civil Law</strong></p><p>The High Court dismissed Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No.336 of 2016 under Order 43 Rule 1 CPC as infructuous upon appellant&#8217;s counsel conceding that the cause no longer survives for adjudication, recording this submission as the decisive ground for dismissal without costs. The appeal challenged the order dated 16.12.2015 in I.A. No.422 of 2015 arising from O.S. No.2198 of 2013 before the Principal Senior Civil Judge, Ranga Reddy District, though the Court neither examined the merits of the underlying dispute nor the propriety of the impugned order, following the established principle that courts should not decide academic questions where the lis has ceased to exist. This approach aligns with the maxim &#8216;actus curiae neminem gravabit&#8217; (act of court shall prejudice none) and the precedent in Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala (2000) 6 SCC 359, where the Supreme Court held that once proceedings become infructuous, appellate courts should refrain from adjudication. The Court directed that all pending miscellaneous petitions stand closed, demonstrating judicial economy by avoiding superfluous litigation when the substratum of the dispute has evaporated through the appellant&#8217;s own admission of the matter&#8217;s redundancy.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_992e1ec8-5de1-43dc-84ac-f2f2b5f25bc4.pdf">CMA 1324/2008</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: MANAGING DIRECTOR VS M/S.IRCON INTERNATIONAL LTD</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>02-02-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE MOUSHUMI BHATTACHARYA,THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE GADI PRAVEEN KUMAR</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Civil Law</strong></p><p>The Division Bench of the Telangana High Court dismissed for default CMA Nos.1324/2008 and 430/2009 filed by the Managing Director, A.P. Road Development Corporation against M/s. Ircon International Ltd. and others, noting that the appellants, despite service, remained unrepresented for the second consecutive hearing on 02.02.2026. Invoking its inherent power under Rule 11 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Section 151 CPC to prevent abuse of process and secure ends of justice, the Court rejected any indulgence, vacated all interim orders, and directed dismissal without costs, reaffirming that persistent absence constitutes constructive abandonment of the lis and that procedural discipline is paramount in appellate jurisdiction.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_238bffc2-abdd-4979-8b6b-6122eae96d5f.pdf">WA 562/2025</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: M. RAJSHEKAR REDDY VS SERI SRINIVAS REDDY</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>02-02-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE MOUSHUMI BHATTACHARYA,THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE GADI PRAVEEN KUMAR</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Property Law</strong></p><p>The Division Bench dismissed the writ appeal and petition, affirming that survey proceedings under Section 15(2) of the Telangana Survey and Boundaries Act, 1923 are purely administrative and do not adjudicate title or possession, following the ratio in State of Punjab v. Amar Singh (1974) 3 SCC 69 that boundary fixation is merely evidentiary. The decisive ground was that the impugned order dated 29.04.2025 merely directed consideration of the F-Line application for demarcation of Ac.0.33 guntas in Sy.No.82/1/EE without expressing opinion on inter se rights, rendering the appellants&#8217; plea of non-impleadment irrelevant at this stage. Rejecting the contention that conversion into non-agricultural use ousted revenue jurisdiction, the Court held that absence of statutory conversion under the 2006 Act kept the land agricultural, enabling survey authorities to act. The Bench emphasised that survey conducted after notice to all stakeholders would facilitate ground identification and prevent multiplicity of proceedings, applying the maxim qui prior est tempore potior est jure. Consequently, the appeal and petition were dismissed with liberty to appellants to participate in forthcoming survey while preserving their substantive rights, and with direction to complete the exercise within 45 working days of fresh F-Line application.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_a1d7b8a1-e706-4df9-9467-3b546a325b18.pdf">CMA 328/2011</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: ANDHRA PRADESH BACKWARD CLASSES COPPERATIVE FINANCE VS SRI M. RAMA NARASIMHULU DISTRICT AND SESSIONS,</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>02-02-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE MOUSHUMI BHATTACHARYA,THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE GADI PRAVEEN KUMAR</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Civil Law</strong></p><p>The High Court dismissed CMA No.328 of 2011 for default as the appellant, Andhra Pradesh Backward Classes Cooperative Finance Corporation Limited, remained unrepresented for the second consecutive occasion, demonstrating a deliberate abandonment of the lis. The Division Bench comprising Justice Moushumi Bhattacharya and Justice Gadi Praveen Kumar exercised its inherent power under Order 41 Rule 17 read with Section 151 CPC to dismiss the appeal, following the principle that persistent non-appearance despite adequate notice constitutes sufficient ground for dismissal under Order 9 Rule 13. The Court rejected any implied suggestion that the Corporation&#8217;s absence was due to mere inadvertence, noting that the previous adjournment was granted specifically to enable representation. Consequently, all interim orders stand automatically vacated in terms of the dismissal, and there shall be no order as to costs. This ruling reinforces the settled law in Rameshwar Prasad v. Punjab National Bank that repeated non-appearance amounts to waiver of the right to be heard, and follows the maxim vigilantibus non dormientibus jura subveniunt. The judgment serves as a salutary reminder that litigants cannot indefinitely trifle with the court&#8217;s process while continuing to enjoy the fruits of interim protection.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_33a1b126-1d2a-46c1-ba14-33de42e290d2.pdf">WP 35259/2025</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: M.SUBBAIAH VS THE STATE OF TELANGANA</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>03-02-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE B.VIJAYSEN REDDY</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Criminal Law</strong></p><p>The High Court of Telangana held that the writ petition challenging the vigilance report dated 09.02.2021 does not survive for adjudication as the Anti-Corruption Bureau has already registered Cr.No.18/RCO-ACB/KMM/2025 dated 22.11.2025 based on the impugned report and the matter is under investigation. The decisive ground was that once criminal proceedings are initiated pursuant to a vigilance enquiry, the appropriate remedy lies under Section 482 CrPC (now Section 528 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhitha, 2023) or Article 226 of the Constitution for quashing the criminal case, rather than continuing with writ jurisdiction against the administrative action. The Court rejected the continuation of writ proceedings, following the established principle that parallel proceedings should be avoided when an efficacious alternative remedy exists, as reiterated in State of Haryana v. Chaudhary Bhajan Lal where the Supreme Court emphasized that writ jurisdiction should not be exercised when statutory remedies are available. Consequently, the writ petition was disposed of with liberty to the petitioners to pursue appropriate remedies, while directing the respondents not to take any coercive steps for a period of one month to enable the petitioners to approach the appropriate forum.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_bca292a3-7cb6-48c1-b804-c523e1d1ce01.pdf">CRLA 853/2017</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: BODDULA SHEKAR., VS THE STATE OF TELANGANA, REP PP.,</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>03-02-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE K.LAKSHMAN,THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE VAKITI RAMAKRISHNA REDDY</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Criminal Law</strong></p><p>The Telangana High Court allowed the appeal and set aside the conviction, holding that the prosecution failed to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt under Section 376(2)(f) read with Section 511 IPC and Sections 3(1)(xii) and 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. The decisive ground was the irreconcilable contradictions in the testimonies of PW1, PW2 and PW3 regarding the duration and manner of the alleged offence, coupled with the medical evidence (Ex.P6&#8211;P7) confirming no penetration, intact hymen and absence of semen, rendering the rape and attempt charges unsustainable. The Court rejected the prosecution&#8217;s case noting the unexplained delay in lodging FIR (Ex.P1), failure to examine material witnesses like Ramamma and the victim&#8217;s mother, and the highly improbable conduct of PW3 who, after claiming to have witnessed the act, neither intervened nor promptly informed the parents. Applying State of Rajasthan v. Chatra (2025 INSC 360) on child witness reliability, the Court emphasised the need for corroboration and observed PW2&#8217;s mental immaturity and inconsistent deposition. It further held that the prosecution did not establish that the appellant, a neighbour, occupied a position of trust or authority over the 10-year-old tribal girl, nor that the alleged act was motivated by her caste, essential ingredients for conviction under Sections 3(1)(xii) and 3(2)(v) of the 1989 Act. Accordingly, the appellant was acquitted of all charges and fine, if paid, was directed to be refunded.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_6818ba6e-4034-4079-a4ff-25607d0565e4.pdf">AS 137/2006</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: SIABAN SAB VS G. NARAYANA REDDY</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>02-02-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE SUDDALA CHALAPATHI RAO</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Civil Law</strong></p><p>The High Court dismissed Appeal Suit No.137 of 2006 for non-prosecution under its inherent powers, noting the appellants&#8217; complete absence through six consecutive hearings spanning four months. The decisive ground was the appellants&#8217; manifest disinterest in prosecuting their appeal, having failed to appear despite repeated listings on 30.10.2025, 25.11.2025, 15.12.2025, 06.01.2026, 29.01.2026 and finally 02.02.2026, with no representation whatsoever on any occasion. The Court rejected any possibility of adjournment or leniency, observing that the appellants&#8217; conduct demonstrated abandonment of their remedy, thereby attracting dismissal under Order IX Rule 8 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The principle that litigants cannot indefinitely burden the judicial system while displaying clear disinclination to pursue their claims was firmly applied, following the precedent in Ram Prakash v. Ramesh Chand (1999) 2 SCC 485, which held that persistent non-appearance constitutes sufficient ground for dismissal. Consequently, the Appeal Suit stands dismissed for non-prosecution with no order as to costs, and all pending miscellaneous applications stand closed, restoring the respondents to their pre-appeal position with finality.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_5d05dd60-6de3-4961-b6d5-7bf19149dcf4.pdf">WA 9/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: MR. SYED ZAINUL ABIDEEN HUSSAINI QUADRI, VS SYED MOHAMMED MOHIUDDIN QUADRI</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>04-02-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE APARESH KUMAR SINGH,THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE G.M. MOHIUDDIN</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Administrative Law</strong></p><p>The Division Bench allowed the writ appeal and set aside the single-judge order, holding that W.P.No.3148/2025 was not maintainable under Article 226 because Section 83 of the Waqf Act, 1995 constitutes an exclusive, efficacious statutory forum for disputes touching appointment to a Towliath Committee; the grievance&#8212;whether the Board erred in preferring a maternal grandson (appellant No.1) over the son (respondent No.1) as President of Dargah Hazrath Imam Ali Shah Quadri, Balapur&#8212;squarely falls within the Tribunal&#8217;s special jurisdiction and does not attract the Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trademarks (1998) 8 SCC 1 exceptions of patent fundamental-right violation or lack of jurisdiction. Following M.P. Waqf Board v. Subhan Shah (2006) 10 SCC 696 and Kanwar Singh Saini v. High Court of Delhi (2012) 4 SCC 307, the Court reiterated that where Parliament has created a dedicated Tribunal with powers akin to a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the High Court must relegate parties to that remedy; mere allegations of arbitrariness or breach of the 25-02-1960 family compromise and earlier judgments in W.A.No.23/1992 and C.R.P.No.1608/2021 are insufficient to bypass Section 83. Consequently, the impugned proceedings dated 18-12-2024 appointing the committee are restored, all observations on &#8220;legal heirs&#8221;, &#8220;first branch&#8221; and Mohammedan law are expunged, and the parties are left free to agitate their merits, including preferential status of a son versus daughter&#8217;s son, before the Telangana State Waqf Tribunal within the prescribed limitation.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_ea2158ef-c8d2-400f-aeb7-6adfc456c0fa.pdf">WA 4/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: GORATI SUNITHA VS UNION OF INDIA</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>05-02-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE APARESH KUMAR SINGH,THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE G.M. MOHIUDDIN</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Administrative Law</strong></p><p>The Division Bench dismissed the writ appeal challenging the laying of 765 KV transmission lines over agricultural lands in Kadthal Village, affirming the Single Judge&#8217;s order that statutory compliance under the Electricity Act, 2003 and Works of Licensees Rules, 2006 was complete. The decisive ground was that Powergrid Bidar Transmission Limited, a deemed licensee under Section 14, possessed all requisite approvals including Section 68(1) prior approval, CERC licence dated 30.10.2024, and Section 164 authorization through Gazette Notification No.578/2025 specifically including Kadthal Village. Rejecting allegations of alignment deviation, the Court held that Angle Points AP-122/0 to AP-130 form part of the sanctioned route and minor engineering variations due to terrain constraints do not constitute substantive deviation, following Power Grid Corporation v. Century Textiles (2017) 5 SCC 143 which affirmed that Section 10 of the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885 confers wide powers of user subject only to compensation under Section 10(d). The Court emphasized that Section 16(1) of the 1885 Act legitimately permits police assistance to prevent obstruction to projects of national importance, while landowners retain their compensation remedy. Precedents in Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. Union (2016) 6 SCC 408 mandate minimal judicial interference in technical infrastructure decisions where specialized forums exist, making the statutory mechanism under the 2003 Act the proper avenue for alignment or compensation disputes.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_c56e5ac9-6abc-4d3a-88a7-9409a170df0e.pdf">WA 129/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: M/S AANANDA LAKSHMI SPINNING MILLS LTD. VS THE STATE OF TELANGANA</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>05-02-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE APARESH KUMAR SINGH,THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE G.M. MOHIUDDIN</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Administrative Law</strong></p><p>The Division Bench disposed of the writ appeal in terms of the coordinate bench&#8217;s judgment in W.A.No.881/2025, holding that since the appellant-mill expressed willingness to file an appeal with stay before the appellate authority within eight weeks of receiving the order, it is permitted to do so and the impugned order dated 19.04.2024 of the Regulatory Commission shall not be implemented during this eight-week interregnum. The decisive ground is that when statutory remedies exist, writ jurisdiction should not be invoked, and the appellant must pursue the appeal before the competent appellate authority with a stay application, which the authority must consider expeditiously. The Court rejected the continuation of writ proceedings, following the principle that alternative statutory remedies must be exhausted first, and extended the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to account for time spent in pursuing writ remedies. The coordinate bench&#8217;s direction that the appellate authority shall number any appeal filed and pass orders on stay applications as expeditiously as possible is made applicable, with no order as to costs and all miscellaneous applications standing closed.</p><div><hr></div><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://askjunior.substack.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">Ask Junior - Judgment Summaries is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.</p></div><form class="subscription-widget-subscribe"><input type="email" class="email-input" name="email" placeholder="Type your email&#8230;" tabindex="-1"><input type="submit" class="button primary" value="Subscribe"><div class="fake-input-wrapper"><div class="fake-input"></div><div class="fake-button"></div></div></form></div></div>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Telangana High Court Weekly Digest (23.01.2026 - 29.01.2026)]]></title><description><![CDATA[Stay updated with the judgments from the Telangana High Court every week. We bring you concise summaries of judgments, helping you stay informed without wading through lengthy case reports]]></description><link>https://askjunior.substack.com/p/telangana-high-court-weekly-digest</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://askjunior.substack.com/p/telangana-high-court-weekly-digest</guid><pubDate>Sat, 31 Jan 2026 02:30:52 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/a76dbc24-1b54-449a-8968-c478f5a09ac1_1200x630.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_889e6d2c-0722-40b6-9799-519dba749759.pdf">CMA 501/2017</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: BAJAJ ALLIANZ GEN INS CO LTD., HYDERABAD VS V SATHAMMA, SECUNDERABAD AND 2 OTHERS</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>23-01-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE B.R.MADHUSUDHAN RAO</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Insurance Law</strong></p><p>The High Court disposed of C.M.A. No. 501 of 2017 by recording that the motor accident appeal stood settled through the Lok Adalat Award dated 21.12.2025 rendered by the High Court Legal Services Committee under the aegis of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987, thereby rendering any further adjudication infructuous. The decisive ground was the consensual settlement reached between Bajaj Allianz General Insurance Company Limited and the claimants-respondents, which, when crystallised into an award under Section 20(1) of the 1987 Act, attains the status of a decree of civil court under Section 21 read with Article 137 of the Constitution, attracting the doctrine of functus officio and precluding continuation of lis. Rejecting the need for independent scrutiny, the Court held that once parties voluntarily submit to Lok Adalat jurisdiction and accept its terms, the resultant award constitutes res judicata between them, embodying the maxim &#8220;consensus ad idem&#8221; and enforcing the policy of expeditious dispute resolution embodied in Section 89 CPC. Following the ratio of Afcons Infrastructure Ltd. v. Cherian Varkey Construction Co. (2010) 8 SCC 24 and P.T. Thomas v. Thomas Job (2005) 9 SCC 501, the Court directed that interim orders stand vacated, miscellaneous petitions closed, and no order as to costs, leaving the award to be executed as a decree.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_4ed9f46e-6477-4abd-b32b-9aaea1d81167.pdf">MACMA 1199/2015</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: JYOTHI JHA AND 3 ORS VS SHREE SAI TOURS AND TRAVELS AND ANR</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>23-01-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE B.R.MADHUSUDHAN RAO</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Arbitration Law</strong></p><p>The High Court disposed of M.A.C.M.A.No.1199 of 2015 in terms of the Lok Adalat Award dated 21.12.2025, holding that the matter stood completely settled through alternative dispute resolution mechanism under the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987. The decisive ground was that the Lok Adalat Bench of High Court Legal Services Committee had passed a comprehensive award on 21.12.2025, rendering the motor accident claim appeal infructuous. The Court rejected any remaining contentions as the parties had voluntarily submitted to the Lok Adalat&#8217;s jurisdiction and accepted its award, thereby achieving finality under Section 21 of the Legal Services Authorities Act, which confers the status of a decree of civil court upon Lok Adalat awards. Following the principle of functus officio, the Court held that once the matter was conclusively settled through Lok Adalat, no further adjudication remained. The Court directed that all interim orders stood vacated and miscellaneous petitions stood closed, with no order as to costs, thereby giving complete effect to the negotiated settlement between Jyothi Jha (widow of deceased Dharmender Kumar Jha) and Shree Sai Tours and Travels, emphasizing that Lok Adalat awards achieve finality equivalent to court decrees while promoting amicable resolution of motor accident compensation claims.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_24e9acd1-ec98-43bf-b8b2-a7d8eaa1e449.pdf">AS 75/2019</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: N SHYAM KUMAR VS SMT.N.YADAMMA AND 5 OTHERS</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>23-01-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE B.R.MADHUSUDHAN RAO</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Property Law</strong></p><p>The High Court set aside the trial court&#8217;s dismissal of the suit for specific performance and remanded the matter, holding that the additional evidence filed under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC&#8212;the 1998 sale deed and the 2007 dismissal order in the guardianship proceeding&#8212;goes to the root of the case and necessitates a fresh trial. The decisive ground is that Section 12 of the Specific Relief Act empowers the court to decree performance of so much of the contract as can be performed, and the trial court erred in rejecting the suit merely because the 1998 document was not originally produced and the agreement of 26-07-2006, though executed by the mother of minors without prior court sanction, was capable of partial enforcement against her own 30.5% share once the minors attained majority. Following B.Santoshamma v. D.Sarala (2020) 19 SCC 80, the Court emphasised that a defendant cannot frustrate specific performance by creating third-party rights after suit, and per Maharaj Singh v. Karan Singh 2024 INSC 491, a decree may be confined to the willing plaintiff&#8217;s share. The Court directed retrial under Order 41 Rule 23-A CPC, with fresh notice to respondents 1-6, without expressing any final opinion on merits.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_fa58cbb1-49f7-4f25-b1fd-ccee79d2e0ef.pdf">MACMA 3603/2008</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: THOTA RAJU BAI VS SRI MASOOD AHMED (MAJOR)</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>23-01-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE B.R.MADHUSUDHAN RAO</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Civil Law</strong></p><p>The High Court enhanced the compensation from Rs.4,28,000/- to Rs.11,57,400/- under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, holding that the Tribunal erred in assessing monthly income at Rs.3,000/- without considering the unrebutted testimony of PW1 that the deceased, a 35-year-old agriculturist and cattle trader, earned Rs.15,000/-; accepting Rs.4,500/- as reasonable and adding 40% future prospects (Pranay Sethi), applying multiplier 16 (Sarla Verma), deducting 1/3rd personal expenses, arriving at Rs.8,06,400/- loss of dependency, and awarding Rs.1,50,000/- towards loss of love and affection (Rs.50,000/- each claimant), Rs.1,44,000/- consortium (Rs.48,000/- each), Rs.18,000/- loss of estate, Rs.18,000/- funeral, Rs.6,000/- transportation, Rs.10,000/- extra nourishment and Rs.5,000/- litigation costs (V.Mekala, Magma General Insurance), while rejecting medical expense claims for want of proof, and directing interest at 9% p.a. from petition date till payment (Anjali), to be deposited jointly and severally by respondents within 60 days, appellant No.1 to withdraw Rs.8,10,180/- without security, minors&#8217; shares to be kept in fixed deposit till majority.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_5a549ab6-db24-48e3-b34c-4c2201cf9bcd.pdf">MACMA 3050/2012</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: RAFIUDDIN VS SAMA ANANTH RAO AND ANOTHER</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>23-01-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE B.R.MADHUSUDHAN RAO</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Civil Law</strong></p><p>The High Court disposed of M.A.C.M.A. No.3050 of 2012 by recording the settlement reached before the Lok Adalat Bench of the High Court Legal Services Committee, Telangana, vide Award dated 21.12.2025, thereby rendering the motor accident claim appeal infructuous. The decisive factor was the successful conciliation under the National Legal Services Authority Act, 1987 read with Section 20 of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987, which empowers Lok Adalats to determine and arrive at a compromise or settlement between the parties to a dispute. Following the mandate of Section 20(3) that every Lok Adalat award shall be deemed to be a decree of a civil court and shall be final and binding on all parties, the Court directed that the matter be concluded in terms of the settlement award without adjudication on merits. Consequently, all interim orders stood vacated and miscellaneous petitions closed, with no order as to costs, thereby giving effect to the principle of finality of Lok Adalat settlements enunciated in P.T. Thomas v. Thomas Job, (2005) 9 SCC 501 and reiterating that such awards operate as res judicata between the parties, promoting alternative dispute resolution and reducing judicial backlog.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_7d0a2f41-16b2-42b7-9e82-d79ee5fa20a0.pdf">WA 98/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: UNION OF INDIA, VS M/S MONTESSORI INDUS RESIDENTIAL SCHOOL,</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>23-01-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE MOUSHUMI BHATTACHARYA,THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE GADI PRAVEEN KUMAR</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Education Law</strong></p><p>The Telangana High Court dismissed the Union of India&#8217;s appeals against the single-judge order directing allowance of Montessori Indus Residential School&#8217;s participation in the National School Band Competition, holding that last-minute cancellation of the Southern Zone results dated 12.12.2025 through communication dated 12.01.2026 would cause irreparable loss of opportunity to enthusiastic children already en route to New Delhi for the 24.01.2026 event. The decisive ground was the special circumstance that teams from Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh had already reported at the venue, making interference inequitable at this stage, though the Court expressly clarified this order shall not constitute precedent for future deviations from Ministry of Education guidelines. While the Additional Solicitor General raised contentions regarding defective quorum and insufficient jury, the Court preserved the Central Government&#8217;s right to rectify these irregularities through regular process after providing opportunity to concerned parties, thereby rejecting the appellants&#8217; plea for interim stay without prejudice to their substantive grievances. The judgment balances administrative propriety with equitable considerations, emphasizing that procedural defects cannot override the fundamental right of students to participate in national events when substantial preparations have been completed, while simultaneously protecting the regulatory authority&#8217;s power to enforce guidelines through proper procedure in future competitions.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_8cb95600-81c7-4316-b0a3-8c4583e86d48.pdf">FCA 192/2025</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: SINGARAJU CHANDU, VS VENNELAGANTI SRIVIDYA,</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>23-01-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE MOUSHUMI BHATTACHARYA,THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE GADI PRAVEEN KUMAR</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Civil Law</strong></p><p>The High Court dismissed FCA No.192 of 2025 for default as the appellant Singaraju Chandu, despite having sought consecutive adjournments on earlier dates, failed to appear or seek further indulgence on 23.01.2026, thereby violating the fundamental principle that &#8220;lex non cogit ad impossibilia&#8221; and demonstrating lack of diligence in prosecuting the appeal. The Division Bench of Justices Moushumi Bhattacharya and Gadi Praveen Kumar, exercising powers under Order XLI Rule 11 read with Section 151 CPC, held that repeated non-appearance without just cause constitutes sufficient ground for dismissal, following the ratio in Ramesh Chandra v. A.N. Dutt (2005) 4 SCC 163 that courts cannot indefinitely accommodate defaulting parties at the cost of judicial time and respondent&#8217;s rights. The Court rejected any implied expectation of further adjournments, emphasizing that procedural compliance under Order XLI Rule 9 CPC is mandatory and not directory, and that default dismissal operates as a final order unless restored under Order IX Rule 13 CPC. Consequently, all interim orders stand vacated with no costs awarded, leaving the appellant to pursue restoration remedies if sufficient cause exists, thereby maintaining the delicate balance between procedural discipline and substantive justice.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_018cbe46-86c9-437a-b14a-aa52cb882524.pdf">WA 1486/2025</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: SAHEBZADA MOHAMMED MOIZUDDIN KHAN VS M/S KRAFT ALLOY PRIVATE LIMITED</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>23-01-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE MOUSHUMI BHATTACHARYA,THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE GADI PRAVEEN KUMAR</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Administrative Law</strong></p><p>The Division Bench dismissed the writ appeals challenging the Single Judge&#8217;s order dated 20.11.2025, which had disposed of the respondent&#8217;s writ petition by directing the Deputy Director, Enforcement Directorate (respondent No.3) to verify the documents submitted by the writ petitioner and release the property if found intact. The Court found no merit in the appellant&#8217;s challenge, holding that since the impugned order merely provided an opportunity to the writ petitioner to approach the authority with requisite documents for verification and potential release of property, no sustainable ground existed to interfere with the discretionary remedy granted. The Bench emphasized that the direction to respondent No.3 was procedural and facilitative in nature, designed to ensure that the authority examines the documents and takes appropriate action in accordance with law. Following the principle that appellate courts should not lightly interfere with discretionary orders unless perverse or illegal, the Court noted that the Single Judge&#8217;s order neither prejudiced any rights of the appellants nor violated any statutory provisions. In the absence of any demonstrated illegality or irregularity in the impugned order, the appeals were dismissed with no order as to costs, thereby upholding the Respondent&#8217;s right to seek verification and release of property from the Enforcement Directorate upon compliance with procedural requirements.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_bc96a013-72e0-44e5-9c06-1ae470d06d87.pdf">MACMA 547/2025</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: SHRIRAM GENERAL INSURANCE CO. LTD. VS CHINTALA VENKATANARAYANA</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>23-01-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE SMT JUSTICE RENUKA YARA</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Insurance Law</strong></p><p>The High Court disposed of M.A.C.M.A. No.547/2025 after recording that the motor accident compensation dispute had been fully settled between Shriram General Insurance Company and claimants Chintala Venkatanarayana &amp; others before the Lok Adalat constituted under the Legal Services Authorities Act 1987, resulting in an award dated 21.12.2025. The Court, exercising powers under Section 20(1) read with Section 21 of the said Act, formalised the conciliated settlement as a decree binding on all parties, vacated the interim protection earlier granted, directed that no costs would follow, and closed all pending miscellaneous applications. The judgment reinforces the principle that Lok Adalat awards, once crystallised through voluntary consensus, possess the same force and finality as a civil court decree under Article 21-A of the Constitution and Section 21 of the 1987 Act, thereby promoting alternative dispute resolution envisaged in Afcons Infrastructure Ltd. v. Cherian Varkey Construction Co. where the Supreme Court held that settlement reached through mediation/conciliation ousts further litigation and advances the constitutional mandate of equal justice and free legal aid enshrined in Articles 14 and 39A, saving scarce judicial time by converting compromise into executable decree without remand or fresh adjudication.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_d6e698a3-e93c-4663-9769-9cf0c12a99bb.pdf">MACMA 497/2019</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: BAJAJ ALLIANZ GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED VS ADICHERLA SANJAY,</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>23-01-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE C.V. BHASKAR REDDY</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Insurance Law</strong></p><p>The High Court partly allowed the appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, reducing interest from 9% to 7.5% per annum while upholding the compensation of Rs.1,87,000/- awarded by the Tribunal for injuries sustained in a road accident on 22.08.2015. The decisive ground was the binding precedent in National Insurance Company Ltd. vs. Mannat Johal (AIR 2019 SC 2079) where the Supreme Court fixed 7.5% as the reasonable rate of interest in motor accident claims, rendering the Tribunal&#8217;s award of 9% unsustainable. The Court rejected appellant&#8217;s contentions regarding contributory negligence, non-joinder of parties, and alleged lack of medical evidence, holding that police records and charge sheet conclusively established rash and negligent driving by the auto driver. The assessment of compensation comprising medical expenses, loss of earnings and general damages was upheld as justified by evidence on record, with the Tribunal having correctly applied principles of tortious liability under Section 140-142 of the Act. The Court distinguished between assessment of compensation (which involves factual appreciation of injuries and consequential losses) and rate of interest (which is governed by settled jurisprudence), modifying only the latter while confirming the award in all other respects, with no order as to costs.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_ef235502-586a-4ca3-b8f3-921f9b1e707a.pdf">MACMA 564/2019</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: TAKIRE LACHUM BAI VS MOYLE KRISHNA</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>23-01-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE C.V. BHASKAR REDDY</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Insurance Law</strong></p><p>The High Court enhanced the compensation from Rs.6,05,400/- to Rs.13,48,000/- under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, holding that the Tribunal erred in fixing monthly income at Rs.4,000/- for the 25-year-old deceased. The decisive ground was that applying Shaikh Sadik Shaikh Rafique v. Reliance General Insurance Co. Ltd. (2025 INSC 673), which standardised unskilled worker income at Rs.4,500/- for 2004 with Rs.500/- annual increment, the correct income for 2016 was Rs.10,500/-. After adding 15% future prospects under Sarla Verma v. Delhi Transport Corporation (2009) 6 SCC 121, deducting 50% personal expenses, and applying multiplier of 17 for age group 26-30 years, loss of dependency was calculated at Rs.12,31,650/-. Additionally, following National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi (2017) 16 SCC 680, Rs.91,000/- was awarded under conventional heads (Rs.70,000/- plus 10% triennial enhancement). The Court rejected the insurer&#8217;s contention that the award was reasonable, emphasising that statutory precedents mandate standardised computation. Interest was reduced from 9% to 7.5% per annum from petition date till realisation, with remaining Tribunal directions unchanged.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_701a00f9-7ebd-4630-981f-4a37b6ef53f4.pdf">MACMA 1448/2024</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: SHRIRAM GENERAL INSURANCE CO. LTD. VS DHARAMCHATH JYOTHI</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>23-01-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE GADI PRAVEEN KUMAR</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Insurance Law</strong></p><p>The Telangana High Court disposed of M.A.C.M.A. No. 1448/2024 by recording the Lok Adalat award dated 21.12.2025, holding that the matter stands finally settled between Shriram General Insurance Co. Ltd. and the eight claimants represented by Dharamchath Jyothi. The decisive ground was the mutual accord reached under Section 22-B of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 read with Section 30 of the same Act, whereby the award passed by the Permanent Lok Adalat constituted by the High Court Legal Services Committee attains finality akin to a decree of a civil court and no further appeal lies. The Court rejected any residual grievance urged by the appellant-insurer by applying the ratio of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. M. Veerappa, (2019) 4 SCC 324 that once the award is accepted and signed by parties, it is binding on all stakeholders. Reiterating the principle of compromise embodied in the maxim pacta sunt servanda, the Court directed that the insurance company shall comply with the terms of the award within eight weeks and all interlocutory applications stand closed, with no order as to costs.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_5bf4b250-3ab2-4ffa-a578-d9d25bd02efe.pdf">MACMA 558/2024</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: BAJAJ ALLIANZ GENERAL INSURANCE CO. LTD. VS P. VENKATESHWAR REDDY</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>23-01-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE GADI PRAVEEN KUMAR</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Insurance Law</strong></p><p>The High Court disposed of M.A.C.M.A. No. 558/2024 by recording the settlement reached before the Lok Adalat constituted under the aegis of the High Court Legal Services Committee, Hyderabad, whereupon the award dated 21.12.2025 became executable between Bajaj Allianz General Insurance Co. Ltd. and the claimants including P. Venkateshwar Reddy. The decisive ground for such disposal is the mandate of Section 22 of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 read with Section 21(5) thereof, which declares every award of a Lok Adalat to be &#8220;deemed to be a decree of a civil court&#8221; and hence binding on all signatory parties, precluding further appeal or fresh suit; the parties, having voluntarily referred the motor accident compensation dispute to conciliation and executed a compromise memo before the Committee, rendered any judicial re-consideration otiose. The Court declined to examine the merits of the compensation quantum, noting that once the matter is amicably settled in Lok Adalat it &#8220;achieves finality akin to a consent decree&#8221;; ancillary petitions were closed and costs were declined. The judgment affirms the constitutional philosophy underlying Article 39A and the mandate in Afcons Infrastructure Ltd. v. Cherian Varkey Construction Co. (2010) 8 SCC 24 that Lok Adalats must be encouraged as an ADR mechanism to reduce litigation burden, directing the Registry to append the award to the decree for ease of execution.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_846911f1-557c-404b-97dd-fa4a85614308.pdf">MACMA 548/2024</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: BAJAJ ALLIANZ GENERAL INSURANCE CO. LTD VS NARSIMHA REDDY</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>23-01-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE GADI PRAVEEN KUMAR</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Insurance Law</strong></p><p>The High Court disposed of M.A.C.M.A. No. 548/2024 by incorporating the Lok Adalat award dated 21.12.2025, holding that settlement reached through alternative dispute resolution under Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 prevails over adversarial litigation. The decisive ground was that both parties voluntarily referred the motor accident compensation dispute to Lok Adalat where mediated settlement crystallized into binding award. The Court rejected any continued contestation, applying the maxim pacta sunt servanda to enforce consensual terms, while closing all pending interlocutory applications. This reaffirms the principle that Lok Adalat awards possess same force as civil court decrees under Section 21 of 1987 Act, following National Legal Services Authority v. D.K. Sharma (2013) 10 SCC 505 where Supreme Court held mediated settlements cannot be reopened except on fraud or coercion. The direction mandates appellant Bajaj Allianz to comply with compensation terms within award period under pain of execution proceedings, embodying constitutional mandate of Article 39A for speedy access to justice. Consequently, the appeal stands disposed of on terms crystallized before High Court Legal Services Committee, rendering any further challenge impermissible in law, with no costs awarded to either party.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_10542278-0124-4732-8b45-4bc10ebafd99.pdf">MACMA 538/2024</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: BAJAJ ALLIANZ GENERAL INSURANCE CO. LTD. VS SMT. SATYAMMA</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>23-01-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE GADI PRAVEEN KUMAR</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Insurance Law</strong></p><p>The High Court disposed of M.A.C.M.A. No. 538 of 2024 by recording the settlement reached through Lok Adalat, demonstrating the efficacy of alternative dispute resolution under Section 22 of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987. The decisive factor was the award dated 21.12.2025 passed by the High Court Legal Services Committee, Hyderabad, wherein both Bajaj Allianz General Insurance Co. Ltd. and claimants Satyamma and others reached an amicable settlement after due deliberations. The Court accepted the parties&#8217; submission that the matter had been successfully referred to and resolved through the Lok Adalat mechanism, thereby avoiding protracted litigation. This approach aligns with the Supreme Court&#8217;s emphasis in Afcons Infrastructure Ltd. v. Cherian Varkey Construction Co. that Lok Adalats promote justice on basis of equal opportunity and constitute an integral part of the Indian legal system. The Court directed that the appeal stands disposed of in terms of the Lok Adalat award without imposing any costs, and all miscellaneous petitions pending in the matter stand closed as a consequential relief. This judgment reinforces the principle that settlements reached through Lok Adalats have the status of decrees of civil courts under Section 21 of the Legal Services Authorities Act, promoting expeditious resolution of motor accident compensation claims.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_4d3450c6-06d3-44e0-8928-27a1029a17f6.pdf">MACMA 1538/2023</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: MUDIGIRI THIRUPATHI, VS ANGALA SAI KIRAN</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>23-01-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE GADI PRAVEEN KUMAR</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Arbitration Law</strong></p><p>The Telangana High Court disposed of M.A.C.M.A. No. 1538/2023 by incorporating the Lok Adalat award dated 21.12.2025, thereby giving judicial sanction to the mediated settlement between Mudigiri Thirupathi and Angala Sai Kiran &amp; others under Sections 19(1) and 21(5) read with Section 22 of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987, which mandate that an award of a Lok Adalat shall be deemed to be a decree of a civil court and final and binding on the parties. The decisive ground was the joint submission of learned counsel that the dispute had been amicably resolved through the High Court Legal Services Committee, rendering further adjudication unnecessary; the Court thus exercised its inherent power under Section 151 CPC to mould relief in line with the compromise and closed all pending miscellaneous applications, following the precedential principle in P.T. Munichikkanna Reddy v. Revamma (2011) 9 SCC 478 that consent awards foster comity and reduce litigation. The judgment reaffirms that once parties record settlement before a Lok Adalat, the High Court will not sit in appeal over the terms but will simply make the award executable as a consent decree, thereby promoting Section 89 CPC&#8217;s philosophy of alternative dispute resolution and upholding the maxim pacta sunt servanda, while awarding no costs.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_f76fbc68-baca-43f6-9268-ea4257304ec5.pdf">MACMA 1285/2024</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: HDFC ERGO GENERAL INSURANCE CO. LTD VS NENAVATH BOJJI</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>23-01-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE GADI PRAVEEN KUMAR</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Insurance Law</strong></p><p>The Telangana High Court held that compensation for death of 2-year-old minor, awarded Rs.25,50,000/-, was arbitrary, and directed Rs.5,50,000/- instead. Decisive ground was Kishan Gopal (2014) 1 SCC 24 &amp; Meena Devi (2023) 1 SCC 204 that minor&#8217;s annual income should be notionally capped at Rs.30,000/-, multiplier for under-15 year child is 15, and future salary increment is to be discarded. Court rejected insurer&#8217;s plea that no liability arose because driver lacked licence; it observed that tractor not being heavy motor vehicle, and no specific issue framed or plea led that owner&#8217;s consent was willful, the statutory defence under sec.149(2) r/w Rule 3 CMV Rules was not available, and charge-sheet per-se does not absolve payment in absence of owner knowingly permitting unlicensed person. The operative principles relied are Meena Devi dictum for determination of dependency from facts, and its precedential use for loss of dependency of Rs.4,50,000/- + Rs.1,00,000/- conventional heads. Accordingly, the High Court partly allowed M.A.C.M.A.1285/2024, modified compensation to Rs.5,50,000/- with 7% interest from O.P. filing till realization, closed miscellaneous applications, and dismissed costs.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_2557f58b-028d-4071-b7b6-ac6c70188f3c.pdf">MACMA 144/2023</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: CHANDRAIAH VS SMT A KOTESWARI</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>23-01-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE GADI PRAVEEN KUMAR</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Civil Law</strong></p><p>The High Court disposed of this MACT appeal by recording the settlement reached through Lok Adalath, following the mandate of Section 89 read with Order XXI Rule 1A of CPC read with Section 19-20 of Legal Services Authorities Act 1987 that make Lok Adalath awards final and binding as decree of civil court. The decisive ground was the joint memo filed by learned counsel that the dispute arising from the motor accident claim had been fully resolved through the award dated 21.12.2025 passed by High Court Legal Services Committee, rendering further adjudication unnecessary. The Court rejected the continuance of litigation in view of the consensual settlement, thereby giving effect to the salutary principle of &#8216;amicus finis litium&#8217; that promotes dispute resolution through mutual accord over adversarial contest. Following the precedent of State of Punjab v Jalour Singh (2007) that Lok Adalath awards cannot be challenged except through Article 226 challenge for fraud or jurisdictional defects, the Court declined to interfere with the award while ordering that all pending miscellaneous applications stood closed. Accordingly, the appeal was disposed of in terms of the award without imposing costs, giving quietus to the proceedings between B.Chandraiah and claimants Smt.A.Koteswari and others.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_42dfb008-ac0f-48b0-b189-8adcb67d2b22.pdf">FCA 5/2018</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: MR. KUMMAMURU KANAKA LAKSHMI VS SMT. K. RADHIKA</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>23-01-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE K.LAKSHMAN,THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE VAKITI RAMAKRISHNA REDDY</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Family Law</strong></p><p>The High Court allowed the husband&#8217;s appeal and dissolved the marriage under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, holding that 12 years of separation coupled with mutual unwillingness to cohabit constituted irretrievable breakdown, though not a standalone ground. The decisive consideration was that both parties, through counsel, unequivocally stated reunion was impossible and had negotiated terms for divorce, with the wife agreeing to dissolve the marriage on payment of Rs.20 lakhs and return of ornaments, demonstrating the marriage had broken down beyond repair. The Court rejected the Family Court&#8217;s approach of denying divorce merely because cruelty allegations remained disputed, emphasizing that prolonged separation, admissions in Ex.P3 letter, and the parties&#8217; consensus were paramount. Following the principles in Naveen Kohli v. Neelu Kohli (2006) 4 SCC 558 and Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh (2007) 4 SCC 555, the Court held that when marriage is shattered beyond hope, public interest requires legal recognition of the fact. The marriage was dissolved on condition that the husband pay Rs.20 lakhs as permanent alimony within three months, with liberty to the wife to enforce payment if defaulted, closing all claims between parties.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_2668e668-8106-4ff0-8647-96fc1b6f2391.pdf">FCA 47/2016</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: M U KUMAR, SECUNDERABAD VS SURYAKALA, HYD</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>23-01-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE K.LAKSHMAN,THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE VAKITI RAMAKRISHNA REDDY</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Family Law</strong></p><p>The Division Bench of the Telangana High Court allowed the husband&#8217;s appeal under Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 and dissolved the marriage under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, holding that the irretrievable breakdown evidenced by 15 years of separation since 2011 coupled with mutual allegations of character assassination, untreated mental illness and suicidal threats constituted cruelty, though the Court meticulously recorded that neither party could substantiate their charges as the husband failed to produce medical proof of schizophrenia or examine independent witnesses beyond a collateral relative, while the wife neither examined witnesses nor exhibited documents to prove the alleged adultery with colleague Preethisagar, yet the cumulative effect of reciprocal suspicion, police counselling under Section 498-A IPC, dismissed domestic violence proceedings and failed mediation wherein the husband had paid Rs.80,000 towards an initially agreed Rs.13,00,000 permanently destroyed the marital bond; relying on the equitable principle that prolonged separation without restitution petition under Section 9 Hindu Marriage Act creates inferential cruelty, the Court set aside the Family Court&#8217;s dismissal and granted divorce on condition that the appellant pays the remaining Rs.12,20,000 within three months as full and final settlement of all claims including those in DVC No.368/2012, closing all miscellaneous applications.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_a8fcf79c-33c7-4b04-b3c4-b5f3d1bae8e6.pdf">WA 1637/2017</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: MEDICAL COUNCIL OF INDIA, VS MR. JANGA MALLESH,</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>23-01-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE K.LAKSHMAN,THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE VAKITI RAMAKRISHNA REDDY</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Education Law</strong></p><p>The Division Bench allowed MCI&#8217;s appeal, setting aside the Single Judge&#8217;s order that had directed issuance of eligibility certificate to a girl who was 16 years 9 months 27 days as on 31.12.2016, holding that the statutory bar under Regulation 4 of MCI Regulations on Graduate Medical Education, 1997 read with Regulation 8 of Eligibility Requirement Regulations, 2002 is mandatory and cannot be relaxed; the Court rejected the plea of equitable relaxation by distinguishing Ankit Chaturvedi where Supreme Court exercised Article 142 power on special facts of completed MBBS and screening test, reiterated the binding force of Akshanjali Morya (2013 SCC OnLine Raj 1698) and Gautam Kapoor (AIR 1987 Raj 174) that 17-years age limit fixed by expert body under Section 33 of Indian Medical Council Act, 1956 is neither arbitrary nor judicially reviewable unless absurd, and held that permission to write SSC/Intermediate at below-age provides no estoppel against statutory prescription; the Court deprecated continued prosecution of foreign medical course after interim risk-acceptance direction and clarified that equity cannot be claimed in contravention of law.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_dba6b9a3-49ad-4a9b-993c-71a02c6c91d4.pdf">CRLA 547/2025</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: BANOTHU BHARATHI @ LASYA @ BUJJI VS THE STATE OF TELANGANA</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>23-01-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE K.LAKSHMAN,THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE VAKITI RAMAKRISHNA REDDY</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Criminal Law</strong></p><p>The Division Bench of the Telangana High Court set aside the conviction and death sentence under Section 302 IPC, holding that the appellant&#8212;though the physical perpetrator&#8212;was protected by Section 84 IPC as she laboured under paranoid schizophrenia that rendered her incapable of knowing the nature or wrongfulness of the act. The decisive ground was the cumulative medical record (2017-2025), the Institute of Mental Health report of 26-09-2025 attesting to active psychosis, and the mitigation investigator&#8217;s finding that the victim &#8220;appeared like a snake&#8221; to the appellant, demonstrating delusional perceptual distortion. The Court rejected the prosecution&#8217;s&#8220; last seen&#8221; and recovery-based circumstantial chain, noting unexplained failure to examine the bed-ridden LW-7, contradiction hostile witnesses, and absence of rational motive; it stressed that bizarre ritualistic conduct and post-partum psychosis negate mens rea. Relying on Rupesh Manger (2023 INSC 826) and Chunni Bai (2025 INSC 577) the Court reiterated that once credible material shows mental illness the burden under Section 84 IPC is only to raise a reasonable doubt, not to prove insanity beyond doubt. Directions under Section 335(b) CrPC: the appellant shall remain in safe custody at the Institute of Mental Health, Erragadda, with monthly psychiatric review.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_a3357eda-cc7e-4293-89d7-9bd45f7c92db.pdf">WA 86/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: B RAHUL RAJU VS STATE OF TELANGANA</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>23-01-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE APARESH KUMAR SINGH,THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE G.M. MOHIUDDIN</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Administrative Law</strong></p><p>The Telangana High Court dismissed I.A.No.1/2026 and W.A.No.86/2026, holding that appellants who were already party to W.A.No.1079/2025&#8212;wherein identical questions arising from the same judgment were heard at length and reserved on 30-12-2025&#8212;cannot be permitted to re-agitate the very controversy through a fresh writ appeal. The decisive ground is the doctrine of constructive res judicata and the equitable principle that a litigant cannot be allowed &#8220;two bites at the cherry&#8221;; once a party has fully participated in a comprehensive hearing and judgment has been reserved, the matter attains finality inter se. Rejecting the plea for condonation of 11 days&#8217; delay, the Court noted that the appellants, being well-represented in the earlier batch of appeals, were aware that re-evaluation of Group-I mains answer scripts under the Sanjay Singh moderation method or, in the alternative, re-conduct of the entire examination within eight months had been directed; yet they chose to file a duplicative remedy. The bench, comprising Chief Justice A.K. Singh and Justice G.M. Mohiuddin, emphasised that allowing such belated parallel proceedings would subvert judicial discipline and cause indefinite uncertainty in filling 563 notified posts. Consequently, the appeal and all pending miscellaneous applications were dismissed with no order as to costs, reinforcing the principle that finality of litigation is essential to public employment cycles.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_c93243d1-7ef1-465a-9355-6963d0c50287.pdf">CMA 26/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: LEAD IT CORPORATION VS M/S. LEAD IT INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>27-01-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE MOUSHUMI BHATTACHARYA,THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE GADI PRAVEEN KUMAR</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Arbitration Law</strong></p><p>The Telangana High Court set aside the trial court&#8217;s order returning the plaint under Order VII Rule 10 CPC, holding that the distinction between non-maintainability of suit and improper forum must be preserved at the pre-registration stage. The decisive ground was that the VI Additional District Judge at Kukatpally erred in conflating two distinct jurisdictional concepts: while a suit&#8217;s maintainability under Section 9 CPC is a substantive defence to be raised by defendants under Order VII Rule 11, the plaint&#8217;s return under Order VII Rule 10 applies only when the court lacks territorial or pecuniary jurisdiction. The Court rejected the trial court&#8217;s suo motu determination that an arbitration award challenge suit was non-maintainable, emphasizing that even a misconceived maintainability plea must be adjudicated only after full contest between parties, not at the unregistered/S.R. stage. Applying the principle that courts cannot dismiss suits without hearing defendants, particularly when the plaint discloses a cause of action, the Division Bench directed the trial court to number the suit and decide maintainability on merits after hearing both sides. The Court clarified that pre-emptive rejection at the scrutiny stage violates natural justice and CPC&#8217;s adversarial framework, allowing C.M.A. No.26/2026 while imposing no costs.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_cba5d98a-a4cd-412c-a1cc-6c12900ba62b.pdf">SA 548/2025</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: JARPALA KISHAN VS GANDAM NAGARAJU</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>27-01-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE SMT JUSTICE RENUKA YARA</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Property Law</strong></p><p>The High Court dismissed the second appeal at admission stage, holding that concurrent findings of fact by the Trial Court and First Appellate Court were neither perverse nor involved substantial questions of law warranting interference under Section 100 CPC. The decisive ground was the appellant&#8217;s failure to discharge the burden of proof under Section 101 Evidence Act to establish title and possession over the suit property, as Ex.A-1 sale deed lacked identifiable plot number, municipal approval, or boundary demarcation through neighbouring witnesses, while the vendor&#8217;s title remained unproven without link documents. The Court rejected arguments regarding perversity of findings and non-joinder of Municipality, emphasizing that questions framed were merely grounds of appeal disguised as substantial questions of law. Following the principle that second appeals cannot be converted into disguised first appeals, particularly where concurrent findings are based on proper appreciation of evidence as held in Madhukar &amp; Ors. v. Sangram &amp; Ors. (2001) 4 SCC 756, the Court affirmed that bare injunction suits require clear title establishment. The judgment reinforces that courts will not interfere with concurrent factual findings unless they suffer from perversity or legal misapprehension, and that plaintiffs must establish complete chain of title before seeking equitable relief of injunction.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_018eb6f1-9d33-434e-be22-dd78f33823d9.pdf">MACMA 165/2019</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: M/S UNIVERSAL SOMPO GENERAL INSURANCE CO LIMITED VS KOTA ANAJAIAH</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>27-01-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE C.V. BHASKAR REDDY</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Insurance Law</strong></p><p>The Telangana High Court dismissed both the insurer&#8217;s appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and claimants&#8217; cross-objections, affirming the Tribunal&#8217;s award of Rs.10,40,000/- with 7.5% interest for the 2012 death of 20-year-old engineering student Kota Dinesh. The decisive findings were that the auto-trolley driver&#8217;s excessive speed constituted sole negligence despite the auto-rickshaw&#8217;s tyre burst being the initial event, and that monthly notional income of Rs.9,000/- for an engineering student in 2012 represented a balanced assessment without requiring documentary proof beyond SSC marks. Rejecting the insurer&#8217;s contributory negligence plea, the Court held the mechanical failure did not diminish the trolley driver&#8217;s duty to maintain safe speed, while also declining enhancement sought under future prospects and consortium heads, noting the Tribunal had already been liberal. Following Sarla Verma v. Delhi Transport Corporation (2009) 6 SCC 121 and National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi (2017) 16 SCC 680, the multiplier was correctly applied based on the deceased&#8217;s age rather than parents&#8217; age. The compensation was held &#8220;just and reasonable&#8221; under law, with both parties bearing their own costs and all miscellaneous applications standing closed.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_924eb987-edd3-4206-96fc-e8a92e4172fd.pdf">MACMA 3079/2019</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: GAJULA RENAMMA VS B.RAJESHWAR REDDY AND 2 OTHERS</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>27-01-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE C.V. BHASKAR REDDY</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Insurance Law</strong></p><p>The High Court enhanced the compensation from Rs.1,78,400/- to Rs.3,88,400/- under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, holding that the Tribunal&#8217;s award was grossly inadequate for 40% permanent disability sustained in a rear-end collision. The decisive ground was the Tribunal&#8217;s failure to properly assess compensation commensurate with grievous injuries including head trauma, avulsion injury to right hand, dental and thigh injuries, and particularly its omission to award adequate amounts for medical expenses, pain and suffering. Rejecting the meager assessment, the Court applied the principle that compensation must be just, reasonable and adequate to ameliorate the victim&#8217;s suffering, enhancing amounts under multiple heads: Rs.50,000/- additional for pain and suffering, Rs.50,000/- specifically for injuries, Rs.1,00,000/- towards medical expenses, and Rs.30,000/- for incidental expenses including transportation, nourishment and attendant charges. Following the precedent in R.D. Hattangadi v. Pest Control (India) Ltd. that compensation should enable the victim to live with dignity despite disability, and applying the multiplier method for loss of future earnings considering 40% disability, the Court directed respondent No.2-Insurance Company to deposit the enhanced amount with 7.5% interest within two months from the petition date till realization, holding that the victim&#8217;s inability to perform daily activities and work warranted substantial enhancement to secure her future.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_bc771c90-2828-4f98-9724-b5dac85bb283.pdf">MACMA 711/2019</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: PICHAKUNTLA LAKSHMI VS SHAIK AMZAD ALI</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>27-01-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE C.V. BHASKAR REDDY</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Insurance Law</strong></p><p>The High Court partly allowed the appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, enhancing compensation from Rs.10,30,000/- to Rs.10,51,000/- and interest from 6% to 7.5% per annum, while upholding the Tribunal&#8217;s finding of rash and negligent driving by the lorry driver. The decisive grounds were that the Tribunal correctly applied the notional income basis for a 28-year-old auto-rickshaw driver and properly deducted personal expenses before applying the age-appropriate multiplier, resulting in Rs.9,60,000/- for loss of dependency. However, the Court held that conventional heads compensation required enhancement to Rs.91,000/- pursuant to National Insurance Company Limited v. Pranay Sethi (2017 ACJ 2700), which mandates Rs.70,000/- plus 10% enhancement every three years for funeral expenses, loss of consortium and loss of estate. The Court rejected the insurer&#8217;s contention that the award was adequate, emphasizing that National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Mannat Johal (AIR 2019 SC 2079) crystallized 7.5% per annum as the reasonable interest rate in motor accident claims. The enhanced compensation shall carry 7.5% interest from petition date till realization, with respondents jointly and severally liable, while maintaining all other Tribunal conditions.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_b7e606e8-0bed-4035-9600-3226b4509531.pdf">MACMA 218/2019</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: ORSU SAIDAMMA VS PUTTA MALLAIAH</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>27-01-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE C.V. BHASKAR REDDY</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Insurance Law</strong></p><p>The High Court allowed the appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, setting aside the Tribunal&#8217;s dismissal of the claim petition filed under Sections 163-A read with Section 140, holding that the Tribunal erred in rejecting compensation solely on technical grounds of unproven ownership and insurance despite having found the driver negligent. The decisive ground was that the Motor Vehicle Inspector&#8217;s report (Ex.A-5) and insurance policy (Ex.B-1) established the registered owner as respondent No.2 and confirmed valid insurance coverage on the accident date, creating a rebuttable presumption under Section 149 that the insurer failed to dislodge through evidence. Rejecting the insurer&#8217;s contention that policy nomenclature defects negated liability, the Court emphasized the beneficial construction of the Act requiring liberal interpretation to achieve &#8220;just compensation&#8221; for accident victims, following National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Swaran Singh (2004) 3 SCC 297, which held that insurers must strictly prove policy violations to escape liability. The Court further ruled that the driver&#8217;s death causing procedural abatement under Order XXII CPC against his estate did not bar adjudication against the surviving owner and insurer, as the cause of action for compensation survived. The matter was remanded to the Tribunal for fresh disposal within three months.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_45d2df87-ccfb-47b5-827b-668887b2f556.pdf">WA 93/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: RAMESH VS MR.TAPAS CHAKRABORTY</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>27-01-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE APARESH KUMAR SINGH,THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE G.M. MOHIUDDIN</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Administrative Law</strong></p><p>The Division Bench dismissed the writ appeal against the direction to dismantle an unauthorized tiffin-centre in a residential pocket, holding that a party who has participated in proceedings, accepted findings and secured time to comply cannot be permitted to approbate and reprobate. The decisive ground is the appellant&#8217;s own conduct: after the Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation invoked Section 461A of the Hyderabad Municipal Corporation Act, 1955 and afforded him notice and hearing, he expressly undertook before the learned Single Judge to remove the two offending structures within two months; the writ petition was then disposed of by consent. The Court rejected the plea of discriminatory enforcement, observing that rampant breaches by others do not validate an illegality and selective invocation of the writ jurisdiction is impermissible once the litigant has acquiesced in the relief. Re-affirming the doctrine of approbation and reprobation embodied in Saradamani Kandappan v. S. Rajalakshmi (2011) 12 SCC 18 and the principle that consent orders cannot be assailed except on limited grounds of fraud or jurisdictional defect, the Bench declined to interfere, dismissed Writ Appeal No. 93 of 2026 with no order as to costs and directed closure of all pending miscellaneous applications.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_d126fa87-f00d-4163-bae7-21f2012ffe57.pdf">WA 68/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: SHRI REDDY SANGAIAH VS THE STATE OF TELANGANA</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>27-01-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE APARESH KUMAR SINGH,THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE G.M. MOHIUDDIN</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Urban Planning Law</strong></p><p>The Telangana High Court dismissed the appellant&#8217;s challenge to an order directing GHMC to process respondent No.5&#8217;s BRS application for regularizing unauthorized construction encroaching a public road, holding that the writ Court&#8217;s direction was consistent with the Division Bench&#8217;s interim order dated 18.06.2016 in WP(PIL) No.63/2016 and the Supreme Court&#8217;s mandate in Rajendra Kumar Barjatya v. State of Rajasthan that unauthorized constructions must first be examined under regularization schemes before demolition. The decisive ground was that respondent No.5&#8217;s earlier rejection preceded the Building Regularization Scheme, 2015, and his fresh application under the Scheme entitled him to reconsideration, while the appellant&#8217;s grievance regarding illegal construction would be addressed only after the BRS decision. Rejecting the contention that the Court should have ordered immediate demolition since regularization was previously denied, the Court emphasized that the Scheme creates a new legal regime requiring fresh consideration of pending appeals. Following the principle that statutory regularization schemes provide a remedial mechanism balancing public interest with individual hardship, the Court directed GHMC to decide both the regularization application and any pending appeal within three months, and if rejected, to demolish the structure if respondent No.5 fails voluntary removal, subject to the Supreme Court&#8217;s pending SLP against the Scheme.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_11a4c850-88f7-4424-9b52-b379c566a89b.pdf">WA 100/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: M/S SHINE SCREENS INDIA LLP, VS DACHEPALLY CHANDRA BABU</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>27-01-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE APARESH KUMAR SINGH,THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE G.M. MOHIUDDIN</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Consumer Law</strong></p><p>The Division Bench dismissed the writ appeal against the interim order directing the State to publish any future cinema ticket price-hike decision ninety days before release, holding that since the writ petition itself remains pending the appellant&#8217;s grievances can be adequately ventilated therein and no interference with an interim measure is warranted at this interlocutory stage. The decisive consideration is that the impugned direction, issued under the court&#8217;s inherent power to regulate procedure and substantive rights under Section 7-A of the Telangana Cinemas (Regulation) Act 1955, merely reiterates the statutory obligation to afford stakeholders reasonable opportunity to seek revision, and has not, in fact, stalled the exhibition or revenue of the appellant&#8217;s film &#8220;Mana Shankara Vara Prasad Garu&#8221;; consequently the appellant fails to demonstrate irreparable prejudice warranting extraordinary interference under Article 226. Rejecting the contention that the writ petitioner, being an individual movie-goer, cannot maintain a public-interest challenge to all future hikes, the Court observed that wider relief ancillary to an individual grievance is permissible where public interest and statutory policy overlap. Following the coordinate Bench&#8217;s approach in W.A. No. 6 of 2026 dated 07-01-2026, the Court reiterated that comprehensive adjudication should await final hearing and directed the writ court to expedite disposal after completion of pleadings, leaving all contentions open.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_69882297-4466-4929-8466-bd63c5f50674.pdf">MACMA 2305/2019</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: THE APSRTC VS MADIRE RAMULU</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>28-01-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE C.V. BHASKAR REDDY</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Civil Law</strong></p><p>The High Court dismissed both appeals arising from a motor accident compensation award, upholding the Tribunal&#8217;s finding of sole negligence against the APSRTC bus driver under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. The decisive ground was that the Corporation failed to adduce any evidence to rebut the claimant&#8217;s case regarding the bus driver&#8217;s rash and negligent driving, with the driver remaining ex parte and the APSRTC producing no documentary evidence to overturn the negligence finding based on Form 54, FIR and charge sheet (Exs.A4-A5). Rejecting the appellant&#8217;s contentions of contributory negligence and non-joinder of the motorcycle owner/insurer, the Court held that the plea of non-joinder does not absolve the bus owner from liability where the Tribunal has found the bus driver negligent, following the principle that a tortfeasor cannot escape liability merely because other potential parties were not impleaded. The Court affirmed the compensation of Rs.2,58,400/- awarded under various heads including medical expenses (Rs.98,400/-), disability (Rs.1,50,000/-), and other charges, holding that neither the Corporation&#8217;s challenge to individual heads nor the claimant&#8217;s enhancement plea was sustainable given the evidence on record, particularly the absence of income proof to substantiate higher loss of earnings.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_e0254fbf-5c08-49f3-9061-d561c061b99d.pdf">MACMA 402/2019</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: SMT. ALLUTLA MANJULA VS M. DURRAL RASU</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>28-01-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE C.V. BHASKAR REDDY</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Insurance Law</strong></p><p>The High Court enhanced the motor accident compensation from Rs.8,89,000/- to Rs.16,08,000/- under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, holding that the Tribunal erred in assessing monthly income at Rs.6,000/- and omitted future prospects and conventional heads. The decisive ground was that for a 33-year-old driver dying in October 2010, the income must be fixed at Rs.7,500/- per month in line with Shaikh Sadik Shaikh Rafique v. Reliance General Insurance Co. Ltd. (2025 INSC 673) which standardised earnings of unskilled workers; applying National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi (2017) 16 SCC 680, 40% future prospects are added, yielding Rs.10,500/- monthly. After deducting 1/4th for personal expenses, annual dependency of Rs.94,500/- multiplied by 16 (age 31-35) produces Rs.15,12,000/- towards loss of dependency. Conventional heads&#8212;loss of estate, consortium and funeral expenses&#8212;are awarded Rs.91,000/- cumulatively, indexed at 10% every three years as mandated in Pranay Sethi, plus Rs.5,000/- transportation, aggregating Rs.16,08,000/- with interest @7.5% from petition date till realisation, to be deposited within two months; liability of respondents joint and several is maintained, rest of Tribunal decree unaltered.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_e8a3f633-918c-4280-94e4-38b88e87703b.pdf">MACMA 254/2019</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: THE ORIENTAL INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED VS VONTELA SAMATHA</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>28-01-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE C.V. BHASKAR REDDY</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Insurance Law</strong></p><p>The High Court dismissed the insurer&#8217;s appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, affirming the Tribunal&#8217;s award of Rs.4,36,200/- with 7.5% interest in a Section 163-A no-fault claim, holding that negligence need not be proved and the deceased&#8217;s alleged rash driving constitutes no defence. The decisive ratio is that Section 163-A creates a statutory entitlement independent of fault, as crystallized in Deepal Girishbhai Soni v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., (2004) 5 SCC 385, where the Supreme Court ruled that contributory negligence is irrelevant and insurers cannot raise the tort-feasor defence in no-fault proceedings. Rejecting the appellant&#8217;s contention that the insured lorry&#8217;s involvement was doubtful, the Court held the claimants&#8217; evidence sufficient to establish the vehicle&#8217;s nexus with the accident and noted that non-joinder of the car&#8217;s owner does not dilute the insurer&#8217;s strict liability under the Second Schedule formula. The compensation, computed on Rs.40,000/- annual income with the prescribed multiplier, was found strictly statutory and immune from interference. Consequently, the appeal lacks merit and is dismissed with no order as to costs, and all pending miscellaneous petitions stand closed.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_514a8431-2dfb-49cd-91ac-0c772ab39d93.pdf">CRLA 3054/2018</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: GONDLA RAMULU , RAMESH VS THE STATE OF TELANGANA</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>28-01-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE K.LAKSHMAN,THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE B.R.MADHUSUDHAN RAO</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Criminal Law</strong></p><p>The Telangana High Court acquitted the appellant of Section 302 IPC conviction, holding that the prosecution failed to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt through either direct or circumstantial evidence. The decisive ground was the complete absence of reliable evidence proving the appellant&#8217;s assault causing death, as all prosecution witnesses except PW.2 turned hostile and even PW.2 merely deposed about a mutual quarrel without witnessing fatal assault. The Court rejected the trial court&#8217;s conclusion that the appellant beat his father indiscriminately with MO1 and MO2 sticks, noting crucial discrepancies in seizure panchanamas where weapons were marked through PW.2 instead of recovery witness PW.4, and contradictions regarding the deceased&#8217;s clothing between scene panchanama (Ex.P3), seizure memo (Ex.P5) and FSL report (Ex.P15). Applying the principle that circumstantial evidence must form a complete chain of circumstances determinative of guilt, the Court emphasized that mere presence at the scene and quarrelling cannot establish murder, particularly when the medical evidence, while confirming fatal internal injuries, lacked definitive linkage to the appellant&#8217;s assault. The Court directed the appellant&#8217;s immediate release from Cherlapally Central Prison and return of fine amount, following the settled principle that when two views are possible, the view favorable to the accused must be adopted.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_6a0e0173-579a-4370-b1ee-8cb48021cf06.pdf">MACMA 603/2019</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: THE MANAGING DIRECTOR, VS JAGATI CHANDRAIAH,</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>29-01-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE C.V. BHASKAR REDDY</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Civil Law</strong></p><p>The High Court dismissed both appeals, affirming the Tribunal&#8217;s award of Rs.11,18,200/- with 7.5% interest under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, holding that the TSRTC driver was solely negligent in causing the deceased&#8217;s death when he moved the bus while the victim was alighting. The decisive finding was that PW-2, an independent eyewitness, categorically testified that the driver started the bus prematurely while the deceased was still on the steps, and the Corporation&#8217;s failure to examine the driver left this unrebutted, establishing rash and negligent driving under Section 304-A IPC. Rejecting the RTC&#8217;s contention of contributory negligence based on the FIR suggesting the deceased fell from a running bus, the Court held this remained a bald allegation without evidentiary support, particularly when corroborated medical records established the manner of accident. Following Pranay Sethi (2017) 16 SCC 680, the Court upheld the notional income of Rs.6,000/- with 40% addition for future prospects, multiplier of 18, and deduction of 50% for personal expenses of the bachelor, finding the assessment of dependency at Rs.9,07,200/- plus medical expenses of Rs.1,81,000/- and conventional heads just and reasonable, with no grounds for enhancement of pain and suffering or funeral expenses.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_ddbebfc2-303f-4342-a42b-e1551e88e8fb.pdf">WA 107/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: THE STATE OF TELANGANA, VS SANDEEP SURA,</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>29-01-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE APARESH KUMAR SINGH,THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE G.M. MOHIUDDIN</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Administrative Law</strong></p><p>The Division Bench allowed the State&#8217;s writ appeal and set aside the Single Judge&#8217;s order directing release of 54.15 quintals of rice, a vehicle and mobile phones seized from respondent No.1&#8217;s rice mill, holding that disputed questions regarding whether the rice was PDS rice requiring presence of Fortified Rice Kernels (FRK) could not be summarily adjudicated under Article 226 when Section 6-A Essential Commodities Act, 1955 proceedings were pending before the Collector (Civil Supplies) who alone is competent to appreciate contradictory technical reports (0.9% FRK in the first report dated 11.09.2025 versus 0.00% in the second dated 14.10.2025), sworn confessional statements of respondents recorded on 17.09.2025, and allegations of tampering that led to the Technical Assistant&#8217;s arrest by ACB. The Court emphasized that extraordinary writ jurisdiction should not be exercised where an efficacious statutory remedy exists, nor in a manner that pre-empts the Collector&#8217;s adjudication or prejudices FIR No.111/2025 investigation treating the seized articles as case property, especially when diversion of PDS rice strikes at food security of weaker sections and G.O.Ms.No.21 dated 30.09.2024 mandates strict action; respondents were relegated to cooperate with the Collector who must pass a reasoned order within three weeks without being influenced by this judgment.</p><p><strong><a href="https://pub-cc8438e664ef4d32a54c800c7c408282.r2.dev/temp_17b73224-a73c-4e9c-a5ab-ad567d1141d1.pdf">WA 118/2026</a></strong></p><p><strong>Parties: ALLAM NAGARAJU VS UNION OF INDIA</strong></p><p><strong>Date: </strong>29-01-2026</p><p><strong>Judge(s): THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE APARESH KUMAR SINGH,THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE G.M. MOHIUDDIN</strong></p><p><strong>Area of Law: Election Law</strong></p><p>The Division Bench dismissed the intra-court appeal, affirming that the appellant-advocate was validly disqualified under amended Rule 4 of the Bar Council of India Rules, 2023, having two criminal cases involving offences punishable with imprisonment of seven years or more pending against him. The decisive ground was that Section 452 IPC, prescribing imprisonment &#8220;which may extend to seven years,&#8221; squarely falls within the disqualifying category, as authoritatively held in Satender Kumar Antil v. CBI (2022) 10 SCC 51, which rejected the artificial distinction between &#8220;up to seven years&#8221; and &#8220;seven years or more&#8221; followed in Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar (2014) 8 SCC 273. The Court rejected the appellant&#8217;s technical plea that no charges were framed in one case and emphasised that the election is being conducted under the Supreme Court&#8217;s direct supervision in M. Vardhan v. Union of India (Writ Petition (C) No.1319 of 2013), whose High-Powered Supervisory Committee&#8217;s decision is final under Article 142. Observing that the appellant falsely declared absence of serious criminal cases, the Bench held that judicial review under Article 226 is circumscribed and interference is warranted only in cases of malice or patent illegality, neither of which was established, thereby confirming the Single Judge&#8217;s dismissal of the writ petition.</p><div><hr></div><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://askjunior.substack.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">Ask Junior - Judgment Summaries is a reader-supported publication. 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