Parties: THE EXECUTIVE ENGINEER HPPWD, DIVISION NO.1 BILASPUR VS SMT. LAXMI DEVI

Date: 09-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Labor Law

The High Court dismissed the petitioner-State’s writ petition challenging an award dated 11.09.2023, passed by the Deputy Labour Commissioner-cum-Appellate Authority under Section 7(7) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, which directed payment of gratuity to the respondent. The Court’s decisive reasoning was that the facts and the issue of law involved in the instant case were almost identical to those adjudicated in State of H.P. & Ors. Versus Binu Ram (CWP No.15443 of 2024, decided on 24.02.2026) and Bindumati Versus State of H.P. and others (CWP No.4632 of 2025, decided on 07.11.2025). The learned Additional Advocate General conceded that the legal issue was covered against the petitioner-State by these precedents, and that the decision in Bindumati had been accepted and implemented by the respondents therein. Consequently, the Court, applying the principle of stare decisis and following the reasoning established in Binu Ram and Bindumati, found no grounds to interfere with the impugned award, thereby affirming the respondent’s entitlement to gratuity.

CWP/6800/2024

Parties: M/S H.M. STEELS LIMITED VS THE JOINT COMMISSIONER, STATE TAXES AND EXCISE AND ANR.

Date: 09-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE VIVEK SINGH THAKUR, JUSTICE RANJAN SHARMA

Area of Law: Tax Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in CWP No. 6800 of 2024, addressed the issue of parallel proceedings under Section 6(2)(b) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (CGST Act) and the Himachal Pradesh Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (HPGST Act), holding that the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in M/s Armour Security (India) Ltd. v. Commissioner, CGST, Delhi East & Anr., AIR 2025 SC 3854, are binding. The Court reiterated that Section 6(2)(b) bars the initiation of parallel adjudicatory proceedings on the same subject matter by different jurisdictional authorities (Central or State) once one authority has already initiated proceedings. While legitimate investigative steps, such as summons under Section 70 of the CGST Act, are permissible, they must not lead to parallel adjudication. The Armour Security judgment clarifies that “initiation of any proceedings” refers to the formal commencement of adjudicatory proceedings via a show cause notice, not preliminary inquiries. The Court directed the petitioner to comply with summons, inform authorities of existing inquiries, and mandated inter-authority coordination to prevent duplication, ensuring that only one authority proceeds with adjudication on a given subject matter, with the first to initiate proceedings generally taking precedence if authorities cannot agree. The Court did not express an opinion on the merits of the allegations.

CWP/7719/2025

Parties: SHOKET ALI VS STATE OF H.P. AND OTHERS

Date: 09-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Education Law

The High Court disposed of the writ petition, declining to issue a direct mandamus for the release of the petitioner’s B. Pharmacy (Allopathy) Degree, despite the petitioner having cleared all examinations and the University acknowledging his name in the green sheet register. The Court’s decision was predicated on the fact that the petitioner’s documents could not be verified due to the non-availability of the admission disclosure list for the year 2014-15, a situation distinct from the precedent in Pratima Das Versus State of Himachal Pradesh and Ors. (SLP (Civil) No.15180 of 2025, decided on 06.01.2026). In Pratima Das, the University had admitted its mistake in preparing the disclosure list, leading to a direct order for degree issuance. Conversely, the present case, akin to Priya Thakur Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh and others (CWP No.2690 of 2024 decided on 22.04.2025), involved a scenario where original records were deposited with a Trial Court. Consequently, the Court granted the petitioner liberty to move an appropriate application before the concerned Trial Court, where the original record is statedly lying deposited, for appropriate orders, leaving all rights and contentions of the parties open.

CWP/19916/2025

Parties: RAKESH KUMAR VS STATE OF H.P. & OTHERS

Date: 09-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court allowed the petition for parole, directing the release of the petitioner for 28 days, subject to furnishing a personal bond of ₹1,00,000/- and two sureties of like amount. The Court held that the rejection of the petitioner’s parole application, based on the assertion that his release would be “detrimental to the security of the area” and that the offence was “heinous,” was contrary to the H.P. Good Conduct Prisoners (Temporary Release) Act, 1968 and its Rules, particularly Rule 3(2), which specifies only two grounds for opposition: danger to State security or prejudice to public order. The Court emphasized that the nature of the offence is not a relevant consideration for denying parole, especially when the prisoner’s conduct in jail is satisfactory, as established in Asfaq v. State of Rajasthan, (2017) 15 SCC 55, which underscored parole’s role in maintaining social ties and facilitating reformation. The Court also relied on Shor v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr., MANU/SCOR/34434/2020, and Harbhajan Singh v. State of H.P., 2019 SCC OnLine HP 3599, to reiterate that parole cannot be rejected solely on the ground of the crime being heinous. The Court found the District Magistrate’s report lacking objective assessment under Section 6 of the Act.

COPC/56/2026

Parties: PRITAM SINGH VS DR. NIPUN JINDAL AND ANOTHER

Date: 09-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Civil Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in COPC No. 56 of 2026, closed the contempt proceedings initiated by Pritam Singh against Dr. Nipun Jindal and another, upon acknowledging that the office order dated 02.04.2026, issued by the respondent-Corporation, had fully complied with the judgment dated 14.10.2024. The Court noted that counsel for both parties were ad idem that all directions contained in the original judgment had been satisfied, thereby rendering the contempt petition infructuous. Consequently, the notices issued to the respondents were discharged. The Court clarified that any surviving grievances of the petitioner would necessitate seeking appropriate remedy in accordance with law, rather than through the present contempt jurisdiction. This decision underscores the principle that contempt proceedings are remedial and coercive in nature, aimed solely at securing compliance with judicial orders, and once such compliance is achieved, the proceedings stand abated. The Court’s action aligns with the established legal position that the purpose of contempt jurisdiction is not to execute the original decree but to ensure respect for judicial pronouncements.

COPC/71/2026

Parties: SURESH KUMAR SHARMA VS M. SUDHA DEVI & ANR.

Date: 09-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Service Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh closed the contempt proceedings in COPC No. 71/2026, noting that the learned Assistant Advocate General had placed on record office instructions dated 08.04.2026 from the Director School Education, Shimla, conveying the consideration order passed in the petitioner’s case under office order dated 12.03.2026. The Court found that the respondents had complied with the directions, thereby rendering the contempt petition infructuous. While closing the proceedings and discharging the notices issued to the respondents, the Court explicitly reserved liberty to the petitioner, Suresh Kumar Sharma, to seek appropriate legal remedy for any surviving grievances that may arise in the future, in accordance with law. This decision effectively concludes the immediate contempt action based on the compliance demonstrated by the respondents, without prejudice to the petitioner’s right to pursue further legal recourse if necessary. The Court’s approach reflects a pragmatic resolution of the contempt matter upon satisfaction of the initial directions, while safeguarding the petitioner’s broader legal entitlements.

COPC/150/2026

Parties: RATTI LAL VS ABHISHEK TRIVEDI

Date: 09-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Civil Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh closed the present contempt proceedings (COPC No. 150/2026) after noting compliance by the respondent. The Court considered the office instructions dated 08.04.2026 from the Director General, Prisons & Correctional Services, Himachal Pradesh, which conveyed the issuance of an office order of even date concerning several individuals, including the petitioner. A copy of this order was appended to the instructions, demonstrating that the respondent had taken the necessary action. Consequently, the Court discharged the notice issued to the respondent and disposed of any pending miscellaneous applications. Crucially, the Court reserved liberty to the petitioner to pursue appropriate remedies for any surviving grievances in accordance with law, should the necessity arise in the future, thereby ensuring that while the contempt was purged, the petitioner’s substantive rights were not foreclosed. This decision reflects the principle that contempt proceedings are primarily aimed at securing compliance with court orders, and once compliance is achieved, the proceedings may be closed, subject to safeguarding the rights of the aggrieved party for future recourse.

COPC/1555/2025

Parties: NAZEER MOHD. VS DEVESH KUMAR AND ORS

Date: 09-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Civil Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh closed the contempt proceedings in COPC No. 1555 of 2025, discharging notices issued to the respondents, upon noting that the respondents had filed a compliance affidavit and passed a consideration order on January 5, 2026. The Court acknowledged the petitioner’s reservations regarding the said consideration order and, therefore, granted liberty to the petitioner to assail it and seek appropriate remedies for any surviving grievances in accordance with law. The core reasoning for closing the contempt proceedings was the respondents’ ostensible compliance with the underlying order through the issuance of the consideration order, thereby addressing the immediate cause for contempt. The Court’s decision implicitly relies on the principle that contempt proceedings are primarily intended to secure compliance with judicial directions, and once such compliance, even if disputed in its efficacy, is demonstrated, the contempt jurisdiction may be concluded, leaving the aggrieved party to pursue substantive remedies against the compliance action itself. No specific statutory sections or precedents were explicitly cited in this brief order, but the Court’s approach aligns with the general practice of allowing parties to challenge compliance actions through fresh proceedings rather than prolonging contempt.

COPC/1511/2025

Parties: RITA DEVI VS DR.AMARJEET K SHARMA

Date: 09-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Service Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in COPC No.1511 of 2025, closed the contempt proceedings initiated by Rita Devi against Dr. Amarjeet K Sharma, following the placement on record of a consideration order dated 08.04.2026 by the learned Additional Advocate General, which addressed the petitioner’s case. The Court discharged the notice issued to the respondent, thereby concluding the contempt action. Crucially, the Court reserved liberty to the petitioner to pursue appropriate remedies for any surviving grievances, including those arising from or against the aforementioned consideration order, strictly in accordance with law. This decision effectively terminates the contempt proceedings on the basis that the respondent has complied with the underlying directive by issuing a consideration order, while simultaneously preserving the petitioner’s right to challenge the substantive outcome of that order through independent legal channels. The Court’s approach reflects a pragmatic resolution of the contempt issue, acknowledging compliance while ensuring that the petitioner’s substantive rights are not foreclosed.

CMPMO/48/2026

Parties: SUBHASH CHAND VS NISHANT & ANR.

Date: 09-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE ROMESH VERMA

Area of Law: Property Law

The High Court dismissed the petitioner’s challenge under Article 227 of the Constitution of India against the Civil Judge’s order setting aside a Local Commissioner’s partition report and directing a fresh one. The Court affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding that the initial partition proposal was flawed as it disproportionately allocated the valuable roadside frontage to the petitioner, thereby disadvantaging the co-sharer respondents. The Court reiterated that mere possession by one co-sharer over a particular portion does not entitle them to retain it to the detriment of others, especially when it involves the best part of the property. The trial court correctly allowed the respondents’ application under Order XX Rule 18 read with Section 151 CPC for finalising the preliminary decree, as any party can seek finalisation once shares are determined. Relying on Garment Craft vs. Prakash Chand Goel, 2022 (4) SCC 181 and Estralla Rubber v. Dass Estate (P) Ltd. (2001) 8 SCC 97, the High Court emphasized its limited supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227, which is not to re-appreciate evidence or substitute its judgment, but to correct grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of law. Finding no jurisdictional error or perversity in the trial court’s order, the petition was deemed devoid of merit.

LPA/35/2026

Parties: HPSEBL AND ANR. VS DEEP RAM

Date: 09-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE GURMEET SINGH SANDHAWALIA, JUSTICE BIPIN CHANDER NEGI

Area of Law: Labor Law

The High Court dismissed the appeal by HPSEBL, upholding the Single Judge’s direction to pay 50% wages to the respondent from 15.09.2003 to 13.09.2009 and full wages thereafter, in the corresponding revised scale. The Court affirmed that the respondent’s oral termination on 15.06.1996, after completing 240 days of service, violated Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, as mandatory notice or wages in lieu thereof were not provided. The Court reiterated that there is no limitation period for raising an industrial dispute under the Act, relying on Ajayab Singh Vs. Sirhind Cooperative Marketing-cum-Processing Service Society Limited and Anr., (1999) 6 SC 82. Furthermore, the principle of “no work no pay” was held inapplicable where an employee is kept from work by authorities without fault, as established in Union of India and Ors. Vs. K.V. Jankiraman and Others, (1991) 4 SCC 109. Since the Labour Court’s award of continuity of service had attained finality, the respondent was entitled to count the period of illegal retrenchment for work-charge status and consequential benefits, aligning with the precedent set in Ghanshyam Vs. HPSEBL and Anr., CWP No.4228 of 2010.

RSA/79/2005

Parties: RAM VINOD AND ANOTHER VS PARVEEN KUMAR AND OTHERS

Date: 09-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Tenancy Law

The High Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the concurrent findings of the lower courts that the plaintiffs were in possession of the suit premises as tenants and that the tenancy had not been surrendered or terminated. The Court held that an oral partnership is valid under Section 4 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932, relying on Dwarkadas Khetan & Co. Bombay v. CIT and Rajabali Jadavji Popatiya v. Karim Rajabali Popatiya, thereby rejecting the appellant’s contention that the absence of a written partnership deed negated the plaintiff’s claim of joint possession with defendant No.5. Furthermore, the Court reiterated that when a plaintiff amends their plaint, the defendant’s subsequent amendment to the written statement must be confined to answering the amended pleadings, as established in Tek Chand Chitkara versus Union of India and Gurdial Singh v. Raj Kumar Aneja, thus upholding the rejection of the defendants’ belated plea of tenancy surrender in March 1988. Finally, the Court, citing Shaha Ratansi Khimji & Sons v. Kumbhar Sons Hotel (P) Ltd., confirmed that the destruction of a building does not terminate a tenancy, as the tenancy includes the underlying land, thereby rejecting the argument that the alleged demolition ended the lease.

LPA/307/2024

Parties: BISHAMBAR NATH VS STATE OF H.P. AND OTHERS

Date: 09-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE GURMEET SINGH SANDHAWALIA, JUSTICE BIPIN CHANDER NEGI

Area of Law: Property Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh dismissed the appeal, affirming the Single Judge’s decision to reject the appellant’s challenge to a Nautor grant under the H.P. Nautor Land Rules, 1968, primarily on grounds of inordinate delay and laches. The appellant had challenged the grant of Khasra No. 80 to the predecessor-in-interest of respondents No. 3 to 7, which was sanctioned on 6.11.2004. Despite the appellant claiming awareness of this allotment in 2016, the writ petition was filed only in December 2023, nearly two decades after the original grant and seven years after alleged awareness, without sufficient cause shown for the delay. The Court noted that the appellant himself had applied for Nautor in 1987, and while allotted other Khasra numbers in 1999, Khasra No. 80 was conspicuously absent from his allotment, yet no grievance was raised at that time. The Court found no reason to interfere with the well-reasoned judgment of the learned Single Judge, emphasizing that an allotment made in 2004 could not be permitted to be assailed after a lapse of 20 years, thereby upholding the principle that stale claims, unsupported by adequate explanation for delay, are not to be entertained.

RSA/105/2012

Parties: SHIV DAYAL & ANR VS KANSHI RAM & ANR.

Date: 09-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Civil Law

The High Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the First Appellate Court’s judgment and restoring the Trial Court’s decree, thereby upholding the validity of the Wills dated 20.03.2007 and 11.04.2007. The Court held that the mere presence of beneficiaries during the Will’s execution and the exclusion of natural heirs do not, by themselves, constitute suspicious circumstances sufficient to invalidate a Will, citing Tirath Singh Versus Sajjan Singh (1997) and Rabindra Nath Mukherjee v. Panchanan Banerjee (1995) 4 SCC 459, which established that the purpose of a Will is to alter the natural line of succession. Crucially, the Court found that the First Appellate Court erred by considering suspicious circumstances not pleaded by the plaintiffs, as per S. Amarjit Singh v. State (1998). Furthermore, the Court clarified that strict verbatim testimony regarding attestation under Section 63(c) of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, is not mandatory; rather, compliance can be inferred from the totality of circumstances, particularly when the testator and witnesses were present throughout the transaction, as held in Naresh Charan Das Gupta v. Paresh Charan Das Gupta (1954) 2 SCC 800. The Court also reiterated the presumption of sanity, placing the burden of proof on those challenging it, especially when a registered Will exists.

RSA/173/2008

Parties: KAILASH CHAND VS DEEPA DEVI & ORS.

Date: 09-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Family Law

The High Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the judgments of the lower courts and decreeing the plaintiff’s suit for a declaration that defendant No.1 was not his legally wedded wife and for a permanent prohibitory injunction. The Court held that the lower courts erred in concluding a valid customary marriage, as the defendants failed to plead and prove the specific custom with clear and unambiguous evidence, as required by precedents such as Lachhmi vs Bali Ram 1997 (2) Shim. LC 145 and Sardar Mohammad v Hosyara and others ILR 1988 HP 226, which establish that custom must be ancient, certain, reasonable, and proved by instances. Furthermore, the presumption of marriage arising from cohabitation, as discussed in Chowdamma v. Venkatappa, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1814 and Badri Prasad v. Dy. Director of Consolidation (1978) 3 SCC 527, was inapplicable here due to the admitted short duration of cohabitation (7-8 months) and insufficient evidence thereof. The Court also found that the undertaking (Ext.DW3/A) could not establish a marriage, as marriage must be solemnized as per custom, not merely by acknowledgment. The Appellate Court’s reliance on Ganesh Pooja, which was neither pleaded nor credibly proven, was deemed unsustainable, leading to the conclusion that both lower courts misappreciated the evidence.

CR/72/2025

Parties: RAJEEV BANSAL VS PARKASH CHAND & OTHERS

Date: 09-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE ROMESH VERMA

Area of Law: Civil Law

The High Court dismissed the Civil Revision Petition, affirming the Additional District Judge’s rejection of the petitioner’s application under Section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908. The Court held that the petitioner’s attempt to re-interpret a compromise decree dated 26.10.2006, which had attained finality and was upheld by the Supreme Court, was unsustainable. The core reasoning was that the compromise decree unambiguously stipulated a 50% share of compensation for the respondent (Parkash Chand, Brij Bhushan, and Pushpa Devi) and the remaining 50% to be shared equally by the petitioner and others. The petitioner’s argument that the respondent was entitled to only 50% of 50% of the total land compensation, effectively 17.5 bighas instead of 35 bighas, was deemed a re-writing of the clear and binding compromise. Relying on M/s D.L.F. Housing and Construction Company (P) Ltd., New Delhi vs. Sarup Singh and others, 1969(3) SCC 807, the Court reiterated that revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC is limited to jurisdictional errors or material irregularities, not re-evaluating factual findings or the merits of a concluded compromise. The Court found no illegality or material irregularity in the lower court’s decision, emphasizing that the compromise decree had crystallized the parties’ rights.

EX.P./2164/2025

Parties: PARAMJEET SINGH VS STATE OF H.P. AND ANOTHER

Date: 09-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Civil Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in Ex. Pet. No.2164 of 2025, disposed of the execution petition filed by Paramjeet Singh against the State of H.P. and another, finding that the judgment in question had been fully complied with. The decisive ground for this conclusion was the submission by the learned Additional Advocate General that a compliance affidavit had been filed in the Registry, confirming the execution of the judgment. This submission was further substantiated by the handing over of a bank draft for Rs. 5000/- to the petitioner’s counsel, representing costs previously imposed by the Court. The learned vice counsel for the petitioner acknowledged this position, thereby confirming the satisfaction of the judgment’s terms. The Court, taking note of these submissions and the acknowledgment, concluded that no further action was required in the execution proceedings, thus bringing the matter to a close. The order reflects a straightforward application of procedural compliance, where the respondents demonstrated fulfillment of their obligations under the original judgment, leading to the closure of the execution petition.

CRWP/30/2025

Parties: SAGAR VS STATE OF HP AND OTHERS

Date: 09-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE GURMEET SINGH SANDHAWALIA, JUSTICE JIYA LAL BHARDWAJ

Area of Law: Constitutional Law

The High Court quashed the detention order dated 19.12.2025 and its extension dated 17.03.2026, issued under Section 3(1) of the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substance Act, 1988 (PIT ND&PS Act), finding multiple infirmities. The decisive ground was the blatant violation of Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India, as the detention order failed to inform the petitioner of his right to make a representation to the detaining authority, a mandatory safeguard established in Kamleshkumar Ishwardas Patel v. Union of India (1995) 4 SCC 51. The Court further held that the “live and proximate link” between the petitioner’s alleged activities and the need for preventive detention had snapped, given over a year and five months had passed since his bail in the sole NDPS case, with no subsequent involvement. The Court emphasized that preventive detention is a drastic measure, not a punitive response to past offences or a substitute for ordinary legal processes, and must be strictly construed with meticulous adherence to procedural safeguards, as reiterated in Rekha v. State of Tamil Nadu (2011) 5 SCC 244 and Mortuza Hussain Choudhary v. State of Nagaland (2025) SCC OnLine SC 502. The Court also noted the detention appeared to be a collective punishment based on family history, rather than the petitioner’s individual illicit trafficking, which is impermissible.

CRMMO/305/2022

Parties: AMIT KUMAR BANSAL VS UNION OF INDIA

Date: 09-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE SANDEEP SHARMA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court quashed criminal complaints and summoning orders against the petitioner, the Managing Director of M/s Theon Pharmaceuticals Limited, under Sections 18(a)(i) and 18(a)(vi) read with Section 16 punishable under Section 27(d) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, finding the proceedings unsustainable. The Court’s decisive reasoning rested on two grounds: firstly, the complaints lacked specific averments regarding the petitioner’s day-to-day functioning and control over manufacturing, a prerequisite for vicarious liability under Section 34 of the Act, especially given the company had appointed a Wholetime Director responsible for business conduct. This aligns with precedents like Susela Padmavathy Amma v. Bharti Airtel Ltd., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 311, and S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Neeta Bhalla, (2005) 8 SCC 89, which establish that mere directorship does not automatically impute liability without clear allegations of active involvement. Secondly, the Court found the cognizance taken by the lower court to be time-barred under Section 468 Cr.P.C., as the complaints were filed beyond the three-year limitation period from the date of knowledge of the offence, which commenced upon receipt of the analyst reports. The Court concluded that continuing the proceedings would constitute an abuse of process.

CRMMO/1094/2025

Parties: MANJEET KAUR VS STATE OF HP & ORS.

Date: 09-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court dismissed the petition seeking to quash FIR No. 23 of 2023, registered under Section 498-A IPC, against the petitioner, holding that the allegations in the FIR and the charge-sheet prima facie disclose the commission of an offence. The Court relied on the principles enunciated in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, which outlines categories for quashing criminal proceedings, particularly emphasizing that courts should not quash an FIR if the allegations, taken at face value, constitute an offence. The Court rejected the petitioner’s argument that no specific allegations were made against her in the initial police complaint, noting that the informant’s application under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act specifically mentioned harassment for dowry. Further, citing Punit Beriwala v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2025 SCC OnLine SC 983, and Maneesha Yadav v. State of U.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 643, the Court reiterated that it cannot conduct a mini-trial or delve into the truthfulness of allegations while exercising powers under Section 482 CrPC. The Court also referenced Muskan v. Ishaan Khan (Sataniya), 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2355, to hold that improvements in statements do not warrant quashing an FIR. Given that a charge-sheet had been filed, the Court, following Iqbal v. State of U.P., (2023) 8 SCC 734, directed that the trial court should appreciate the materials collected during the investigation.

CR.R/464/2023

Parties: KAMAL SINGH VS CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date: 09-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE SANDEEP SHARMA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in Cr.R. Nos. 464, 465, 466, and 467 of 2023, dismissed the petitions filed by Kamal Singh, Yadvender Singh, Manoj Kumar, and Ram Singh, respectively, as withdrawn. The decisive ground for this dismissal was the explicit request made by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, who, acting under instructions, sought permission to withdraw the present petitions. The Court, therefore, did not delve into the merits of the cases or pronounce on any substantive legal issues, but rather acceded to the petitioners’ request for withdrawal. This action aligns with the established procedural principle that a party may, with the leave of the court, withdraw their petition, particularly when such a request is made unequivocally by their legal representative. Consequently, the petitions were dismissed as withdrawn, along with any pending applications, without further adjudication. The judgment, delivered by Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sandeep Sharma, reflects a procedural closure based on the petitioners’ voluntary withdrawal, rather than a substantive determination of the legal questions involved.

CRMPM/247/2026

Parties: SATNAM SINGH VS STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH

Date: 09-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh granted regular bail to the petitioner, Satnam Singh, in FIR No. 366 of 2024, registered under Sections 21 and 29 of the NDPS Act, primarily on the ground of violation of his right to a speedy trial. While acknowledging that previous bail applications had been dismissed or withdrawn, the Court, relying on precedents such as State of Maharashtra Vs. Captain Buddhikota Subha Rao (1989) Suppl. 2 SCC 605, Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan @ Pappu Yadav (2004) 7 SCC 528, and State of T.N. v. S.A. Raja, (2005) 8 SCC 380, reiterated the principle that a subsequent bail application can only be considered upon a material change in circumstances, which must be substantial and not merely cosmetic. The Court found such a change in the fact that the petitioner had been arrested on 09.12.2024 and had undergone a substantial period of incarceration (over one year and three months) without the prosecution completing its evidence, thereby violating his right to a speedy trial, as affirmed in Shubham Chaudhary vs. State of H.P. 2026:HHC:6937. Further, the absence of any other FIR against the petitioner negated the apprehension of him indulging in similar crimes. The bail was granted subject to furnishing a bond of ₹1,00,000/- with one surety and other standard conditions.

CRMPM/265/2026

Parties: TRILOKI NATH VS STATE OF H.P.

Date: 09-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE VIRENDER SINGH

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court granted bail to the applicant, Triloki Nath, in connection with FIR No.47 of 2025, registered under Section 25 of the Arms Act and Sections 109, 126(2), 115(2), 190, 191(2), 191(3), 238, 351(2), 352 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), finding that his continued judicial custody served no useful purpose. The Court’s reasoning was primarily anchored on the completion of the investigation and the filing of the charge sheet, obviating the need for further custodial interrogation. Crucially, the Court noted that charges had not yet been framed, and the applicant had been in custody since June 9, 2025. Furthermore, the Court applied the principle of parity, observing that co-accused Neelam Devi, Shiv Nath, and Hanuman Nath had already been released on bail in Cr.MP(M) Nos.1773, 2499 & 2771 of 2025. The Court also considered the nature of the incident as a “free fight” where both parties had lodged FIRs, leaving the determination of the aggressor to trial. Emphasizing that pre-trial punishment is prohibited, the Court directed the applicant’s release on a personal bond of Rs. 50,000 with one surety, subject to conditions under Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS).

CRMPM/405/2026

Parties: SHUBHKARAN VS STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH

Date: 09-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh granted regular bail to the petitioner, Shubhkaran, in FIR No. 206 of 2025, registered under Sections 20 and 29 of the NDPS Act and Section 181 of the MV Act, finding insufficient prima facie material to connect him to the crime. The Court’s decisive reasoning rested on the inadmissibility of the co-accused’s statement as substantive evidence against the petitioner, citing Section 162 of Cr.P.C. (corresponding to Section 181 of BNSS) and Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act (corresponding to Section 23 of BSA). The Court relied on Dipakbhai Jagdishchandra Patel v. State of Gujarat (2019) 16 SCC 547, which held that co-accused statements during investigation are barred by Section 162 Cr.P.C., and Tofan Singh Versus State of Tamil Nadu (2021) 4 SCC 1, which established that confessions to police officers are inadmissible under Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act. Furthermore, the Court, referencing Saina Devi vs State of Himachal Pradesh 2022 Law Suit (HP) 211, held that call detail records alone, without other corroborating evidence, are insufficient to establish a prima facie case. The Court noted the prosecution’s failure to seek cancellation of previous bail for alleged violations. Consequently, the petitioner was released on bail subject to furnishing a bond of ₹1,00,000/- and standard conditions.

CRMPM/2738/2025

Parties: MRIDUL VS STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH

Date: 09-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court dismissed the petitioner’s regular bail application, finding sufficient prima facie material connecting him to the crime under Sections 103(1) and 3(5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023, which carries severe punishment including death or life imprisonment. The Court noted that CCTV footage, photographs of the deceased in an injured state, a video showing the deceased being kicked found on a co-accused’s mobile, and the presence of the deceased’s DNA on the petitioner’s shoe collectively indicated involvement. The Court rejected the petitioner’s contentions that the deceased might have fallen due to intoxication, or that discrepancies in witness statements warranted bail, citing X Vs. State of Rajasthan (MANU/SC/1267/2024) and Suraj Singh v. State of H.P. (2022 SCC OnLine HP 268) which caution against appreciating evidence or granting bail based on discrepancies at an early stage. Further, relying on Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P. ((1978) 1 SCC 240), the Court reiterated that the severity of the punishment is a vital factor against granting bail, and mere incarceration period does not automatically entitle an accused to bail in serious offences like murder, as held in Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi) ((2018) 12 SCC 129).

CRMPM/2924/2025

Parties: ASHOK KUMAR VS STATE OF HP

Date: 09-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court dismissed the petitioner’s regular bail application under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (NDPS) Act, 1985, for offences under Sections 20 and 29, involving the recovery of 1.106 kilograms of charas, a commercial quantity. The Court held that the petitioner failed to satisfy the twin conditions mandated by Section 37 of the NDPS Act, which requires the Court to be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing the accused is not guilty and is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. Relying on Union of India v. Niyazuddin & Another (2018) 13 SCC 738 and State of Kerala v. Rajesh, AIR 2020 SC 721, the Court reiterated that these conditions are cumulative and paramount, overriding the general principles of bail. The argument of prolonged incarceration and violation of the right to a speedy trial was rejected, citing Union of India vs. Vijin K. Varghese 2025:INSC:1316, which held that bail cannot be granted solely on this ground without satisfying Section 37. The Court further emphasized, per Narcotics Control Bureau v. Kashif (2024) 11 SCC 372, that in NDPS cases involving commercial quantities, negation of bail is the rule, and its grant is an exception.

CRMPM/3011/2025

Parties: XYZ VS STATE OF H.P. & ANR.

Date: 09-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE VIRENDER SINGH

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court dismissed the prosecutrix’s application under Section 483(3) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS) seeking cancellation of bail granted to respondent No. 2, finding no cogent and overwhelming circumstances to warrant such cancellation. The Court reasoned that while the prosecutrix alleged threats and violation of bail conditions, including a request on Instagram and pressure from relatives, the police inquiry into these allegations found nothing substantive. Furthermore, the Court noted the prosecutrix had simultaneously filed a petition under Section 144 of the BNSS (formerly Section 125 Cr.P.C.) for maintenance and a complaint to the respondent’s employer, suggesting an intent to harass. Relying on Dolat Ram and Others Vs. State of Haryana, (1995) 1 Supreme Court Cases 349, the Court reiterated that “very cogent and overwhelming circumstances” are necessary for bail cancellation, distinguishing it from initial bail rejection. The Court also referenced Dinesh M.N. (S.P.) Vs. State of Gujarat, (2008) 5 Supreme Court Cases 66, which permits cancellation if bail was granted on substantially irrelevant material, but found this inapplicable here. Consequently, the Court concluded that the applicant failed to establish a case for cancellation of bail.

CWP/2221/2026

Parties: AJAY KUMAR AND OTHERS VS STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH AND ANOTHER

Date: 08-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE AJAY MOHAN GOEL

Area of Law: Service Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in a consolidated judgment encompassing multiple writ petitions, held that the issues raised by the petitioners were squarely covered by its prior decision in Vijay Parmar & Ors. Vs. State of H.P., CWP No. 9321 of 2025, decided on 06.04.2026. The decisive ground for this conclusion was the undisputed submission by the petitioners that the legal questions presented were identical to those adjudicated in Vijay Parmar & Ors. Vs. State of H.P., a contention which the respondents-Department could not controvert. While acknowledging the respondents’ right to challenge the Vijay Parmar judgment, the Court deemed it appropriate to dispose of the present petitions by directing that the orders and directions issued in Vijay Parmar & Ors. Vs. State of H.P. shall apply mutatis mutandis to the instant cases. This approach reflects the principle of stare decisis and judicial economy, ensuring consistent application of law where factual and legal matrices are substantially similar. Consequently, all pending miscellaneous applications were also disposed of in conformity with this primary direction.

CWP/3123/2019

Parties: KAMLINI KANT GUPTA VS STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH & ORS

Date: 08-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Administrative Law

The High Court disposed of the writ petition, directing Respondent No. 2/Competent Authority to examine and decide the petitioner’s representation dated 01.05.2018 (Annexure P-1) within six weeks, granting the petitioner an opportunity of hearing and permission to submit additional documents. The petitioner had sought release of four FDRs pledged as security for excise licenses for the financial year 2016-17, which the respondents retained, imposing a penalty of Rs. 12,10,383/- for failure to lift 100% quota as per Condition No. 4.3 of the Himachal Pradesh Announcements of Excise Allotment/Tender for 2016-17. The petitioner contended that he had lifted the benchmark 80% of the minimum guaranteed quota, thus precluding penalty, and that respondents failed to conduct quarterly reviews as per Clause 4.3. The Court, without delving into the merits of the penalty, found it necessary for the respondents to re-examine the facts and figures presented in the representation in light of the applicable Excise Announcements. Crucially, the Court mandated that in the event of an adverse decision, the FDRs shall not be encashed for two weeks thereafter, ensuring due process and a window for further legal recourse.

CWP/9662/2024

Parties: MEENA THAKUR VS STATE OF H.P. AND OTHERS

Date: 08-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Civil Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in CWP No.9662 of 2024, disposed of the writ petition filed by Meena Thakur against the State of H.P. and others as having been rendered infructuous. The decisive ground for this disposition was the submission by the learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Surya Chauhan, who informed the Court that, in light of the facts already noted in the order dated 09.09.2024, the present writ petition no longer required adjudication. This procedural outcome reflects the principle that courts will not proceed with matters that have lost their practical relevance or where the relief sought has become unnecessary due to intervening circumstances. Consequently, the Court, presided over by Ms. Justice Jyotsna Rewal Dua, formally recorded the petition as infructuous, thereby also disposing of any pending miscellaneous application(s) associated with the matter. The judgment did not delve into the merits of the original petition, as the petitioner’s counsel’s submission rendered such an examination moot, aligning with the judicial economy principle of avoiding unnecessary litigation.

CWP/10474/2023

Parties: SUNDER SINGH VS UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS

Date: 08-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Land Acquisition Law

The High Court allowed the writ petition, directing the respondents, including NHAI and the Competent Authority Land Acquisition (CALA), Solan, to acquire the petitioner’s remaining land and pass an award within four months. The decisive ground for this ruling was a fresh demarcation report dated 23.09.2025, conducted by the Tehsildar, Solan, pursuant to the Court’s order dated 10.07.2025. This report conclusively established that, in addition to the 01 biswa already acquired under a notification issued on 21.12.2017 under Section 3-A of the National Highways Act, 1956, the remaining 03 biswas of the petitioner’s land in Khasra No.198/98/51/44/6 also fell under the road widening works carried out by NHAI. The Court noted that the initial demarcation report dated 05.10.2020, supporting the petitioner’s claim, was disputed by the respondents, necessitating the Court-ordered fresh demarcation. As the subsequent Tehsildar’s report, conducted in the presence of all parties including NHAI officials, confirmed the petitioner’s grievance and received no objections, the Court found no reason to deny compensation for the entire land utilized for the National Highway No.5 project.

COPC/42/2026

Parties: DESH RAJ VS ROHIT JAMWAL

Date: 08-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Civil Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in COPC No.42 of 2026, closed the contempt proceedings against the respondent, Rohit Jamwal, upon confirmation that the judgment in question had been complied with. The learned Additional Advocate General submitted an order dated 07.04.2026, demonstrating that the petitioner’s case had been considered and decided, thereby satisfying the earlier judgment. Crucially, a bank draft for Rs.15,000/-, comprising Rs.10,000/- imposed in the original judgment and an additional Rs.5,000/- imposed by the order dated 07.04.2026, was handed over to the petitioner’s counsel, signifying the complete discharge of monetary obligations. Consequently, the notice issued to the respondent was discharged. The Court, however, reserved liberty to the petitioner to pursue appropriate remedies for any surviving grievances in accordance with law, thereby ensuring that while the contempt was purged, other legal avenues remained open. This decision underscores the principle that compliance with court orders, including payment of costs, effectively purges contempt, leading to the closure of such proceedings.

COPC/224/2026

Parties: POOJA THAKUR VS SH. RAKESH KANWAR

Date: 08-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Civil Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in Pooja Thakur v. Sh. Rakesh Kanwar, COPC No.224 of 2026, decided on April 8, 2026, closed the contempt proceedings initiated by the petitioner. The decisive ground for this closure was the production of an order dated April 7, 2026, by the learned Additional Advocate General, which addressed and decided the petitioner’s underlying case. The Court, presided over by Ms. Justice Jyotsna Rewal Dua, noted that with the issuance of this order, the immediate cause for the contempt petition had been resolved. Consequently, the Court deemed it appropriate to terminate the present proceedings. However, recognizing the possibility of residual grievances, the Court explicitly reserved liberty to the petitioner to pursue any surviving claims through appropriate legal remedies, strictly in accordance with law. This direction ensures that while the contempt action is concluded due to the intervening order, the petitioner’s substantive rights are not foreclosed, allowing for further legal recourse if necessary. The Court’s action reflects a pragmatic approach to judicial efficiency, closing a contempt matter once the primary compliance issue is addressed, while safeguarding the litigant’s right to further legal redress.

COPC/226/2026

Parties: SATISH SINGH VS SH. RAKESH KANWAR

Date: 08-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Civil Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in COPC No. 226 of 2026, closed the contempt proceedings initiated by Satish Singh against Sh. Rakesh Kanwar, noting that the respondent had complied with the underlying order. The Court’s decision was predicated on the submission by the learned Additional Advocate General of an order dated April 7, 2026, which demonstrated that the petitioner’s case had been decided. This action effectively rendered the contempt petition infructuous, as the alleged contemnor had taken steps to remedy the non-compliance that formed the basis of the contempt application. The Court, however, prudently reserved liberty to the petitioner to pursue appropriate legal remedies for any remaining grievances, thereby upholding the principle that while contempt proceedings address non-compliance with judicial orders, they do not preclude the aggrieved party from seeking substantive relief on the merits of their case. This approach aligns with the procedural objective of contempt jurisdiction, which is to ensure obedience to court orders rather than to adjudicate the underlying dispute afresh. The Court did not rely on any specific precedents or statutory sections in this particular order, as it was a procedural closure based on compliance.

LPA/227/2025

Parties: CHET RAM VS STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH AND OTHERS

Date: 08-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE GURMEET SINGH SANDHAWALIA, JUSTICE BIPIN CHANDER NEGI

Area of Law: Service Law

The High Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the impugned judgment dated 18.11.2024 and quashing the rejection order (Annexure P-12), thereby entitling the appellant to pay parity with his junior, Shri Kehar Singh. The Court found that the denial of pay parity, based on the premise that the appellant and his junior worked on different categories/posts prior to promotion as Senior Assistants, was baseless. Crucially, a joint seniority list of Junior Assistants/Junior Scale Stenographers demonstrated the appellant’s seniority over Kehar Singh. The Court emphasized that once a promotion is effected to a common cadre from different feeder categories, the original “birth mark” of the feeder category is obliterated, rendering the distinction drawn in the rejection order legally unsound. This principle underscores that for pay parity purposes in a common cadre, the initial feeder category becomes irrelevant. The Court noted that a review DPC, held pursuant to a previous judgment in CWP(T) No.4095 of 2008, had already recommended the appellant’s promotion from 06.08.1994, the date his junior was promoted, necessitating the creation of a supernumerary post. Consequently, the appellant was held entitled to the higher pay fixation received by his junior.

CWPIL/1/2025

Parties: COURT ON ITS OWN MOTION VS THE STATE OF HP AND OTHERS

Date: 08-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE GURMEET SINGH SANDHAWALIA, JUSTICE BIPIN CHANDER NEGI

Area of Law: Environmental Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, taking suo motu cognizance of environmental degradation, held that the Shanan Hydroelectric Project (Respondent No. 6) was liable for unscientific de-silting operations causing severe pollution and fish mortality in the Uhl River, a designated trout habitat. The Court found that Respondent No. 6 repeatedly violated prior directions from CWPIL No. 57 of 2018, recommendations of a Joint Expert Committee, and obligations under the Himachal Pradesh Fisheries Act, 1976, and the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974, by conducting de-silting during the trout breeding season (November to February) and failing to maintain the minimum environmental flow of 15% as directed by the National Green Tribunal in O.A. No. 498 of 2015 (Pushp Saini Vs. Ministry of Environment and Climate Change). Relying on the “Polluter Pays Principle” established in M.C. Mehta Vs. Kamal Nath and Others (2000) 6 SCC 213 and Indian Counsel for Enviro-Legal Action Vs. Union of India (2011) 8 SCC 161, the Court directed Respondent No. 6 to cease de-silting before March 1st annually, install sensors for TSS discharge monitoring, ensure 15% minimum flow, and deposit Rs. 12,00,000/- with the Department of Fisheries for restocking, emphasizing that economic considerations cannot override environmental rights under Article 51-A(g) of the Constitution.

CWPOA/73/2019

Parties: KASHMIR SINGH VS STATE OF HP AND OTHERS

Date: 08-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JIYA LAL BHARDWAJ

Area of Law: Service Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh allowed the petition, quashing the order dated 29.03.2017, and directed the re-engagement of the petitioner as DPE on PTA basis, along with notional Grant-in-Aid from 03.07.2007 and actual benefits from the date of the judgment. The Court found the rejection of the petitioner’s re-engagement arbitrary and unsustainable, primarily because the respondents had not challenged the Additional District Magistrate’s order dated 18.11.2014, which had directed the petitioner’s re-appointment and recorded the Principal’s admission that the petitioner’s services were terminated due to a regular incumbent joining. The Court emphasized that the respondents’ subsequent contradictory stand, claiming the petitioner was not covered under PTA-GIA and his services were not terminated due to a regular incumbent, amounted to a “summersault” and was contrary to their earlier admissions. Relying on the precedent set in Raj Kumar Pathania versus State of Himachal and others (CWP No.4670 of 2015) and Vinod Kumar Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh & others (CWP No. 379 of 2018), which established the principle of re-engagement for PTA teachers whose services were terminated due to regular appointments, the Court held that the petitioner, having been appointed through proper procedure against a vacant post and fulfilling qualification criteria, was entitled to re-engagement, even if it necessitated transferring a regular incumbent.

CWPOA/359/2019

Parties: MADAN LAL AND OTHERS VS STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH AND ANOTHER

Date: 08-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JIYA LAL BHARDWAJ

Area of Law: Service Law

The High Court dismissed the petitioners’ prayer for full monetary benefits and arrears from the date of their initial appointment as Auditors, affirming the respondents’ decision to restrict actual monetary benefits to three years prior to the order dated 30.09.2010. The Court reasoned that while the petitioners were granted the same pay scale as their juniors, who had successfully litigated in Sanjeev Kumar Mahajan and Others vs. State of HP and Another, they were not vigilant in asserting their rights before the competent court of law in a timely manner. The Court relied on the principle established in Union of India and others vs. Tarsem Singh, (2008) 8 SCC 648, and reiterated in Rushibhai Jagdishbhai Pathak vs. Bhavnagar Municipal Corporation, (2022) 18 SCC 144, that while claims relating to a continuing wrong like pay fixation may be granted despite delay, the consequential relief for arrears is typically restricted to a period of three years prior to the filing of the writ petition. The Court distinguished Suri Dass Negi’s case by noting that the petitioners approached the court only after the restrictive order of 30.09.2010, unlike the timely action in Sanjeev Kumar Mahajan’s case, thus finding no infirmity in the respondents’ decision to limit arrears.

CWPOA/4273/2019

Parties: KAMLESH SHARMA VS STATE OF H.P AND OTHERS

Date: 08-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JIYA LAL BHARDWAJ

Area of Law: Service Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh allowed the petition, quashing the order dated 13.07.2011, and directed the respondents to offer the petitioner appointment as Clerk notionally from 03.07.1997, with consequential pensionary benefits on an actual basis from her retirement date, including arrears with 6% interest if delayed. The decisive ground was the arbitrary and discriminatory action of the State in granting relaxation of Recruitment and Promotion Rules for respondent No.3, Ms. Sumedha Awasthi, while denying the same to the similarly situated petitioner, Kamlesh Sharma, despite a prior Court order dated 10.11.2010 in CWP(T) No.43 of 2010, which explicitly held both to be similarly situated and directed similar treatment. The Court emphasized that while the State can relax rules, such relaxation must apply to a class of persons, not an individual, and selective application violates Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. The Court rejected the State’s argument that the relaxation for respondent No.3 was a one-time measure and could not be a precedent, holding that such a process, when applied to only one of two jointly litigating and similarly situated individuals, is unfair and arbitrary. The Court molded the relief, considering the petitioner’s unemployment and advanced age, to provide notional benefits for pensionary purposes.

RP/114/2025

Parties: STATE OF H.P. & OTHERS VS MARS BOTTLERS UNA & ANOTHER

Date: 08-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE VIVEK SINGH THAKURJUSTICE SUSHIL KUKREJA

Area of Law: Administrative Law

The High Court dismissed the State’s Review Petition, affirming its earlier judgment that quashed orders dated 15.6.2024 and 9.12.2024 and directed the Commissioner, State Taxes and Excise, to determine an appropriate compounding fee and renew the respondent’s licence. The Court clarified that its original directions were not based on any concession by the Advocate General or specific provisions of the Punjab Distillery Rules, 1932, as amended by the 1994 notification, but rather on the exercise of inherent powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for judicial review of administrative action, finding the penalty imposed disproportionate. The Court emphasized that the Punjab Distillery Rules, 1932, as amended on 27.11.1963, continued to apply to the Una area by virtue of Sections 5, 88, and 89 of the Punjab Reorganisation Act, 1966, and Sections 3 and 49 of the State of Himachal Pradesh Act, 1970, as no valid notification had superseded them for that specific region. The Court further rejected the State’s contention regarding non-compoundable sections 39(III) and (IV) of the H.P. Excise Act, 2011, noting the highly unreliable and doubtful nature of the alleged illicit liquor recovery, which rendered the State’s action disproportionate. While deleting paragraph 36 from the impugned judgment to avoid multiplicity of litigation, the Court found no error apparent on record warranting review.

CRMMO/929/2025

Parties: SANDEEP KUMAR & ANR VS STATE OF HP AND ANOTHER

Date: 08-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in Cr. MMO No. 929 of 2025 with Cr. Appeal No. 234 of 2012, set aside the conviction and sentence of the appellants for an offence punishable under Section 324 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), previously recorded by the learned Sessions Judge, Kangra. The Court’s decisive ground was the voluntary compromise reached between the parties during the pendency of the appeal, where the informant/victim stated on oath that he had settled the matter and did not wish to pursue the FIR. Relying on the Supreme Court’s pronouncement in Suraj Singh Gujar v. State of M.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2414, which held that a conviction under Section 324 IPC can be quashed by invoking Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. when a voluntary compromise is effected, the High Court found the compromise to be genuine and without influence. Consequently, the judgment of conviction dated 26.05.2012 and the order of sentence dated 28.05.2012 were quashed, and the appellants were acquitted of the offence under Section 324 IPC.

CR.R/25/2025

Parties: VINOD SIPAHIYA VS ANUJ KUMAR

Date: 08-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Banking Law

The High Court allowed the revision petition, setting aside the conviction and sentence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, finding that the cheque in question was invalid as it sought to encash an amount exceeding the specified cap for multi-city cheques at a non-home branch. The Court noted that the cheque explicitly stated it was “valid for ₹50,000/- and under,” yet the complainant presented it for ₹1,50,000/- at a non-home branch. Relying on the Reserve Bank of India’s Policy on Multi-City (Payable at Par) CTS-2010 Standard Cheques, particularly Clauses 4 and 6, and the Supreme Court’s ruling in Pro Knits v. Canara Bank (2024) 10 SCC 292, which affirmed the binding nature of RBI instructions under Sections 21 and 35-A of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949, the Court held that the cheque could only be honoured for the capped amount. The Court further distinguished the revisional court’s limited scope, as established in Malkeet Singh Gill v. State of Chhattisgarh (2022) 8 SCC 204 and Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander (2012) 9 SCC 460, but found a jurisdictional error by the lower courts in failing to appreciate this critical aspect, despite the defence being raised during cross-examination.

CR.R/417/2025

Parties: KEWAL RAM VS HIMACHAL PRADESH COOPERATIVE AGRICULTURE AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK LTD

Date: 08-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court dismissed the revision petition, upholding the conviction and sentence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (NI Act), 1881, finding no patent defect, error of jurisdiction, or law in the concurrent findings of the lower courts. The Court reiterated that revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 Cr.P.C. is limited, not appellate, and does not permit re-appreciation of evidence unless perversity is shown, as established in Malkeet Singh Gill v. State of Chhattisgarh (2022) 8 SCC 204 and State of Gujarat v. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao (2023) 17 SCC 688. The decisive ground for upholding the conviction was the accused’s admission under Section 313 Cr.P.C. regarding the loan, cheque issuance, and dishonour, which, coupled with the unchallenged testimony of the complainant’s witness, established the ingredients of Section 138 NI Act. The Court relied on APS Forex Services (P) Ltd. v. Shakti International Fashion Linkers (2020) 12 SCC 724, affirming that once cheque issuance and signature are admitted, a presumption under Section 139 NI Act arises, placing the burden of rebuttal on the accused. Furthermore, the Court, citing Laxmi Dyechem v. State of Gujarat (2012) 13 SCC 375, held that dishonour due to “payment stopped by drawer” also attracts Section 138 NI Act. The argument regarding the complainant’s witness authority was rejected as it was not challenged during cross-examination, consistent with State of Uttar Pradesh Versus Nahar Singh (1998) 3 SCC 561.

CRMPM/208/2026

Parties: SOM CHAND VS STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH

Date: 08-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh dismissed the regular bail petitions filed by Som Chand and Neha Kumari, accused under Sections 103(1), 117(2), 126(2), and 115(2) read with Section 3(5) of the Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023, for the death of Bhura Ram. The Court primarily relied on the principle that a subsequent bail application is maintainable only upon a substantial change in circumstances, as established in State of Maharashtra v. Captain Buddhikota Subha Rao (1989) Suppl. 2 SCC 605, and reiterated in Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan @ Pappu Yadav (2004) 7 SCC 528 and Prasad Shrikant Purohit v. State of Maharashtra (2018) 11 SCC 458. The Court found no material change in circumstances since Neha Kumari’s previous bail application was dismissed. It rejected arguments that discrepancies in witness statements warranted bail, citing X v. State of Rajasthan MANU/SC/1267/2024, which cautions against granting bail based on minor discrepancies after trial commencement in serious offences. The Court also dismissed the contention of delayed trial progress, holding that incarceration period alone does not entitle bail in murder cases, per Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2018) 12 SCC 129. Given the severity of the punishment for the charged offence under Section 103(1) BNS, the Court concluded that the petitioners were not entitled to bail.

CRMPM/482/2026

Parties: MANOJ KUMAR @ MANU TOMAR VS STATE OF HP

Date: 08-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh dismissed the pre-arrest bail petition filed by Manoj Kumar @ Manu Tomar in FIR No. 37 of 2026, registered under sections 126(2), 308(3), 62, and 3(5)/111(3) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS), finding that custodial interrogation was necessary and exceptional circumstances for granting anticipatory bail were absent. The Court, relying on P. Chidambaram v. Directorate of Enforcement (2019) 9 SCC 24, reiterated that the power to grant pre-arrest bail is extraordinary and to be exercised sparingly, and further, as held in Srikant Upadhyay v. State of Bihar 2024 SCC OnLine SC 282, it cannot be granted as a rule. The Court noted that the petitioner was prima facie connected to the mobile number used for threatening the informant, and despite being granted transit bail, failed to cooperate with the investigation, thereby justifying the police’s apprehension regarding non-cooperation. Citing State Versus Anil Sharma (1997) 7 SCC 187, the Court emphasized that where custodial interrogation is required, pre-arrest bail should not be granted, particularly given the serious allegations of impersonating Enforcement Directorate officers and demanding money, which undermined the authority of the Union of India. The Court also found substance in the apprehension that the petitioner might intimidate witnesses if released on bail, as highlighted in Pratibha Manchanda v. State of Haryana (2023) 8 SCC 181, which mandates balancing individual rights with public interest and fair investigation.

CRMPM/2600/2025

Parties: MANGAL BAHADUR VS STATE OF HP

Date: 08-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh dismissed the petitioner’s regular bail application in FIR No. 153 of 2023, registered under Section 302 IPC, finding a strong prima facie case for murder. The Court noted that the petitioner and the deceased, his mother, were last seen together, and the petitioner failed to explain the circumstances of her death, particularly given the recovery of the deceased’s DNA on the petitioner’s clothes and a Khukhri found at the scene, and his suspicious conduct of washing the floor. The Court relied on the principles for granting bail articulated in Pinki v. State of U.P., (2025) 7 SCC 314, which reiterated the factors from Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P., (1978) 1 SCC 240, and Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 4 SCC 280, emphasizing the nature of the charge, severity of punishment, and the likelihood of the accused thwarting justice. The Court rejected the argument that an injury to the arm could not constitute murder, noting the charge framing by the Trial Court and the profuse bleeding. It also dismissed the contention of trial delay as a ground for bail, citing Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2018) 12 SCC 129, which held that incarceration period alone does not entitle bail in murder cases.

CRMPM/2418/2025

Parties: DHEERAJ KUMAR VS STATE OF HP

Date: 08-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh dismissed the petitioner’s regular bail application under Section 20 of the NDPS Act, finding that the petitioner failed to satisfy the twin conditions stipulated in Section 37 of the NDPS Act. The Court determined that the petitioner was found in conscious possession of a commercial quantity (1.212 kg) of charas, thereby attracting the rigours of Section 37. The Court, relying on Union of India v. Niyazuddin & Another (2018) 13 SCC 738 and State of Kerala v. Rajesh AIR 2020 SC 721, reiterated that for bail in commercial quantity NDPS cases, the Court must be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe the accused is not guilty and is unlikely to commit further offences while on bail, a standard higher than prima facie grounds. The Court rejected arguments of delayed trial and hostile witnesses, citing Union of India v. Vijin K. Varghese 2025:INSC:1316, which held that prolonged incarceration alone does not circumvent Section 37, and Dineet v. State (NCT of Delhi) 2025 SCC OnLine Del 8603, which clarified that witness credibility cannot be assessed at the bail stage. Consequently, the petitioner, having failed to demonstrate reasonable grounds for innocence or unlikelihood of re-offending, was denied bail.

CWP/439/2020

Parties: M/S RANA ENTERPRISES VS THE PRINCIPAL SECRETARY (EXCISE & TAXATION) AND OTHERS

Date: 07-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Tax Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in M/S Rana Enterprises v. The Principal Secretary (Excise & Taxation) and others, dismissed CWP No.439 of 2020 as having been rendered infructuous due to the efflux of time. The Court’s decision was predicated solely on the statement made by the learned vice counsel appearing for the petitioner, who explicitly submitted that the writ petition had become infructuous. This submission, indicating that the subject matter or relief sought in the petition no longer required adjudication, formed the decisive ground for the Court’s conclusion. Consequently, the Court did not delve into the merits of the case or address any substantive legal questions, as the foundational premise for judicial intervention had ceased to exist. The dismissal was a procedural outcome, acknowledging that the dispute had, by virtue of changed circumstances over time, lost its live character, thereby obviating the need for a judicial determination. All pending miscellaneous applications were also disposed of as a corollary to the main petition’s dismissal.

CWP/1793/2021

Parties: ANAND BHATNAGAR VS STATE OF H.P. AND OTHERS

Date: 07-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Civil Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh dismissed the writ petition filed by Anand Bhatnagar as withdrawn, acknowledging that the substantive reliefs sought, including the quashing of impugned orders (Annexure-P/13 and Annexure-P/14) concerning land vesting and subsequent transfers, and rectification of revenue entries, could not be granted without first setting aside the judgment and decree dated 07.12.1985 (Annexure P/10) passed by the Sub-Judge, First Class, Kandaghat. The petitioner’s counsel conceded this jurisdictional limitation, opting to withdraw the petition to pursue appropriate remedies against the said judgment and decree. Crucially, the Court accepted the petitioner’s prayer that the period spent prosecuting this writ petition should be excluded from the computation of limitation for any future legal action. This decision underscores the principle that a writ court will not ordinarily entertain challenges to executive actions or revenue entries that are inextricably linked to a subsisting civil court judgment, requiring the prior annulment of such judgment through appropriate legal channels. The Court’s direction regarding limitation reflects a pragmatic approach to ensure that a litigant is not prejudiced by pursuing a remedy in the wrong forum, provided the intention to pursue the correct remedy is declared.

CWP/2106/2026

Parties: RAJINDER RANA VS STATE OF H.P. & ORS.

Date: 07-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE VIVEK SINGH THAKUR, JUSTICE RANJAN SHARMA

Area of Law: Constitutional Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh disposed of CWP No. 12522 of 2025 and CWP No. 2106 of 2026, directing the Secretary, H.P. Vidhan Sabha, to release admissible pension and arrears to the petitioners, Rajinder Rana and Ravi Thakur, within one month. The Court’s decision was predicated on instructions received from the Secretary, H.P. Vidhan Sabha, confirming the withdrawal of the earlier Himachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly (Allowances and Pension of Members) Amendment Bill, 2024, which had sought to disentitle disqualified Members of Legislative Assembly (under the 10th Schedule) from pension. A new Bill, Himachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly (Allowances and Pension of Members) Amendment Bill, 2026 (Bill No. 8 of 2026), has since been passed by the State Legislature, prospectively limiting the disentitlement for pension to MLAs elected from the 14th Legislative Assembly onwards who are disqualified under the 10th Schedule of the Constitution. As the petitioners were elected in the 12th and 13th Legislative Assemblies, they fall outside the ambit of this new prospective legislation and thus remain entitled to pension for their previous terms. The Court mandated that if arrears are not released within the stipulated period, interest at 6% per annum from the date of accrual until final payment shall be levied.

CWP/3034/2024

Parties: MEDICAL SUPERINTENDENT, STATE INSURANCE CORPORATION & OTHERS VS DR. KUNAL CHAUHAN

Date: 07-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE GURMEET SINGH SANDHAWALIA, JUSTICE BIPIN CHANDER NEGI

Area of Law: Service Law

The High Court dismissed the petition challenging the Central Administrative Tribunal’s order, which directed the petitioners to allow the respondent, a Homeopathic Physician, to continue working on a contract basis until a regular appointment is made as per Recruitment and Promotion Rules. The Court found no reason to interfere, noting that the Tribunal’s directions were limited and in consonance with the law laid down by the Apex Court in Hargurpratap Singh Vs. State of Punjab & others, (2007) 13 SCC 292. This precedent establishes that where an employee has been working on a contract basis for an extended period with no complaints regarding their work or conduct, and there is a continuing need for their services, their contract should be extended until a regular appointment can be made, preventing arbitrary termination. The Court observed that the petitioners had already complied with the Tribunal’s order by extending the respondent’s services, with a further extension anticipated until a regular employee is posted. The Court also noted that the respondent had filed a separate writ petition seeking regularization, a relief not granted by the Tribunal, thus distinguishing the present limited relief from a claim for permanent employment.

CWP/3192/2026

Parties: BHAGAT SINGH AND OTHERS VS STATE OF H.P. AND OTHERS

Date: 07-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Administrative Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in CWP No.3192 of 2026, disposed of the writ petition by directing the respondent authorities to consider the petitioners’ proposal for the creation/reorganization of a new Gram Panchayat Bhamar at Tansar, strictly in accordance with the provisions of the Himachal Pradesh Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 and applicable government policy, before the next Panchayat elections in 2031. The Court’s decision was predicated upon the office instructions dated 20.03.2026 issued by the Additional Secretary (PR) to the Government of Himachal Pradesh, which acknowledged that the petitioners’ proposal was part of a larger pool of pending proposals to be considered in due course, likely before the 2031 elections, due to administrative constraints and statutory timelines. The petitioners’ counsel expressed satisfaction with this undertaking, and the Assistant Advocate General concurred, leading the Court to issue a mandamus without delving into the merits of the matter. This approach reflects a judicial deference to administrative assurances, ensuring that the petitioners’ right to consideration is upheld within a reasonable timeframe, aligning with the principle of fair and non-discriminatory administrative action.

CWP/4495/2023

Parties: SUSHIL KUMAR VS STATE OF H.P AND OTHERS

Date: 07-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Education Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh allowed the writ petition, directing the respondent-University to issue the petitioner’s LLB degree and Detailed Marks Cards, holding that the petitioner, Sushil Kumar, was a bona fide student who had cleared all examinations, and the non-issuance of his degree was solely due to a clerical error on the University’s part. The Court found that while the petitioner’s name appeared in the green sheet register, it was erroneously omitted from the admission disclosure list, with another individual’s name incorrectly entered against his roll number. The decisive ground for this decision was the direct applicability of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Pratima Das Versus State of Himachal Pradesh and Ors. (SLP(Civil) No.15180/2025, decided on 06.01.2026), where a similar factual matrix led the apex court to conclude that a student cannot be made to suffer for the University’s administrative errors. In Pratima Das, the Supreme Court emphasized that where a student is bona fide and has cleared examinations, and the error lies with the institution, the student should not be deprived of their documents. Consequently, the High Court, noting the respondent-University’s concession that the present case was squarely covered by Pratima Das, directed the immediate issuance of the petitioner’s academic documents.

CWP/4579/2026

Parties: SHEELA THAKUR VS STATE OF H.P. AND OTHERS

Date: 07-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Administrative Law

The High Court quashed a warrant of arrest issued against the petitioner, Sheela Thakur, under Section 75-A of the Himachal Pradesh Land Revenue Act, 1954, by the Collector-cum-Assistant Registrar, Co-operative Societies. The decisive ground for this ruling was the explicit prohibition in Section 75-A(4) of the Act, which unequivocally states that “The process of arrest and detention shall not be executed against a defaulter who is a female, a minor, a lunatic or an idiot.” The Court found that the respondent authority had mechanically issued the arrest warrant against a female defaulter without due regard to this statutory mandate, demonstrating a clear misapplication of the law. Consequently, the Court directed the concerned respondent officer, being a quasi-judicial adjudicating authority, to attend training at the Himachal Pradesh Judicial Academy to enhance efficiency and knowledge. While quashing the warrant, the Court also reserved liberty for the petitioner to submit a comprehensive proposal for repaying the outstanding loan amount to the Shimla Urban Co-operative Bank Limited, directing the bank to consider it pragmatically, and ordered that no coercive action be taken against the petitioner until such consideration.

CWP/10257/2025

Parties: ARSHIYA SHARMA & ANR. VS STATE OF H.P. & ORS.

Date: 07-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Education Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in CWP No. 10257/2025, disposed of the writ petition filed by Arshiya Sharma & Anr. as having been rendered infructuous, following the production of the petitioners’ re-appear examination results for the 6th Semester. The decisive ground for this disposition was the submission by the learned counsel for respondent No.2, the University, confirming that the petitioners had successfully cleared their re-appears in the 6th Semester examinations held in January 2026, with the results now available on the University’s website. This development effectively resolved the primary grievance underlying the petition. The Court noted the petitioners’ counsel’s acknowledgment that, in light of these results, the writ petition no longer presented a live controversy. While the results for the 7th Semester examination, indicating re-appears in some papers and passes in others, were also placed on record, the Court held that the consequences arising from these 7th Semester results would follow independently. Consequently, the Court, taking note of the 6th Semester results, ordered the disposal of the writ petition and all pending miscellaneous applications.

FAO/77/2014

Parties: KALYAN SINGH CHAUHAN (SINCE DEAD THROUGH HIS LRS) & ANOTHER VS M/S P.K. CONSTRUCTION & OTHERS

Date: 07-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE SUSHIL KUKREJA

Area of Law: Insurance Law

The High Court partly allowed the claimants’ appeal for enhanced compensation and dismissed the insurer’s appeal, modifying the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal’s award from Rs. 6,22,000/- to Rs. 8,60,410/- under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. The Court reassessed the deceased’s monthly income at Rs. 5,000/-, applying a 50% deduction for personal expenses as per Sarla Verma (SMT) & others vs. Delhi Transport Corporation & another, (2009) 6 SCC 121, and a 50% addition for future prospects, consistent with National Insurance Company Limited vs. Pranay Sethi & others, (2017) 16 SCC 680, given the deceased’s age of 28 years. A multiplier of ‘17’ was applied for loss of dependency. Crucially, the Court rejected the insurer’s contention that the deceased was a gratuitous passenger, holding that the insurer failed to discharge the burden of proof. Relying on the amended Section 147 of the 1988 Act and distinguishing New India Assurance Company Ltd Vs Asha Rani & Ors. 2003 (2) SCC 223 and National Insurance Company Ltd. vs. Baljit Kaur 2004 (2) SCC 1, the Court found the deceased was an employee of the vehicle owner, travelling in the goods carriage for work, thus covered by the insurance policy. Compensation under conventional heads was also enhanced by 10% every three years from 2017, as per Pranay Sethi and Sunita & ors. vs. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. & ors., Civil Appeal No.9538 of 2025, including filial consortium as established in Magma General Insurance Company Limited Vs. Nanu Ram alias Chuhru Ram & others, (2018) 18 Supreme Court Cases 130.

FAO/282/2025

Parties: NIAC LTD. VS PRATIBHA KAPOOR & ANR.

Date: 07-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE SUSHIL KUKREJA

Area of Law: Civil Law

The High Court set aside the award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal-I, District Kullu, and remanded the case for fresh adjudication, holding that the Tribunal erred by failing to return findings on the crucial issue of negligence. The Court emphasized that a claim under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act is based on the principle of fault liability, making proof of negligence a sine qua non for maintaining such a petition. Despite framing an issue regarding rash and negligent driving, the Tribunal explicitly stated that issues concerning negligence were not required to be adjudicated, thereby contravening settled principles of law which mandate that once issues are framed, findings must be returned on all of them. The Court underscored that a judgment must deliver justice, not merely a legal conclusion, and it was incumbent upon the Tribunal to answer the question of negligence based on pleadings, evidence, and material on record. Consequently, the impugned award dated 16.05.2025 was quashed, and the matter remitted to the Tribunal with directions to decide all issues afresh, particularly issue No. 1 concerning negligence, after affording parties a reasonable opportunity to lead evidence, and to conclude the matter expeditiously by 31.10.2026.

FAO/470/2011

Parties: AMIT ENTERPRISES VS RAMAWATI AND OTHERS

Date: 07-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE SUSHIL KUKREJA

Area of Law: Labor Law

The High Court dismissed the appeal under Section 30 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923, affirming the Commissioner’s award of compensation and penalty to the dependents of the deceased workman. The Court decisively held that an employer-employee relationship existed between the appellant and the deceased, Satish Kumar, who died from an electric shock during employment. This was established through the deposition of PW-1 (the deceased’s widow) and the admission of Respondent No. 2 (the principal employer) that the appellant had engaged the deceased for contract work on its premises. The Court rejected the appellant’s contention that the claim was barred by Sections 75(2)(b), 75(3), and 53 of the Employees State Insurance Act, 1948, as the appellant failed to prove that the deceased was insured or covered under the ESI Act. Consequently, the jurisdiction of the Commissioner under the Workmen’s Compensation Act remained intact. The imposition of a 15% penalty under Section 4A(3)(b) of the Act was also upheld, as the appellant provided no valid reason for the delayed payment of compensation.

RSA/467/2006

Parties: PRABH DAYAL & OTHERS VS KALA DEVI (SINCE DECEASED), THROUGH HER LRS.

Date: 07-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Civil Law

The High Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the concurrent findings of the lower courts that the Will dated 13.03.1958 was not duly proved, thereby denying the appellants indefeasible title. The Court rejected the application for additional evidence under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC, finding no cogent reason for its non-production earlier, citing Sopanrao v. Syed Mehmood and Jagdish Prasad Patel v. Shivnath which establish that additional evidence is permissible only under specific circumstances, such as due diligence or court requirement, not to patch up a weak case as held in North Eastern Railway Administration. vs. Bhagwan Das. The Court further held that the presumption under Section 90 of the Indian Evidence Act does not dispense with the rigorous proof required for a Will under Section 63(c) of the Succession Act, 1925 and Section 68 of the Evidence Act, 1872, as established in Bharpur Singh v. Shamsher Singh. The Court emphasized that it would not interfere with concurrent findings of fact unless perverse, citing Kashibai v. Parwatibai and Rur Singh v. Bachan Kaur, and noted that the propounded Will was conditional, and its conditions were not shown to have been fulfilled.

CMP.M/260/2026

Parties: HIMACHAL ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION AND ANOTHER VS NAND LAL

Date: 07-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Civil Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in CMP (M) No. 260/2026 in Review Petition No. 29/2026, dismissed the review petition and the accompanying application for condonation of delay as withdrawn, following a submission by the learned counsel for the applicants/petitioners. The decisive ground for this dismissal was the explicit instruction from the applicants/petitioners’ counsel to withdraw both the review petition and the application for condonation of delay, indicating their intention to prefer a Letters Patent Appeal against the original judgment. The Court, therefore, did not delve into the merits of the review petition or the delay application, but rather acted upon the procedural request for withdrawal. This action aligns with the principle that a party is generally at liberty to withdraw its application or petition, particularly when expressing an intent to pursue an alternative remedy, such as an appeal. The order, pronounced by Justice Jyotsna Rewal Dua, effectively closes the review proceedings without prejudice to the applicants’ right to pursue further appellate recourse.

CWPIL/113/2025

Parties: ANJALI SONI VERMA & OTHERS VS STATE OF HP & OTHERS

Date: 07-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE GURMEET SINGH SANDHAWALIA, JUSTICE BIPIN CHANDER NEGI

Area of Law: Civil Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh dismissed CWPIL No. 113 of 2025 as withdrawn, granting the petitioners liberty to file a fresh petition on the same cause of action. This decision was rendered following a submission by the learned counsel for petitioners No. 2 to 4, who expressed an unwillingness to press application No. 6472 of 2026, filed under Order 6 Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure for amendment of the writ petition, and concurrently sought to withdraw the main writ petition with the aforementioned liberty. The Court, comprising Chief Justice G.S. Sandhawalia and Justice Bipin C. Negi, acceded to this request, thereby disposing of the pending application(s) as well. The core reasoning behind the Court’s conclusion was the petitioners’ explicit prayer for withdrawal with the specific condition of retaining the right to re-litigate the matter, a common practice reflecting judicial discretion in allowing parties to refine their legal strategy without prejudice to their substantive claims. This procedural order underscores the principle that courts generally permit withdrawal of petitions with liberty to file afresh when such a request is made by the petitioner and does not appear to be an abuse of process, ensuring that substantive justice is not foreclosed due to procedural choices.

EX.P./705/2025

Parties: UMESH KUMAR VS HIMACHAL ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION AND OTHERS

Date: 07-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Service Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh disposed of the execution petition, Ex. Pet. No. 705 of 2025, filed by Umesh Kumar against the Himachal Road Transport Corporation, following the production of an office order dated 02.03.2026 by the respondents’ counsel. The Court’s decision was predicated on the principle that once the primary grievance forming the basis of the execution petition has been addressed, even if partially, by an administrative order, the execution proceedings lose their immediate efficacy. The Court, therefore, reserved liberty to the petitioner to pursue appropriate remedies in accordance with law for any surviving grievances, including those arising from or against the consideration order dated 02.03.2026. This approach aligns with the judicial practice of not adjudicating on matters that have been rendered moot or where an alternative, more suitable forum exists for the resolution of subsequent disputes, thereby ensuring judicial economy and preventing premature intervention in administrative processes. The Court implicitly recognized that while the initial cause for execution might have been addressed, the petitioner retained the right to challenge the adequacy or legality of the remedial action taken.

CR.A/537/2012

Parties: STATE OF H.P. VS YOGESH KUMAR @ YADU

Date: 07-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE VIVEK SINGH THAKUR, JUSTICE RANJAN SHARMA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh dismissed the State’s appeal against the respondent’s acquittal under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, upholding the trial court’s finding that the prosecution failed to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Court found significant inconsistencies and contradictions in the prosecution’s evidence, particularly concerning the sequence of events and the alleged assaults. Crucially, the FSL report, which detected no alcohol in the deceased’s samples, directly contradicted the testimonies of PW-7 Pawan Kumar and PW-8 Durga Dass, who claimed the deceased consumed liquor with the respondent. Furthermore, the testimonies of PW-1 Bebi, PW-2 Shreshta Devi, PW-3 Dayawanti, and PW-5 Bhani Devi were based on hearsay, not direct observation, and thus lacked conclusive primary evidentiary value. The Court highlighted the dubious conduct of PW-9 Parkash Chand, who, despite allegedly witnessing the fatal assault, fled the scene and remained silent, casting doubt on his version of events. The Investigating Officer’s self-contradictory statements regarding the quarrel at the respondent’s shop further weakened the prosecution’s case. Applying the settled principle that where two views are possible, the one favouring the accused must be adopted, the Court concluded that the prosecution’s narrative was doubtful and lacked cogent, reliable, and convincing evidence to warrant interference with the acquittal.

CRMPM/135/2026

Parties: SUKHA VS STATE OF HP

Date: 07-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh dismissed the petitioner’s application for regular bail in FIR No. 34 of 2025, registered under Sections 331(4), 305, 111(2)(b), and 238 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhitta, 2023 (BNS), primarily due to the strong prima facie case established by the recovery of stolen jewellery and the petitioner’s extensive criminal antecedents. The Court, relying on the principles enunciated in Pinki v. State of U.P., (2025) 7 SCC 314, which reiterated the factors for granting bail from Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P., (1978) 1 SCC 240, and Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 4 SCC 280, emphasized that while bail is the normal rule, it is not granted as a matter of course, especially where there is a likelihood of repeating offences or thwarting justice. The recovery of stolen articles from the petitioner, coupled with the presumption under Section 119 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA) regarding possession of stolen goods, strongly indicated his involvement. Furthermore, the Court noted the 15 prior FIRs against the petitioner, holding, as in Champa vs. State of H.P., 2025:HHC:28899, that such criminal antecedents disentitle an accused from bail, particularly when similar offences are involved, thereby supporting the State’s apprehension that the petitioner would re-offend if released.

CRMPM/254/2026

Parties: ASHOK VS STATE OF HP

Date: 07-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh dismissed the petitioner’s regular bail application in FIR No. 234 of 2025, registered under Sections 22 and 29 of the NDPS Act, for alleged possession of 3120 capsules of Spasmore containing Tramadol Hydrochloride. The Court, while acknowledging that the prosecution failed to establish the quantity as ‘commercial’ under Section 37 of the NDPS Act, thereby rendering its rigours inapplicable, nevertheless denied bail. The decisive ground was the “huge quantity” of capsules recovered, which, absent a prescription, disentitled the petitioner from bail, reflecting the Court’s concern regarding the pervasive menace of drug addiction. Relying on Madan Lal v. State of H.P., the Court held that all occupants of a vehicle are in conscious possession of contraband found therein, establishing prima facie possession by the petitioner. Further, citing Khushi Ram Gupta v. State of H.P. and Bunty Yadav v. State of H.P., the Court reiterated that bail is not a matter of right, even when Section 37 NDPS Act is inapplicable, and releasing an accused in such cases sends a negative societal signal. The Court also referenced Union of India v. Namdeo Ashruba Nakade and Ankush Vipan Kapoor v. National Investigation Agency to underscore the alarming rise in drug abuse among youth and the State’s duty under Article 47 of the Constitution to address this public health crisis.

CRMPM/360/2026

Parties: SWARAN SINGH @ KUKA VS STATE OF HP

Date: 07-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh dismissed the petitioner’s regular bail application under Section 20 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act (NDPS Act), holding that no substantial change in circumstances had occurred since the dismissal of his previous bail petitions. The Court, relying on State of Maharashtra v. Captain Buddhikota Subha Rao (1989) Suppl. 2 SCC 605, reiterated that a subsequent bail application is maintainable only upon a material change in the fact situation, not merely cosmetic alterations, to prevent abuse of process and ensure judicial discipline. Further, citing Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan @ Pappu Yadav (2004) 7 SCC 528, the Court emphasized the onus on the applicant to demonstrate why, despite earlier rejections, the subsequent application should be granted. The argument of delayed trial, violating the right to speedy trial, was rejected as the status report indicated active prosecution with multiple dates fixed for evidence, demonstrating the trial court’s expeditious intent. Consequently, finding no fresh grounds or substantial change in circumstances, the petition was dismissed, though the petitioner was granted liberty to file a fresh application if the trial is not concluded expeditiously.

CRMP/5601/2025

Parties: KULDEEP SINGH @ RANA VS STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH

Date: 07-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE VIVEK SINGH THAKUR, JUSTICE RANJAN SHARMA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court dismissed the applicant’s prayer for suspension of sentence under Section 430(1) of the Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sahita 2023, finding no palpable or gross error in the trial court’s judgment convicting him under Sections 20(b)(ii)(c) and 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, for possessing a commercial quantity of charas. The Court held that mere prolongation of incarceration or sympathetic grounds do not warrant suspension of sentence. It rejected the argument that PW-9, being the complainant and Investigating Officer, vitiated the trial, citing Mukesh Singh versus State (NCT of Delhi) (2020) 10 SCC 120, which established no absolute bar against an informant acting as investigator absent proven bias. The Court further clarified, relying on State of Punjab versus Baldev Singh (1999) 6 SCC 172, that Section 50 of the NDPS Act was inapplicable as no personal search was conducted, and the recovery was from a bag on the applicant’s lap. Discrepancy in contraband weight was deemed nominal and insufficient to aid the applicant. Parity with a co-accused was denied due to differing roles. The Court reiterated, referencing Aasif @ Pasha versus State of Uttar Pradesh and others, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1644 and Omprakash Sahni vs. Jai Shankar Chaudhary and Anr. (2023) 6 SCC 123, that suspension requires a prima facie satisfaction of fair chances of acquittal, not a re-appreciation of evidence or picking lacunae. The applicant failed to demonstrate such a likelihood.

CWP/2798/2026

Parties: BAL KRISHAN & ORS. VS STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH & ORS.

Date: 06-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE VIVEK SINGH THAKUR, JUSTICE RANJAN SHARMA

Area of Law: Urban Planning Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh dismissed the petition challenging the inclusion of Gram Panchayats Kutehla and Manjhed in the newly constituted Nagar Panchayat Swarghat, District Bilaspur, vide notification dated 25.02.2026. The Court found no arbitrariness, illegality, or violation of Articles 14 and 243 of the Constitution of India, holding that the impugned notification was issued after fulfilling all legal formalities and due consideration of objections. The decisive ground was that the respondents had conducted surveys, considered the population exceeding two thousand, annual revenue exceeding Rs.5,00,000/-, and the area’s rapid urbanization, qualifying it as a transitional area under Section 3 of the Himachal Pradesh Municipal Act, 1994. The Court rejected the petitioners’ arguments that their objections were not considered in the right perspective, and that inclusion would cause loss to farmers and compel them to pay taxes, noting that the creation of the Nagar Panchayat was for better development and improved arrangements, with customary rights protected. The Court emphasized that the need for planned provision of civic amenities through municipal planning justified the inclusion of such transitional areas.

CWP/2992/2026

Parties: BALBIR SINGH & ORS. VS STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH & ORS.

Date: 06-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE VIVEK SINGH THAKUR, JUSTICE RANJAN SHARMA

Area of Law: Constitutional Law

The High Court dismissed the petition challenging the constitution of Nagar Panchayat Barsar, including Gram Panchayat Bani, finding no arbitrariness, illegality, or violation of Articles 14 and 243Q of the Constitution of India. The Court held that the impugned notifications dated 23/24.11.2025 and 25.02.2026 were validly issued after fulfilling all legal formalities and considering objections. The decisive ground was that Article 243Q(2) does not mandate the existence of all enumerated factors for declaring an area as transitional, smaller urban, or larger urban, but allows for “such other factors” as deemed fit, which in this case included “better development and well-organized arrangements.” The Court distinguished Champal Lal vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors., (2018) 16 SCC 356, noting that in Champal Lal, the State had failed to specify reasons for creating the municipal area, whereas here, the respondents had provided detailed reports from the Deputy Commissioner, Hamirpur, and field staff, outlining population, revenue, and existing infrastructure, demonstrating a rational basis for the decision. The Court concluded that the objections raised by the petitioners were duly considered and rejected by the Principal Secretary (Urban Development) through a reasoned order.

CWP/3683/2026

Parties: RAVI CHAND VS STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH & ORS.

Date: 06-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE VIVEK SINGH THAKUR, JUSTICE RANJAN SHARMA

Area of Law: Urban Planning Law

The High Court dismissed the petition challenging the inclusion of Villages Darang and Chiru in the Municipal Council Jawalamukhi, affirming the impugned order dated 09.02.2026 and notification dated 25.02.2026. The Court found no scope for interference, holding that the Principal Secretary (Urban Development) had duly considered and rejected the petitioner’s objections in a reasoned and speaking order, as directed in the previous litigation (CWP No.6319 of 2025, Ravi Chand vs. State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors.). The core reasoning was that the objections, primarily concerning loss of agricultural benefits, financial hardship, and lack of consultation, were largely “apprehensive and general in nature,” founded on “anticipated consequences,” and failed to disclose any “statutory infirmity, jurisdictional defect, or legal impediment under the Himachal Pradesh Municipal Act, 1994.” The Court emphasized that municipal inclusion is guided by “statutory parameters, administrative feasibility, and the requirement of contiguity and continuity for effective municipal administration and integrated urban planning,” and that the predominance of agricultural land or dependence on rural livelihoods, without pointing out statutory violations, cannot negate municipal inclusion. The State Election Commission’s relaxation for creation/reorganization of local bodies also rendered the petitioner’s plea regarding the notification dated 17.11.2025 unsustainable.

CWP/3711/2026

Parties: SUMAN LATA VS STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH & ORS.

Date: 06-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE VIVEK SINGH THAKUR, JUSTICE RANJAN SHARMA

Area of Law: Administrative Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh dismissed the petition challenging the inclusion of Village Saletar in the proposed Municipal Council Jawalamukhi, affirming the impugned order dated 09.02.2026 and notification dated 25.02.2026. The Court found no grounds for interference, holding that the Principal Secretary (Urban Development) had duly considered and rejected the petitioner’s objections in a reasoned and speaking order, as directed in the previous round of litigation (CWP No.6313 of 2025, Suman Lata vs. State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors., decided on 18.12.2025). The decisive ground for upholding the inclusion was that the objections, primarily based on anticipated financial hardship, loss of rural benefits, and lack of existing infrastructure, were largely apprehensive and general in nature, failing to disclose any statutory infirmity, jurisdictional defect, or legal impediment under the Himachal Pradesh Municipal Act, 1994. The Court noted that municipal inclusion is guided by statutory parameters, administrative feasibility, and the requirement of contiguity and continuity for effective urban planning, and that the State Election Commission had granted relaxation for such reorganizations. The Court implicitly relied on the principle that policy decisions made after due process and consideration of objections, without statutory violation, should not be interfered with by judicial review.

CWP/3734/2020

Parties: ANU BALA VS THE DIRECTOR, URBAN DEVELOPMENT AND ANOTHER

Date: 06-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JIYA LAL BHARDWAJ

Area of Law: Service Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh allowed the petition, quashing the office order dated 11.09.2020 and the order dated 25.07.2020, which retrospectively converted the petitioner’s regular appointment as Peon to a daily wage basis. The Court held that the respondents’ action was illegal, arbitrary, and contrary to principles of natural justice, as no prior notice or opportunity of hearing was afforded to the petitioner before passing an order with civil consequences. The decisive ground was that the petitioner was initially appointed on a regular basis on 19.12.2016, without any misrepresentation on her part, and had been receiving emoluments accordingly for over three years. The Court emphasized the settled legal principle that any order having “evil/civil consequences” must be preceded by a show cause notice to the affected party. The respondents’ contention that the initial regular appointment was a “bonafide mistake” due to misconstruing instructions was rejected, particularly given the significant delay in rectification and the absence of fault attributable to the petitioner. Consequently, the Court found no justification for altering the petitioner’s service status retrospectively, especially after such a lapse of time and without due process.

CWP/4458/2026

Parties: M/S THAKUR BOTTLE STORE VS STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH AND ORS.

Date: 06-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE VIVEK SINGH THAKUR, JUSTICE RANJAN SHARMA

Area of Law: Tax Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh dismissed the petition filed by M/s Thakur Bottle Store, challenging an order passed by the Appellate Authority under Section 107 of the Himachal Pradesh Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (H.P. GST Act). The Court’s decisive reasoning rested on the admitted fact that a statutory appeal provision exists under Section 112 of the H.P. GST Act, allowing appeals from orders of the Appellate Authority to the Goods and Services Tax Tribunal. Crucially, the Court noted that the GST Tribunal is functional within the State of Himachal Pradesh. Therefore, the petitioner had an efficacious alternative remedy available under the specific statutory framework. The Court, adhering to the principle of exhaustion of statutory remedies, declined to entertain the writ petition, granting the petitioner liberty to pursue the appropriate remedy as provided by the H.P. GST Act. This judgment reinforces the established legal principle that where a specific statutory appeal mechanism is available and functional, parties must ordinarily exhaust such remedies before invoking the extraordinary writ jurisdiction of the High Court. The petition was accordingly disposed of, along with any pending applications.

CWP/4569/2026

Parties: SMT. KANTA DEVI VS THE STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH AND OTHERS

Date: 06-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE AJAY MOHAN GOEL

Area of Law: Service Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in CWP No. 4569 of 2026, disposed of the petition filed by Smt. Kanta Devi, a Class IV employee, who sought to continue in service until the age of 60 years, aligning with the precedent set by the High Court in Satya Devi Versus State of H.P. and others (CWP No. 2274 of 2021, decided on 28.05.2024). The Court, acknowledging that the core issue of extending the retirement age for Class IV employees was pending adjudication before the Supreme Court of India in Satya Devi’s case, directed that the parties shall abide by the final judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. This disposition reflects a pragmatic approach to judicial economy, deferring to the apex court on a matter of significant legal interpretation and widespread applicability, thereby ensuring uniformity and avoiding potentially conflicting pronouncements on an issue already seized by the highest judicial authority. The Court’s decision to await the Supreme Court’s ruling underscores the principle of judicial hierarchy and the importance of a definitive pronouncement on a matter affecting numerous employees.

CWP/8236/2024

Parties: RAKESH KUMAR VS STATE OF H.P AND OTHERS

Date: 06-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Administrative Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in CWP No. 8236 of 2024, allowed the petitioner’s writ petition, quashing the selection of respondent No. 5 as a fair price shop distributor and directing the appointment of the petitioner. The Court found that the respondents erred in denying the petitioner five marks for matriculation, despite him possessing a higher qualification (10+2) for which he was awarded two marks. The decisive ground was the respondents’ failure to provide the petitioner an opportunity to produce his matriculation certificate, especially given that he had a higher qualification, which logically presumes matriculation, and had represented this omission to the authorities. The Court reasoned that since the petitioner was awarded marks for 10+2, the respondents should have sought clarification or the matriculation certificate, rather than summarily rejecting his claim based on non-uploading, particularly when the online portal allegedly allowed only one certificate upload. The Court noted that the petitioner was in possession of the matriculation certificate at the time of application and had promptly represented the issue. Consequently, adding five marks for matriculation would place the petitioner at the top of the merit list with 13 marks, surpassing respondent No. 5’s 11 marks. The Court directed the respondents to appoint the petitioner within two weeks.

CWP/14347/2025

Parties: WATTS EDUCATION SOCIETY, PHARER VS STATE OF H.P. AND OTHERS

Date: 06-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Education Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh disposed of CWP No.14347 of 2025, filed by Watts Education Society, as the petitioner’s grievances regarding the cancellation of its No Objection Certificate (NOC) were redressed. The petitioner had sought quashing of cancellation letters dated 23.09.2024 and 02.12.2024, and a declaration that its NOC No.EDN-HE(21)A(1)P.S.-04/2019-NOC dated 13.04.2021 remained valid. The decisive ground for disposal was the respondents’ submission, through their reply, that a necessary NOC had been granted to the petitioner-institution for the academic session 2025-26 vide letter dated 18.10.2025 by the Director Secondary Education, Himachal Pradesh. Furthermore, the respondents assured that the case for grant of NOC for the subsequent session, 2026-27, would be considered as per existing Rules. Consequently, the petitioner’s counsel confirmed that this stand had redressed their grievances and sought permission to withdraw the petition with liberty to file a fresh one if future necessity arose. The Court, finding the grievances addressed, allowed the withdrawal, thereby disposing of the writ petition and any pending miscellaneous applications.

CMPMO/138/2026

Parties: BHUMA DEVI & OTHERS VS HIMATI DEVI

Date: 06-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE ROMESH VERMA

Area of Law: Civil Law

The High Court dismissed the petition, affirming the Senior Civil Judge’s order which rejected the petitioners’ application under Order 13 Rule 4 C.P.C. for exhibiting a Will. The decisive ground was that the petitioners, having already been granted a singular opportunity by the High Court on 12.09.2025 to lead evidence on “self-responsibility” after their evidence was initially closed on 19.05.2025, failed to utilize this opportunity to present their evidence. Instead, they filed the application under Order 13 Rule 4 C.P.C., which the Court found to be a mere stratagem to secure yet another opportunity to lead evidence, thereby violating the spirit and letter of the High Court’s previous order. The Court held that allowing such an application would amount to granting an additional opportunity, which was contrary to its earlier directive. The learned trial court had correctly concluded that the application lacked substance and merit, being filed without any justifiable cause for the delay or inadvertence claimed. Consequently, the High Court found no error or infirmity in the impugned order, concluding that the petition was devoid of merit and deserved dismissal.

CMPMO/185/2022

Parties: JASWANT BEHL VS SUBHASH KUMAR & OTHERS

Date: 06-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE ROMESH VERMA

Area of Law: Civil Law

The High Court dismissed the petition challenging the Senior Civil Judge’s order refusing to dismiss a suit under Order 23 Rule 3 read with Section 151 CPC, finding no perversity warranting interference under Article 227 of the Constitution. The Court reasoned that the purported compromise agreements, dated 2013 and 2014, were merely photocopies and, even if genuine, constituted only agreements to sell, which, as per Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, do not confer proprietary rights or create an interest in immovable property. Relying on the principle established in Ramesh Chand vs Suresh Chand (Civil Appeal No. 6337 of 2012), the Court affirmed that an agreement to sell does not convey valid title without a registered conveyance deed. Furthermore, the defendant’s significant delay of over seven years in filing the application, after the original plaintiff’s death in 2015 and at the stage of defendant’s evidence, demonstrated a lack of due diligence and an attempt to prolong the proceedings, rather than a genuine effort to enforce a valid compromise. The Court reiterated that its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227, as clarified in Shri Digant vs. M/S P.D.T. Trading Co. & others (Civil Appeal No. 13801 of 2025), is to be exercised sparingly, only for grave injustice or jurisdictional errors, none of which were present.

FAO/261/2024

Parties: SUSHIL KUMAR VS BRIJ BALA (DECEASED) THROUGH LRS

Date: 06-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE SUSHIL KUKREJA

Area of Law: Property Law

The High Court dismissed the appeal under Order 43 Rule 1(u) CPC, upholding the First Appellate Court’s remand order which allowed applications under Order 1 Rule 10 and Order 6 Rule 17 read with Section 151 CPC for impleadment and amendment. The Court reasoned that a suit for possession by a co-owner against a trespasser or tenant is maintainable without impleading other co-owners, as established in Shri Ram Pasricha vs. Jaganath (1976) 4 SCC 184 and Om Prakash and Anr vs. Mishri Lal (Dead) (2017) 5 SCC 451, which affirmed that a co-owner owns every part of the joint property and a tenant is estopped from denying the landlord’s title under Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The Court further held, relying on Aliji Momonji & Co. vs Lalji Mavji & Ors. (1996) 5 SCC 379, that other co-owners were not “necessary parties” as effective adjudication was possible in their absence, making them at best “proper parties,” and a suit is not defeated by non-joinder of proper parties. Moreover, per Prem Kishore and Others Vs. Brahm Prakash and Others (2023) 19 SCC 244, dismissal for non-joinder is not a decision on merits and thus not res judicata. The First Appellate Court correctly allowed the applications and remanded the matter for fresh trial, with directions for expeditious disposal.

RFA/3/2012

Parties: SURINDER SINGH VS COLLECTOR LAND ACQUISITION & ANOTHER

Date: 06-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE SUSHIL KUKREJA

Area of Law: Land Acquisition Law

The High Court modified the Reference Court’s award, enhancing compensation for acquired land to Rs. 24,000/- per biswa, irrespective of classification, and clarifying interest payment under the Land Acquisition Act. The Court held that the market value should be determined by considering the highest bona fide sale exemplar, rejecting the averaging method, as established in State of Punjab & another vs. Hans Raj (dead) by LRs Sohan Singh & others, (1994) 5 SCC 734 and Anjani Molu Dessai vs. State of Goa & another, (2010) 13 SCC 710. It applied a 20% deduction for development charges, acknowledging the land’s potential and existing amenities, citing Lal Chand v. Union of India, 2009 15 SCC 769 and Trishala Jain & another vs. State of Uttaranchal & another, (2011) 6 SCC 47. Crucially, the Court clarified that interest under Section 34 of the Act is payable from the date of taking possession, not the award date, as mandated by Major General Kapil Mehra & others vs. Union of India & another, (2015)2 SCC 262, directing 9% per annum for the first year and 15% thereafter. The classification of land was deemed irrelevant for compensation when acquired for a housing colony, per H.P. Housing Board vs. Ram Lal & others, 2003 (3) Shimla Law Cases 64.

LPA/137/2026

Parties: DR. RAKESH KUMAR KAPILA VS STATE OF H.P. AND ORS.

Date: 06-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE GURMEET SINGH SANDHAWALIA, JUSTICE BIPIN CHANDER NEGI

Area of Law: Education Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh dismissed the appeal, affirming the Single Judge’s decision to uphold the appointment of respondent No. 4 to the additional charge of Vice-Chancellor under Section 24(5) of the Himachal Pradesh University of Agriculture, Horticulture and Forestry Act, 1986. The Court held that Section 24(5), which governs temporary absences of the Vice-Chancellor, grants the Chancellor discretion to appoint “senior faculty members” and does not mandate the appointment of the “senior most” faculty member. This distinction was crucial, as evidenced by the explicit use of “Senior Most Professor” in Statute 3.2(3) for the Dean of Colleges, a phrase conspicuously absent from Section 24(5). The Court noted that the Chancellor had duly considered a seniority list and bio-datas of the three senior-most professors before exercising discretion, a process unchallenged by the appellant. The argument that the appellant, as the senior-most professor, should have been appointed was thus rejected, as the statutory language did not support such a claim. The Court also clarified that a separate challenge regarding the Dean, Post Graduate Studies, constituted a distinct cause of action and was correctly not addressed in the present writ petition.

RSA/10/2025

Parties: SUGHAM BHAGAT VS REENA SHARMA & ANOTHER

Date: 06-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE ROMESH VERMA

Area of Law: Civil Law

The High Court held that the First Appellate Court erred in allowing the plaintiff-respondent to withdraw the suit under Order 23 Rule 1 CPC at the appellate stage, thereby setting aside the trial court’s judgment and decree. The decisive ground was that the trial court had already adjudicated and crystallized the rights of defendant No.2/appellant by finding a valid Will dated 26.09.2002 in her favour, making her the absolute owner of the suit property. The Court emphasized that once rights are vested through a decree, a suit cannot be withdrawn at the appellate stage to destroy that decree, unless strong reasons are shown that no vested rights would be prejudiced, a principle affirmed in R. Rathinavel Chettiar and another Vs. V. Sivaraman and others (1999) 4 SCC 89 and Executive Officer, Arthanareswarar Temple Vs. R. Sathyamoorthy and Others (1999)3 SCC 115. The First Appellate Court failed to provide cogent reasons for allowing the withdrawal, and the mere non-filing of a reply by the defendant did not automatically entitle the plaintiff to withdraw the suit, as a wrong concession by counsel cannot bind parties when statutory provisions dictate otherwise, as held in Union of India and others vs. Mohan Lal Likumal Punjabi and others (2004)3 Supreme Court Cases 628. Consequently, the High Court quashed the First Appellate Court’s judgment, dismissed the withdrawal application, and remanded the appeal for fresh adjudication on merits.

RSA/180/2018

Parties: ANIL KUMAR & ANOTHER VS LOKHA RAM

Date: 06-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE ROMESH VERMA

Area of Law: Civil Law

The High Court dismissed the appellants’ second appeal, affirming the concurrent findings of the lower courts which rejected their suit for possession under Sections 5 and 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. The Court held that the suit was hopelessly time-barred, having been filed in 2009, more than 21 years after the execution of an agreement (Ext. DW-1/A) in 1988, which evidenced the defendant’s possession and purchase of the land from the plaintiffs’ grandfather. Relying on Section 65 of the Limitation Act, which prescribes a 12-year limitation period for possession suits, the Court found the plaintiffs’ claim unsustainable. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that the agreement, though not conferring title, was admissible for the collateral purpose of proving possession, and the plaintiffs were estopped by their conduct and acquiescence, having failed to challenge the defendant’s possession during the lifetime of their grandfather and father, who were signatories to the agreement. The Court reiterated the limited scope of interference in second appeals under Section 100 CPC, citing Hero Vinoth (minor) vs. Seshammal (2006) 5 SCC 545 and Navaneethammal vs. Arjuna Chetty AIR 1996 SC 3521, which mandate that concurrent findings of fact should not be disturbed unless a substantial question of law is involved, and the High Court cannot re-appreciate evidence to substitute its own findings. The demarcation report relied upon by the plaintiffs was also disregarded as it was conducted without the defendant’s presence.

RSA/199/2023

Parties: PARAS RAM VS PREM CHAND & ANOTHER

Date: 06-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE ROMESH VERMA

Area of Law: Property Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh dismissed the Regular Second Appeal, affirming the concurrent findings of the lower courts which decreed a preliminary partition of the suit land. The Court held that the plaintiff, as a co-owner, was entitled to partition, a right substantiated by the jamabandi for the year 2006-2007 (Ext.PW1/B), which clearly established joint ownership. The appellant’s contention that a previous suit for injunction, dismissed due to the plaintiff being out of possession, barred the present partition suit was rejected. The Court reasoned that the previous injunction suit was simpliciter, and the title of the parties was not adjudicated therein, thus incidental findings on title in that case would not constitute res judicata for a partition suit. The defendants, having been proceeded against ex parte in the trial court and failing to challenge that order, could not now dispute the established facts. The Court found no question of law, much less a substantial question of law, arising in the appeal, given the clear documentary evidence of co-ownership and the absence of any rebuttal by the defendants. The judgment underscored that a co-owner has an inherent right to seek partition, and the lower courts correctly appreciated the evidence.

EX.P./394/2024

Parties: AKASHDEEP SHARMA & ORS. VS STATE OF H.P.

Date: 06-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Service Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh disposed of Execution Petition No. 3942024, noting the respondent’s compliance affidavit which confirmed that the contractual services of all petitioners had been allowed to be counted for pensionary benefits. This decision was based on the petitioners’ exercise of their option under office order dated 01.11.2024, a copy of which was appended to the compliance affidavit. The Court, taking into consideration the affidavit and accompanying documents, found that the primary grievance leading to the execution petition had been addressed. While disposing of the petition, the Court prudently reserved liberty to the petitioners to pursue appropriate legal remedies for any remaining grievances that might arise in the future, thereby ensuring that their rights were not foreclosed by this disposal. This approach reflects a pragmatic judicial disposition, acknowledging the resolution of the immediate issue while preserving avenues for further recourse if necessary. The Court’s order effectively closed the execution proceedings, contingent upon the satisfactory implementation of the stated compliance.

EX.P./1542/2025

Parties: RAMESH KUMAR & ORS. VS STATE OF H.P. & ORS.

Date: 06-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Civil Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh disposed of Execution Petition No. 1542/2025, noting the respondents’ compliance with previous orders. The learned Additional Advocate General confirmed the deposition of costs and presented an office order dated 06.04.2026, which addressed the petitioners’ cases. Consequently, the Court found no further cause for execution, concluding that the immediate grievances leading to the petition had been resolved. However, the Court prudently reserved liberty to the petitioners to pursue appropriate legal remedies should any surviving grievances necessitate future action, thereby ensuring that their rights are not foreclosed by this disposal. This decision underscores the principle that execution proceedings are contingent upon the non-compliance with a decree or order, and once compliance is demonstrated, the execution petition stands satisfied, albeit with a caveat for potential future claims arising from the same underlying dispute. The Court’s approach reflects a pragmatic resolution, balancing the finality of the execution process with the petitioners’ right to address any residual issues.

CR.A/406/2015

Parties: STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH VS TARA CHAND

Date: 06-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE VIVEK SINGH THAKUR, JUSTICE RANJAN SHARMA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh dismissed the State’s appeal under Section 378 Cr.P.C., upholding the acquittal of the respondent-accused for an offence under Section 20 of the NDPS Act, 1985, concerning the recovery of 450 grams of Cannabis-Charas. The decisive ground for upholding the acquittal was the prosecution’s failure to comply with the mandatory provisions of Section 50 of the NDPS Act. The Court found that the Investigating Officer improperly offered a third option for personal search before a police officer, in addition to the statutorily mandated options of a Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate, thereby vitiating the recovery. This non-compliance was deemed fatal to the prosecution’s case, rendering the recovered contraband inadmissible as evidence. The Court relied on the Constitutional Bench decisions in State of Punjab versus Baldev Singh, (1999) 6 SCC 172, and Vijaysinh Chandubha Jadega versus State of Gujrat, (2011) 1 SCC 609, which established that informing the accused of their right to be searched before a Gazetted Officer or Magistrate is imperative, and non-compliance renders the recovery suspect and vitiates conviction based solely on such recovery. Further reliance was placed on State of Rajasthan v. Parmanand and another, (2014) 5 SCC 345, and Ranjan Kumar Chadha versus State of Himachal Pradesh, 2023 SCC Online SC 1262, which explicitly held that offering a third option for search before a police officer defeats the protection under Section 50. The Court also noted glaring discrepancies in the prosecution’s evidence, further weakening its case.

CRMPM/324/2026

Parties: RAMESH KUMAR ALIAS AJU VS STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH

Date: 06-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court granted regular bail to the petitioner, Ramesh Kumar alias Aju, in a case involving Sections 20 and 29 of the NDPS Act, finding that the prosecution’s evidence, primarily based on a bank transaction and call detail records (CDRs), was insufficient to establish a prima facie case connecting him to the recovery of a commercial quantity of charas. The Court relied on its previous judgment in Saina Devi vs State of Himachal Pradesh 2022 Law Suit (HP) 211, which held that a person cannot be kept in custody solely based on CDRs, and further noted that disclosure statements of co-accused cannot be read against the petitioner as per Tofan Singh Vs State of Tamil Nadu, 2021 4 SCC 1. Additionally, the Court cited Amal E vs State of Kerala 2023:KER:39393 to underscore that financial transactions alone are not sufficient to connect an accused with the commission of a crime under the NDPS Act, thereby raising reasonable doubt regarding the satisfaction of the twin conditions under Section 37 of the NDPS Act. Considering the completion of the investigation and the lack of other material evidence, the Court concluded that no fruitful purpose would be served by continued detention, ordering release on bail subject to conditions.

CRMPM/350/2026

Parties: SACHIN KUMAR VS STATE OF HP

Date: 06-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court granted regular bail to the petitioner, Sachin Kumar, in FIR No. 68 of 2025 under Sections 21 and 29 of the NDPS Act, primarily on the ground of violation of his right to a speedy trial, noting his incarceration for over a year without trial commencement. The Court, while acknowledging the recovery of 8 grams of heroin from a vehicle he occupied, which constitutes an intermediate quantity, rejected the prosecution’s contention that the presence of multiple packets indicated drug peddling rather than addiction, deeming it premature. Relying on the principle established in Shubham Chaudhary vs. State of H.P. 2026:HHC:6937, the Court held that further detention is unjustified where an accused has undergone a substantial part of the potential sentence. Furthermore, the Court, citing Ayub Khan v. State of Rajasthan, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3763, held that criminal antecedents alone may not be a sufficient ground to deny bail in cases of long incarceration. The Court also referenced Madan Lal versus State of H.P. (2003) 7 SCC 465 to establish conscious possession by all vehicle occupants. Bail was granted subject to conditions including a bond of ₹1,00,000/-, non-intimidation of witnesses, regular trial attendance, and restrictions on travel and communication.

CRMPM/407/2026

Parties: MOHAMMAD DEEN VS STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH

Date: 06-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court dismissed the petitioner’s application for regular bail in FIR No. 22 of 2026, registered under Sections 20 and 25 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, for the recovery of 109 grams of charas. The Court held that despite the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act not applying to intermediate quantities, bail cannot be claimed as a matter of right, emphasizing that each case must be adjudged on its own facts. The Court relied on the principles laid down in Pinki v. State of U.P., (2025) 7 SCC 314, which reiterated the factors for granting bail, including the nature of the charge, evidence, punishment, likelihood of thwarting justice, and criminal antecedents, as originally articulated in Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P., (1978) 1 SCC 240. Further, the Court noted the petitioner’s criminal antecedents, specifically FIR No. 28 of 2023 under Sections 20 and 25 of the NDPS Act, and cited Champa vs. State of H.P., 2025:HHC:28899, which held that criminal antecedents, particularly for similar offences, disentitle an accused from bail. The Court also considered the societal impact of drug offences, referencing Khushi Ram Gupta v. State of H.P., 2022 SCC OnLine HP 3779, and the Supreme Court’s observations in Union of India v Namdeo Ashruba Nakade, SLP (Crl.) 9792/2025, regarding the increasing menace of drug abuse.

CRMPM/413/2026

Parties: ABHAY VS STATE OF HP

Date: 06-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court dismissed the petitioner’s regular bail application in FIR No. 87 of 2025, registered under Sections 20 and 29 of the NDPS Act and Section 25 of the Arms Act, finding that the petitioner failed to satisfy the twin conditions of Section 37 of the NDPS Act. The Court held that the petitioner was prima facie in conscious possession of a commercial quantity of charas (1.044 kg), relying on Madan Lal versus State of H.P. (2003) 7 SCC 465, which established that all occupants of a vehicle are in conscious possession of contraband recovered therefrom if not concealed. The argument regarding discrepancy in contraband weight was rejected, citing Sohan Lal alias Bhau and others Vs. State of H.P. and others, 2019 STPL 3203 HP, which mandates that the Magistrate’s certificate under Section 52-A of the NDPS Act prevails. The Court reiterated that the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act apply, requiring satisfaction that there are reasonable grounds to believe the accused is not guilty and unlikely to commit further offences while on bail, a standard higher than prima facie grounds, as established in Union of India Versus Niyazuddin & Another (2018) 13 SCC 738 and State of Kerala Versus Rajesh, AIR 2020 SC 721. The Court further rejected the contention that prolonged incarceration alone warrants bail, referencing Union of India vs. Vijin K. Varghese 2025:INSC:1316, which held that the twin conditions of Section 37 must still be met.

CRMPM/432/2026

Parties: KEWAL VS STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH

Date: 06-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh dismissed the petitioner’s regular bail application under Sections 20 and 29 of the NDPS Act, primarily on the ground that no material change in circumstances justified a fresh application after a previous dismissal and withdrawal of an SLP from the Supreme Court. The Court, relying on State of Maharashtra Vs. Captain Buddhikota Subha Rao (1989) Suppl. 2 SCC 605, reiterated that a subsequent bail application requires a substantial change in the fact situation, not merely cosmetic alterations. Further, citing Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan @ Pappu Yadav (2004) 7 SCC 528, the Court emphasized the onus to consider previous rejections and provide specific reasons for allowing a subsequent application. The Court found no such change, noting the petitioner’s continued failure to satisfy the twin conditions of Section 37 of the NDPS Act, which apply due to the commercial quantity of charas recovered. The argument of delayed trial was also rejected, as the progress of recording 16 out of 25 witnesses did not indicate undue delay attributable to the prosecution, and Union of India vs. Vijin K. Varghese 2025:INSC:1316 affirmed that prolonged incarceration alone cannot circumvent Section 37 rigours.

CRMPM/1786/2025

Parties: VISHAVDEEP ALIAS VISHWADEEP ALIAS AALA VS STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH

Date: 06-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE SUSHIL KUKREJA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court dismissed the petitioner’s successive bail application filed under Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita for offences under Sections 21 and 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, finding no substantial change in circumstances since the previous dismissal. The Court, relying on State of Maharashtra Vs. Captain Buddhikota Subha Rao, AIR 1989 SC 2292, and State of M.P vs. Kajad, (2001) 7 SCC 673, reiterated that successive bail applications are permissible only upon establishing a substantial, not merely cosmetic, change in circumstances, and without such change, the application constitutes an impermissible review of the earlier order. The Court further held, citing Chenna Boyanna Krishna Yadav Vs. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 1 SCC 242, and Kalyan Chandra Sarkar ,vs Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7SCC 528, that mere prolonged incarceration (over two years and ten months in this case) or the unlikelihood of an immediate conclusion of trial, particularly in serious offences involving commercial quantities of contraband (266 grams of chitta/heroin), does not, by itself, warrant bail, especially when the trial is progressing with due expedition.

CRMPM/2622/2025

Parties: RAVI KAUSHAL VS STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH

Date: 06-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh granted pre-arrest bail to the petitioners in FIR No. 45 of 2025, registered under Sections 79, 115(2), 190, 191(2), 191(3), and 352 of the Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) and Section 8 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act (POCSO), primarily on the ground that the allegations of molestation of minor daughters were not present in the initial FIR but emerged during investigation, suggesting an “improvement” in the informant’s version. The Court noted the existence of a counter-FIR (FIR No. 46 of 2025) lodged by the petitioners against the informant party, indicating two conflicting narratives of the incident. Relying on the principle established in P. Chidambaram v. Directorate of Enforcement (2019) 9 SCC 24 and Srikant Upadhyay v. State of Bihar 2024 SCC OnLine SC 282, that pre-arrest bail is an extraordinary power to be exercised sparingly, and Pratibha Manchanda v. State of Haryana (2023) 8 SCC 181, which mandates balancing individual rights with public interest and fair investigation, the Court found that since the charge sheet had been filed, custodial interrogation was no longer required. The Court also referenced Devinder Kumar Bansal v. State of Punjab (2025) 4 SCC 493, emphasizing that anticipatory bail can be granted in exceptional circumstances where false implication is evident. Consequently, the petitions were allowed, and the petitioners were released on bail subject to conditions, including not intimidating witnesses or leaving their address without intimation.

CRMP/4978/2025

Parties: GULSHER AHMAD & OTHERS. VS STATE OF H.P.

Date: 06-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE VIVEK SINGH THAKUR, JUSTICE RANJAN SHARMA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh dismissed the application for acquittal filed by Gulsher Ahmad, Nazeer Ahmad, and Haneef, who were convicted under Sections 368, 342 IPC, and Section 17 of the Protection of Children From Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act). The Court found no merit in their contention that there was no evidence linking them to the offence or that they were unaware of the victim’s minority. The decisive ground for dismissal was the clear evidence, including the victim’s consistent deposition under Section 161 Cr.P.C. and Section 164 Cr.P.C., which explicitly stated that the applicants were informed of the victim’s minor status by co-accused Taliv Hussain and yet provided shelter to him and the victim in their homes. The Court emphasized that the applicants’ actions and illegal omission to report the kidnapping, despite knowing the victim was a minor, prima facie indicated abetment of the offence, making them liable under Section 17 of the POCSO Act, which punishes abetment with the same severity as the abetted offence. The Court noted that the applicants’ statements under Section 313 Cr.P.C. offered only a general denial without specifically refuting knowledge of the victim’s age or providing shelter, thereby failing to demonstrate a fair chance of acquittal.

Parties: PRADEEP KUMAR AND ANOTHER VS STATE OF H.P AND ANOTHER

Date: 02-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Service Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh dismissed the writ petition challenging the criteria for marks allocated for employment in Primary Agriculture Co-operative Societies, holding that the petition, in its present form, did not survive. The decisive ground for this conclusion was the submission by the learned Additional Advocate General that the impugned criteria, as set out in the order dated 09.07.2019 (Annexure P-6), had subsequently undergone amendment by an order dated 30.06.2021, a copy of which was placed on record. Consequently, the Court found that the original challenge had become infructuous due to the supervening amendment of the very criteria under dispute. The Court clarified that the petitioners retained the liberty to seek appropriate legal remedy should they feel aggrieved by the fresh criteria established by the amended order. This disposition effectively rendered the pending miscellaneous application(s) also infructuous. The judgment implicitly relies on the principle that a challenge to a superseded instrument becomes academic, necessitating a fresh cause of action against the amended provisions.

CWP/12102/2025

Parties: ANANT RAM NEGI VS STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH & ORS

Date: 02-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Administrative Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh set aside the Deputy Commissioner, Shimla’s order dated 08.05.2025, which dismissed the petitioner’s Revision Petition No. 7/2025 under Section 148 of the Himachal Pradesh Panchayati Raj Act, 1994, as time-barred. The decisive ground for this ruling was the clear infraction of principles of natural justice, as the petitioner was not afforded an opportunity to explain the delay in filing the revision petition before its dismissal on limitation grounds. The Court noted that the original proceedings in Case No. 8A/2019 before the Collector Sub Division Kotkhai, despite being “decided” on 07.06.2023, were inexplicably continued with numerous subsequent hearings attended by the petitioner until 12.11.2024, creating ambiguity regarding the effective date of the final order. Consequently, the Court directed the Deputy Commissioner, Shimla, to hear the matter afresh, providing all parties an opportunity of hearing in accordance with law. This judgment underscores the fundamental requirement of audi alteram partem even in matters concerning limitation.

CWP/16382/2025

Parties: M/S TILOKSONS BREWERY & DISTILLERY VS STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH & ORS.

Date: 02-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Administrative Law

The High Court quashed the cancellation of the petitioner’s excise licenses, holding that the Commissioner State Taxes & Excise-cum-Financial Commissioner (Excise) failed to exercise an independent and unbiased mind, being unduly influenced by the Collector (Excise)’s non-statutory recommendations and assuming the role of a judge in his own cause. The Court found that the inspection team, which formed the basis of the cancellation, was not constituted in consonance with Section 6 and Section 8 of the Himachal Pradesh Excise Act, 2011, as amended by the Himachal Pradesh Excise (Amendment) Act, 2024, and the Notification dated 26.04.2025, which mandated the presence of an Executive Magistrate and a Police Officer of specified ranks. Relying on the principle from Nazir Ahmad vs. King Emperor (AIR 1936 PC 253) that “where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all,” the Court noted the procedural impropriety. While not vitiating the entire inspection due to the registration of an FIR and the petitioner’s admitted defence, the Court directed the Commissioner to re-adjudicate the matter afresh, disregarding the Collector’s recommendations and pleadings, ensuring an independent and impartial decision within two months, and mandating strict adherence to statutory provisions for future inspections.

COPC/477/2024

Parties: LOK PAL & ORS. VS ONKAR CHAND SHARMA & ANR.

Date: 02-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Civil Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in Lok Pal & Ors. v. Onkar Chand Sharma & Anr., COPC No. 477/2024, decided on April 2, 2026, closed the contempt proceedings, discharging the notices issued to the respondents. The Court’s decision was predicated upon the compliance affidavit filed by the respondents, the instructions placed on record, and the submissions made by the learned Senior Advocate for the petitioners, which collectively indicated that the respondents had substantially complied with the underlying order, thereby obviating the need for further action in the contempt petition. While closing the proceedings, the Court judiciously reserved liberty to the petitioners to seek appropriate legal remedy for any surviving grievances in accordance with law, should such a necessity arise in the future, thereby ensuring that the petitioners’ rights are not foreclosed by the closure of the present contempt action. This approach aligns with the principle that contempt proceedings are primarily intended to ensure compliance with court orders rather than to punish, and once compliance is achieved, the proceedings may be closed, subject to safeguarding future recourse for the aggrieved party. The Court did not cite any specific statutory sections or precedents in this particular order, relying instead on the factual matrix of compliance.

COPC/1285/2025

Parties: INDRA DEVI VS ER. R.K.VERMA

Date: 02-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Service Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in COPC No. 1285 of 2025, closed the contempt proceedings initiated by Indra Devi against Er. R.K. Verma, discharging the notice issued to the respondent. The Court’s decision was predicated on the respondent’s compliance with the previous order, specifically the payment of the imposed cost to the petitioner, as confirmed by the learned Deputy Advocate General and supported by a receipt placed on record. Crucially, the Court noted the submission of office instructions dated 30.03.2026 from the Executive Engineer, Rajgarh Division, HPPWD, Rajgarh, District Sirmour, H.P., which indicated that the petitioner’s pension case had been reconsidered and allowed, albeit subject to the outcome of an LPA filed by the respondent, and had been forwarded to the Accountant General, Himachal Pradesh, on 13.03.2026. Consequently, with the core grievance addressed, the Court deemed the contempt purged, reserving the petitioner’s right to pursue appropriate remedies for any surviving grievances in accordance with law at a future stage. This closure underscores the principle that contempt proceedings are remedial and coercive, aimed at securing compliance with judicial orders, and are typically discharged upon such compliance.

EX.P/16/2024

Parties: KANTA DEVI AND OTHERS VS STATE OF H.P AND ANOTHER

Date: 02-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Civil Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in Ex. Petition No. 16 of 2024, disposed of the execution petition as fully satisfied, following the submission by the petitioners’ counsel that the judgment and decree had been completely complied with. The Court noted that the respondent-State had deposited the entire decreetal amount, including all its components. This disposition was based on the factual ascertainment that the financial obligations arising from the underlying judgment and decree had been met, thereby rendering the execution proceedings infructuous. The Court’s decision reflects the fundamental principle that the purpose of execution proceedings is to ensure the enforcement of a judgment, and once such enforcement is achieved, the petition for execution ceases to have any further legal efficacy. While no specific statutory sections or precedents were explicitly cited in this brief order, the underlying legal framework for execution of decrees under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, implicitly guided the Court’s determination that satisfaction of the decree terminates the execution process. Consequently, all pending miscellaneous applications were also disposed of.

FAO/4219/2013

Parties: SUDHA DEVI & OTHERS VS BRIJ LAL & ANOTHER

Date: 02-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE SUSHIL KUKREJA

Area of Law: Civil Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in an appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, enhanced the compensation awarded to the appellants/claimants, modifying the impugned award dated 30.10.2012. The Court re-evaluated the compensation for the death of Gagan, who died in a motor vehicle accident on 15.06.2009, due to the rash and negligent driving of a truck owned by respondent No. 1. While upholding the Tribunal’s assessment of the deceased’s income at Rs. 4000/- per month due to lack of documentary evidence, the Court applied the principles established in National Insurance Company Limited Versus Pranay Sethi & others, (2017) 16 SCC 680, adding 40% for future prospects as the deceased was 35 years old. Further, in line with Sarla Verma & others vs. Delhi Transport Corporation and another, (2009) 6 SCC 121, a 1/3rd deduction for personal expenses was applied, and a multiplier of ‘16’ was used. The Court also enhanced conventional heads of compensation, including loss of estate, funeral expenses, and spousal and parental consortium, by 10% every three years from 2017, as per Pranay Sethi and Sunita & ors. Vs. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. & ors., Civil Appeal No.9538 of 2025, and Magma General Insurance Company Limited Vs. Nanu Ram alias Chuhru Ram & others, (2018) 18 Supreme Court Cases 130, which expanded the definition of consortium. Consequently, the total compensation was increased to Rs. 9,16,386/-, payable by respondent No. 1.

RFA/264/2011

Parties: LAND ACQUISITION COLLECTOR VS REGISTRAR (JUDICIAL) ADMINISTRATOR-GENERAL HIGH COURT OF H.P. & OTHERS

Date: 02-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE SUSHIL KUKREJA

Area of Law: Land Acquisition Law

The High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the Land Acquisition Collector under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, challenging an award dated 27.12.2010 by the learned Reference Court which enhanced compensation. The decisive ground for dismissal was the Collector’s lack of locus standi to challenge an order passed by an appellate authority that set aside his own quasi-judicial award. The Court held that an adjudicating authority, exercising quasi-judicial powers, cannot, in the absence of specific statutory conferment, prefer an appeal against an order of an appellate body that has set aside its decision. This principle was firmly established by the Supreme Court in Mohtesham Mohd. Ismail Vs Special Director, Enforcement Directorate and another [(2007) 8 SCC 254], which held that a quasi-judicial authority, even if an officer of the Central Government, acts as an impartial tribunal and cannot claim a litigative interest to challenge an appellate order setting aside its own judgment. Consequently, the Collector, having acted as a quasi-judicial authority, could not become a judge in his own cause, rendering the appeal not maintainable.

CWPOA/781/2019

Parties: KIRPA RAM VS STATE OF HP AND OTHERS

Date: 02-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JIYA LAL BHARDWAJ

Area of Law: Labor Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh allowed the petition, directing the respondents to grant gratuity to the petitioner under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, considering his entire service period from 1981 to 31.03.2010, after adjusting any amount already paid, within three months, failing which interest at 6% per annum would accrue. The Court’s decisive ground was that once daily wage service is regularized, the entire service, including the daily wage period, must be counted for gratuity, as established in Netram Sahu vs. State of Chhattisgarh and another, (2018) 5 SCC 430. The Court rejected the respondents’ argument that the matter should be adjourned sine die due to a reference to a Larger Bench in Dhansai Sahu vs. State of Chhattisgarh and others, (2020) 19 SCC 808, holding that judicial propriety, as per Rajnish Kumar Rai vs. Union of India and others, 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 842, demands adherence to existing Supreme Court precedents until a Larger Bench pronounces otherwise. The Court further dismissed the contention based on Section 2(e) of the Gratuity Act, reiterating that the Act applies to daily wagers whose services are regularized, emphasizing the welfare nature of the legislation.

CWPOA/2016/2019

Parties: PURNA NAND SHARMA VS STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH AND OTHERS

Date: 02-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JIYA LAL BHARDWAJ

Area of Law: Service Law

The High Court dismissed the petition challenging the disciplinary action against the petitioner, an Animal Husbandry Assistant, for contracting a second marriage in contravention of Rule 21 of the CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964. The Court held that the petitioner’s challenge to the original penalty orders dated 29.04.2008 and 04.12.2008 was untenable as these had merged into the subsequent revisional order dated 29.03.2013, which the petitioner failed to challenge. The Court distinguished the standard of proof in departmental enquiries from criminal cases, relying on Capt. M. Paul Anthony versus Bharat Gold Mines Limited and another, (1999) 3 SCC 679, which established that departmental proceedings require proof based on a preponderance of probabilities, unlike the “beyond reasonable doubt” standard in criminal matters. Furthermore, the Court reiterated that the Disciplinary Authority is not required to assign detailed reasons if it accepts the Enquiry Officer’s findings, citing Boloram Bordoloi versus Lakhimi Gaolia Bank and others, (2021) 3 SCC 806. The Court, exercising its limited scope under Article 226 of the Constitution, as articulated in State of Andhra Pradesh and others versus S. Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963 SC 1723, refused to re-appreciate evidence or act as an appellate authority, finding no perversity or procedural violation in the enquiry or the penalty imposed.

CRMMO/1295/2024

Parties: PARAMJIT ARORA AND ANOTHER VS STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH

Date: 02-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE SANDEEP SHARMA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court quashed criminal proceedings against the petitioners, Directors of M/s Health Biotech Limited, initiated under Sections 18(a)(i) and 27(d) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, for manufacturing and selling a “not of standard quality” drug. The Court held that the complaint lacked specific averments establishing the petitioners’ vicarious liability under Section 34 of the Act, as it failed to demonstrate their direct involvement in the company’s day-to-day affairs or manufacturing activities. The Court emphasized that merely holding a directorship does not automatically impute liability, especially when an authorized technical director was appointed and responsible for manufacturing. Relying on precedents such as S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Neeta Bhalla and Pawan Kumar Goel v. State of U.P., the Court reiterated that for vicarious liability, the complaint must clearly spell out how and in what manner a director was in charge of and responsible for the company’s business. The Court concluded that continuing the proceedings would constitute an abuse of process under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (formerly Section 482 Cr.P.C.), as the prosecution’s case against the petitioners was bound to fail without such specific allegations.

CWP/35/2020

Parties: BIDHI CHAND VS STATE OF H.P. AND OTHERS

Date: 01-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Civil Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in CWP No. 35 of 2020, dismissed the writ petition filed by Bidhi Chand against the State of H.P. and others, as withdrawn. The decisive ground for this dismissal was the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Daleep Singh Kaith, who stated that he was under instructions to withdraw the writ petition. Consequently, the Court, presided over by Ms. Justice Jyotsna Rewal Dua, acceded to this request, thereby dismissing the petition along with any pending miscellaneous application(s). This order reflects the procedural aspect where a petitioner retains the right to withdraw their petition, provided such a request is formally made through counsel and accepted by the Court. The judgment did not delve into the merits of the case, nor did it rely on any specific statutory provisions or precedents, as the matter was resolved purely on the basis of the petitioner’s voluntary withdrawal. The Court’s action was a straightforward acceptance of the petitioner’s decision to not pursue the litigation further, concluding the proceedings without a substantive adjudication of the claims raised therein.

CWP/2726/2019

Parties: JASHWANT SINGH AND ANOTHER VS STATE OF H.P. AND OTHERS

Date: 01-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Civil Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in CWP No.2726 of 2019, dismissed the writ petition filed by Jashwant Singh and another against the State of H.P. and others, as withdrawn. The decisive ground for this dismissal was the submission by the learned vice counsel appearing for the petitioners, who stated that she was under instructions to withdraw the writ petition. Consequently, the Court, presided over by Ms. Justice Jyotsna Rewal Dua, acceded to this request, thereby dismissing the present writ petition along with any pending miscellaneous application(s). This outcome reflects the procedural aspect of litigation where parties retain the right to withdraw their petitions, and courts generally permit such withdrawals unless there are compelling reasons to deny them, such as prejudice to other parties or public interest concerns, none of which were articulated or appeared to be present in this instance. The Court’s action is consistent with the principle that a petitioner is dominus litis and can choose to discontinue proceedings, a fundamental tenet of adversarial jurisprudence. No specific statutory sections or precedents were cited in the judgment as the dismissal was based purely on the petitioner’s withdrawal request.

CWP/4242/2026

Parties: STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH & ANR. VS PAWAN KUMAR

Date: 01-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Labor Law

The High Court dismissed the State’s petitions challenging orders of the Deputy Labour Commissioner-cum-Appellate Authority, Himachal Pradesh, which directed payment of gratuity under Section 7(7) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972. The Court held that the issue of law involved in the present cases was identical to that decided in State of H.P. & Ors. Versus Binu Ram (CWP No.15443/2024, decided on 24.02.2026) and Bindumati Versus State of H.P. and others (CWP No.4632/2025, decided on 07.11.2025). The Court noted that the decision in Bindumati had been accepted and implemented by the respondents therein, and the subsequent Binu Ram judgment was based on Bindumati. Consequently, the Court found that the legal issue was already covered against the petitioners-State by these prior decisions. Applying the principle of stare decisis and following the reasoning established in Binu Ram and Bindumati, the Court concluded that the present writ petitions lacked merit, thereby affirming the gratuity payment orders.

CWP/4254/2026

Parties: DUMNU RAM AND ANOTHER VS STATE OF H.P. AND OTHERS

Date: 01-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Property Law

The High Court dismissed the petitioners’ challenge to the Divisional Commissioner’s order dated 13.01.2026, which rejected their revision petition under Section 54 of the H.P. Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1971. The Court affirmed that the orders dated 01.03.2000 by the Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings and 05.06.2000 by the Consolidation Officer had attained finality, having been passed in the presence of the parties, including the petitioners’ predecessors-in-interest, and not separately assailed. The petitioners’ contention regarding violation of natural justice was rightly rejected, given their repeated unsuccessful legal challenges, including CWP No.398 of 2000, CWP No.714 of 2002, Civil Suit No.91/2000, and RSA No.208 of 2016, all of which were dismissed. Crucially, the Court noted that the land in question was de-notified on 30.12.2005, rendering the revision petition non-maintainable under Section 15(2) of the Act, as consolidation operations had concluded. Thus, the Divisional Commissioner’s decision was found to be without infirmity.

CWP/4255/2026

Parties: VISHAL UPPAL VS STATE OF H.P. AND OTHERS

Date: 01-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Administrative Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in CWP No.4255 of 2026, dismissed the writ petition filed by Vishal Uppal as withdrawn, accepting the petitioner’s prayer to avail an alternate remedy available in law against the impugned order. The decisive ground for this outcome was the petitioner’s express intention, conveyed through learned vice counsel, to pursue an alternative legal recourse, thereby rendering the continuation of the writ petition unnecessary. The Court, therefore, did not delve into the merits of the impugned order or the substantive legal arguments that might have been raised, but rather acceded to the procedural request for withdrawal. This decision aligns with the principle that courts generally permit withdrawal of petitions when a party wishes to pursue an alternative, equally efficacious remedy, thereby promoting judicial economy and allowing parties to choose their preferred legal avenue. The order effectively closes the writ proceedings without prejudice to the petitioner’s right to initiate appropriate proceedings elsewhere. The Court’s acceptance of the withdrawal request, along with any pending miscellaneous application(s), signifies a procedural closure based on the petitioner’s election of remedy.

COPC/161/2026

Parties: AVINASH KUMAR VS SH. ADITYA NEGI

Date: 01-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Civil Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in COPC No.161 of 2026, closed the contempt proceedings initiated by Avinash Kumar against Sh. Aditya Negi, discharging the notice issued to the respondent. The Court’s decision was predicated on the respondent having placed on record a consideration order dated 31.03.2026, which was passed in compliance with the directions previously issued in the judgment forming the basis of the contempt petition. Despite the petitioner expressing grievances regarding this consideration order, the Court deemed the primary objective of the contempt proceedings—securing compliance with its earlier directions—to have been met. Consequently, the Court held that while the contempt action itself was no longer maintainable given the respondent’s ostensible compliance, the petitioner retained the liberty to pursue appropriate legal remedies for the redressal of any surviving grievances, including those specifically pertaining to the consideration order dated 31.03.2026. This approach underscores the principle that contempt proceedings are primarily for enforcing judicial orders, and once compliance, even if disputed in its efficacy, is demonstrated, the contempt jurisdiction is typically exhausted, leaving other avenues open for substantive challenges.

RSA/120/2021

Parties: SANSAR CHAND VS LEELA DHAR & ANOTHER

Date: 01-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE ROMESH VERMA

Area of Law: Civil Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh dismissed the second appeal, affirming the concurrent findings of the lower courts which rejected the appellant’s suit for specific performance of an oral agreement to sell. The Court held that the appellant failed to prove the existence of an oral agreement to sell, the payment of sale consideration, or the delivery of possession, noting that the revenue records (Jamabandi Ext. PA for 2009-2010) contradicted the claim of possession. A decisive factor was the appellant’s unexplained delay of over 15 years in seeking specific performance, which no prudent person would exhibit after paying a substantial amount. The Court reiterated that in a second appeal under Section 100 of the CPC, interference with concurrent findings of fact is unwarranted unless a substantial question of law is involved, as established in Hero Vinoth (minor) vs. Seshammal, (2006) 5 SCC 545. The Court found no perversity or illegality in the lower courts’ judgments, concluding that the appellant presented no substantial question of law, but merely sought re-appreciation of facts, which is impermissible in a second appeal.

EX.P./33/2026

Parties: VIRENDER SINGH VS STATE OF H.P. & ANR.

Date: 01-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Service Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh disposed of Execution Petition No. 33/2026, noting that the learned Additional Advocate General had placed on record office instructions dated 23.03.2026 from the Director School Education. The Court’s decision to dispose of the petition was predicated on the submission of these instructions, which presumably addressed the core grievance leading to the execution proceedings. Crucially, the Court reserved liberty to the petitioner, Virender Singh, to seek appropriate remedy in accordance with law for any surviving grievance should the necessity arise in the future. This reservation ensures that while the immediate execution petition is concluded based on the submitted instructions, the petitioner’s rights are not foreclosed if the underlying issues are not fully resolved or new issues emerge. The judgment implicitly relies on the principle of judicial economy, concluding the present execution proceedings upon the apparent compliance or resolution indicated by the official instructions, while maintaining an avenue for future recourse. This approach reflects a pragmatic judicial management of execution matters, balancing immediate closure with the protection of litigant’s rights. All pending miscellaneous applications were also disposed of as a consequence of this primary order.

CR.A/335/2015

Parties: STATE OF H.P. VS PURSHOTTAM SINGH

Date: 01-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court dismissed the State’s appeal against the acquittal of the respondent for offences under Section 447 IPC and Section 33 of the Indian Forest Act, affirming the trial court’s finding that the prosecution failed to prove the requisite intent for criminal trespass and the necessary procedural compliance for Forest Act violations. The Court, relying on Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand (2025) 5 SCC 433 and State of M.P. v. Ramveer Singh 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1743, reiterated that interference with an acquittal is warranted only if the judgment is patently perverse, based on misreading of evidence, or if no two reasonable views are possible. The Court found that the FIR was improperly lodged, citing Param Dev vs State of H.P. 2015:HHC:236, which held that FIRs for encroachment should only be lodged for areas exceeding 10 bighas, whereas the alleged encroachment was 5-02 bighas. Furthermore, applying Mathri v. State of Punjab 1963 SCC OnLine SC 180 and Rajinder v. State of Haryana (1995) 5 SCC 187, the Court held that the prosecution failed to prove the intent to intimidate, insult, or annoy, which is essential for Section 447 IPC. For the Indian Forest Act charge, the Court, referencing State of H.P. vs. Amin Chand 1992 (2) Shim.LC 169, concluded that the prosecution did not establish the mandatory publication of the notification under Section 31, read with Section 30, thereby rendering Section 33 inapplicable.

CR.A/376/2014

Parties: STATE OF H.P. VS KALYAN SINGH

Date: 01-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh dismissed the State’s appeal against the acquittal of the respondent for offences under Section 447 IPC and Section 26 of the Indian Forest Act, finding no perversity in the trial court’s judgment. The Court affirmed the acquittal primarily because the demarcation of the alleged encroached land was not conducted as per law, specifically lacking the establishment of three permanent points and the accused’s presence, as mandated by the principles laid down in State of H.P. v. Laxmi Nand, 1992 SCC OnLine HP 41 and State of H.P. vs. Joginder Singh 1992 (1) Shim. LC 339. Furthermore, the prosecution failed to prove the requisite intent to “intimidate, insult or annoy” for criminal trespass under Section 447 IPC, as established in Mathri v. State of Punjab, AIR 1964 SC 986 and Rajinder v. State of Haryana, (1995) 5 SCC 187. Crucially, no notification declaring the disputed Khasra numbers as a Reserved Forest under Section 4 of the Indian Forest Act was produced, a mandatory requirement for attracting Section 26, as reiterated in State of H.P. vs. Amin Chand 1992 (2) Shim.LC 169. The Court concluded that the trial court’s view was reasonable, warranting no interference in an appeal against acquittal.

CR.R/81/2016

Parties: GURU DEV VS STATE OF HP

Date: 01-04-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court dismissed the criminal revision, upholding the concurrent findings of conviction and sentence against the petitioner for offences under Sections 279 and 304A of the Indian Penal Code, arising from a fatal motor vehicle accident. The Court affirmed that the revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 Cr.P.C. is limited to rectifying patent defects, errors of jurisdiction, or law, and does not permit re-appreciation of evidence unless findings are perverse or grossly erroneous, as established in Malkeet Singh Gill v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2022) 8 SCC 204, and State of Gujarat v. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, (2023) 17 SCC 688. The Court found no perversity in the lower courts’ reliance on the corroborated testimonies of eyewitnesses Narinder Kumar (PW1) and HC Suman Kumar (PW8), supported by the post-mortem report indicating crush injuries, which collectively proved the petitioner’s negligent driving and failure to maintain sufficient distance as mandated by Rule 23 of the Rules of the Road Regulations, 1989, a principle reiterated in Nishan Singh v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., (2018) 6 SCC 765. The Court further held that the one-year simple imprisonment for Section 304A IPC was not excessive, emphasizing the need for deterrent sentences in cases of rash and negligent driving causing death, citing Dalbir Singh Versus State of Haryana, (2000) 5 SCC 82.

CWP/2800/2026

Parties: TILAK RAJ VS BAR COUNCIL OF INDIA & ANR.

Date: 31-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Administrative Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh disposed of CWP No. 2800/2026, filed by Tilak Raj against the Bar Council of India and another, on the ground that the petitioner’s grievance had been fully redressed. The decisive factor was the submission by the learned Senior Advocate for respondent No.2, the Bar Council of Himachal Pradesh, confirming that the certificate of practice had been issued to the petitioner. This fact was acknowledged by the petitioner in person, thereby rendering the writ petition infructuous. The Court concluded that since the relief prayed for by the petitioner had been granted, the petition had worked itself out, necessitating its disposal. This outcome aligns with the fundamental principle that courts will not adjudicate on matters where the cause of action no longer subsists or the relief sought has already been obtained, thereby making the proceedings academic. Consequently, the writ petition was disposed of, along with any pending miscellaneous applications.

CWP/3661/2026

Parties: GURBACHAN SINGH VS THE EXECUTIVE ENGINEER, CHANGER AREA LIFT IRRIGATION PROJECT, BASSI

Date: 31-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Labor Law

The High Court dismissed the writ petition, affirming the Labour Court’s decision that the petitioner failed to establish an employer-employee relationship with the respondent, thereby justifying the dismissal of his claim under Section 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The Court found that the petitioner’s assertion of direct employment by the respondent, following an interview on 01.05.2011, was contradicted by his cross-examination admission of no interview and the respondent’s consistent stand that work was executed through contractors. Crucially, the petitioner provided no oral or documentary evidence of direct wage payment, control, or supervision by the respondent, nor an appointment letter, and the purported seniority list (Ex. PW1/B) was merely a list of project workers. The Court relied on the principles laid down in General Manager, U.P. Cooperative Bank Ltd. Versus Achchey Lal & Anr. (Civil Appeal No.2974/2016, decided on 11.09.2025), which articulated the “Control Test,” “Organization/Integration Test,” and “Multiple Factor Test” for determining employer-employee relationships, including factors like appointing authority, paymaster, dismissal power, and extent of control. Applying these tests, the Court concluded that the Labour Court correctly found the petitioner had not discharged the burden of proof regarding his employment by the respondent, especially given the respondent’s consistent use of contractors.

CWP/11504/2025

Parties: BRAHAM DASS AND ORS. VS STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH & ORS.

Date: 31-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Civil Law

The High Court held that the findings of the Revenue Authorities regarding the devolution of property under Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, were non-est, as the substantive issue of succession was pending adjudication before a Civil Court in Regular Second Appeal No. 481 of 2015. The Court reasoned that orders passed by Revenue Authorities must yield to the findings and judgments of Civil Courts, especially when the matter in issue is sub judice before the latter. Consequently, the mutation bearing No. 417, attested on 24.05.2003, was deemed merely an administrative act to fill a vacuum in revenue records, its validity being contingent upon the final outcome of the Civil Court proceedings. The petitioners had initially challenged the mutation under Section 14 of the Himachal Pradesh Land Revenue Act, 1954, before the Sub Divisional Collector, whose dismissal was upheld by the Divisional Commissioner under Section 17 of the Act, both relying on Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act. The Court directed that the parties maintain status quo regarding the nature, possession, and title of the suit property until the decision in Regular Second Appeal No. 481 of 2015, with the mutation abiding by that final outcome.

COPC/120/2026

Parties: THE LOHARA CO-OPERATIVE CHO RECLAMATION & SOIL CONSERVATION SOCIETY VS SH. SUSHIL RANA

Date: 31-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Civil Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh closed contempt proceedings initiated by The Lohara Co-operative Cho Reclamation & Soil Conservation Society against Sh. Sushil Rana, finding substantial compliance with its previous directions in The Lohara Cooperative Cho Reclamation & Soil Conservation Society Versus State of H.P. & Ors. (CWP No.20281 of 2025, decided on 26.02.2026). The decisive ground for closing the contempt petition was the respondent’s filing of a compliance affidavit and office instructions dated 30.03.2026 and 31.03.2026, which provided a clear undertaking and revised timelines for completing the demarcation and marking of dried Chil trees by 10.04.2026 and processing the petitioner’s case for felling approval from the competent authority by 20.04.2026. The Court noted that the Deputy Ranger, Lohara Block, also personally assured adherence to these timelines. Consequently, the Court extended the original timelines, directing the respondent to strictly comply with the new schedule, including allowing the petitioner to fell trees by 30.04.2026 upon issuance of felling permission. The notice issued to the respondent was accordingly discharged.

COPC/1544/2025

Parties: GEETA RAM VS DEVESH KUMAR AND ORS.

Date: 31-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Service Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in COPC No.1544 of 2025, closed the contempt proceedings initiated by Geeta Ram against Devesh Kumar and Ors., discharging the notices issued to the respondents. The decisive ground for this closure was the submission by the learned Additional Advocate General, supported by office instructions dated 30.03.2026 from the Executive Engineer, B&R Division HPPWD, Sarkaghat, confirming that the petitioner’s pension case had been referred to and sanctioned by the Accountant General, Himachal Pradesh, effective 01.04.2023, with the petitioner now drawing a monthly pension of Rs. 11,750/- along with other allowances. The learned counsel for the petitioner acknowledged these facts, thereby rendering the contempt petition infructuous as the primary grievance concerning the non-sanction of pension had been redressed. The Court, however, reserved liberty to the petitioner to seek appropriate remedy for any surviving grievances in accordance with law, reflecting the principle that while contempt proceedings address non-compliance with court orders, they do not preclude further legal recourse for other outstanding issues. This judgment underscores the Court’s pragmatic approach to contempt matters, concluding them once compliance is achieved, while preserving the litigant’s right to pursue other claims.

CMPMO/7/2026

Parties: M/S ESCORTS KUBOTA LTD. VS DEVINDER KUMAR

Date: 31-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE VIRENDER SINGH

Area of Law: Civil Law

The High Court, exercising its power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, partially allowed the petition filed by M/s Escorts Kubota Ltd. against the trial court’s order dated 26.11.2025, which had imposed a condition of depositing ₹9,00,000/- to set aside an ex parte order. The Court affirmed the trial court’s jurisdiction to impose conditions while allowing an application under Order 9 Rule 7 CPC for recalling an ex parte order, especially given the defendant’s failure to appear despite notice by publication under Order 5 Rule 20 CPC and the delay in filing the application, necessitating condonation under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. However, the High Court found the condition to deposit ₹9,00,000/- to be excessive and arbitrary, as the original suit was for recovery of ₹5,00,000/-. Consequently, the Court modified the condition, directing the petitioner to deposit ₹5,00,000/- as security, to be invested in an FDR and not disbursed until the final disposal of the suit, thereby balancing the plaintiff’s interest in securing the decretal amount with the defendant’s right to participate in the proceedings.

CMPMO/173/2023

Parties: SURENDER KUMAR VS PANKAJ BANSAL & ANR.

Date: 31-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE ROMESH VERMA

Area of Law: Civil Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh dismissed the petitions challenging orders directing the petitioner/defendant to furnish security under Order 38 Rule 5 read with Section 151 CPC, finding no illegality or infirmity in the lower courts’ decisions. The Court affirmed that the plaintiffs/respondents established a prima facie case for recovery of rent arrears, supported by a rental agreement, and demonstrated the defendant’s intent to obstruct or delay execution of a potential decree by disposing of assets. Crucially, the Court noted the defendant’s sale of property during the pendency of the Order 38 Rule 5 applications, evidenced by a sale deed dated 10.02.2023, which “clinches entire controversy” and falsified the defendant’s denial of intent. Relying on Raman Tech and Process Engg Co. vs. Solanki Traders, SC C 2008 (2) 302, the Court reiterated that while Order 38 Rule 5 is a drastic power, it is warranted when a plaintiff has a prima facie case and the defendant attempts to remove or dispose of assets to defeat a decree. The Court also cited M/s Radha Krishan Industries vs. State of Himachal Pradesh, AIR 2021 SC 2114, emphasizing that attachment before judgment requires both a bona fide claim and proof of the defendant’s intention to obstruct execution. The High Court, exercising its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, declined to re-appreciate facts, adhering to the principle established in Garment Craft vs. Prakash Chand Goel, 2022 (4) SCC 181, that such jurisdiction is not appellate and is exercised sparingly for grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of fundamental principles.

OMPM/17/2018

Parties: PREM SINGH & OTHERS VS INDIRA SHARMA AND OTHERS

Date: 31-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE VIRENDER SINGH

Area of Law: Civil Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh dismissed applications for restoration of a civil suit and condonation of delay, holding that the applicant failed to demonstrate “sufficient cause” under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for the delay in filing the restoration application under Order 9 Rules 9 & 4 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Court found that the applicant’s explanation for the delay, primarily based on his ailment and alleged lack of knowledge regarding the suit’s dismissal, was contradictory and lacked credibility, particularly given the inconsistent testimonies of the applicant and his witness, AW-2 Shyam Sunder. Crucially, the Court noted that the suit, filed in 2012, was dismissed in default on 24.08.2017 after the plaintiffs failed to comply with a Court order dated 16.11.2016 and impart instructions to their counsel, despite being duly served with court notices. The Court emphasized that while procedural laws are for the advancement of justice, a liberal approach to Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not warrant accepting submissions that do not appeal to judicial conscience, especially when a valuable right has accrued to the defendants. The non-appearance of co-plaintiffs, who were also served, to depose about non-service of notices led the Court to draw an adverse inference against the applicant’s claims.

FAO/71/2014

Parties: KAMAL KUMAR VS THE BAZAZ ALLIANZ GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY & OTHERS

Date: 31-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE SUSHIL KUKREJA

Area of Law: Civil Law

The High Court dismissed the appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (MV Act), affirming the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal’s award of Rs. 50,000/- to the appellant, who was the deceased’s nephew. The core issue was whether the appellant, despite being a legal representative, was entitled to enhanced compensation beyond the statutory amount, given his lack of proven dependency. The Court, relying on Manjuri Bera (Smt) Vs. Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. and another, (2007) 10 SCC 643, and National Insurance Company Ltd. vs. Birender and others, AIR 2020 SC 434, reiterated that while a legal representative, even if not dependent, can maintain a claim petition under Section 166 of the MV Act and inherit the deceased’s estate, the quantum of compensation for non-dependents cannot be less than the statutory liability under Section 140(2) of the Act. The Court found no cogent evidence to establish the appellant’s dependency on the deceased, noting that the appellant was a married agriculturist with his own parents residing nearby. Consequently, the Tribunal’s decision to limit compensation to Rs. 50,000/-, representing the loss to the deceased’s estate under Section 140(2) of the MV Act, was upheld as correct, as the appellant failed to prove actual financial dependency for enhanced compensation.

FAO/119/2013

Parties: RAM LAL VS NARAIN SINGH (DECEASED) & ANOTHER

Date: 31-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE VIRENDER SINGH

Area of Law: Civil Law

The High Court, exercising its appellate jurisdiction under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, significantly enhanced the compensation awarded to the appellant, Ram Lal, from Rs. 29,000/- to Rs. 2,51,473/-, along with 7.5% interest per annum. The Court found the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal’s initial award inadequate, failing to constitute “just compensation” as mandated by the beneficial nature of the M.V. Act. Relying on the Supreme Court’s pronouncement in Oriental Insurance Company Limited versus Mohd. Nasir and another, (2009) 2 SCC (Cri.) 987, which emphasized a liberal construction of beneficial legislation to provide expeditious relief, and Raj Kumar versus Ajay Kumar & Another, (2011) 1 Supreme Court Cases, 343, which outlined various heads for compensation, the High Court meticulously reassessed damages. It awarded enhanced amounts for pain and suffering, loss of enjoyment of life due to 5% permanent disability, loss of earning capacity (specifically for forced earned leave), medical expenses, travelling expenses, and special diet and attendant charges, thereby rectifying the MACT’s omission to adequately compensate under these heads.

FAO/541/2017

Parties: KAMALJEET VS PARVEEN AND OTHERS

Date: 31-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE VIRENDER SINGH

Area of Law: Civil Law

The High Court, exercising its appellate jurisdiction under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, enhanced the compensation awarded to the claimant, Kamaljeet, from Rs. 13,23,000/- to Rs. 19,46,700/- with 7.5% interest, finding the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (MACT) had failed to award ‘just compensation’. The Court, guided by the principle established in Oriental Insurance Company Limited versus Mohd. Nasir and another, (2009) 2 SCC (Cri.) 987, that the M.V. Act is a beneficial legislation requiring liberal construction to provide just compensation, re-evaluated the claimant’s income and functional disability. It held that the MACT erred in assessing the claimant’s monthly income at Rs. 6,000/-, despite credible evidence from PW-2, a registered contractor, proving the claimant earned Rs. 13,000/- per month as a painter-cum-supervisor. The Court accepted the 40% permanent disability, applying a multiplier of ‘15’ as per Sarla Verma and others vs. Delhi Transport Corporation and another, 2009 (6) SCC 121, to calculate loss of earning capacity, and also revised non-pecuniary damages for pain and suffering, and special diet and attendant charges, while upholding the MACT’s awards for loss of enjoyment of life, medical expenses, and transportation charges.

FAO/4012/2013

Parties: LEELAWATI VS JAI KRISHAN SHARMA

Date: 31-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE VIRENDER SINGH

Area of Law: Family Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh allowed the appellant-wife’s appeal under Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, setting aside the trial court’s decree of divorce granted to the respondent-husband on the ground of desertion under Section 13 of the H.M. Act. The Court held that the husband failed to establish desertion, which requires proving both the physical act of separation and animus deserendi, i.e., an intention to bring cohabitation permanently to an end, without reasonable cause, for a continuous period of two years prior to the petition. The Court found the husband’s pleadings vague regarding the exact date of desertion and his efforts to reconcile, noting his admission of not filing for restitution of conjugal rights under Section 9 of the H.M. Act. Crucially, the Court observed that the husband did not controvert the wife’s specific plea that he was residing with another woman, Rekha, which constituted a valid reason for the wife not to live in the matrimonial home. The reliance by the trial court on Gita Jagdish Mangtani versus Jagdish Mangtani, 2005 (8) SSC 177, was deemed inapplicable to the facts. The husband’s conduct, including a legal notice seeking dissolution of marriage, indicated an intention to benefit from his own wrong, disentitling him to relief.

FAO/4060/2013

Parties: NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY LTD. VS REKHA DEVI AND OTHERS

Date: 31-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE VIRENDER SINGH

Area of Law: Insurance Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh dismissed the appeal filed by National Insurance Company Ltd. under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, upholding the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal’s award of Rs. 5,54,160/- with 7.5% interest. The Court affirmed the Tribunal’s finding that vehicle No. HP17A-6406 was involved in the accident, rejecting the appellant’s contention that vehicle No. UA07B-7120 was responsible. The decisive ground for this conclusion was the categorical and unchallenged testimony of PW-3, Jai Kishan, an eyewitness, who deposed on oath that vehicle No. HP17A-6406 was present at the scene and driven rashly and negligently. The Court emphasized that the appellant-insurer failed to cross-examine PW-3 effectively on the involvement of vehicle No. UA07B-7120, thereby admitting the witness’s statement regarding HP17A-6406. The Court held that a police report under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C., which suggested the involvement of a different vehicle, was inconsequential against direct, sworn, and cross-examined eyewitness testimony, which carries a presumption of truth. The Court found no reason to interfere with the Tribunal’s assessment of evidence, particularly its reliance on PW-3’s statement and its rejection of RW-1’s testimony as irrelevant to the accident’s cause.

RFA/234/2013

Parties: KAUSHALYA DEVI VS SUINI (SINCE DECEASED THROUGH HER LRS)

Date: 31-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE SUSHIL KUKREJA

Area of Law: Civil Law

The High Court, in RFA No. 234 of 2013, allowed the appeal in part, setting aside the Trial Court’s dismissal of the suit for specific performance, and instead directed the refund of earnest money with interest. The Court found that while the agreement to sell, dated 17.07.2008, and the subsequent power of attorney, Ex. PW-1/D, were duly executed by the defendant, the agreement was unenforceable as it violated Section 113 of the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act. This section imposes a ten-year bar on the alienation of land where proprietary rights have been acquired under the Act, a condition clearly noted in the jamabandi (Ex. PW-1/B) and applicable until 2016. The Court rejected the defendant’s claim that the documents were forged or obtained through undue influence, noting her admission of signatures and the lack of evidence supporting her allegations, particularly given the registered nature of the power of attorney. Relying on Prem Singh v. Birbal (2006) 5 SCC 353, the Court reiterated the presumption of valid execution for registered documents, which the defendant failed to rebut. Consequently, specific performance was denied due to the legal prohibition, but the plaintiff was held entitled to the refund of Rs. 8,00,000/- earnest money with 6% interest per annum from the date of filing the suit.

RSA/367/2005

Parties: TULSI RAM & ORS. VS CHET RAM & ORS.

Date: 31-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Property Law

The High Court set aside the concurrent judgments and decrees of the lower courts, dismissing the plaintiffs’ suit for permanent prohibitory injunction, holding that the defendant, Tulsi Ram, was a co-owner of the suit land and thus could not be restrained. The Court found that the family settlement (Ex. DX) was inadmissible as it purported to create new rights and was compulsorily registrable under Section 17(1)(b) of the Registration Act, 1908, but remained unregistered, relying on Roshan Singh v. Zile Singh, (2018) 14 SCC 814. Crucially, the Court determined that non-occupancy tenancy is heritable, not solely by natural succession but also under the general law of succession, specifically Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, as established in Charno Devi and ors. Vs. Dali Mal (deceased) through his L.Rs. Shamsher Singh and others, 1994 (2) Shim. LC 279 and Smt. Nathi Vs. Shri Ned Chand 1997 (2) Shim. LC 179 HP. Therefore, Tulsi Ram, as the son of a predeceased son, was entitled to inherit the tenancy with Bhagi Rath, correcting the Compensation Officer’s mistake which the Civil Court had jurisdiction to rectify, per Rajinder Singh Vs. Shakuntla Devi and others, 2005 (3) Shim. LC 1. The Court also affirmed that clubbing issues for discussion does not vitiate a judgment under Order 20 Rule 5 CPC, citing Hiru vs. Mansa Ram 2003 (1) Curr. L.J. 133, and that a suit for injunction without declaration is maintainable where the defendant’s claim does not raise a genuine cloud on title, as held in Anathula Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy, (2008) 4 SCC 594.

RSA/467/2007

Parties: CHUNI LAL (DECEASED) THROUGH LRS VS KARAN VIR SINGH AND OTHERS

Date: 31-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Civil Law

The High Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the concurrent findings of the lower courts that the plaintiffs were entitled to a permanent prohibitory injunction and alternative relief of possession. The Court held that the misdescription of the suit property, specifically Khasra No. 228/1, as being in Mohal Dhalog instead of Mohal Sanana, was a clerical error rectifiable under Section 152 of the CPC and did not prejudice the defendants, particularly as they admitted possession over the said Khasra in Mohal Sanana. Relying on Srinivas Ram Kumar v. Mahabir Prasad, 1951 SCC 136, the Court reiterated that a decree can be granted on an alternative case admitted by the defendant, even if not explicitly pleaded by the plaintiff, where no injustice results. The argument that the suit was time-barred, being essentially for possession and filed beyond three years from the partition order, was rejected. The Court found ample evidence, including Patwari testimony and revenue records (Rapat No. 417, 411, 452), confirming that possession was delivered to the plaintiffs’ predecessor-in-interest after partition, thus establishing the plaintiffs’ possession and rendering the suit for injunction maintainable and not time-barred.

EX.P./2167/2025

Parties: MOSAM DEEN VS STATE OF H.P. & ORS.

Date: 31-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Service Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh disposed of Execution Petition No. 2167/2025, noting that the respondents had placed on record the consideration order dated 06.03.2026, passed in the petitioner’s case by the Director School Education, as evidenced by office instructions dated 20.03.2025. The Court’s decision to dispose of the execution petition was predicated on the fulfillment of the underlying obligation by the respondents, thereby rendering the execution proceedings infructuous. While concluding the present petition, the Court judiciously reserved liberty to the petitioner to pursue appropriate legal remedies for any surviving grievances that may arise in the future, ensuring that the petitioner’s rights are not foreclosed by this disposal. This approach reflects the principle of judicial economy, where proceedings are concluded once their purpose is served, while simultaneously safeguarding the litigant’s right to seek redress for subsequent or unaddressed issues. The Court did not cite any specific statutory sections or precedents in this particular order, relying instead on the procedural compliance demonstrated by the respondents.

CR.A/119/2007

Parties: BALDEV RAJ AND ANOTHER VS STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH

Date: 31-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE SANDEEP SHARMA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court allowed the appeal under Section 374 Cr.P.C., quashing the conviction and sentence of the appellant under Section 325 read with Section 34 IPC, following an amicable compromise between the parties. The Court, exercising its inherent powers under Section 528 of the BNS, 2023 (corresponding to Section 482 Cr.P.C.), accepted the post-conviction settlement, noting that the offence, while non-compoundable under Section 320 Cr.P.C., was predominantly private in nature and its continuation would not serve the ends of justice. Relying on Ramgopal And Another Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2021 (4) RCR (Criminal) 322, the Court affirmed its power to accept such compromises to foster harmony, even after conviction, provided the offence is not heinous or of grave public impact. The Court distinguished this from serious offences as outlined in Narinder Singh & Ors. vs. State of Punjab & Ors., (2014)6 SCC 466, which established guidelines for exercising inherent powers, emphasizing that offences of mental depravity or those against society should not be quashed on compromise. Given the victim’s disinterest in further prosecution and the appellant’s medical condition, the Court found no impediment to accepting the compromise, thereby securing peace between the closely related parties.

CRMPM/70/2026

Parties: PRAKASH KUMAR VS STATE OF H.P.

Date: 31-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE VIRENDER SINGH

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court granted bail to the applicant, Prakash Kumar, under Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, in connection with FIR No. 207 of 2024, registered under Sections 103, 127(2), 125(B), 61(2), and 3(5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita. The Court’s decision was primarily predicated on the inadmissibility of disclosure statements made by co-accused while in police custody, rendering them unusable against the applicant. While a scanner was recovered based on the applicant’s disclosure statement under Section 23 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, the Court deemed this recovery insufficient to deny bail. Crucially, the Court applied the principle of parity, noting that co-accused Yog Raj had already been granted bail by the same Court on 7.7.2025 in Cr. M.P.(M) No.753 of 2025. The Court emphasized that keeping the applicant in judicial custody indefinitely, without a specific role attributed to him, would amount to pre-trial punishment. Considering the likely protracted duration of the trial, the Court concluded that no useful purpose would be served by continued incarceration, imposing conditions including a personal bond of Rs. 50,000/- with two sureties.

CRMPM/95/2026

Parties: SURESH CHAND VS STATE OF H.P.

Date: 31-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE VIRENDER SINGH

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court granted bail to the applicant, Suresh Chand, in a case registered under Sections 20, 29-61-85 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, primarily on the ground that the prosecution’s case against him was largely based on the alleged disclosure statements of co-accused made during police custody, which are inadmissible. The Court, relying on Tofan Singh versus State of Tamil Nadu, (2021) 4 Supreme Court Cases 1, reiterated that confessional statements made to officers invested with powers under Section 53 of the NDPS Act are barred under Section 25 of the Evidence Act and cannot be used to convict an accused. Furthermore, the Court found that bank transactions, specifically two transfers of Rs. 45,000/-, and Call Detail Records (CDRs) showing communication and tower locations between the applicant and co-accused, were insufficient at this stage to establish criminal liability. Citing State by (NCB) Bengaluru versus Pallulabid Ahmad Arimutta & Anr., 2022 (2) SCALE 14, the Court emphasized that the evidentiary value of CDRs is to be determined during trial and that CDRs only provide metadata, not the substance of conversations. The Court concluded that the conditions under Section 37(b)(ii) of the NDPS Act were met, as there were no reasonable grounds to believe the applicant was guilty, and he was unlikely to commit further offences while on bail, imposing stringent conditions.

CRMPM/80/2026

Parties: SANT PRAKASH SHARMA VS STATE OF H.P.

Date: 31-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE VIRENDER SINGH

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court granted bail to the applicant, Sant Prakash Sharma, in FIR No. 313 of 2023 under Sections 302, 201 read with Section 34 IPC and Section 25 of the Arms Act, primarily on the ground of inordinate delay in trial, which infringes the fundamental right to speedy trial enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The Court noted that despite the applicant’s arrest on 13.12.2023, only three out of 47 witnesses had been examined over two years and three months, indicating a “snail pace” of trial. Relying on Abdul Rehman Antulay and others versus R.S. Nayak and another [(1992) 1 Supreme Court Cases 225], which established speedy trial as a fundamental right under Article 21, and Union of India versus K.A. Najeeb [(2021) 3 Supreme Court Cases 713], which held that courts are ordinarily obligated to grant bail when timely trial is impossible and significant incarceration has occurred, the Court found the delay to be “writ at large.” Additionally, the Court considered the applicant’s ill health and the jail authorities’ failure to provide adequate medical treatment, citing Paschim Banga Khet Mazdoor Samity versus State of W.B. [(1996) 4 SCC 37] on the State’s obligation to safeguard life under Article 21, and directed the Chief Secretary and Director General of Prisons to submit reports on medical facilities and police escort availability in jails.

CRMPM/263/2026

Parties: MOHIT KUMAR VS STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH

Date: 31-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The Himachal Pradesh High Court granted regular bail to the petitioner, Mohit Kumar, in FIR No. 41 of 2025, registered under Sections 10 and 11 of the Public Examination (Prevention of Unfair Means) Act, 2024. The Court’s decisive reasoning rested on the principle of parity, noting that a co-accused, Gaurav, facing similar allegations, had already been granted bail by the Supreme Court of India in Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No(s).504/2026 on 20.03.2026, primarily due to prolonged custody. The petitioner had been in custody since 19.05.2025. While the State argued against bail, citing the heinous nature of the offence and the petitioner’s potential involvement in an organised syndicate, the Court found the allegations against the petitioner to be similar to those against the co-accused who had secured bail. Consequently, the Court concluded that the petitioner was also entitled to bail on the same principle, directing his release on terms and conditions to be imposed by the trial court, including compliance with the conditions stipulated in the Supreme Court’s order for the co-accused.

CRMPM/332/2026

Parties: AKASH GOYAL VS STATE OF HP

Date: 31-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court dismissed the petitioner’s regular bail application under Sections 22 and 29 of the NDPS Act, finding that the twin conditions of Section 37 of the NDPS Act were not satisfied. The Court held that the prosecution had presented sufficient prima facie material, including WhatsApp conversations between the petitioner and co-accused regarding drug delivery, to connect the petitioner to the crime, thereby refuting the argument that implication was solely based on inadmissible co-accused statements. Given the recovery of a commercial quantity of Tramadol (2.253 kg against a notified 250g commercial quantity), the rigours of Section 37 applied. The Court relied on Union of India Versus Niyazuddin & Another (2018) 13 SCC 738 and State of Kerala Versus Rajesh AIR 2020 SC 721, which established that bail in NDPS cases involving commercial quantities requires the Court to be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe the accused is not guilty and unlikely to commit further offences while on bail. The Court further cited Narcotics Control Bureau v. Kashif (2024) 11 SCC 372, reiterating that in such cases, negation of bail is the rule and its grant an exception, and the petitioner failed to demonstrate satisfaction of these mandatory conditions.

CRMPM/290/2026

Parties: BHUPINDER THAKUR VS STATE OF HP

Date: 31-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court dismissed the petitioner’s regular bail application in an FIR registered under Sections 20, 25, and 29 of the NDPS Act, finding that the petitioner failed to satisfy the twin conditions mandated by Section 37 of the NDPS Act. The Court held that the recovery of 3.575 kilograms of charas, a commercial quantity, from the vehicle driven by the petitioner, coupled with his presence alongside a co-accused at a significant distance from their homes, established a prima facie case of conscious possession, as per Madan Lal versus State of H.P. (2003) 7 SCC 465, which posits that all occupants of a vehicle are in conscious possession of contraband found therein unless proven otherwise under Sections 35 and 54 of the NDPS Act. The Court reiterated the stringent parameters for bail in NDPS cases involving commercial quantities, emphasizing that the “reasonable grounds” for believing the accused is not guilty, as required by Section 37(1)(b)(ii), means something more than prima facie grounds, as established in Union of India v. Niyazuddin & Another (2018) 13 SCC 738 and State of Kerala Versus Rajesh AIR 2020 SC 721. The Court further rejected the argument of prolonged incarceration as a sole ground for bail, citing Union of India vs. Vijin K. Varghese 2025:INSC:1316, which held that delay alone cannot circumvent the mandatory conditions of Section 37.

CRMPM/395/2026

Parties: PANKAJ SHARMA VS STATE OF HP

Date: 31-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh dismissed the petitioner’s regular bail application in FIR No. 16 of 2026, registered under Sections 326(g), 351(2), and 62 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS), finding prima facie evidence connecting the petitioner to the crime and a high likelihood of him repeating the offence or tampering with the investigation. The Court, relying on the principles established in Pinki v. State of U.P., (2025) 7 SCC 314, which reiterated the factors for granting bail from Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P., (1978) 1 SCC 240, and Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 4 SCC 280, noted that the nature of the charge, the severity of punishment (life imprisonment for Section 326(g) BNS), and the likelihood of the accused absconding or interfering with justice are crucial considerations. The Court rejected the argument that the FIR did not constitute an offence under Section 326(g) BNS, holding that setting fire to a room used for property custody falls within its ambit. Given the petitioner’s prior threats, his presence at the scene, and the recovery of incriminating articles, the Court concluded that releasing him on bail would be detrimental to the ongoing investigation and public interest.

CRMPM/439/2026

Parties: RAJEEV KUMAR VS STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH

Date: 31-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court dismissed the pre-arrest bail petition filed under Section 318(4) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023, on the ground that the petitioner had not exhausted the alternative remedy before the Sessions Court. The Court, relying on the Supreme Court’s pronouncements in Mohammed Rasal C versus State of Kerala and Anr. (Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No. 6588 of 2025, decided on 08.09.2025) and Jagdeo Prasad v. State of Bihar (2025 SCC OnLine SC 2108), emphasized that while concurrent jurisdiction exists for anticipatory bail under Section 482 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (formerly Section 438 CrPC), the hierarchy of courts demands that petitioners first approach the Sessions Court. This practice ensures that the High Court benefits from the Sessions Court’s judicial perspective, facilitates expeditious disposal, and acts as a filtration process, preventing the High Court from being flooded with such applications. The Court noted that the petitioner had withdrawn his earlier petition before the Sessions Judge without inviting a decision on merits, thereby failing to fulfill the purpose of exhausting the primary remedy. Consequently, the petition was not entertained, with liberty granted to the petitioner to approach the Sessions Court for a decision on merits.

CRMPM/1459/2025

Parties: XYZ VS STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH & ANOTHER

Date: 31-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE VIRENDER SINGH

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh dismissed applications filed under Section 483(3) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) seeking cancellation of bail previously granted to the accused in FIR No. 6 of 2025, registered under Sections 376, 504, and 506 of the Indian Penal Code. The Court held that the applicant failed to demonstrate “very cogent and overwhelming circumstances” necessary for bail cancellation, as established in Dolat Ram and Others Vs. State of Haryana, (1995) 1 Supreme Court Cases 349, which mandates that bail, once granted, should not be mechanically cancelled without supervening circumstances rendering continued freedom detrimental to a fair trial. The applicant’s allegations of threats and evidence tampering were deemed vague, lacking specific dates or instances, and unsupported by any complaint to the police or other authority, thus failing to meet the high threshold for misuse of liberty. The Court also referenced Dinesh M.N. (S.P.) Vs. State of Gujarat, (2008) 5 Supreme Court Cases 66, which permits bail cancellation if it was granted on substantially irrelevant material, but found no such ground here. Consequently, the applications were dismissed due to the absence of concrete evidence substantiating the alleged misuse of bail conditions.

CRMPM/2947/2025

Parties: HARSH DHIMAN VS STATE OF H.P.

Date: 31-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh dismissed the petitioner’s application for regular bail in FIR No. 112 of 2023, registered under Sections 302, 341, 323, 324, and 325 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, finding that the petitioner was not entitled to bail. The Court’s reasoning was primarily based on the gravity of the offence, where the petitioner allegedly inflicted a fatal head injury with an iron rod, leading to the victim’s death. The Court rejected the petitioner’s claim of parity with the co-accused, Nisha, who was granted bail, by distinguishing their roles, noting that Nisha was armed with a Darat but caused no fatal injury, whereas the petitioner caused the fatal injury. Relying on Sagar v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2584, the Court emphasized that parity is not the sole ground for bail and requires examining the accused’s specific role in the crime. The Court also dismissed the argument of delayed trial, citing Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2018) 12 SCC 129, which held that incarceration period alone does not entitle an accused to bail in murder cases, and noted the trial court’s efforts to expedite proceedings. The Court reiterated the principles for granting bail from Pinki v. State of U.P., (2025) 7 SCC 314, which referenced Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P., (1978) 1 SCC 240 and Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 4 SCC 280, highlighting factors like the nature of accusations, severity of punishment, and the likelihood of thwarting justice.

CRMPM/2979/2025

Parties: S VS STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH

Date: 31-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court dismissed the petitioner’s regular bail application in FIR No. 57 of 2024, registered under Sections 49 and 64 of the Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita, primarily because there was no substantial change in circumstances since his previous bail application (Cr.MP(M) No. 446 of 2025) was dismissed. The Court, relying on State of Maharashtra v. Captain Buddhikota Subha Rao (1989) Suppl. 2 SCC 605, Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan @ Pappu Yadav (2004) 7 SCC 528, and State of T.N. v. S.A. Raja (2005) 8 SCC 380, reiterated that successive bail applications require a material change in facts or law, not merely cosmetic alterations, and courts must record specific reasons for granting bail despite prior rejections. The Court rejected the argument that the victim not supporting the prosecution’s case warranted bail, citing X Vs. State of Rajasthan MANU/SC/1267/2024, which cautions against granting bail in serious offences based on early discrepancies in testimony, and Suraj Singh v. State of H.P., 2022 SCC OnLine HP 268, which prohibits appreciating evidence at the bail stage. The Court also found no violation of the right to a speedy trial given the trial court’s efforts to expedite proceedings.

CWP/979/2019

Parties: M/S VASHISHT BRICKS KILN VS HIMACHAL PRADESH POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD AND ANOTHER

Date: 30-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Environmental Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh dismissed the writ petition filed by M/s Vashisht Bricks Kiln, challenging an office order dated 22.04.2019 issued by the Himachal Pradesh Pollution Control Board for disconnection of power supply. The decisive ground for dismissal was that the petition had been rendered infructuous as on the date of hearing. The Court, presided over by Ms. Justice Jyotsna Rewal Dua, noted the submission by the learned counsel for the petitioner confirming the infructuous nature of the petition. Consequently, the Court held that no further adjudication was required on the merits of the challenge to the power disconnection order, as the underlying grievance no longer subsisted. This decision aligns with the fundamental principle that courts generally do not adjudicate on academic or infructuous matters, thereby conserving judicial resources and ensuring that only live controversies are addressed. The Court did not rely on any specific statutory sections or precedents as the matter was disposed of on the preliminary ground of infructuousness. All pending miscellaneous applications were also disposed of as a result of this primary order.

CWP/4053/2026

Parties: LAXMI CHAND AND OTHERS VS STATE OF H.P AND OTHERS

Date: 30-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Land Acquisition Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh permitted the petitioners to withdraw the present writ petition, CWP No. 4053 of 2026, with liberty to file afresh in accordance with law. This decision was reached after the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners conceded that there were inadvertent errors in the pleadings and the issues raised, particularly in light of prior decisions on the subject. The Court acknowledged the petitioners’ request to withdraw the petition, which sought to quash a letter dated 21.06.2017 (Annexure P/3), a Tripartite agreement dated 29.06.2017 (Annexure P/4), and consequential proceedings, or, alternatively, to direct respondents to deposit enhanced compensation as per an award dated 27.04.2017 (Annexure P/2). The Court’s decision to allow withdrawal was predicated on the submission that the petitioners needed to rectify their pleadings and arguments, especially considering the precedent set in Tohnu Ram deceased through L.Rs and another versus Ultra Tech Cement and another, CMPMO No.325/2025, decided on 02.09.2025. Consequently, the petition was disposed of as withdrawn, along with any pending miscellaneous applications.

CWP/7858/2022

Parties: PRAVEEN KUMAR AND OTHERS VS UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS

Date: 30-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE VIVEK SINGH THAKURJUSTICE RANJAN SHARMA

Area of Law: Service Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in CWP No. 7858 of 2022, disposed of the petition as having become infructuous, noting that the grievances of the petitioners, Praveen Kumar and others, against the Union of India and others, had been fully redressed. This resolution stemmed from subsequent events, specifically the issuance of an office order dated 28.03.2026, which addressed the promotion and posting of the petitioners. The Court found that this administrative action effectively satisfied the directions previously issued by the Court, thereby rendering further judicial intervention unnecessary. The decision, delivered by Hon’ble Mr. Justice Vivek Singh Thakur and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Ranjan Sharma, reflects the principle that courts will not adjudicate matters where the underlying cause of action has been resolved through extra-judicial means, particularly when such resolution aligns with the relief sought or directions previously given. Consequently, the petition and any pending applications were closed, signifying that the petitioners had obtained the desired outcome without the need for a substantive judgment on the merits of their original claims.

CWP/19712/2025

Parties: BALDEV VS STATE OF H.P.

Date: 30-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh allowed the petitioner’s parole application, quashing the rejection order dated 11.8.2025, holding that the denial was unjustified and contrary to the reformative objectives of parole. The Court found that the rejection, based on the nature of the offence (Sections 20 and 29 of NDPS Act) and a speculative risk of re-engagement in drug supply, was not covered by the permissible grounds under Section 3(1) of the H.P. Good Conduct Prisoners (Temporary Release) Act, 1968, particularly Section 3(1)(d) which allows for “any other sufficient cause.” The Court emphasized that the term “any other sufficient cause” should be liberally construed to enable convicts to maintain family and social ties, citing Asfaq v. State of Rajasthan, (2017) 15 SCC 55, which established that parole is an opportunity for convicts to breathe fresh air and maintain societal links, and Harbhajan Singh v. State of H.P., 2019 SCC OnLine HP 3599, which held that the mere nature of the offence cannot be a ground to deny parole if the prisoner’s conduct shows a tendency to reform. The Court further relied on Shor v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr. (05.08.2020 - SC Order): MANU/SCOR/34434/2020, reiterating that parole cannot be rejected solely because the crime is heinous. Consequently, the petitioner was ordered to be released on parole for 28 days, subject to furnishing a personal bond and surety bonds.

CWP/20449/2025

Parties: SH. BABU RAM VS CHAUDHARY SARWAN KUMAR HIMACHAL PRADESH KRISHI VISHVAVIDYALAYA, PALAMPUR AND ANOTHER

Date: 30-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE AJAY MOHAN GOEL

Area of Law: Service Law

The High Court allowed the petitions, directing the Chaudhary Sarwan Kumar Himachal Pradesh Krishi Vishvavidyalaya to pay the petitioners their due and admissible leave encashment, including 300 days as sanctioned, along with interest. The Court’s decisive reasoning was that the present matter was squarely covered by its previous judgment in Himachal Pradesh Agriculture University Pensioner’s Sabha versus Chaudhary Sarwan Kumar Himachal Pradesh Krishi Vishvavidyalaya and another, CWP No.10878 of 2025, decided on 23.07.2025. The respondent University’s contention regarding a shortage of funds was implicitly rejected as insufficient to override the established legal precedent. The Court noted that the instructions provided by the respondent University did not dispute that the petitioners’ case fell within the ambit of the aforementioned precedent. Consequently, the directions issued in CWP No.10878 of 2025 were deemed applicable to the present petitioners. The respondents were mandated to release the admissible leave encashment within three months, failing which the amount would accrue interest at 5% from the date of the judgment. This ruling underscores the principle of stare decisis and the binding nature of prior judgments on similar facts and legal issues.

COPC/105/2026

Parties: SHASHI BALA VS SH. ASHISH KUMAR KOHLI

Date: 30-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Service Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in COPC No.105 of 2026, closed the contempt proceedings initiated by Shashi Bala against Sh. Ashish Kumar Kohli, noting that the Director School Education, Himachal Pradesh, had passed an office order dated 15.12.2025, thereby deciding the petitioner’s case. The Court acknowledged the petitioner’s grievances regarding this consideration order but deemed the contempt proceedings concluded given the respondent’s compliance with the underlying directive to consider the petitioner’s matter. The decisive ground for closing the contempt was the production of the said office order, indicating that the respondent had taken action as required. Consequently, the notice issued to the respondent was discharged. However, the Court explicitly granted the petitioner liberty to pursue appropriate legal remedies for her surviving grievances, including any challenges against the consideration order dated 15.12.2025 itself, thereby preserving her right to further judicial recourse on the merits of her claim. This approach reflects the principle that contempt proceedings are primarily concerned with ensuring compliance with court orders, not adjudicating the substantive merits of the underlying dispute once compliance, even if unsatisfactory to the petitioner, has occurred.

COPC/134/2026

Parties: SANTOSH KUMARI VS RAKESH KANWAR AND ORS.

Date: 30-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Service Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in COPC No.134 of 2026, closed the contempt proceedings initiated by Santosh Kumari against Rakesh Kanwar and Ors. The decisive ground for this closure was the production by the learned Additional Advocate General of an office order dated 19.03.2026, which effectively decided the petitioner’s case. The Court, taking note of this development, deemed the contempt proceedings to have served their purpose. While closing the present proceedings, the Court explicitly reserved liberty to the petitioner to pursue appropriate remedies for any surviving grievances in accordance with law. This direction ensures that while the immediate cause for contempt was addressed, the petitioner’s broader rights to seek redressal for any remaining issues are preserved, reflecting a pragmatic approach to judicial economy and the enforcement of court orders. The judgment implicitly relies on the principle that contempt proceedings are primarily a mechanism to ensure compliance with judicial directives, and once compliance is achieved, the proceedings can be concluded, without prejudice to other legal avenues available to the aggrieved party.

COPC/142/2026

Parties: PANKAJ KUMAR VS DR.GOPAL BERI

Date: 30-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Service Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in COPC No.142 of 2026, closed the contempt proceedings initiated by Pankaj Kumar against Dr. Gopal Beri, noting that the respondent had complied with the underlying order. The decisive ground for this closure was the production of office instructions dated 28.03.2026 from the Director, Health Services, Himachal Pradesh, which conveyed the decision regarding the petitioner’s case under the order dated 24.03.2025. The Court, while acknowledging the compliance, expressly reserved liberty to the petitioner to pursue appropriate legal remedies for any surviving grievances in accordance with law. This approach aligns with the principle that contempt proceedings are primarily concerned with ensuring obedience to court orders, and once compliance is demonstrated, the proceedings may be concluded, without prejudice to the parties’ rights to litigate substantive issues elsewhere. The Court did not rely on specific precedents in this order, as the matter was resolved on the basis of demonstrated compliance with a prior directive. The pending miscellaneous application(s) were also disposed of accordingly.

CMPMO/80/2021

Parties: DURGI DEVI VS TEJ RAM & ORS.

Date: 30-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE ROMESH VERMA

Area of Law: Civil Law

The High Court dismissed the petitioner’s challenge to the District Judge’s order, which had set aside the Civil Judge’s temporary injunction granted under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC, thereby rejecting the petitioner’s application for injunction. The Court held that the first appellate court correctly found the petitioner failed to satisfy the “triplicate test” for injunction, comprising prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable loss, as established in Dalpat Kumar vs. Prahlad Singh, (1992) 1 SCC 719. The Court emphasized that long-standing revenue entries, reflecting an oral sale from 1966 and carrying a presumption of truth, created a prima facie case in favour of the respondents, not the petitioner, despite the challenge to these entries. It was further clarified, relying on Dasaundhi Ram & anr. Vs. Hans Raj, 1985 SLJ 293 and Udho vs. Ram Krishan, 2000 (2) SLJ 1219, that oral sales were permissible in 1966, prior to the applicability of Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act in the region from December 1970. The Court, exercising its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, as guided by Garment Craft vs. Prakash Chand Goel, 2022 (4) SCC 181, found no perversity or grave dereliction of duty in the first appellate court’s decision, affirming that it had correctly applied the principles for granting temporary injunctions.

LPA/51/2025

Parties: STATE OF HP AND OTHERS VS GOVERDHAN ALIAS GOVERDHAN DASS

Date: 30-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE GURMEET SINGH SANDHAWALIA, JUSTICE JIYA LAL BHARDWAJ

Area of Law: Land Acquisition Law

The High Court dismissed the State’s appeal, affirming the Single Judge’s direction to initiate acquisition proceedings and award compensation for land utilized for road construction since 1999. The Court decisively held that the State cannot deprive a landowner of property without due process and compensation, rejecting arguments of delay, laches, or implied consent, especially when similarly situated landowners received compensation for the same project. This conclusion was grounded in Article 300A of the Constitution, which mandates that no person shall be deprived of property save by authority of law. The Court relied on the Apex Court’s pronouncements in Vidya Devi vs. State of Himachal Pradesh and others (2020) 2 SCC 569 and Sukh Dutt Rattra vs. State of Himachal Pradesh and others (2022) 7 SCC 508, which establish that the State cannot take possession of private land without paying compensation and that delay and laches cannot be raised against a continuing cause of action for deprivation of property. The Court further noted the Apex Court’s deprecation of the State’s practice of challenging such orders, as seen in The State of HP and others vs. Upender Kumar (SLP (Civil) No. 49057 of 2024), reinforcing the principle that the right to property, though not fundamental, remains a constitutional right.

RSA/15/2025

Parties: BALWANT SIGH VS HARNAM SINGH

Date: 30-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE ROMESH VERMA

Area of Law: Property Law

The High Court dismissed the appellant’s regular second appeal, affirming the concurrent findings of the lower courts which decreed the respondent’s suit for partition. The Court held that the suit property remained joint, rejecting the appellant’s contention of a prior family partition and separate possession. The decisive ground was the appellant’s failure to adduce any concrete evidence, particularly revenue records, to substantiate the alleged family arrangement, despite the presumption of truth attached to revenue records (Ext. P-1). The Court emphasized that mere separate possession does not equate to partition by metes and bounds, and any such partition, to be legally recognized, must be recorded in the revenue records, adhering to the mandatory provisions of Sections 35 and 135 of the H.P. Land Revenue Act, which constitutes a complete code for such matters. The Court relied on Mangat Ram Vs. Gulat Ram (since deceased) through his LRs Jagdeep Kumar & Ors, Latest HLJ 2011 (HP) 274, which established that private arrangements for cultivation do not constitute final partition without compliance with statutory procedures. Further, the Court reiterated the limited scope of interference in second appeals under Section 100 CPC, citing Navaneethammal vs. Arjuna Chetty AIR 1996 SC 3521 and Kondiba Dagadu Kadam vs. Savitribai Sopan Gujar and others, AIR 1999 SC 2213, holding that re-appreciation of concurrent findings of fact is impermissible unless based on no evidence or contrary to law.

EX.P./336/2025

Parties: KULDEEP RAJ & ANR. VS STATE OF H.P. AND ORS

Date: 30-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Service Law

The High Court disposed of the execution petition, directing the respondents to release actual monetary benefits to the petitioners within four weeks, specifically by April 29, 2026, following the non-compliance with its earlier judgment in Kuldeep Raj & Anr. Vs. State of H.P. & Anr. (CWP No. 7568/2022 decided on 23.12.2024). The original judgment, relying on the ratio of Sanjay Kumar’s case and Sapna Rani, had directed the respondents to pay consequential monetary benefits to the petitioners with effect from April 22, 2017, within eight weeks. While the respondents had subsequently issued an office order dated February 18, 2026, conveying the petitioners’ actual promotion from April 22, 2017, the monetary benefits remained outstanding. The Court, acknowledging the partial compliance through the promotion order but noting the continued delay in monetary disbursement, reiterated the imperative for timely execution of its previous directions. Liberty was reserved for the petitioners to seek further remedies for any surviving grievances. This decision underscores the Court’s commitment to ensuring full and timely compliance with its judgments, particularly concerning financial entitlements arising from promotions.

CRMMO/15/2026

Parties: ADITYA KUMAR @ ADI SAH & ORS. VS STATE OF HP & ANR.

Date: 30-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court dismissed the petition seeking to quash FIR No. 237 of 2025, registered under Sections 126(2), 190, 191(2), 191(3), and 351(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS), and Section 25 of the Indian Arms Act, despite a compromise between the parties. The Court held that offences under the Arms Act are serious and societal in nature, thus precluding quashing based on a private settlement. Relying on Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303, the Court reiterated that while inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. are distinct from compounding under Section 320 Cr.P.C., they cannot be invoked for heinous offences or those with a serious societal impact. Further, citing State of M.P. v. Laxmi Narayan, (2019) 5 SCC 688, it was emphasized that offences under the Arms Act fall within the category of serious offences and cannot be quashed on the basis of compromise. The Court distinguished the precedents cited by the petitioners, noting Naushey Ali & ors. Vs. State of U.P. and another 2025 INSC 182 did not involve the Arms Act, and Shankar Singh Vs. State of HP and another 2025:HHC:12312 and Manpreet Singh Vs. State of Punjab and ors. 2025:PHHC:054473 did not apply the principle from Laxmi Narayan. The Court concluded that quashing the FIR under the Arms Act was impermissible.

CRMMO/685/2025

Parties: RAJINDER SINGH & ORS. VS STATE OF HP & ORS.

Date: 30-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court dismissed the petition seeking to quash FIR No. 16 of 2022, registered under Sections 341, 323, 504, 506, 147, 148, 149, 325, and 307 of the Indian Penal Code, despite a compromise between the parties, holding that offences under Section 307 IPC are heinous and cannot be quashed on such grounds. The Court reasoned that the FIR prima facie disclosed the commission of an offence under Section 307 IPC, given the nature of injuries inflicted with a pointed weapon on the informant’s head and an attack with a darati. Relying on Gian Singh v. State of Punjab (2012) 10 SCC 303, the Court reiterated that while the High Court’s inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash proceedings based on compromise is distinct from compounding under Section 320 Cr.P.C., it must be exercised sparingly, particularly not for serious offences like murder, rape, or those involving mental depravity, which are crimes against society. Further, Narender Singh v. State of Punjab 2014 (6) SCC 466 and State of M.P. v. Laxmi Narayan (2019) 5 SCC 688 were cited to affirm that Section 307 IPC offences generally fall into the category of heinous crimes against society, precluding quashing based on compromise, unless the inclusion of Section 307 is merely pro forma, which was not the case here.

CRMMO/979/2025

Parties: VIRENDER KUMAR VS CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date: 30-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh dismissed the petition filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, seeking to quash the Special Judge’s order dated 10.09.2025, which rejected the petitioner’s application for relaxation of bail conditions. The Court held that the petitioner, accused of offences under Sections 409, 419, 465, 466, and 471 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, including non-bailable offences, was statutorily obligated under Section 441 Cr.P.C. to furnish surety bonds to secure his presence during trial. The Court noted that the Trial Court had already explored all possibilities, including reducing the bail amount from ₹25,00,000/- to ₹1,00,000/- and offering options for cash or bank security, and had even considered the Supreme Court’s judgment in Girish Gandhi vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. 2024 INSC 617 regarding sureties. The Court found no extraordinary circumstances to invoke its inherent jurisdiction, particularly given the petitioner’s past conduct of not appearing in court, reinforcing that the insistence on surety bonds was not unreasonable.

CRMPM/210/2026

Parties: JAGDISH THAKUR VS STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH

Date: 30-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court dismissed the petitioner’s regular bail application under Section 20 of the NDPS Act, finding no material change in circumstances to warrant reconsideration of a previously rejected bail plea. The Court, relying on precedents such as State of Maharashtra v. Captain Buddhikota Subha Rao (1989) Suppl. 2 SCC 605 and Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan @ Pappu Yadav (2004) 7 SCC 528, reiterated that successive bail applications are permissible only upon a substantial change in the fact situation or law, not merely cosmetic alterations, and require the Court to record specific reasons for deviating from earlier rejections. The Court further held, citing Union of India v. Vijin K. Varghese 2025:INSC:1316 and Union of India v Namdeo Ashruba Nakade SLP (Crl.) 9792/2025, that bail cannot be granted solely on grounds of prolonged incarceration without satisfying the twin conditions stipulated under Section 37 of the NDPS Act, particularly given the recovery of a commercial quantity (2 kilograms of charas) and the serious nature of the allegations. The Court emphasized that reviewing earlier findings on the petitioner’s connection to the crime is impermissible in a subsequent bail petition without a change in circumstances, as established in State of M.P. v. Kajad (2001) 7 SCC 673.

CRMPM/293/2026

Parties: ARNAV SAVIRAJ CHAUHAN VS STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH

Date: 30-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court dismissed the petitioner’s regular bail application under Sections 20, 25, and 29 of the NDPS Act, 1985, for recovery of a commercial quantity (1 kg 174 grams) of charas from a private vehicle in which he was an occupant. The Court held that the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act applied, necessitating satisfaction that the accused is not guilty and unlikely to commit further offences, a threshold not met. The decisive ground was the applicability of the presumption of conscious possession under Sections 35 and 54 of the NDPS Act, as established in Madan Lal v. State of H.P. (2003) 7 SCC 465, which posits that all occupants of a private vehicle are in conscious possession of contraband found therein. The Court rejected the petitioner’s reliance on judgments concerning commercial vehicles or intermediate quantities, distinguishing them. Furthermore, the Court reiterated, citing Dipakbhai Jagdishchandra Patel v. State of Gujarat (2019) 16 SCC 547 and Tofan Singh v. State of Tamil Nadu (2021) 4 SCC 1, that co-accused statements are inadmissible under Section 162 Cr.P.C. and Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, thus providing no basis for bail. The Court emphasized that bail is not a matter of course and must be exercised judiciously, considering factors outlined in Pinki v. State of U.P. (2025) 7 SCC 314 and Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2001) 4 SCC 280.

CRMPM/379/2026

Parties: KAMIL MOHAMMED VS STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH

Date: 30-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court dismissed the pre-arrest bail petitions filed under Sections 302(2) and 3(5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023, and Sections 41 & 42 of the Indian Forest Act, 1927, holding that the petitioners failed to establish exceptional circumstances warranting such relief. The Court, relying on P. Chidambaram v. Directorate of Enforcement (2019) 9 SCC 24, reiterated that anticipatory bail is an extraordinary power to be exercised sparingly, balancing individual rights with public interest and fair investigation, as articulated in Pratibha Manchanda v. State of Haryana (2023) 8 SCC 181. The Court rejected the argument that reliance on a co-accused’s statement renders it inadmissible for denying bail, citing Union of India vs Khaliludeen 2022 Supreme SC 1247 and State of Haryana v. Samarth Kumar 2022 SCC OnLine SC 2087, which held that pre-arrest bail cannot be granted solely on the basis of Tofan Singh (2021) 4 SCC 1. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that custodial interrogation is crucial for effective investigation, as held in State Versus Anil Sharma (1997) 7 SCC 187, and that the grant of regular bail to a co-accused does not automatically entitle others to pre-arrest bail. The serious nature of the environmental offence and the ongoing investigation into the timber’s destination also weighed against granting bail.

CWP/1679/2026 · Administrative Law [25-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Parties: VIJAY KUMAR SHARMA vs STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH & ORS

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in CWP No. 1679 of 2026, disposed of the writ petition as withdrawn, reserving liberty for the petitioner, Vijay Kumar Sharma, to file a fresh petition in accordance with law. This decision was predicated on the submission by the learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Jagat Pal, who indicated that subsequent developments had occurred since the filing of the present petition, necessitating their inclusion on record. Consequently, the petitioner sought and was granted permission to withdraw the current writ petition with the express liberty to institute a new one. The Court’s order, delivered by Ms. Justice Jyotsna Rewal Dua, reflects a procedural disposition, acknowledging the petitioner’s right to amend their legal recourse based on evolving circumstances. This approach aligns with the principle of allowing parties to present their complete case, ensuring that justice is not hampered by technicalities when new material emerges. The Court did not delve into the merits of the original petition, focusing solely on the procedural request for withdrawal and the grant of liberty to refile, thereby facilitating a more comprehensive adjudication at a later stage. The pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, were also disposed of as a consequence of the main petition’s withdrawal.

Why it matters: Practitioners can note that courts readily grant permission to withdraw a writ petition with liberty to file afresh when new developments need to be brought on record, streamlining litigation.

2. Himachal Pradesh not obligated to adopt Punjab pay scales for state employees

CWP/451/2019 · Service Law [25-03-2026]

Bench: GURMEET SINGH SANDHAWALIA, JUSTICE RANJAN SHARMA

Parties: STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH & OTHERS vs HIMACHAL PRADESH STATE CO-OPERATIVE DEPARTMENT NON-GAZETTED EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in CWP No. 451 of 2019 and connected matters, overturned the Tribunal’s order directing the State to grant Inspectors the pay scale of Rs. 1800-3200 with effect from 01.01.1986, on par with their Punjab counterparts. The Court held that the State of Himachal Pradesh is not bound to adopt pay scales prescribed by another State, including Punjab, as there is no constitutional or legal mandate compelling such adoption, a principle affirmed in State of Himachal Pradesh versus P.D. Attri and others, (1999) 3 SCC 217. The Court emphasized that each State, under Entry No. 41 of the Seventh Schedule, has exclusive jurisdiction over its public services and can formulate its own pay policies, as reiterated in Secretary, Mahatma Gandhi Mission and another versus Bhartiya Kamgar Sena and others, (2017) 4 SCC 449. Mere similarity in designation does not establish parity, and the onus to prove wholesale identity in eligibility, duties, and responsibilities lies with the claimant, a point underscored in State of Punjab versus Jagjit Singh, (2017) 1 SCC 148. The Tribunal erred by substituting its wisdom for the State’s policy decisions, especially when the State’s own Revised Pay Rules of 1991, which were not challenged, governed the pay scales. The Court concluded that judicial review in such matters is limited, and courts cannot rewrite statutory rules or mandate policy decisions with financial implications without a clear legal right.

Why it matters: State governments are not bound to automatically adopt pay scales or service conditions from other states, even if a historical practice of adoption existed. Policy decisions on pay scales rest with respective state authorities, who consider local factors and financial implications. Practitioners should note that claiming pay parity requires establishing an express, conscious decision by the employer to equate posts, not just mere similarity in designation or historical patterns.

3. Petitioner withdraws writ to file public interest litigation

CWP/2539/2026 · Administrative Law [25-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Parties: TARSEM SINGH vs STATE OF H.P. AND OTHERS

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in CWP No.2539 of 2026, decided on March 25, 2026, permitted the petitioner, Tarsem Singh, to withdraw the writ petition. The decisive ground for this disposition was the petitioner’s counsel, Ms. Heena Chauhan, seeking permission to withdraw the petition with the stated intention of pursuing an appropriate remedy by filing a public interest oriented petition to address the grievances raised in the instant writ. Consequently, the Court, presided over by Ms. Justice Jyotsna Rewal Dua, disposed of the present writ petition as withdrawn, along with any pending miscellaneous application(s). This decision reflects the Court’s adherence to procedural norms, allowing a litigant to withdraw a petition when they express a clear intent to pursue an alternative, more suitable legal avenue, particularly one involving public interest. The judgment implicitly acknowledges the petitioner’s right to choose the appropriate forum and nature of litigation for the redressal of their grievances, without delving into the merits of the original petition. The Court’s action is a straightforward procedural order, not establishing new legal principles but rather facilitating the petitioner’s strategic litigation choices.

Why it matters: Practitioners should note that a petitioner can withdraw a writ petition to pursue the matter through a public interest litigation. This highlights an alternative avenue for addressing grievances with broader public implications.

4. High Court directs authority to decide petitioners’ representations within eight weeks

CWP/3598/2026 · Administrative Law [25-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE AJAY MOHAN GOEL

Parties: NAVITA DOGRA vs STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in CWP No.3598 of 2026, disposed of the petition filed by Navita Dogra and another, directing the Competent Authority to decide the representations (Annexure P-1 Colly) submitted by the petitioners. The Court, noting the petitioners’ counsel’s submission that representations had been filed with the respondent-Department, deemed it appropriate to direct a time-bound decision on these representations. The core reasoning was to ensure administrative action on pending grievances, thereby providing an expeditious remedy without delving into the merits of the representations themselves at this stage. The Court did not rely on specific precedents or statutory sections, as the order was procedural, focusing on the administrative duty to address representations. The judgment effectively mandates the Competent Authority to consider the averments made in the representations and pass an appropriate decision within a period of eight weeks from the date of the order. This approach aligns with the principle of ensuring that administrative authorities fulfill their duty to respond to citizen grievances in a timely manner. The Court’s direction ensures that the petitioners’ concerns are formally addressed by the relevant department.

Why it matters: Practitioners seeking swift resolution on pending representations can use this as a precedent to request time-bound directions from the High Court. This judgment confirms the court’s readiness to push for administrative efficiency.

5. Execution Petition Disposed After Compliance Affidavit Filed

EX.P./671/2025 · Civil Law [25-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Parties: MANJEET KAUR vs STATE OF H.P. AND OTHERS

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh disposed of the execution petition, Ex. Pet. No. 671 of 2025, filed by Manjeet Kaur against the State of H.P. and others, on the ground that the judgment in question had been complied with. The decisive factor leading to this conclusion was the submission by the learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Gaurav Sharma, confirming that the judgment now stands complied with, a fact corroborated by the respondents’ filing of a compliance affidavit. The Court, presided over by Ms. Justice Jyotsna Rewal Dua, therefore found no further cause for the continuation of the execution proceedings. This disposition underscores the principle that the purpose of an execution petition is to ensure compliance with a court’s judgment, and once such compliance is achieved, the petition becomes infructuous. The Court’s action reflects the procedural aspect of judicial enforcement, where the execution process concludes upon the satisfaction of the decree or order. The order implicitly relies on the fundamental legal principle that once a judgment is executed, the enforcement mechanism ceases to operate, thereby bringing finality to the litigation concerning that specific judgment.

Why it matters: Practitioners should note that filing a compliance affidavit can lead to the expeditious disposal of execution petitions, demonstrating that fulfilling court orders can resolve outstanding matters efficiently.

6. Execution Petition Disposed After Compliance Affidavit Filed

EX.P./1113/2025 · Administrative Law [25-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Parties: BIMLA DEVI AND OTHERS vs STATE OF H.P. AND OTHERS

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in Ex. Pet. No. 1113 of 2025, disposed of the execution petition filed by Bimla Devi and others, finding that the respondents, State of H.P. and others, had complied with their obligations. The Court’s decision was predicated upon the filing of a compliance affidavit by the respondents, which explicitly conveyed the decisions taken on the petitioners’ representations through office orders dated 05.09.2025. These office orders were duly appended to the compliance affidavit, thereby demonstrating the respondents’ adherence to the directions previously issued by the Court. The Court, taking careful note of the submitted compliance affidavit and the accompanying office orders, concluded that the purpose of the execution petition had been fulfilled. This effectively rendered the petition infructuous, as the actions required from the respondents had been completed and documented. The judgment implicitly underscores the principle that an execution petition serves to ensure compliance with judicial directives, and once such compliance is demonstrated to the satisfaction of the Court, the petition stands to be closed. The Court did not cite any specific precedents or statutory sections in this particular order, relying instead on the factual demonstration of compliance.

Why it matters: This order signifies that if respondents file a compliance affidavit and office orders, the executing court will dispose of the execution petition. It provides clarity on the process for closing execution proceedings once directions are met.

7. High Court quashes cross FIRs after parties amicably settle disputes

CRMMO/1081/2025 · Criminal Law [25-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE SANDEEP SHARMA

Parties: SUKHWINDER @ SONU vs STATE OF H.P. & ANR.

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, exercising its inherent powers under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, quashed FIR No.90 of 2025, under Sections 333, 64, and 351(2) of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, and FIR No.91 of 2025, under Sections 126(2), 115(2), 191(2), 190, and 351 of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, along with all consequent proceedings, on the basis of an amicable compromise between the parties. The Court noted that both FIRs arose from the same series of events, with complainants in one case being accused in the other, and the parties had resolved their disputes, with complainants affirming on oath their voluntary settlement and disinterest in further prosecution. Relying on the principles laid down in Narinder Singh and others versus State of Punjab and another (2014) 6 SCC 466, and Gian Singh v. State of Punjab and anr. (2012) 10 SCC 303, which distinguish the High Court’s inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. from compounding under Section 320 Cr.P.C., the Court held that while heinous offences should not be quashed, cases involving predominantly personal or family disputes, where the possibility of conviction is remote due to compromise, warrant quashing to prevent abuse of process. Finding the alleged offences to be petty and not involving moral turpitude or grave crime, the Court concluded that no fruitful purpose would be served by continuing the criminal proceedings.

Why it matters: The High Court can quash FIRs even for non-compoundable offenses if all parties reach an amicable settlement and continuing the case would be an abuse of process. This provides a pathway for disposing of cases with private disputes that are not grave offenses, reducing litigation burden and promoting peace among parties.

8. High Court upholds acquittal in vehicular accident case; ‘high speed’ not enough for negligence

CR.A/178/2015 · Criminal Law [25-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Parties: STATE OF H.P. vs ASHOK KUMAR

The High Court dismissed the State’s appeal against the acquittal of the respondent for offences under Sections 279 and 304-A of the Indian Penal Code, finding no perversity in the Trial Court’s judgment. The Court held that the prosecution presented contradictory versions, initially investigating the deceased’s murder by other individuals (who were even imprisoned for 54-56 days) before shifting to the present case of negligent driving, without adequately explaining the exoneration of the former suspects, thereby casting doubt on the prosecution’s narrative. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that mere assertions of “high speed” by witnesses, without specific details, are insufficient to establish rashness or negligence, relying on Mohanta Lal vs. State of West Bengal, 1968 ACJ 124 and State of Karnataka vs. Satish, 1998 (8) SCC 493, which established that speed alone is not a criterion for judging rashness or negligence. Crucially, the Court reiterated that the respondent’s alleged confession to the police was inadmissible under Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, citing Aghnoo Nagesia vs. State of Bihar, AIR 1966 SC 119 and Narayan Yadav vs. State of Chhattisgarh, MANU/SC/1018/2025, which prohibit the use of confessional statements made to police. The Court concluded that the Trial Court’s view was reasonable, warranting no interference in an appeal against acquittal, as per Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, (2025) 5 SCC 433.

Why it matters: This ruling clarifies that merely stating ‘high speed’ is insufficient to prove rash and negligent driving in accident cases under Sections 279 and 304-A IPC. Practitioners must adduce specific evidence of a driver’s breach of duty to succeed in such prosecutions.

9. Himachal Pradesh High Court acquits man in NDPS case due to Section 50 violation

CR.A/478/2015 · Criminal Law [25-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE VIVEK SINGH THAKUR, JUSTICE RANJAN SHARMA

Parties: STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH vs ANIL KUMAR @ RINKU

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh dismissed the State’s appeal against the acquittal of the respondent in a case under Section 20 of the Narcotic Drugs & Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, finding that the prosecution failed to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The decisive ground for upholding the acquittal was the non-compliance with the mandatory procedure under Section 50 of the NDPS Act regarding the search of the respondent. The Court noted significant contradictions and discrepancies in the testimonies of the police witnesses (PW-2 and PW-9), particularly concerning the timing of events, the initial suspicion for stopping the respondent, and the availability of independent witnesses, despite the location being a National Highway with commercial establishments. Crucially, the Court relied on the principles laid down in Ranjan Kumar Chaddha vs. State of Himachal Pradesh, AIR 2023 Supreme Court 5164, which mandates that a person to be searched must be clearly informed of their right to be searched before a Gazetted Officer or Magistrate, and any waiver of this right must be recorded in writing, offering only two specific options. In the present case, the consent memo indicated a third option, allowing search by the Investigating Officer without a clear written waiver of the right to be searched before a Gazetted Officer or Magistrate, thereby vitiating the trial as the compliance with Section 50 was not in consonance with the established law.

Why it matters: Police must offer only two options for search under Section 50 NDPS Act: before a Magistrate or a Gazetted Officer. Offering a third option or taking written consent for search by the Investigating Officer, as required by the Supreme Court from Ranjan Kumar Chaddha v. State of Himachal Pradesh, AIR 2023 SC 5164, is a non-compliance that vitiates the trial.

10. Bail Granted in NDPS Case Based on Intermediate Quantity and No Criminal Record

CRMPM/266/2026 · Criminal Law [25-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Parties: RAJAT KUMAR vs STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH

The High Court granted regular bail to the petitioner, Rajat Kumar, in FIR No. 74 of 2025 under Sections 21 and 29 of the NDPS Act, for the recovery of 45 grams of heroin, finding that the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act were inapplicable as the quantity was intermediate. The Court relied on the principles for granting bail enunciated in Pinki v. State of U.P. (2025) 7 SCC 314, which reiterated the factors from Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P. (1978) 1 SCC 240, Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2001) 4 SCC 280, and Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh (2002) 3 SCC 598, emphasizing judicious exercise of discretion, nature of accusation, severity of punishment, and likelihood of abscondence or tampering. While acknowledging the prosecution’s prima facie case of conscious possession based on Madan Lal versus State of H.P. (2003) 7 SCC 465, which held that all occupants of a vehicle are in conscious possession of contraband recovered therein, the Court noted the petitioner’s lack of criminal antecedents and the status report indicating he was a drug addict, not a peddler, deserving a chance for reformation. The Court concluded that the petitioner, being a permanent resident with roots in society, was unlikely to abscond, thus satisfying the “bail, not jail” principle from State of Rajasthan v. Balchand (1977) 4 SCC 308.

Why it matters: Lawyers handling NDPS cases should note that bail is possible even with conscious possession of contraband if the quantity is intermediate, the accused has no prior record, and the prosecution indicates personal consumption, outweighing the ‘bail not jail’ principle despite the seriousness of drug offenses.

11. Bail Granted in Rape Case Citing Parity with Co-Accused and Completion of Investigation

CRMPM/199/2026 · Criminal Law [25-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Parties: AJAY KUMAR CHAUDHARY vs STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH & ANR

The High Court granted regular bail to the petitioner, Ajay Kumar Chaudhary, in FIR No. 53 of 2025, registered under Sections 376, 511, 506, and 120B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, primarily on the ground of parity and completion of investigation. The Court noted that the co-accused, Rakesh Kumar Shah, against whom similar allegations of connivance were made, had already been released on bail on 26.11.2025. The Court applied the principles for granting bail as enunciated by the Supreme Court in Pinki v. State of U.P., (2025) 7 SCC 314, which reiterated the factors from Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P., (1978) 1 SCC 240, and Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 4 SCC 280, emphasizing the nature of the accusation, severity of punishment, and likelihood of absconding or tampering with evidence. The Court also considered State of Rajasthan v. Balchand, (1977) 4 SCC 308, which established “bail, not jail” as the normal rule. Rejecting the prosecution’s apprehension of witness intimidation, the Court observed the petitioner’s prior conduct during pre-arrest bail did not support such a claim and that conditions could mitigate this risk. The investigation being complete and the charge sheet filed, the petitioner’s custodial interrogation was deemed unnecessary. The bail was granted subject to furnishing a bond of ₹1,00,000/- with one surety and conditions including non-intimidation of witnesses, regular court attendance, and intimation of address changes.

Why it matters: A High Court granted bail in a rape case, noting that a co-accused was already on bail and the investigation was completed. Practitioners should note that previous bail (in a related case or for the same accused) and the end of custodial interrogation can strengthen a bail application.

12. Financial transactions and call records alone insufficient to deny bail in NDPS cases

CRMPM/285/2026 · Criminal Law [25-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Parties: KIRPAL SINGH vs STATE OF HP

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh granted regular bail to the petitioner, Kirpal Singh, in FIR No. 282 of 2025, registered under Sections 21, 27A, and 29 of the NDPS Act and Sections 221 and 132 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023. The Court held that mere financial transactions and call detail records were insufficient to prima facie connect the petitioner to the commission of the crime, particularly regarding the stringent conditions for bail under the NDPS Act. Relying on Amal E vs State of Kerala 2023:KER:39393, the Court reiterated that financial transactions alone do not establish involvement in drug sales without further evidence linking them to narcotic activities. Further, citing Dinesh Kumar @ Billa Versus State of H.P. 2020 Cri. L.J. 4564 and Saina Devi vs State of Himachal Pradesh 2022 Law Suit (HP) 211, it was emphasized that call detail records and co-accused disclosure statements, without other corroborative material, are inadequate to deny bail. The Court also clarified, referencing Rhea Chakraborty v. Union of India 2021 Cr LJ 248, that simply purchasing drugs does not amount to “financing” under Section 27A of the NDPS Act, which requires providing funds to make an illicit activity operational or to sustain it. While acknowledging the petitioner’s criminal antecedents, the Court found them immaterial given the insufficient material to establish current involvement. The bail was granted subject to conditions including a bond of ₹1,00,000/-, non-intimidation of witnesses, regular trial attendance, and communication of contact details.

Why it matters: Practitioners should note that merely relying on financial transactions or call detail records of an accused for drug purchase is insufficient to deny bail under the NDPS Act, especially for Section 27A (financing illicit traffic), unless direct evidence of financing the drug trade is presented.

13. Himachal Pradesh High Court interprets bail for women in NDPS cases

CRMPM/341/2026 · Criminal Law [25-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Parties: PURNIMA LAPANG vs STATE OF HP

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh granted regular bail to the petitioner, Purnima Lapang, in FIR No. 5 of 2026 under Sections 21 and 29 of the NDPS Act, despite the recovery of 50.340 grams of heroin from a room where she was present with a co-accused. The Court acknowledged the prima facie applicability of presumptions under Sections 35 and 54 of the NDPS Act, shifting the burden to the petitioner to demonstrate non-conscious possession, which could only be rebutted during trial. However, the Court noted that the recovered quantity was intermediate, thus not attracting the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act. Crucially, the Court relied on Section 480 of the Bhartiya Nagrik Surkasha Sanhita (BNSS), which permits granting bail to women in non-bailable offences, a principle reinforced by Nethra vs State of Karnataka (MANU/KA/2055/2022) concerning Section 437 Cr.P.C. The Court distinguished precedents cited by the petitioner, such as Anjali vs. State of H.P. and Seema vs. State of H.P., on factual grounds, particularly regarding the petitioner’s presence in the room from which recovery was made. Considering the petitioner’s lack of criminal antecedents and the filing of the charge sheet, the Court concluded that no useful purpose would be served by further detention, ordering release on bail subject to conditions.

Why it matters: The Court clarified that intermediate quantity of contraband in NDPS cases means Section 37 rigours do not apply, and female accused are entitled to special consideration for bail. This provides a clear guideline for lawyers representing women in NDPS cases where the quantity is not commercial.

14. Pre-arrest bail denied in violent assault case involving Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita charges

CRMPM/391/2026 · Criminal Law [25-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Parties: SUKANT CHAUHAN vs STATE OF HP

The High Court dismissed the petitioner’s application for pre-arrest bail in FIR No. 64 of 2026, registered under Sections 109, 191(2), 191(3), 190, and 115(2) of the Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023, finding that the allegations of the petitioner being armed with a sword and involved in a violent assault causing multiple injuries prima facie established his involvement. The Court, relying on P. Chidambaram v. Directorate of Enforcement (2019) 9 SCC 24, reiterated that the power to grant pre-arrest bail is extraordinary and should be exercised sparingly, only in exceptional circumstances, as it interferes with the investigation. Further, citing Srikant Upadhyay v. State of Bihar 2024 SCC OnLine SC 282, it emphasized that anticipatory bail is not a rule and its grant in serious cases may lead to a miscarriage of justice or hamper investigation. The Court also referenced State Versus Anil Sharma (1997) 7 SCC 187, which held that pre-arrest bail should not be granted where custodial interrogation is required for recovery and eliciting circumstances, as effective interrogation is qualitatively more elicitation-oriented than questioning a suspect protected by a bail order. The argument that a co-accused was granted regular bail was rejected, as the parameters for pre-arrest and regular bail differ.

Why it matters: Practitioners should note that pre-arrest bail is considered an extraordinary power, to be exercised sparingly, especially when custodial interrogation is deemed necessary for investigation, recovery of weapons, or to establish the crime’s circumstances.

15. Bail Granted in NDPS Case Based on Lack of Direct Evidence and Speedy Trial Right

CRMPM/2582/2025 · Criminal Law [25-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE RANJAN SHARMA

Parties: DAMINI vs STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH

The High Court granted bail to the petitioner, Damini, under Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, in connection with an FIR under Sections 21, 25, and 29 of the NDPS Act, finding that the stringent conditions of Section 37 of the NDPS Act were satisfied. The Court reasoned that there were reasonable grounds to believe the petitioner was not guilty, as no contraband was recovered from her, and her implication rested solely on the co-accused’s disclosure statement and a bank transaction of Rs. 20,000, which, per Tofan Singh versus State of Tamil Nadu (2021) 4 SCC 1, cannot be the sole basis for conviction under the NDPS Act. Furthermore, the Court noted the petitioner’s prolonged incarceration of ten months and the likelihood of the trial taking considerable time, which, as established in V. Senthil Balaji versus The Deputy Director, Directorate of Enforcement (Criminal Appeal No. 4011 of 2024) and Partha Chatterjee Versus Directorate of Enforcement (2024 SCC Online SC 3729), mandates that the rigours of special enactments like Section 37 of the NDPS Act must yield to the fundamental right to speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution. The Court also considered that past criminal antecedents alone, as per Maulana Mohammed Amir Rashidi versus State of Uttar Pradesh (2012) 2 SCC 382, cannot be the sole ground for denying bail, especially when no cogent material suggested tampering with evidence or witnesses.

Why it matters: High Courts will increasingly grant bail in NDPS cases if the trial is delayed, even with stringent Section 37 conditions, overriding statutory embargoes on the right to speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution. Practitioners should highlight prolonged incarceration and absence of direct evidence, beyond confessional statements, especially when no recovery was made directly from the accused.

16. Bidder must submit correct GST number as per tender conditions

CWP/1069/2026 · Administrative Law [24-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE VIVEK SINGH THAKUR, JUSTICE RANJAN SHARMA

Parties: RAMESH CHAND vs HIMACHAL PRADESH STATE FOREST DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION LIMITED & ORS.

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh dismissed the petitioner’s writ petitions, holding that the Himachal Pradesh State Forest Development Corporation Limited rightly rejected his bids for felling and transport work. The Court found that the petitioner failed to submit complete and valid documents as required by Clause 59 of the tender conditions. Specifically, for Lot Nos. 22 and 30, the petitioner submitted the GST number of a partnership firm (Shyamak Enterprises) while bidding in an individual capacity, which the Court deemed insufficient as a partnership firm is a separate legal entity and its GST number cannot be treated as an individual’s personal GST. For Lot No. 65, the GST number of his proprietorship concern (M/s Sarovar Bar & Restaurant Bani) was found to be inactive. The Court emphasized that the tender required a personal or sole proprietor’s activated GST number for individual bids. The Court rejected the petitioner’s argument of arbitrariness or mala fide intent, noting that the Corporation had consistently required valid and activated GST numbers corresponding to the bidding entity, distinguishing the petitioner’s case from others where sole proprietorship GST numbers were accepted for individual bidders. Consequently, no grounds for interference were found, and the petitions were dismissed.

Why it matters: The Himachal Pradesh High Court ruled that a bidder’s failure to provide a valid and activated personal GST number, as stipulated in tender conditions, justifies the rejection of their bid. Lawyers should advise clients to strictly adhere to tender document specifications, particularly concerning GST details, to avoid disqualification.

17. Writ petition against disputed revenue authority orders and mutation dismissed

CWP/2905/2026 · Property Law [24-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Parties: MANJU LATA vs THE STATE OF H.P. & ORS

The High Court dismissed the writ petition seeking to quash various revenue orders and a mutation, holding that the petitioner’s claims were not only belated but also involved disputed questions of fact unsuitable for adjudication under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The Court noted that the petitioner’s predecessors had consistently failed to establish their claims before multiple revenue authorities, with orders dating back to 1985, 1986, 1987, 1992, and 1997, all confirming the possession of Sh. Achhar Singh. Furthermore, a civil suit filed by the petitioner’s father in 2007, seeking declaration and injunction, was also dismissed in 2019, thereby indicating a concurrent finding against the petitioner’s assertions of continuous physical possession. The Court emphasized that the writ jurisdiction under Article 227 is supervisory and not appellate, and therefore, it cannot delve into re-evaluation of factual disputes that have been conclusively determined by lower authorities and civil courts. Consequently, finding no merit in the petition, it was dismissed.

Why it matters: Practitioners should note that High Courts will generally not entertain writ petitions (under Article 227) involving belated causes of action, previously adjudicated matters, or disputed questions of fact, especially when revenue authorities and civil courts have already ruled on the case.

18. State must pay gratuity to employees as per previous rulings

CWP/3588/2026 · Labor Law [24-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Parties: THE EXECUTIVE ENGINEER, JSV DIVISION, PALAMPUR, DISTT. KANGRA vs SHAMBHU RAM

The High Court dismissed the petitions filed by the Executive Engineer, JSV Division, Palampur, challenging orders passed by the Deputy Labour Commissioner-cum-Appellate Authority under Section 7(7) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, which directed payment of gratuity to the respondents. The Court found that the facts and the issue of law involved in the present cases were identical to those adjudicated in State of H.P. & Ors. Versus Binu Ram (CWP No.15443/2024, decided on 24.02.2026) and Bindumati Versus State of H.P. and others (CWP No.4632/2025, decided on 07.11.2025). The learned Deputy Advocate General conceded that the legal issue was covered against the State by these precedents, particularly noting that the decision in Bindumati had been accepted and implemented by the State. Consequently, applying the principle of stare decisis and following the reasoning established in Binu Ram and Bindumati, the Court held that the petitioners’ challenge lacked merit, thereby affirming the gratuity payments.

Why it matters: This ruling reiterates the state’s obligation to pay gratuity under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, aligning with prior judgments. Practitioners should note that similar cases against the state for gratuity payments are likely to succeed based on this established precedent.

19. High Court allows reconsideration of industrial plot re-allotment after resumption.

CWP/3638/2026 · Property Law [24-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Parties: M/S KING’S PALACE FURNITURES & FURNISHERS vs HIMACHAL PRADESH STATE INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION LTD.

The High Court disposed of the writ petition, directing the respondent, Himachal Pradesh State Industrial Development Corporation Ltd., to consider a fresh proposal from the petitioner, M/s King’s Palace Furnitures & Furnishers, for re-allotment of an industrial plot. The plot, initially leased on 30.06.2011, was resumed by the respondent on 13.01.2022 due to the petitioner’s failure to commence construction/production within the stipulated period, as per Clauses 4, 5, 12, and 24 of the allotment letter. Although the resumption order offered a one-time restoration opportunity within one year, which lapsed in January 2023 without compliance, the petitioner’s subsequent representation for reconsideration on 22.04.2025 was rejected on 09.01.2026. However, given that the respondent had not yet finalized auction proceedings for the resumed plot and expressed no objection to reconsidering a new proposal, the Court, without delving into the merits, allowed the petitioner one week to submit a concrete proposal. The respondent was then directed to consider this proposal in accordance with law and communicate its decision within two weeks thereafter, leaving all rights and contentions of the parties open.

Why it matters: Practitioners representing industrial allottees facing plot resumption can advise clients to submit fresh proposals for re-allotment. The court’s order indicates that authorities must consider such proposals, even after prior rejection, if auction proceedings are not finalized.

20. High Court directs police to consider citizen’s request for protection

CWP/3652/2026 · Administrative Law [24-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Parties: ROHIT KATWAL vs THE STATE OF H.P. & ORS

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in Rohit Katwal v. The State of H.P. & Ors., disposed of a writ petition seeking police protection, directing the competent authority to expeditiously address the petitioner’s representation. The petitioner had sought a writ of mandamus for police protection free of cost, alleging threat perceptions and highlighting that his representation dated 22.02.2026 (Annexure PX) to the respondent-Police Department had not been acted upon. The decisive ground for the Court’s order was the assurance by the learned Deputy Advocate General that the respondents/Competent Authority would look into the said representation and take action in accordance with law. Consequently, the Court, taking note of this assurance, directed respondent No.4/Superintendent of Police, Una/Competent Authority, to examine the petitioner’s grievance as articulated in his e-mail representation dated 22.02.2026 (Annexure PX) expeditiously and to take appropriate action as deemed fit in accordance with law. This judgment underscores the principle that where an administrative remedy is available and the authority undertakes to address the grievance, the Court may direct such action rather than issuing a substantive writ at the initial stage, thereby ensuring due process and administrative efficiency. The Court did not rely on specific precedents but rather on the procedural undertaking by the State.

Why it matters: This ruling reminds authorities to act promptly on citizen requests for police protection. Lawyers can cite this to ensure timely consideration of their clients’ safety concerns.

21. Writ petition dismissed as infructuous due to passage of time

CWP/9050/2025 · Administrative Law [24-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Parties: M/S PARAM LIQUORS vs STATE OF H.P. & ORS.

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in CWP No. 9050/2025, disposed of the writ petition filed by M/s Param Liquors as having been rendered infructuous due to the efflux of time. The learned counsel for the petitioner explicitly submitted that the petition had become infructuous, leading the Court to conclude that no live controversy remained for adjudication. This decision aligns with the established legal principle that courts generally refrain from adjudicating academic or moot issues, as their primary function is to resolve actual disputes between parties. While no specific precedents were cited in this brief order, the underlying principle is well-settled, reflecting the judiciary’s focus on judicial economy and the avoidance of advisory opinions. Consequently, the Court, acting upon the petitioner’s submission, found it unnecessary to delve into the merits of the case, thereby disposing of the main petition and any pending miscellaneous applications. The judgment underscores the procedural aspect of judicial review where the continued relevance of a petition is paramount for its consideration.

Why it matters: This ruling highlights that courts may dismiss cases as infructuous if the passage of time resolves the underlying issue, thereby conserving judicial resources. Practitioners should periodically assess if the relief sought remains relevant or if circumstances have rendered the petition moot.

22. Police and Excise Departments must apply independent minds before ordering factory closures

CWP/13269/2025 · Administrative Law [24-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Parties: M/S HIMGIRI BEVERAGES (DISTILLER & BOTTLER) vs STATE OF H.P. & ORS.

The High Court disposed of the petition filed by M/s Himgiri Beverages, which challenged the closure of its factory by the State Excise & Taxation Department at the instance of the Police Department, following an FIR No. 117/2025 registered under Section 39(1)(A) of the H.P. Excise Act, 2011. The Court observed that while the petitioner’s primary grievance regarding factory operation had been redressed, neither the State Taxes & Excise Department nor the Police Department took responsibility for the unjustified closure. The Excise Department failed to apply independent mind before halting production, and the Police Department improperly requested complete closure without assessing legal, factual, and necessity aspects or repercussions, and subsequently failed to respond to communications seeking resumption. The Court, noting the fair stance of the petitioner’s counsel and the Deputy Advocate General’s assurance, dropped the matter with a caution to both departments and their functionaries to be mindful of their duties towards state revenue and licensees, expressing hope that such incidents would not recur. The petition was thus disposed of with these observations.

Why it matters: This ruling cautions government departments against arbitrary factory closures, emphasizing the need for independent assessment and considering financial implications for businesses and state revenue. Practitioners representing businesses facing similar situations can cite this judgment to challenge hasty or unjustified closure orders.

23. School Merger Notification Withdrawn by State Government

CWP/9706/2024 · Education Law [24-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE VIVEK SINGH THAKUR, JUSTICE RANJAN SHARMA

Parties: SCHOOL MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE GPS OLWA vs STATE OF H.P. AND ORS.

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh disposed of CWP No. 9706 of 2024 after the State, through the Additional Advocate General, placed on record a communication dated 23.03.2026 from the Director School Education, Himachal Pradesh. This communication directed that the previously merged Government Primary School Olwa, which had been merged into Government Primary School Matal vide Government Notification dated 17.08.2024 (at Sr. No. 159), shall continue to function as Government Primary School Olwa until further orders. This continuation, however, is subject to a review of the enrollment in the beginning of the next academic session. Consequently, the Court held that the decision to merge Government Primary School Olwa into Government Primary School Matal, as notified on 17.08.2024, stood withdrawn. The petition was thus disposed of in terms consistent with the aforementioned communication, rendering any pending applications also disposed of. The Court’s decision was predicated on the State’s affirmative action to reverse the merger, thereby resolving the petitioner’s grievance without the need for further judicial intervention or a detailed adjudication on the merits of the original merger notification.

Why it matters: This ruling confirms that a school merger notification can be withdrawn by the state, affirming governmental discretion in educational administration. Practitioners should note that such decisions can be reversed, potentially impacting future school rationalisation policies.

24. Himachal Pradesh High Court Dismisses State’s Challenge to Gratuity Payments

CWP/19649/2025 · Labor Law [24-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Parties: PRINCIPAL SECRETARY (JSV) & ANR. vs SITA RAM AND ANOTHER

The High Court dismissed the State’s petitions challenging orders passed by the Deputy Labour Commissioner-cum-Appellate Authority under Section 7(7) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, which directed payment of gratuity to the respondents. The Court found that the facts and the issue of law involved in the present cases were substantially similar to those adjudicated in State of H.P. & Ors. Versus Binu Ram (CWP No.15443 of 2024, decided on 24.02.2026) and Bindumati Versus State of H.P. and others (CWP No.4632 of 2025, decided on 07.11.2025). The learned Assistant Advocate General conceded that the legal issue was covered against the petitioner-State by these prior decisions, with the decision in Bindumati having been accepted and implemented. Consequently, applying the reasoning and analogy of Binu Ram and Bindumati, the Court held that the State’s challenge lacked merit, thereby affirming the gratuity payments. The Court’s decision underscores the principle of judicial consistency and the binding nature of precedents on similar questions of law and fact.

Why it matters: This decision reaffirms that the High Court of Himachal Pradesh will consistently apply its prior rulings regarding gratuity payments, signaling a clear precedent for similar cases against the state government. Practitioners can rely on settled law when advising clients on gratuity claims in the state.

25. Party cannot introduce new evidence at advanced stage of trial

CMPMO/535/2024 · Civil Law [24-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE ROMESH VERMA

Parties: CHARAN DASS vs PREETO DEVI & OTHERS

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh dismissed the petitioner’s challenge to the Senior Civil Judge’s order, which rejected applications under Order 7 Rule 14 CPC read with Section 65(a) of the Indian Evidence Act and Section 45 of the Indian Evidence Act. The Court affirmed that the applications, filed at the rebuttal evidence stage in a suit initiated in 2010, were a belated attempt to fill lacunae in the plaintiff’s case, a practice consistently disapproved. Relying on precedents such as Rakesh Kumar Kaundal vs. Smt. Sarswati Devi & others and Rajesh Kumar and another vs. State Bank of India, the Court reiterated that Order 7 Rule 14 CPC cannot be invoked to remedy a lack of diligence or to introduce documents without cogent explanation for their delayed production. Furthermore, the Court found no basis for admitting secondary evidence under Section 65(a) of the Indian Evidence Act, as the petitioner failed to establish that the original sale deed was in the possession of the defendant or that its non-production was properly accounted for, particularly noting the implausibility of the defendant possessing a document from 1978 when he was an infant. The Court also rejected the application under Section 45 of the Indian Evidence Act for expert opinion, holding that the plaintiff had known the case’s facts since its inception and the applications were intended to prolong litigation. The Court concluded that the trial court’s plausible view warranted no interference under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

Why it matters: Practitioners cannot introduce new evidence at the rebuttal stage of a trial if they knew about the evidence earlier. Courts will not allow parties to fill lacunae or significantly delay proceedings. This ruling impacts civil litigation practice, especially regarding evidence submission timelines.

26. Contempt proceedings closed after petitioner’s representation considered

COPC/1181/2025 · Administrative Law [24-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Parties: DOT RAM vs SANJAY SOOD

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in COPC No. 1181/2025, closed the contempt proceedings initiated by Dot Ram against Sanjay Sood, noting that the respondent had complied with the Court’s directions. The decisive ground for this closure was the production of office instructions dated 13.01.2026 from the Divisional Forest Officer, Seraj Forest Division at Banjar, which conveyed the decision regarding the petitioner’s representation under office order dated 12.01.2026. This demonstrated that the respondent had taken action as required, thereby purging the contempt. The Court discharged the notice issued to the respondent and disposed of all pending miscellaneous applications. Crucially, the Court reserved liberty to the petitioner to pursue appropriate remedies for any surviving grievances, ensuring that while the contempt was purged, the petitioner’s substantive rights were not foreclosed. This approach aligns with the principle that contempt proceedings are primarily aimed at securing compliance with court orders, rather than punishing the contemnor indefinitely once compliance is achieved. The Court did not explicitly rely on any specific precedents in this brief order, but its action reflects the established practice of closing contempt proceedings upon satisfactory compliance.

Why it matters: Practitioners should note that contempt proceedings may be closed if the respondent takes action requested by the petitioner, even if the underlying grievance remains. The petitioner retains liberty to pursue other remedies.

27. Motor accident compensation enhanced for injured petitioner’s future prospects and loss of amenities.

FAO/65/2016 · Insurance Law [24-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE SUSHIL KUKREJA

Parties: MEERA DEVI vs VEENA DEVI AND OTHERS

The High Court partially allowed the appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, enhancing the compensation awarded to the appellant for injuries sustained in a motor accident. The Court found the Tribunal erred in calculating future prospects and omitting compensation for loss of amenities. Relying on National Insurance Company Ltd. vs. Pranay Sethi and ors, the Court held that for a self-employed individual below 40 years, a 40% addition to established income for future prospects is warranted, correcting the Tribunal’s 50% addition. Further, citing R.D. Hattangadi v. Pest Control (India) Pvt. Ltd., which delineates pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages, the Court awarded Rs. 50,000/- for loss of amenities of life, noting that such damages compensate for the inability to lead a full life and enjoy normal amenities. The Court upheld the Tribunal’s assessment of the appellant’s notional monthly income at Rs. 5,000/- as a housewife, referencing Arun Kumar Agarwal and another Vs. National Insurance Company Ltd. & others for the principle of pecuniary estimation of a housewife’s services. Consequently, the total compensation was modified to Rs. 4,09,674/-, with other terms of the award remaining unchanged.

Why it matters: The High Court increased compensation for a motor accident victim by adding 40% for future prospects for a self-employed individual and specifically awarding for loss of amenities, providing clear guidance on calculating damages under the MV Act.

28. Court restores appeal for fresh decision, citing natural justice violation

FAO/149/2013 · Civil Law [24-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE SUSHIL KUKREJA

Parties: SHIV CHARAN vs STATE OF HP & ANOTHER

The High Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the order dated 14.01.2013, which had dismissed the appellant’s application under Order 41, Rule 21 read with Section 151 of the CPC for restoration of an appeal, and consequently set aside the judgment and decree dated 22.08.2000. The Court reasoned that the First Appellate Court had decided the appeal on 22.08.2000 without hearing the appellant’s counsel, who was absent due to an advocates’ strike, thereby violating the fundamental principle of natural justice, audi alteram partem, which guarantees a right to fair hearing and prohibits condemnation unheard. The Court found that no effective opportunity of being heard was provided to the appellant before the earlier judgment and decree were passed, rendering the decision ex-parte in effect. The Court emphasized that it was the duty of the First Appellate Court to ensure an effective opportunity to address arguments. Accordingly, the matter was remanded, directing the First Appellate Court to decide the appeal afresh on merits, providing reasonable opportunity of hearing to both parties, with a specific timeline for disposal.

Why it matters: A court must provide an effective hearing opportunity even if advocates are on strike; a decision made without hearing one party violates natural justice and is grounds for restoration and fresh consideration.

29. High Court allows appointment of revenue expert to trace land history in property dispute

CR/79/2025 · Property Law [24-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE JIYA LAL BHARDWAJ

Parties: MANU SHARMA vs OM DUTT AND OTHERS

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh partly allowed the revision petition, setting aside the trial court’s order dated 29.05.2025, which dismissed the petitioner’s application under Order 26 Rule 9, 10A CPC for the appointment of a revenue expert. The Court held that where the history and ownership of land, particularly after consolidation and settlement operations involving new Khasra numbers, need to be traced across multiple generations, the appointment of a revenue expert is necessary and proper for the adjudication of the case, as such an investigation constitutes a “scientific investigation” under Order 26 Rule 10A CPC and elucidates matters in dispute under Order 26 Rule 9 CPC. Relying on Karan Singh and another vs. Malkiat Devi and others, 2010 (3) Shim. LC 543, the Court reiterated that a revenue expert is uniquely positioned to link old and new Khasra numbers, thereby saving judicial time and aiding in a just conclusion, without amounting to collection of evidence for a party. The Court distinguished Ratti Ram vs. Shobha Ram, 2021 (3) Him. L.R. (HC) 1576 and Rajinder Singh vs. Ran Singh and others on the grounds of delay in filing the application. However, the Court upheld the dismissal of the application under Order 39 Rule 7 CPC, finding no material to suggest violation of the status quo order. The trial court was directed to appoint a revenue officer as an expert.

Why it matters: The Himachal Pradesh High Court ruled that courts can appoint a revenue expert to trace the history and ownership of land, especially after consolidation and settlement operations, to accurately resolve property disputes. This approach avoids future complications and saves court time, setting a precedent for such appointments at an early stage of litigation.

30. Himachal Pradesh High Court overturns denial of promotion after DPC recommendation

CWPOA/543/2019 · Service Law [24-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE JIYA LAL BHARDWAJ

Parties: PRADEEP SINGH vs STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH & OTHERS

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh allowed the petition, quashing the impugned order dated 27.07.2004 and directing the State to appoint the petitioner as Assistant Engineer (Civil) with all consequential benefits based on the DPC recommendations of 30.05.2003. The Court found that the State had arbitrarily and discriminatorily denied the petitioner’s promotion, despite his eligibility as of 01.01.2002 and the DPC’s recommendation, while promoting other similarly situated candidates. The State’s rejection of the petitioner’s claim, by taking a “U-turn” from its initial stand in previous litigation and introducing new grounds regarding prospective application of R&P Rules notified on 30.05.2002 and a 100-point roster, was deemed unjustified. The Court emphasized that the State failed to follow the procedure outlined in Clause 16.15 of the Handbook on Personnel Matters, Volume-I, for disagreeing with DPC recommendations, which mandates a second reference with cogent reasons. The Court rejected the State’s reliance on Shailender Dania’s case as it was not in existence when the DPC was convened in 2002, reiterating the settled law that equals cannot be treated unequally. The Tribunal’s earlier direction merely stayed filling the post, not rejecting the petitioner’s claim or considering respondent No.4.

Why it matters: This ruling emphasizes that state authorities cannot unilaterally reject DPC recommendations or change eligibility criteria post-facto. Practitioners should note that once a DPC recommends a promotion, the appointing authority must follow a prescribed procedure to express disagreement, ensuring fairness and preventing arbitrary denials.

31. Himachal Pradesh High Court mandates release of pay scale arrears to Patwaris

EX.P./2455/2025 · Service Law [24-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Parties: SEEMA & ORS. vs STATE OF H.P. & ANR.

The High Court disposed of the execution petition, noting the respondents’ compliance affidavit and consideration order dated 20.12.2025, which re-fixed the petitioners’ pay by granting higher pay-scale benefits. However, the Court observed that arrears due to the petitioners from the date of completing two years of regular service as Patwaris had not been released. Consequently, the Court directed the respondents to release the admissible arrears to the petitioners within twelve weeks from the date of the order. The Court further clarified that the petitioners retain the liberty to pursue appropriate legal remedies for any remaining grievances at a later stage. This decision effectively closes the present execution proceedings while ensuring the petitioners receive their outstanding financial entitlements, thereby enforcing the spirit of the original order regarding pay-scale benefits. The Court’s direction underscores the principle that compliance with pay-scale revisions must include the timely disbursement of all consequential arrears.

Why it matters: This ruling directs the government to pay outstanding arrears within twelve weeks, clarifying that employees can pursue further legal remedies for any remaining grievances. Practitioners should note the court’s strict timeline for compliance.

32. High Court quashes FIR for theft and house-breaking after compromise

CRMMO/632/2025 · Criminal Law [24-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Parties: ABHISHEK @ ABBU vs STATE OF H.P. & ANR.

The High Court quashed FIR No. 126 of 2022, registered under Sections 457 and 380 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), and all consequential proceedings, based on a compromise effected between the petitioner and the informant. The Court noted that the parties, being neighbours, desired to maintain cordial relations, and the informant had unequivocally stated on record that he had entered into the compromise without coercion and had no objection to the quashing of the FIR. The decisive ground for this decision was the existence of binding precedents from the High Court itself, which had previously quashed FIRs for similar offences under Section 380 IPC in Musharaf versus State of H.P. 2022 (1) Shim. LC 319 and Harsh Anand versus State of H.P. 2020 STPL 5681, and for offences akin to Section 457 IPC (specifically Section 452 IPC) in Chaman Lal versus State of H.P. Latest HLJ 2023 (HP) (1) 213, Avinash Singh Rana versus State of H.P. 2023 STPL 3181, Ameen versus State of H.P and others 2023 (1) Him. L.R. 375, and Prashant Dharmani and others versus State of H.P. and others 2023 (1) Him. L.R. 241. These precedents established the principle that where parties have genuinely compromised in certain non-compoundable offences, particularly those arising from personal disputes, the High Court may exercise its inherent powers to quash criminal proceedings to secure the ends of justice.

Why it matters: The High Court reiterates its stance on quashing FIRs for offences under Sections 380 and 457 IPC when parties reach a compromise, allowing legal practitioners to advise clients on the possibility of mediation and FIR quashing in similar cases.

33. Himachal Pradesh High Court affirms conviction despite hostile witness and minor police discrepancies

CR.A/245/2022 · Criminal Law [24-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Parties: PARAS RAM vs STATE OF H.P.

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh dismissed the appeal, upholding the conviction and sentence of the appellant under Section 20(b)(ii)(B) of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1984, for possessing 800 grams of charas. The Court found that the prosecution had established its case beyond reasonable doubt, despite the independent witness (PW-1) turning hostile, relying on the consistent testimonies of police officials. Citing Sat Paul v. Delhi Admn., (1976) 1 SCC 727, the Court held that a witness’s testimony, even if partially discredited, can be relied upon if their credit is not completely shaken. Further, relying on Ashok alias Dangra Jaiswal versus State of Madhya Pradesh, (2011) 5 SCC 123, it was reiterated that independent witnesses turning hostile does not automatically discard the prosecution’s version. Minor contradictions in official witnesses’ statements, attributed to memory lapse over time, were deemed insufficient to discredit the core of the prosecution’s case, as per Rajan v. State of Haryana, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1952 and Karan Singh v. State of U.P., (2022) 6 SCC 52. The Court also affirmed, citing Kripal Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (2019) 5 SCC 646, that police officials’ testimonies are credible and can form the basis of conviction, even without independent corroboration, especially in cases of chance recovery where associating independent witnesses is impractical, as held in Kashmira Singh Versus State of Punjab 1999 (1) SCC 130. Non-compliance with Section 52A of the NDPS Act was not fatal as the entire contraband was sent for FSL analysis, consistent with Narayan Singh Vs. State of H.P. 2023 HHC 9715. The integrity of the case property was confirmed by intact seals at the FSL, as per Baljit Sharma vs. State of H.P 2007 HLJ 707.

Why it matters: The Court clarified that an independent witness turning hostile or minor contradictions in police testimony do not automatically negate the prosecution’s case, especially when evidence of untampered contraband remains strong. Practitioners should note that courts will carefully scrutinise police testimonies, but will not discard them simply due to status or minor inconsistencies, especially in chance recovery scenarios.

34. Acquittal upheld in cheque bounce case where cheques were misused by in-laws

CR.A/264/2015 · Criminal Law [24-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Parties: SURENDER PAL SHARMA vs VIRENDER KUMAR

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh dismissed an appeal against the acquittal of the respondent in a case under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, upholding the Trial Court’s finding that the defence was highly probable. The Court, relying on the principles established in Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 176 and P. Somaraju v. State of A.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2291, reiterated that interference with an acquittal is warranted only if the judgment is patently perverse, based on misreading or omission of material evidence, or if no two reasonable views are possible. The Trial Court had accepted the respondent’s defence, corroborated by his son (DW1) and his own statement under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., that he had issued blank signed cheques to his wife for household expenses, which were subsequently misused by the complainant after his wife’s suicide and the registration of a criminal case against him. The High Court found the complainant’s admissions regarding the timeline of events and the criminal case against the respondent made it highly unlikely that the cheque would have been issued for a legitimate debt. Concluding that the Trial Court’s view was reasonable and not perverse, the High Court declined to interfere with the acquittal.

Why it matters: This ruling reinforces that an appellate court will not readily overturn an acquittal if the trial court’s view was reasonable, even if another view is possible. It highlights the importance of probable defence for alleged cheque misuse in NI Act cases.

35. Police failure to include independent witnesses invalidates NDPS conviction

CR.A/4085/2013 · Criminal Law [24-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE VIVEK SINGH THAKUR, JUSTICE RANJAN SHARMA

Parties: STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH vs PANDAV RAM

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh dismissed the State’s appeal against the respondent’s acquittal under Section 20 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substance Act, 1985, affirming the trial court’s decision despite disagreeing with its reliance on the overruled precedent of Sunil Kumar vs. State of H.P. The Court found the prosecution’s case riddled with serious doubts, primarily due to the Investigating Officer’s failure to make serious efforts to associate independent witnesses during the search and seizure, despite the recovery spot being a populated area with commercial establishments and regular traffic, including buses, at the time of the alleged recovery. Crucially, the Court noted inconsistencies in the police witnesses’ testimonies regarding the events leading to the respondent’s apprehension and the movement of vehicles, as well as unexplained delays in returning to the police station and tampering with the arrest memo. Further, the non-production of the seal by the police official to whom it was entrusted, coupled with the other lapses, rendered the prosecution’s narrative unreliable, reinforcing the principle that benefit of doubt must accrue to the accused, particularly when the presumption of innocence has been fortified by an acquittal. The Court referenced Ranjan Kumar Chaddha vs. State of Himachal Pradesh, AIR 2023 Supreme Court 5164 to clarify that Section 50 of the NDPS Act was inapplicable as nothing was recovered from the respondent’s person.

Why it matters: This ruling highlights the critical importance of police making genuine efforts to include independent witnesses during search and seizure operations, even at ‘odd hours,’ to secure convictions under the NDPS Act. Practitioners should scrutinise police actions for such efforts, as their absence can lead to acquittal, particularly when other procedural lapses or inconsistencies exist.

36. Deterrent sentence upheld for hit-and-run driver causing death

CR.R/195/2015 · Criminal Law [24-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Parties: RAJEEV KUMAR vs STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH

The High Court dismissed the criminal revision, upholding the concurrent findings of conviction and sentence against the petitioner for offences under Sections 279, 337, and 304-A IPC, and Section 187 of the Motor Vehicles Act. The Court found that the petitioner’s admission under Section 313 Cr.P.C. that he was driving the vehicle, coupled with eyewitness testimonies (PW-1, PW-6, PW-7) and the site plan (Ext.PW-11/A) and photographs (Ext.PW-2/A to Ext.PW-2/F) demonstrating the jeep was on the wrong side of the road, established his rash and negligent driving. The Court relied on Malkeet Singh Gill v. State of Chhattisgarh (2022) 8 SCC 204 and State of Gujarat v. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao (2023) 17 SCC 688 to reiterate that a revisional court’s jurisdiction under Section 397 Cr.P.C. is narrow, limited to rectifying patent defects or errors of jurisdiction/law, and does not permit re-appreciation of evidence unless findings are perverse. The Court also cited State of Maharashtra v. Sukhdev Singh (1992) 3 SCC 700, affirming that an accused’s statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. can be considered for conviction, and Balu Sudam Khalde v. State of Maharashtra (2023) 13 SCC 365, holding that incriminating suggestions by defence counsel bind the accused. The Court further noted that the petitioner’s failure to render aid, violating Section 134 MV Act, justified the conviction under Section 187 MV Act, and the sentence was appropriate given the need for deterrence in road accident cases, as held in Dalbir Singh Versus State of Haryana (2000) 5 SCC 82.

Why it matters: High Court reaffirms that revisional jurisdiction is limited and will not re-appreciate evidence unless there is perversity. It highlights that statements made by the accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C., including suggestions in cross-examination, bind the accused and can be used to determine guilt, reinforcing the importance of a deterrent approach to sentencing in cases of rash and negligent driving causing death.

37. Prosecution fails to prove drug case due to seal discrepancies

CR.A/4166/2013 · Criminal Law [24-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE VIVEK SINGH THAKUR, JUSTICE RANJAN SHARMA

Parties: STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH vs DEEPAK BHUPAL ALIAS NANDU

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh dismissed the State’s appeal against the acquittal of the respondent, Deepak Bhupal, in a case under Section 15 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985. The Court upheld the acquittal primarily due to significant and irreconcilable discrepancies in the prosecution’s evidence concerning the integrity of the seized contraband and the sequence of events. Crucially, the Court noted material contradictions regarding the number and description of seals on the parcel containing the alleged poppy husk, both at the time of seizure, resealing by the SHO under Section 55 of NDPS Act, and upon its production in Court and at the FSL. The independent witness (PW-1) turned hostile, denying his presence at the recovery and alleging his signatures were taken at the police station. Furthermore, the Court found inconsistencies in the timing of the Ruqua dispatch and FIR registration, as deposed by PW-9, which cast doubt on the entire prosecution narrative. While acknowledging the respondent’s defence evidence under Section 65(b) of the Indian Evidence Act was inadmissible, the Court concluded that the prosecution failed to prove, beyond reasonable doubt, that the case property produced was indeed connected to the respondent, thereby affirming the principle that benefit of doubt must accrue to the accused.

Why it matters: This case highlights the critical importance of maintaining a clear chain of custody and consistent evidence, especially regarding seals on seized contraband. Prosecutors must ensure that physical evidence presented in court matches initial documentation, as discrepancies can lead to acquittal, even in drug cases.

38. BNS Section 103(1) offence not made out if death from single push

CRMPM/292/2026 · Criminal Law [24-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Parties: AYUSH SHARMA vs STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH

The High Court granted regular bail to the petitioner, Ayush Sharma, in FIR No. 02 of 2026, registered under Sections 103(1), 115(2), and 117(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS), finding that the allegations, even if accepted, did not prima facie constitute an offence under Section 103(1) BNS. The Court relied on Jani Gulab Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra, 1970 SCC (Cri) 532, which held that knowledge of likely death from a push causing a fall is difficult to impute, especially when a fractured occipital bone is a rare outcome. This precedent, also followed in State of H.P. vs. ABC 2026:HHC:32, established that merely pushing someone who subsequently dies from a fall does not automatically lead to a charge of culpable homicide. The Court noted that Sections 115(2) and 117(2) BNS are bailable. While acknowledging the parameters for bail laid down in Pinki v. State of U.P., (2025) 7 SCC 314 and State of Rajasthan v. Balchand, (1977) 4 SCC 308, which emphasize “bail, not jail” unless circumstances suggest otherwise, the Court found no justification for continued detention. The apprehension that the petitioner, having renounced the world, might not attend trial was addressed by imposing stringent bail conditions, including a bond of ₹1,00,000/- with two sureties, and restrictions on movement and communication.

Why it matters: Lawyers should note that a single push leading to death, without knowledge of likely fatality, may not constitute an offence under BNS Section 103(1), potentially impacting bail applications and charges.

39. Himachal Pradesh High Court mandates grievance redressal for hydro project affected families

CWP/215/2024 · Land Acquisition Law [23-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Parties: SURJAN KUMAR vs STATE OF H.P. AND OTHERS

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh disposed of multiple writ petitions seeking employment in a Hydro Electric Power Project, directing the Deputy Commissioner, Kinnaur, to address the petitioners’ grievances. The Court’s decision stemmed from the petitioners’ reliance on a Memorandum of Understanding dated 23.09.2004 and a Resettlement & Rehabilitation Scheme notified on 11.06.2007, which mandated employment preference for project-affected families. However, the Court noted significant factual disputes, particularly concerning the petitioners’ status as land owners and the existence of subsequent agreements. Specifically, minutes from meetings held on 17.08.2013 and 29.12.2021 indicated that consensus had been reached regarding employment and compensation for affected individuals, with some agreements explicitly stating no further employment demands would be made. Given these conflicting factual assertions and the project’s commercial operation since 2021, the Court found it inappropriate to adjudicate the matter directly. Instead, it leveraged the Deputy Commissioner’s designated role as Administrator for the Resettlement & Rehabilitation Scheme, directing him to examine the petitioners’ claims in accordance with law, after associating all parties and stakeholders, and to take an appropriate decision within twelve weeks. This approach ensures a thorough factual inquiry by the designated authority before judicial intervention.

Why it matters: The Himachal Pradesh High Court directed the Deputy Commissioner, Kinnaur, to resolve employment grievances of families affected by a Hydro Electric Power Project. This clarifies the process for project-affected individuals seeking employment under MoUs and R&R schemes, requiring the Administrator to actively mediate such disputes.

40. Appellate Authority must pass reasoned order on employee’s grievance

CWP/2807/2026 · Service Law [23-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Parties: SURINDER PAUL vs THE REGISTRAR CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETIES, H.P AND OTHERS

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh quashed the Board of Directors’ decision dated 10.03.2025, communicated via order dated 17.03.2025, which rejected the petitioner’s appeal against his termination from service, holding it to be non-speaking and unreasoned. The Court found that the appellate authority failed to consider the various grounds raised by the petitioner, including challenges to the inquiry report’s merits, alleged procedural irregularities, and crucially, the jurisdictional competence of respondent No.3 (Managing Director) to issue the penalty order, contending that for a Class-IV employee, the General Manager was the Disciplinary Authority, thereby depriving the petitioner of his right to a first appeal. Relying on Kranti Associates Private Limited and another versus Masood Ahmed Khan and others (2010)9 SCC 496, which mandates recording reasons even in administrative decisions affecting individuals prejudicially, and Roop Singh Negi versus Punjab National Bank and Others (2009) 2 SCC 570, which reiterated that departmental proceedings are quasi-judicial and require reasoned orders, the Court emphasized that reasons are indispensable for fairness, transparency, and judicial review. Consequently, the Court directed the competent authority of the respondent-bank to reconsider the petitioner’s appeal afresh, passing a reasoned and speaking order within six weeks, after affording him an opportunity of hearing.

Why it matters: The High Court reiterates that even administrative decisions impacting individuals prejudicially require recorded reasons, allowing for judicial review. Practitioners should ensure appellate orders affecting their clients are duly reasoned, or such orders can be challenged.

41. High Court directs authority to decide petitioner’s representation within eight weeks

CWP/3296/2026 · Administrative Law [23-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE AJAY MOHAN GOEL

Parties: MANOJ KUMAR vs STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH AND OTHERS

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in CWP No.3296 of 2026, disposed of the writ petition by directing the competent authority to decide the petitioner’s representation (Annexure P-2) within a period of eight weeks from the date of the order. The Court’s decision was predicated on the submission by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, Ms. Mamta Garg, who requested that the petition be disposed of with a direction to the respondent-Department to take an appropriate decision on the representation within a time-bound period, considering the averments made therein. Mr. Pushpinder Jaswal, learned Additional Advocate General, accepted notice on behalf of the respondents. The Court, therefore, did not delve into the merits of the petitioner’s claim but rather exercised its power to ensure administrative action on a pending representation, thereby upholding the principle of expeditious disposal of grievances by competent authorities. This procedural direction reflects the Court’s role in compelling administrative bodies to perform their duties within a reasonable timeframe, a common practice in writ jurisdiction when a representation is pending and no decision has been rendered. The order effectively mandates a review of the petitioner’s case by the executive without prejudging its outcome.

Why it matters: Practitioners can advise clients that the High Court may expedite decisions on pending representations, ensuring timely resolution of administrative matters within a specified timeframe.

42. Himachal Pradesh High Court directs prompt decision on representation by authorities

CWP/3424/2026 · Administrative Law [23-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE AJAY MOHAN GOEL

Parties: NISHA RANI vs STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH AND ANOTHER

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in CWP No.3424 of 2026, disposed of the petition by directing the Competent Authority to decide the representation filed by the petitioner, Nisha Rani, within a period of eight weeks from the date of the order. The Court’s decision was predicated on the submission by the petitioner’s counsel that a representation (Annexure P-3) had already been filed with the respondent-Department, and that the petition could be resolved by a direction for its time-bound consideration. This approach reflects the Court’s exercise of its writ jurisdiction to ensure administrative authorities address grievances expeditiously, particularly when a formal representation has been made. The Court did not delve into the merits of the petitioner’s claims but rather focused on ensuring due process by compelling the administrative body to perform its duty of considering the representation. This procedural directive aligns with the principle of judicial restraint, where courts encourage exhaustion of administrative remedies before intervening on substantive issues. The order effectively mandates a review of the petitioner’s averments by the appropriate authority, thereby providing a clear administrative recourse without prejudging the outcome.

Why it matters: Practitioners can rely on this for speedy resolution of client representation by the departments, ensuring time-bound decisions from competent authorities within eight weeks. This precedent streamlines administrative grievance redressal.

43. High Court directs authority to decide representation within eight weeks

CWP/3429/2026 · Administrative Law [23-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE AJAY MOHAN GOEL

Parties: SHRI KHEM RAJ vs STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH AND OTHERS

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh disposed of the writ petition, directing the Competent Authority to decide the petitioner’s representation (Annexure P-4) within a period of eight weeks from the date of the order. The Court’s decision was predicated on the submission by the petitioner’s counsel that the petitioner had already filed a representation with the respondent-Department, and the petition could be resolved by directing the Competent Authority to take an appropriate decision on it within a time-bound period, considering the averments made therein. This approach reflects the principle of judicial restraint and the efficient disposal of matters where an internal departmental remedy has been invoked and requires a definitive response. The Court did not delve into the merits of the representation itself but rather ensured that the administrative process initiated by the petitioner would be concluded expeditiously. This procedural directive ensures that the petitioner’s grievance receives due consideration at the appropriate administrative level, thereby upholding the principle of due process. The order effectively remits the matter for administrative adjudication, without expressing any opinion on the substantive claims.

Why it matters: Practitioners can use this judgment to request timely resolution of their clients’ representations by competent authorities, establishing an eight-week timeframe for decision-making.

44. High Court directs government to decide new Gram Panchayat formation within twelve weeks

CWP/3537/2026 · Administrative Law [23-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Parties: CHARAN DASS vs STATE OF H.P. & ORS.

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in CWP No. 3537/2026, directed the respondents/competent authority to consider and decide the petitioner’s proposal for the formation of a new Gram Panchayat by separating Ward Nos. 5, 6, and 7 from Gram Panchayat Mittian, as per resolutions Annexure P-2 colly. The Court, without delving into the merits, acknowledged that the petition was filed on behalf of several residents of the affected villages, as detailed in Annexure P-1 (colly), and was predicated on a resolution passed by Gram Panchayat Mittian on 18.12.2024. The decisive ground for this direction was the petitioner’s and residents’ satisfaction with a directive for the respondents to consider and decide the grievance in accordance with law within a time-bound manner, to which the learned Additional Advocate General had no objection. Consequently, the Court disposed of the petition with a specific direction to the respondents/competent authority to consider the concerned Gram Panchayat’s resolution and take an appropriate decision, in accordance with law and procedure, within a period of twelve weeks from the date of the order. This approach reflects the Court’s exercise of its writ jurisdiction to ensure administrative action on a representation, without prejudging the substantive outcome.

Why it matters: The ruling directs authorities to take a time-bound decision on forming new Gram Panchayats, benefitting practitioners involved in local governance and administrative law cases. This ensures prompt consideration of such proposals, which often face delays.

45. Transfer petition dismissed as employee had not completed normal tenure

CWP/3538/2026 · Service Law [23-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE AJAY MOHAN GOEL

Parties: KAMLA DEVI vs STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH AND ANOTHER

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in CWP No.3538 of 2026, dismissed the petition filed by Kamla Devi against the State of Himachal Pradesh, holding it to be premature. The Court, presided over by Hon’ble Mr. Justice Ajay Mohan Goel, found that the petitioner had not completed her normal tenure of three years at her current posting station, rendering both the petition and her underlying representation premature. While the judgment did not explicitly cite specific statutory sections or prior precedents, its core reasoning implicitly relies on the established administrative principle that transfers or adjustments are typically considered only after an employee has served a prescribed minimum tenure at a particular location, thereby upholding the stability and predictability of administrative postings. The Court, therefore, declined to intervene at this juncture, observing that the petitioner retained the liberty to approach the concerned Authority for her adjustment through an appropriate representation at a later, more opportune stage. This decision underscores the judiciary’s reluctance to interfere with routine administrative matters, particularly those concerning transfers and postings, unless there is a clear violation of law or policy, or the administrative action is demonstrably arbitrary or malafide, none of which were found to be present in the instant premature challenge.

Why it matters: Practitioners should advise clients that transfer requests before completing the prescribed tenure are likely to be dismissed as premature. This reaffirms the standard administrative stance on employee transfers.

46. Family land partition stands as father’s share now vests with son

CWP/5644/2025 · Property Law [23-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Parties: NAND LAL AND ANOTHER vs STATE OF H.P. AND OTHERS

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in CWP No. 5644 of 2025, quashed the Divisional Commissioner’s order dated 27.02.2025, thereby reinstating the Assistant Collector Second Grade’s partition order dated 31.07.2018. The Court’s decision was predicated on the subsequent submission by respondent No. 5 that no dispute survived between the parties concerning the partition. Initially, respondent No. 5 had challenged the Assistant Collector’s order, arguing that his father, Sh. Nanku, had transferred his entire share to him, making respondent No. 5 a necessary party to the partition proceedings. This argument led the Divisional Commissioner to allow the revision petition. However, during the writ petition hearing, it was clarified that Sh. Nanku had since passed away on 14.06.2020, and his 128 shares, initially allotted to him in the partition, had devolved upon respondent No. 5. Crucially, respondent No. 5 explicitly accepted the mode and instrument of partition, confirming no grievance remained regarding the shares allotted to the petitioners. Consequently, the Court found no surviving dispute, rendering the Divisional Commissioner’s intervention unnecessary and restoring the original partition order, while clarifying respondent No. 5’s right to seek mutation of his late father’s shares in accordance with law.

Why it matters: This judgment clarifies that if a party’s grievances are resolved due to subsequent events, a High Court may quash an appellate order and reinstate the original partition decree. Practitioners should note that a change in circumstances can resolve disputes and simplify complex partition matters.

47. High Court Upholds Dismissal of Injunction Suit in Neighbourly Construction Dispute

RSA/30/2024 · Property Law [23-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE ROMESH VERMA

Parties: JAI PAL vs NIRMLA DEVI

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh dismissed the appellant’s Regular Second Appeal, affirming the concurrent findings of the lower courts which rejected the appellant’s suit for permanent prohibitory and mandatory injunction under Sections 38 and 39 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. The appellant had alleged that the respondent was raising forceful construction and interfering with his property, specifically claiming the respondent dismantled a 4-inch brick wall and constructed a staircase overlapping his slab, despite the appellant having adjusted his pillar dimensions to create space. The decisive ground for dismissal was the comprehensive report of the Local Commissioner (DW-1/A), appointed by the trial court, which, after two site visits, unequivocally stated that neither party had encroached upon the other’s property and that both had constructed within their respective boundaries as directed. The Court found that the appellant failed to substantiate his claims with concrete evidence, particularly discrediting the site plan (Ext. PW-2/A) prepared by PW-2 due to lack of proper measurements and bias. The Court emphasized that the lower courts’ findings were pure findings of fact, and in the absence of any perversity or substantial question of law, the High Court would not interfere with such concurrent factual determinations.

Why it matters: The High Court’s refusal to reassess concurrent factual findings by lower courts reinforces that Regular Second Appeals primarily address questions of law, not fact. Practitioners must ensure strong legal arguments and not rely on re-litigating facts already decided.

48. Execution petition disposed after judgment implementation

EX.P./482/2026 · Education Law [23-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Parties: SUBHASH CHAND vs CHAUDHARY SARWAN KUMAR HIMACHAL PRADESH KRISHI VISHWAVIDYALAYA, PALAMPUR

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh disposed of Ex. Petition No. 482 of 2026, noting the successful implementation of the judgment in question. The decisive ground for this disposition was the respondent’s submission of an office order dated 21.11.2025, confirming the execution of the judgment, a fact acknowledged and affirmed by the petitioner’s counsel. This effectively rendered the execution petition infructuous, as the relief sought had been granted. The Court’s action aligns with the fundamental principle that execution proceedings are designed to ensure compliance with judicial pronouncements, and once such compliance is achieved, the purpose of the petition is fulfilled. While no specific precedents were cited in this brief order, the underlying legal logic is rooted in the procedural jurisprudence governing execution petitions, where the Court’s role shifts from adjudication to enforcement, concluding once enforcement is complete. Consequently, all pending miscellaneous applications were also disposed of, reflecting the finality of the matter.

Why it matters: Lawyers should note that once a judgment is implemented, the execution petition for that judgment will be disposed of. This signals the end of the enforcement process for the decreed party.

49. Court denies forensic analysis request for electronic evidence as premature

CRMMO/127/2026 · Criminal Law [23-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Parties: ANITA DEVI vs STATE OF HP & ORS.

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh dismissed the petitioner’s plea to set aside/modify an order refusing forensic examination of a pen drive containing video evidence, holding that the application was premature. The petitioner, a victim in a pending trial, sought to introduce a video from social media to impeach a defence witness and demonstrate the true sequence of events, but it was initially not taken on record due to the absence of a certificate under Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act. Subsequently, the Special Judge declined to send the DVD for forensic examination, reasoning that the authenticity could be determined during the appreciation of evidence, as witnesses were yet to be examined. The High Court affirmed this reasoning, noting that if the witness admits the video’s authenticity, forensic examination would be unnecessary, and authenticity could also be established by examining the person who recorded the incident. The Court emphasized that inherent jurisdiction is extraordinary and to be exercised sparingly, finding no case for its exercise at this stage. Thus, the petition failed as the trial court was justified in deeming the application premature.

Why it matters: Before forensic examination of electronic evidence, courts may require witnesses to be examined to determine if authenticity is disputed, affecting when such requests should be made.

50. High Court quashes POCSO FIR after accused marries victim, have child

CRMMO/863/2025 · Criminal Law [23-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Parties: SHUBHAM vs STATE OF HP & ANR.

The High Court quashed FIR No. 112 of 2024, registered under Section 64 of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS) and Sections 4 and 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act), and all consequential proceedings, based on a compromise between the parties. The Court found that the petitioner/accused and the victim had married on 6.8.2025 and were residing happily, a fact confirmed by the victim’s statement, her mother’s statement, and the police status report. Relying on the precedent in Shri Devi vs. State of H.P. 2019 (3) ShimLC 1746, which held that continuation of proceedings is futile where the accused and victim have married and have children, and Ranjeet Kumar v. State of H.P., 2023 SCC OnLine HP 1625, which affirmed quashing FIRs in such circumstances to prevent disturbance to happy family life, the Court concluded that no fruitful purpose would be served by continuing the prosecution. The Court also cited Mahesh Mukund Patel vs. State of U.P. & others 2025 SCC OnLine SC 614, where the Supreme Court held that High Courts should exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. to quash proceedings when parties are happily married. Accordingly, the Court allowed the petition, quashing the FIR and all related proceedings.

Why it matters: This ruling establishes that the Himachal Pradesh High Court will quash POCSO and BNS FIRs when the accused and victim voluntarily marry and live together, prioritising family stability over continued prosecution.

51. FIR quashed after 14-year delay in Gram Panchayat proceedings

CRMMO/1233/2023 · Criminal Law [23-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Parties: VED PRAKASH vs STATE OF HP & ANR.

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh quashed FIR No. 26 of 2012, registered under Sections 341 and 323 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, and all consequent proceedings against the petitioner, primarily due to an inordinate and unexplained delay of over fourteen years in prosecution. The Court found that the challan, forwarded to the Gram Panchayat Lingzar in 2012, remained unacted upon until 2025, constituting a gross violation of the petitioner’s fundamental right to a speedy trial. Relying on the Supreme Court’s pronouncement in Ranjan Dwivedi v. CBI, (2012) 8 SCC 495, which emphasized that the guarantee of a speedy trial is intended to avoid oppression, relieve anxiety, and prevent the loss of evidence, the Court held that such prolonged inaction amounted to an abuse of the process of law. Furthermore, considering that the offences under Sections 341 and 323 IPC are compoundable, and the informant/complainant expressed no objection to the quashing, the Court concluded that continuing the proceedings would be an exercise in futility, especially given the Gram Panchayat’s limited power under Section 33 of the Himachal Pradesh Panchayati Raj Act to impose a fine not exceeding ₹100/-.

Why it matters: This ruling reinforces the right to a speedy trial, even for minor offenses in rural courts, and allows practitioners to argue for quashing old, stagnant cases where substantial delays have occurred. It also highlights the importance of timely prosecution by Gram Panchayats.

52. Human bite not a dangerous weapon under IPC Section 324

CR.A/58/2013 · Criminal Law [23-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Parties: MOHAN SINGH vs STATE OF H.P.

The High Court partially allowed the appeal, upholding the conviction and sentence under Sections 354, 341, and 323 of the IPC, but setting aside the conviction under Section 324 of the IPC. The Court affirmed the trial court’s reliance on the victim’s and her daughter-in-law’s corroborated testimonies, finding no infirmity despite arguments of delayed reporting or minor exaggerations, citing Achhar Singh v. State of H.P., (2021) 5 SCC 543, which held that a witness’s testimony is not discarded due to exaggeration alone, and Selvamani v. State, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 837, which clarified that hostile witness testimony remains on record if corroborated. Crucially, the Court rejected the appellant’s argument that the entire trial was vitiated due to investigation by an unauthorized officer, relying on State of M.P. v. Chunnilal, (2009) 12 SCC 649, which established that while investigation under the SC&ST Act by an unauthorized officer is invalid, proceedings for IPC offences can continue. However, the Court, following Shakeel Ahmed v. State (Delhi), (2004) 10 SCC 103, held that human teeth are not a “dangerous weapon” under Section 324 of the IPC, thus overturning the conviction for causing hurt by biting.

Why it matters: The Court clarified that injuries caused by human bites do not attract Section 324 IPC, which deals with voluntarily causing hurt by ‘dangerous weapons or means’. This means that such an act, if causing grievous hurt, would fall under Section 325 IPC (voluntarily causing grievous hurt) or Section 323 IPC (voluntarily causing simple hurt) if the injury is not grievous, impacting how such cases are charged and tried.

53. Interference with acquittal is only in cases of perversity, not merely another possible view

CR.A/66/2013 · Criminal Law [23-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Parties: STATE OF H.P. vs MEERA DEVI & ANR.

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh dismissed the State’s appeal against the acquittal of Meera Devi and Om Parkash for offences under Sections 451, 323, and 504 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, upholding the Trial Court’s finding that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. The Court, relying on the principles established in Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, (2025) 5 SCC 433, and State of M.P. v. Ramveer Singh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1743, reiterated that interference with an acquittal is warranted only if the judgment is patently perverse, based on misreading of evidence, or if no reasonable person could have recorded the acquittal. The Court found material contradictions in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses (PW1, PW2, PW3), noting that the informant (PW1) exaggerated her version, and her account was not corroborated by medical evidence or other witnesses. Furthermore, the absence of independent witnesses despite the incident occurring in a populated area, coupled with the Investigating Officer’s admission that no villager corroborated the incident, rendered the prosecution’s case highly suspect. The Court also considered the unexplained injury sustained by Meera Devi, as evidenced by her MLC (Ext.DA), which further weakened the prosecution’s narrative. Concluding that the Trial Court took a reasonable view, the High Court declined to interfere, even if an alternative view were possible, and directed the respondents to furnish bail bonds under Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Why it matters: High Courts will not interfere with a trial court’s acquittal if a reasonable view exists, even if another view is also possible. Practitioners appealing acquittals must demonstrate perversity, misreading of evidence, or omission of material evidence by the trial court.

54. High Court upholds acquittal in cheque bounce case, citing proper evidence appreciation

CR.A/264/2013 · Criminal Law [23-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Parties: AKSHAY AGGARWAL vs ANIL GUPTA AND ANOTHER

The High Court dismissed the appeal against acquittal in a Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 case, affirming the Appellate Court’s finding that the accused’s defence of issuing a blank cheque as security for a committee transaction was highly probable. The Court reiterated that interference with an acquittal judgment is warranted only if it is patently perverse, based on misreading of evidence, omits material evidence, or takes a view no reasonable person would. Relying on Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 176, which cited Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 and H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581, the Court emphasized that if two reasonable conclusions are possible, the appellate court should not disturb the acquittal. The Court found the complainant’s denial of running a committee incredible, especially when corroborated by defence witnesses, and noted that a witness’s testimony cannot be rejected solely due to a relationship, as held in Baban Shankar Daphal v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 137. Consequently, the Appellate Court’s reasonable view, even if another view were possible, did not warrant interference.

Why it matters: The court clarifies the appellate court’s role in reviewing acquittals, emphasizing that interference is only warranted if the lower court’s view is patently perverse, misreads evidence, or no other reasonable conclusion is possible. This reinforces the strong presumption of innocence after an acquittal, making it harder for complainants to overturn such decisions and shifting focus to the quality of defense evidence.

55. Probation granted for 2009 grievous hurt case, citing reformative justice and ill health

CR.A/326/2012 · Criminal Law [23-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Parties: PRITHI SINGH vs STATE OF H.P.

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in Prithi Singh v. State of H.P., while upholding the conviction of the appellant under Section 325 IPC for causing grievous hurt, partially allowed the appeal by setting aside the sentence and ordering the appellant’s release on probation. The Court affirmed the conviction based on the corroborative testimonies of Simro Devi (PW1) and Shakuntla Devi (PW2), supported by medical evidence from Dr. Raj Kumar (PW13) and Dr. Bhanu Awasthi (PW4), which established that the appellant inflicted grievous injuries with a stick. Crucially, the Court relied on the principle established in State of Uttar Pradesh Versus Nahar Singh 1998 (3) SCC 561 and reiterated in Arvind Singh v. State of Maharashtra, (2021) 11 SCC 1, that unchallenged testimony in cross-examination cannot be disputed during arguments, thereby accepting the prosecution’s narrative regarding the fencing of land and the assault. Further, the Court, citing Annaporna Dutt v. State of U.P., 1993 Supp (2) SCC 246, held that a witness’s testimony cannot be rejected merely due to a land dispute. However, considering the incident occurred in 2009, the victim’s demise, the appellant’s current ill health, his mother’s dependency, and the Probation Officer’s recommendation, the Court applied the reformative principles of the Probation of Offenders Act, as discussed in Arvind Mohan Sinha v. Amulya Kumar Biswas, (1974) 4 SCC 222 and Chellammal v. State, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 870, which mandates considering probation, and directed the appellant’s release on a bond of ₹50,000/- for three years.

Why it matters: This ruling highlights the High Court’s emphasis on reformative justice under the Probation of Offenders Act. Practitioners should note that age of the case, the offender’s health, and lack of re-offending can lead to probation even in grievous hurt convictions, particularly where a probation officer recommends it.

56. Unregistered firms can pursue cheque bounce cases under NI Act

CR.R/642/2025 · Criminal Law [23-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Parties: VIJAY KUMAR vs M/S NEW SHILPI JEWELLERS THROUGH ITS PARTNER PANKAJ CHAUHAN

The High Court dismissed a criminal revision petition, upholding the conviction and sentence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (NI Act), 1881, for cheque dishonour. The Court, relying on Malkeet Singh Gill v. State of Chhattisgarh (2022) and State of Gujarat v. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao (2023), reiterated that revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 Cr.P.C. is narrow, confined to rectifying patent defects, jurisdictional errors, or perversity, and does not permit re-appreciation of evidence unless findings are perverse or wholly unreasonable, as held in Kishan Rao v. Shankargouda (2018). The Court rejected arguments that a complaint by an unregistered firm was not maintainable, citing Uttam Traders Ranghri v. Tule Ram (2018), which clarified Section 69(2) of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932, bars only civil recovery proceedings, not Section 138 NI Act complaints. It further held that any partner can file such a complaint without specific authorization, as per Reshmi Constructions v. Laxman Vithal Chunekar (2014). The Court affirmed that once cheque issuance and signature are admitted, a presumption under Section 139 NI Act arises regarding legally enforceable debt, which the accused failed to rebut, consistent with APS Forex Services (P) Ltd. v. Shakti International Fashion Linkers (2020). Payments made post-cause of action do not absolve criminal liability, as per Rajneesh Aggarwal v. Amit J. Bhalla (2001), and the creditor can appropriate payments in the absence of debtor’s stipulation under Sections 59 and 60 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. The Court also confirmed the complaint was within limitation by excluding the notice service date, following Saketh India Ltd. v. India Securities Ltd. (1999), and upheld the default imprisonment for compensation, citing K.A. Abbas v. Sabu Joseph (2010).

Why it matters: The Himachal Pradesh High Court ruled that an unregistered partnership firm can file a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. This decision clarifies that Section 69(2) of the Indian Partnership Act, which bars civil recovery proceedings by unregistered firms, does not apply to criminal proceedings for cheque dishonour. Therefore, legal practitioners representing unregistered firms can proceed with cheque dishonour cases.

57. Acquittal upheld due to unexplained FIR delay and contradictory witness testimonies

CR.A/330/2015 · Criminal Law [23-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Parties: STATE OF H.P. vs ONKAR CHAND

The High Court dismissed the State’s appeal against the acquittal of the respondent for offences under Sections 341, 352, 506 IPC and Section 3(1)(x) of the SC&ST Act, upholding the Trial Court’s finding that the prosecution’s case was doubtful. The Court, relying on Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 176 and P. Somaraju v. State of A.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2291, reiterated that interference with an acquittal is warranted only if the judgment is patently perverse, based on misreading/omission of material evidence, or reaches a conclusion no reasonable person could. The decisive grounds for upholding the acquittal included an unexplained delay of approximately one day in lodging the FIR, which, as per Mehraj Singh v. State of U.P. (1994) 5 SCC 188, leads to suspicion of embellishment and concoction. Further, the testimonies of alleged eyewitnesses (PW2 and PW3) were inconsistent with the informant’s version, their presence at the scene was doubtful, and they were inimical to the accused, while another eyewitness (PW6) did not support the prosecution. The absence of medical examination for the victim and the non-examination of a named witness (Prakash Chand) further weakened the prosecution’s narrative, leading the Court to conclude that the Trial Court’s view was reasonable and required no interference.

Why it matters: This ruling reaffirms that unexplained delays in lodging an FIR and inconsistencies in witness accounts can lead to an acquittal, even in cases involving serious charges like those under the SC/ST Act. Practitioners should ensure prompt reporting and consistent evidence presentation.

58. Writ Petition Withdrawn by Petitioner Due to Unspecified Reasons

CWP/1207/2026 · Administrative Law [20-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Parties: M/S HARI BHUSHA vs STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH & ORS

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in CWP No. 1207 of 2026, disposed of the writ petition filed by M/s Hari Bhusha as withdrawn, following a request from the learned counsel for the petitioner. This decision, rendered by Ms. Justice Jyotsna Rewal Dua on March 20, 2026, effectively concludes the proceedings without an adjudication on the merits of the case. The Court’s action is a procedural one, acknowledging the petitioner’s right to withdraw their petition, thereby rendering any pending miscellaneous applications also disposed of as a consequential measure. This practice aligns with the fundamental principle of procedural law allowing parties to withdraw their actions, provided no prejudice is caused to the opposing side or the administration of justice. The judgment does not delve into substantive legal principles or rely on specific precedents, as the withdrawal obviated the need for a detailed legal analysis. The Court simply recorded the petitioner’s request and acted accordingly, reflecting a common procedural outcome in writ jurisdiction where parties opt not to pursue their claims further.

Why it matters: This order signals the end of a specific legal challenge without a substantive ruling. Practitioners should note that this case cannot be cited for precedent, as the court did not evaluate its merits.

59. Petitioner withdraws petition to pursue alternate legal remedies

CWP/3104/2026 · Land Acquisition Law [20-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Parties: KESHAV RAM vs STATE OF H.P. & ORS.

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in CWP No. 3104/2026, dismissed the writ petition filed by Keshav Ram seeking directions to the State respondents for the grant of Rehabilitation and Resettlement entitlements equal to benefits provided in District Kangra, as per Annexure P-2. The decisive ground for dismissal was the petitioner’s counsel, Mr. Suresh Saini, seeking permission to withdraw the petition after arguing the matter for some time. The Court noted that the petitioner intended to avail an appropriate remedy, as may be available in law, for the redressal of the grievances raised in the instant writ petition. Consequently, the petition was dismissed as withdrawn, with all pending miscellaneous applications also standing disposed of. The judgment, delivered by Ms. Justice Jyotsna Rewal Dua on 20.03.2026, did not delve into the merits of the substantive relief sought, but rather acceded to the petitioner’s request for withdrawal, thereby allowing the petitioner to pursue alternative legal avenues. This procedural dismissal underscores the principle that a petitioner may withdraw a petition to pursue other remedies, provided such withdrawal is sought and granted by the Court.

Why it matters: Practitioners should note that the court allows withdrawal of petitions to pursue other remedies, indicating flexibility in litigation strategy when new avenues become apparent.

60. Writ petition withdrawn for petitioner to pursue statutory remedy

CWP/3353/2026 · Administrative Law [20-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Parties: RAJEEV KUMAR vs STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH & ORS

The High Court disposed of the writ petition filed by Rajeev Kumar, challenging an order dated 30.01.2026 passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Una, H.P., which rejected his application for impleadment in an appeal preferred by respondent No.3 under Section 148 of the Himachal Pradesh Panchayati Raj Act, 1994. The Court noted that the petitioner possessed a statutory remedy against the impugned order under Rule 143 of the Himachal Pradesh Panchayati Raj Rules, 1997. Consequently, the learned counsel for the petitioner sought permission to withdraw the present writ petition with liberty to pursue the appropriate remedy in accordance with law. Acceding to this request, the Court permitted the withdrawal of the petition, explicitly directing that the period spent in prosecuting this writ petition shall not be computed for the purpose of limitation, thereby preserving the petitioner’s right to avail the statutory alternative remedy without prejudice to the limitation period. This decision underscores the principle of exhaustion of statutory remedies before invoking the extraordinary writ jurisdiction.

Why it matters: Practitioners must exhaust statutory remedies under the Himachal Pradesh Panchayati Raj Act before filing a writ petition, as courts will direct withdrawal if such remedies exist and grant liberty to re-approach.

61. Daily wager employee entitled to reinstatement if retrenchment rules not followed

CWP/3354/2026 · Labor Law [20-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Parties: THE STATE OF H.P. AND ANR. vs ROOP CHAND

The High Court dismissed the State’s petition, upholding the Labour Court’s award of reinstatement with seniority and continuity in service, and Rs. 50,000/- compensation in lieu of back wages, to the respondent. The decisive ground was the Labour Court’s finding that the respondent had completed over 240 days of service from 2013-2016, and his termination without complying with the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, specifically Sections 25(B)(G) and (H), was illegal. The Court rejected the State’s argument that the respondent was a casual/bill-based worker engaged for seasonal work, relying on State of H.P. and others Vs. Mohar Singh (LPA No.251 of 2025), which held that no artificial distinction can be created between a daily wager and a bill-based worker based solely on the mode of payment. The Court also noted the Labour Court’s correct inference from the petitioners’ cross-examination suggesting the respondent worked continuously, and the finding that bills were camouflaged in names of non-existent persons to suppress man-days. The Court reiterated that interference with Labour Court awards under Articles 226 and 227 is limited to fundamental flaws or gross violations of legal principles, as established in K.V.S. Ram Vs. Bangalore Metropolitan Transport Corporation (2015) 12 SCC 39 and Bhuvnesh Kumar Dwivedi Vs. Hindalco Industries Ltd. (2014)11 SCC 85.

Why it matters: Employers, including the State, cannot distinguish between daily wage and ‘bill-based’ workers to deny protections under the Industrial Disputes Act. Practitioners should note that courts will look beyond nomenclature to ensure compliance with retrenchment procedures.

62. High Court directs electricity dispute to expert regulatory commission

CWP/8142/2022 · Administrative Law [20-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Parties: M/S GROWEL ENERGY COMPANY LTD. vs STATE OF H.P. & ORS.

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh dismissed the writ petition filed by M/s Growel Energy Company Ltd., seeking to quash a letter dated 11.06.2021 and direct the Electricity Board to forward a draft Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) to the H.P. Electricity Regulatory Commission for approval, on the ground of availability of an efficacious alternate statutory remedy. The Court held that the petitioner’s grievance, concerning the non-forwarding of the draft PPA and the determination of tariff, falls squarely within the adjudicatory functions of the State Commission under Section 86(1)(f) of the Electricity Act, 2003, which empowers it to adjudicate disputes between licensees and generating companies. Relying on the principles laid down in Radha Krishan Industries Versus State of Himachal Pradesh and others (2021) 6 SCC 771, which reiterates that where a right is created by a statute prescribing a remedy, resort must be had to that statutory remedy before invoking Article 226, and further, Himachal Pradesh Electricity Board Ltd. Versus Kundan Hydro (Luni) Pvt. Ltd. & another (LPA No.492 of 2024, decided on 09.01.2026), which emphasized that the Electricity Act is an exhaustive code and expert bodies like Regulatory Commissions are best suited to deal with electricity-related issues, the Court concluded that the High Court should not entertain such matters. Consequently, the petition was disposed of, reserving liberty for the petitioner to pursue the appropriate statutory remedy, with the period spent in the writ petition not being computed for limitation purposes.

Why it matters: Practitioners must exhaust statutory remedies before approaching the High Court, especially in specialized areas like electricity regulation, where expert bodies are designated to adjudicate disputes and fix tariffs.

63. RERA recovery certificates must be expedited by District Collectors

CWP/21214/2025 · Property Law [20-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Parties: SAKET LAKHOTIA vs UNION OF INDIA & ORS

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh disposed of multiple writ petitions, including CWP No. 21214 of 2025, by directing the District Collector, Solan, to expeditiously conclude recovery proceedings initiated by the Competent Authority under the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (RERA). The petitioners had initially sought various reliefs, including a declaration that provisions of the State legislation, specifically Section 118(1) and Section 183(3)(D) of the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972, should yield to Sections 11, 18, 19, and 40 of the Parliamentary legislation, RERA, and the quashing of certain annexures precluding recovery. However, the petitioners’ counsel narrowed the scope of the petitions, requesting that they be treated as filed solely for relief (d), which sought a mandate directing respondents No. 2 and 3 to execute and comply with orders passed by respondent No. 4 (RERA) in terms of Section 103 of the H.P. Land Revenue Act, 1954. The Court accepted this limited prayer, noting that the grievance had already been adjudicated in Pawan Wasant Borle Vs. Union of India and others (CWP No. 1153 of 2026, decided on 25.02.2026). Consequently, the present petitions were disposed of in line with the directions in Pawan Wasant Borle, ensuring that recovery certificates issued by RERA and demand orders by the District Collector are taken to their logical conclusion in accordance with law.

Why it matters: District Collectors must ensure expeditious recovery proceedings based on RERA orders and certificates. This reinforces the enforceability of RERA’s decisions, benefitting aggrieved homebuyers.

64. High Court closes contempt petition due to petitioner’s undertaking in Supreme Court

COPC/47/2026 · Civil Law [20-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE VIVEK SINGH THAKUR

Parties: UMESH CHANDER vs C. PAULRASU

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh closed the present contempt petition, COPC No.47 of 2026, filed by Umesh Chander against C. Paulrasu, noting that the petitioner had communicated before the Apex Court in SLP(C) No.3483 of 2026 that he would not be pressing for execution proceedings. The decisive ground for closing the contempt proceedings was the petitioner’s undertaking before the Apex Court, which rendered the present petition for non-compliance of an order deferring execution infructuous. Faced with this development, the Court found it appropriate to close the proceedings, granting liberty to the petitioner to file afresh should the occasion arise. This disposition effectively acknowledges the petitioner’s withdrawal of the intent to pursue execution, thereby removing the substratum of the contempt action. The Court’s decision reflects a pragmatic approach, recognizing that the petitioner’s stance before a higher forum directly impacts the viability of the ongoing contempt proceedings. The order thus disposes of the contempt petition along with any pending miscellaneous applications, without delving into the merits of the original non-compliance, given the petitioner’s subsequent undertaking.

Why it matters: Lawyers should note that a contempt proceeding can be closed if the petitioner has given an undertaking in a higher court regarding the same matter, reserving the right to refile if circumstances change. This streamlines litigation by preventing parallel proceedings on the same issue.

65. Appellate Court cannot permit additional evidence without specific reasons or due diligence

CMPMO/369/2022 · Civil Law [20-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE ROMESH VERMA

Parties: KULDEEP CHAND & OTHERS vs PRITAM CHAND

The High Court set aside the First Appellate Court’s order allowing additional evidence under Order 41 Rule 27 read with Section 151 CPC, finding it erroneous and unsustainable. The decisive ground was the First Appellate Court’s failure to adhere to the strict parameters governing the admission of additional evidence, particularly its contradictory finding of gross negligence by the respondent while simultaneously allowing the application to “do complete justice” without specifying how the documents were relevant or necessary for effective adjudication. The Court emphasized that Order 41 Rule 27 CPC permits additional evidence only under specific contingencies, such as due diligence preventing earlier production or the appellate court requiring it to pronounce judgment, not merely to fill lacunae or for the convenience of a litigant. Relying on Iqbal Ahmed (dead) by LRs & another vs. Abdul Shukoor and Gobind Singh and others vs. Union of India, the Court reiterated that additional evidence must be in consonance with pleadings and that the appellate court must record clear reasons for its admission, which was absent here. The matter was remanded for fresh consideration of the application and the main appeal expeditiously.

Why it matters: Lawyers should note that appellate courts cannot allow new evidence unless specific conditions under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC are met and properly recorded. Courts must evaluate if the evidence was unavailable despite due diligence or if it’s crucial for judgment, rather than permitting it to merely prolong litigation.

66. Appeal dismissed as withdrawn after decree satisfaction claimed

RSA/200/2019 · Civil Law [20-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE ROMESH VERMA

Parties: LEELA DEVI & OTHERS vs RADHA DEVI

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in RSA No. 200 of 2019, dismissed the appeal filed by Leela Devi & others against Radha Devi as withdrawn, following a submission by the appellants’ counsel. The decisive ground for this outcome was the appellants’ counsel’s explicit statement that he had instructions not to press the appeal and sought permission for its withdrawal. This submission was made in response to the respondent’s contention that the decree, which was the subject matter of the appeal, stood satisfied. The Court, therefore, did not delve into the merits of the original dispute or the satisfaction of the decree, but rather acted solely upon the procedural request for withdrawal. This action aligns with the established legal principle that a party has the right to withdraw an appeal if they no longer wish to pursue it, provided such withdrawal does not prejudice the rights of other parties or violate any procedural rules. The Court’s order effectively closed the matter without a substantive adjudication, disposing of any pending miscellaneous applications concurrently. The judgment did not rely on specific precedents or statutory sections, as the resolution was purely procedural, based on the appellants’ voluntary withdrawal.

Why it matters: Practitioners should note that appeals can be withdrawn if the decree is satisfied, negating further litigation. This can save time and resources, particularly if the client’s objective has been met.

67. Tenant’s plea to restore essential services dismissed, appeal affirmed

CR/13/2021 · Tenancy Law [20-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE ROMESH VERMA

Parties: RAJEEV SHARMA vs RAM DEVI &ORS.

The High Court dismissed the Civil Revision Petition, affirming the concurrent findings of the Rent Controller and Appellate Authority, which rejected the tenant’s application under Section 11(2) of the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1987, for restoration of essential services. The Court held that the tenant failed to prove the landlady had cut off or withheld essential services, specifically ingress/egress and toilet facilities. The decisive ground for dismissal was the tenant’s own witnesses’ admissions, which contradicted his claims, and a compromise deed (Ext. R-1) dated 27.8.2016, wherein the landlady explicitly stated no locks were placed on the gates and the tenant was free to open them. The Court, relying on Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited vs. Dilbahar Singh, (2014) 9 SCC 78, reiterated that its revisional jurisdiction does not permit re-appreciation or re-assessment of evidence to arrive at a different factual finding unless the lower authorities’ findings are perverse, based on no evidence, or result in a gross miscarriage of justice. Since the tenant’s own evidence and a material compromise document falsified his claims, the lower authorities’ conclusions were deemed sound and not warranting interference.

Why it matters: High Courts will not re-appreciate or re-assess evidence in revisional jurisdiction under Rent Control Acts unless findings are perverse or based on no evidence. Practitioners should note that a compromise between parties, even during pending applications, can significantly impact the outcome, strengthening the case against a tenant’s claims for restoration of services.

68. Arbitration petition withdrawn with liberty to file afresh

ARB.C/398/2025 · Arbitration Law [20-03-2026]

Bench: GURMEET SINGH SANDHAWALIA

Parties: M/S T.K. SYSTEM vs INSTITUTE OF INTEGRATED RUVAL DEVELOPMENT

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in Arb. Case No. 398 of 2025, permitted the petitioner, M/s T.K. System, to withdraw its petition with liberty to file afresh on the same cause of action, thereby dismissing the instant petition as withdrawn. This decision stemmed from an observation made on January 9, 2026, which highlighted the critical procedural lacuna regarding the issuance of a notice for the appointment of an Arbitrator to the respondent, Institute of Integrated Rural Development, and questioned the maintainability of the petition in its absence. The Court’s grant of permission to withdraw, rather than outright dismissal on merits, implicitly acknowledges the petitioner’s right to rectify the procedural defect and re-initiate proceedings, aligning with the principle that substantive justice should not be thwarted by curable procedural oversights. While no specific statutory sections or precedents were explicitly cited in the brief order, the underlying legal logic is rooted in the fundamental requirement of due process and proper initiation of arbitration proceedings, where a valid notice to the opposing party is a prerequisite for the maintainability of a petition seeking appointment of an arbitrator. The Court’s approach ensures that while procedural requirements are upheld, parties are afforded an opportunity to correct deficiencies.

Why it matters: Practitioners can withdraw arbitration petitions with liberty to refile on the same cause of action, especially if procedural prerequisites like issuing notice for arbitrator appointment were not met.

69. Execution petition disposed after compliance with judgment terms

EX.P./2272/2025 · Civil Law [20-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Parties: DEV RAM vs STATE OF HP AND ORS.

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh disposed of the execution petition, Ex. Pet No.2272 of 2025, filed by Dev Ram against the State of HP and Ors., noting that the judgment in question had been complied with. The decisive ground for disposal was the acknowledgment by both parties that the terms of the previous order, specifically the imposition of costs, had been fulfilled. The learned Additional Advocate General confirmed the compliance by handing over a bank draft for Rs. 5000/- to the petitioner’s counsel, which the petitioner’s counsel acknowledged. This action satisfied the costs imposed under the order dated 06.03.2026. The Court’s conclusion rested on the principle that an execution petition becomes infructuous once the underlying judgment or order it seeks to enforce has been duly complied with by the judgment debtor. No specific precedents were cited in this order, as the matter pertained to the factual compliance of a prior directive rather than the interpretation of complex legal principles. Consequently, the execution petition and any pending miscellaneous applications were closed.

Why it matters: The High Court closed an execution petition as the state complied with the judgment and paid the imposed costs. This signals that courts will dispose of execution petitions swiftly once compliance is confirmed by both parties.

70. Execution petition disposed after compliance, petitioner can pursue further grievances

EX.P./2275/2025 · Education Law [20-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Parties: KHUSHI RAM vs STATE OF HP AND ORS.

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in Ex. Pet No.2275 of 2025, disposed of the execution petition filed by Khushi Ram, noting that the respondents had passed a consideration order on 06.09.2025, deciding the petitioner’s case. The Court’s decision was predicated on the submission by the learned Additional Advocate General of office instructions dated 10.12.2025 from the Director of School Education, Himachal Pradesh, which confirmed the issuance of the said consideration order, a copy of which was appended. This action by the respondents effectively addressed the immediate grievance that formed the basis of the execution petition. The Court, however, prudently reserved liberty to the petitioner to pursue appropriate legal remedies for any remaining grievances in accordance with law, thereby ensuring that while the present execution proceedings were concluded due to the respondents’ compliance, the petitioner’s overall rights were not foreclosed. This approach reflects a pragmatic judicial disposition, acknowledging the resolution of the specific execution matter while preserving the petitioner’s right to further legal recourse for any outstanding issues. The Court did not rely on any specific statutory sections or precedents in this particular order, as it was primarily an administrative disposal based on the respondents’ compliance.

Why it matters: Lawyers should note that an execution petition concludes when the order is compiled, but the petitioner retains the right to pursue further remedies for any remaining grievances if allowed by law. This clarifies the scope of relief in execution proceedings.

71. Petitioner can challenge compliance order if grievances remain

EX.P./2576/2025 · Administrative Law [20-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Parties: BRAHAM DUTT vs STATE OF H.P. AND ORS

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh disposed of the execution petition, Ex.Pet No.2576 of 2025, filed by Braham Dutt against the State of H.P. and Ors., noting the respondents’ compliance affidavit which placed on record the consideration order dated 15.12.2025. The decisive ground for disposal was the petitioner’s counsel expressing reservations regarding the said consideration order and seeking liberty to challenge it. The Court, therefore, granted liberty to the petitioner to pursue appropriate remedies for the redressal of any surviving grievances, including those against the consideration order, in accordance with law. This approach aligns with the principle that while execution proceedings aim to ensure compliance, they should not preclude a party from challenging the substance of a compliance action if new grounds for grievance arise from it. The Court did not delve into the merits of the petitioner’s reservations but rather ensured that the petitioner’s right to a full legal recourse was preserved, effectively closing the execution petition while opening the door for a fresh challenge. No specific precedents or statutory sections were cited in this order, as it primarily dealt with the procedural closure of an execution petition based on the petitioner’s request for further legal recourse against a compliance order.

Why it matters: Practitioners should note that an execution petition’s disposal does not preclude a party from challenging the compliance order if their grievances are not fully addressed. This ensures avenues for relief remain open even after initial orders are executed.

72. Acquittal upheld for assault, citing unreliable witnesses and medical evidence inconsistency

CR.A/290/2014 · Criminal Law [20-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Parties: STATE OF H.P. vs RAKESH KUMAR & ORS.

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh dismissed the State’s appeal against the acquittal of the respondents for offences under Sections 147, 148, 323, and 325 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code, upholding the Trial Court’s finding that the prosecution’s case was suspect. The Court, relying on Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand (2025) 5 SCC 433 and State of M.P. v. Ramveer Singh 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1743, reiterated that interference with an acquittal is warranted only if it is patently perverse, based on misreading of evidence, or omits material evidence, and no two reasonable views are possible. The Court found the Trial Court’s view reasonable, noting the strained relationship between parties due to a land dispute, the belated registration of the FIR, and inconsistencies in witness testimonies. Specifically, the medical evidence regarding the missing tooth was equivocal, suggesting a natural cause or fall, and the informant’s admission of alcohol consumption further weakened the assault claim. The Court also applied the principle from Harbeer Singh v. Sheeshpal (2016) 16 SCC 418 and Rajesh Yadav v. State of U.P. (2022) 12 SCC 200, requiring careful scrutiny of chance witnesses, finding PW3 and PW7 unreliable. Consequently, the Court concluded that the prosecution failed to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt, directing respondents to furnish bail bonds under Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Why it matters: This ruling reaffirms that minor inconsistencies in witness testimonies and medical reports, especially concerning ‘chance witnesses’ or alcohol consumption, can be grounds for upholding an acquittal in assault cases. Practitioners should note the emphasis on corroboration when parties have strained relationships.

73. Court quashes conviction due to flawed identification parade

CR.A/337/2024 · Criminal Law [20-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Parties: SWARAN SINGH & ANOTHER vs STATE OF H.P.

The High Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the conviction and sentence under Sections 333 and 353 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, thereby acquitting the appellants. The decisive ground for this reversal was the infirmity in the identification of the accused, who were strangers to the informant and identified for the first time in court without a prior Test Identification Parade (TIP). The Court emphasized that such dock identification, without corroboration from a TIP, is highly suspect, relying on the principles articulated in P. Sasikumar v. State of T.N., (2024) 8 SCC 600, which held that when accused are unknown to witnesses, their identification in the dock is not acceptable, and Jayan v. State of Kerala, (2021) 20 SCC 38, which stated that identification by a witness who first saw the accused during the incident is weak evidence without a TIP. Further, the Court noted material contradictions in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses (PW2 and PW3), whose cross-examination statements, indicating they did not witness the incident or brawl, were not clarified by re-examination, thus benefiting the defence as per Ramsewak v. State of M.P., (2004) 11 SCC 259 and Javed Masood v. State of Rajasthan, (2010) 3 SCC 538. The medical evidence regarding the injury and the torn shirt also failed to corroborate the prosecution’s narrative, leading the Court to conclude that the prosecution had not proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt. The appellants were directed to furnish bail bonds under Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Why it matters: This ruling reinforces that identification made for the first time in court, without a previous test identification parade, is highly unreliable. Practitioners should ensure proper identification procedures are followed to prevent convictions being overturned on this ground.

74. Defamation complaint dismissed: Public servant’s conduct criticism in good faith not defamation

CR.A/342/2012 · Criminal Law [20-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE SANDEEP SHARMA

Parties: RAKESH KAUSHAL vs ARVIND GOEL

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh dismissed the appellant’s criminal appeal, upholding the lower court’s dismissal of a defamation complaint filed under Sections 499 and 500 of the IPC, finding no illegality or infirmity in the impugned judgment. The Court reasoned that the appellant, a former Deputy Commissioner, failed to establish that the respondent, a newspaper editor, acted with malicious intent or without good faith in publishing news items and writing letters to higher authorities alleging corruption. Crucially, the Court noted the appellant’s own admissions in cross-examination, including his failure to provide information sought by the respondent regarding the expenditure on a Bhajan cassette involving his relatives and a company owned by his brother, despite a notice from the Governor’s Secretary. The Court emphasized that it is not defamation to impute anything true concerning any person if it is for the public good, or to express in good faith an opinion respecting a public servant’s conduct in discharge of public functions, as per the exceptions to Section 499 IPC. Furthermore, a civil suit for damages filed by the appellant on similar facts had been dismissed and attained finality, which the Court considered persuasive. The Court relied on the principle established in Bilal Ahmed Kaloo vs. State Of Andhra Pradesh, 1997 (7) SCC 431, that a maker of imputation without publication is not liable, and Laloo Prasad vs State of Bihar and Another, (1997) 2 Crimes 498 (Pat.), regarding the non-liability for attributed utterances.

Why it matters: This ruling clarifies that good faith criticism of a public servant’s conduct, especially when information is withheld, generally does not amount to defamation under IPC Sections 499 and 500. Practitioners should note that prior civil suit dismissals on similar facts can also preclude criminal defamation complaints.

75. Charges sustained against petitioner for circulating molestation video

CR.R/125/2026 · Criminal Law [20-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Parties: ROBIN JEET SINGH vs STATE OF H.P.

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh dismissed the revision petition, upholding the Special Judge’s order framing charges against the petitioner, Robin Jeet Singh, under Section 67B of the Information Technology Act, 2000 and Section 21 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act. The Court found no infirmity in the trial court’s decision, emphasizing that at the stage of framing charges, the court must only ascertain a prima facie case, without undertaking a threadbare analysis of the evidence or determining the likelihood of conviction. Relying on Vishnu Kumar Shukla v. State of U.P., (2023) 15 SCC 502, the Court reiterated that the primary consideration is the existence of a prima facie case, and the probative value of materials need not be deeply examined. Further, citing Ram Prakash Chadha v. State of U.P., (2024) 10 SCC 651, it affirmed that while sifting and weighing evidence is permissible for a prima facie determination, delving into admissibility and evidentiary value is not. The Court noted that the charge sheet specifically alleged the petitioner forwarded the incriminating video, and a grave suspicion, as held in Tuhin Kumar Biswas v. State of W.B., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2604, is sufficient to frame charges, rendering the non-recovery of the video from the petitioner’s phone inconsequential at this preliminary stage.

Why it matters: A High Court ruled that a ‘grave suspicion’ is sufficient to frame charges, even without direct digital recovery from the accused’s device, if witness testimony indicates their involvement. This means practitioners should be aware that charges can be sustained based on witness accounts rather than solely on forensic evidence.

76. Bail Granted in NDPS Case Due to Intermediate Quantity and Co-accused Release

CRMPM/211/2026 · Criminal Law [20-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Parties: RAJ KUMAR vs STATE OF HP

The High Court granted regular bail to the petitioner, Raj Kumar, in FIR No. 21 of 2025 under Sections 21, 25, 27A, and 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act (NDPS), for the recovery of 228 grams of heroin. The Court held that the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act did not apply as the recovered quantity was intermediate, not commercial. A decisive factor was the principle of parity, as co-accused Jagdish Kumar and Jitender Kumar, found in the same vehicle, had already been released on bail. The Court noted the petitioner’s year-long incarceration and the slow pace of trial, with only 6 out of 33 witnesses examined, emphasizing that bail cannot be withheld as pre-trial punishment. Relying on the principles enunciated in Pinki v. State of U.P., (2025) 7 SCC 314, which reiterated the broad principles for bail from Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P., (1978) 1 SCC 240, and Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 4 SCC 280, the Court underscored that bail discretion must be exercised judiciously, considering the nature of accusation, evidence, and severity of punishment, while also recalling State of Rajasthan v. Balchand, (1977) 4 SCC 308, which established “bail, not jail” as the normal rule. The petitioner was released on furnishing bail bonds of ₹1,00,000/- with conditions including non-intimidation of witnesses and regular trial attendance.

Why it matters: Practitioners should note that bail can be granted in NDPS cases involving intermediate quantities of contraband, especially when co-accused have already received bail. Delay in trial and the principle of parity can be strong arguments for securing pre-trial release, even in serious offenses.

77. Bail denied in NDPS case as commercial quantity recovered and twin conditions not met

CRMPM/282/2026 · Criminal Law [20-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Parties: PARVEEN vs STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH

The High Court dismissed the petitioner’s regular bail application in FIR No. 150 of 2025 under Sections 20 and 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act (NDPS Act), finding that the petitioner failed to satisfy the twin conditions mandated by Section 37 of the NDPS Act. The Court reasoned that the recovery of 1.30 kgs of charas, a commercial quantity, from the vehicle in which the petitioner was a passenger, prima facie established conscious possession, relying on Madan Lal versus State of H.P. (2003) 7 SCC 465, which held that all occupants of a vehicle are in conscious possession of contraband found therein unless proven otherwise. The Court emphasized that Section 37(1)(b)(ii) requires satisfaction that there are reasonable grounds to believe the accused is not guilty and is not likely to commit any offence while on bail, a standard higher than prima facie grounds, as established in Union of India Versus Niyazuddin & Another (2018) 13 SCC 738 and reiterated in State of Kerala Versus Rajesh AIR 2020 SC 721 and Union of India v. Mohd. Nawaz Khan (2021) 10 SCC 100. The argument that “bail is the rule and jail is the exception” was rejected, citing Narcotics Control Bureau v. Kashif (2024) 11 SCC 372, which states that in commercial quantity NDPS cases, negation of bail is the rule. Furthermore, prolonged incarceration alone cannot be a ground for bail without satisfying Section 37, as held in Union of India vs. Vijin K. Varghese 2025:INSC:1316.

Why it matters: Practitioners must demonstrate satisfaction of twin conditions under Section 37 of the NDPS Act for bail in commercial quantity cases; prolonged incarceration alone is insufficient grounds.

78. Himachal Pradesh High Court denies bail for attempted murder with hammer

CRMPM/2977/2025 · Criminal Law [20-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Parties: LOVKESH KUMAR vs STATE OF HP

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh dismissed the petitioner’s application for regular bail in FIR No. 91 of 2025, registered under Sections 109(1), 126(2), 115(2), and 117(1) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS), for allegedly inflicting a temporal fracture on the victim’s cranium with a hammer. The Court, applying the principles for bail enunciated in Pinki v. State of U.P., (2025) 7 SCC 314, which reiterated the factors from Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P., (1978) 1 SCC 240, and Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 4 SCC 280, found that the nature of the charge, the severity of the potential punishment (life imprisonment under Section 109(1) BNS), and the heinousness of the crime weighed against granting bail. The Court rejected the petitioner’s argument that the absence of blood on the recovered hammer falsified the prosecution’s case, holding that this was a matter for trial and did not, prima facie, render the victim’s statement suspect. Relying on State of Rajasthan v. Balchand, (1977) 4 SCC 308, which established “bail, not jail” as the normal rule but with exceptions for grave or heinous offences, the Court concluded that the petitioner could not be released on bail given the serious nature of the offence and the severe punishment it entails.

Why it matters: The Court emphasized that bail for serious offenses punishable with life imprisonment is generally denied. Practitioners should note the Court’s reliance on the severity of punishment and ongoing trial proceedings as key factors in bail decisions.

CWP/2881/2026 · Education Law [19-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Parties: TARUN GOYAL vs STATE OF H.P. AND OTHERS

The High Court disposed of the writ petition, directing the petitioner to approach the learned Trial Court for correction of marks, while acknowledging his entitlement to the LLB degree. The decisive ground was the respondent-University’s admission that the petitioner was a bona fide student and the non-inclusion of his name in the admission disclosure list was a clerical error on their part, a situation squarely covered by the precedent in *Pratima Das Versus State of Himachal Pradesh and Ors.* (SLP (Civil) No.15180 of 2025, decided on 06.01.2026). *Pratima Das* established that a student should not suffer due to university errors in record-keeping, mandating the issuance of academic documents. However, regarding the mismatch in first-semester marks between the Gazette and green sheet, the Court, relying on *Priya Thakur Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh and others* (CWP No.2690 of 2024, decided on 22.04.2025), held that such corrections, requiring alteration of original records deposited with the Trial Court, necessitate an application to that forum for appropriate orders. Thus, the Court directed the Trial Court to pass orders on the petitioner’s application for mark correction.

Why it matters: Universities must issue degrees to bona fide students even if internal clerical errors caused discrepancies. Practitioners representing students facing similar administrative hurdles should pursue remedies based on established bona fide student status.

2. Consultants not entitled to additional fees if appointment letter specifies remuneration

CWP/3212/2026 · Service Law [19-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Parties: LAL CHAND SHASTRI vs UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS

The High Court dismissed the petitioner’s writ petition seeking additional consultation fees, holding that his claim was untenable as his appointment letter explicitly stipulated the professional fee. The Court reasoned that the petitioner was appointed as an Associate Consultant on 14.10.2020 with clear terms, including a professional fee of Rs. 5000/- per day, capped at Rs. 75,000/- per month, which he accepted and was duly paid. While the petitioner relied on Condition No. 12 of his appointment letter, which stated that unmentioned terms would be governed by the “Policy for Engagement of Consultants and Advisors,” the Court found this inapplicable because the professional fee was unambiguously specified in the appointment order itself. The Corporate Circulars No. 702/2020 and 719/2020, issued prior to his appointment, providing for additional fees for ‘Consultants/Advisors’, were deemed not applicable to the petitioner’s specific contractual terms. The Court reiterated its earlier decision in *Lal Chand Shastri Versus Union of India & Ors.* (CWP No.9525 of 2025), which had directed the respondents to decide the representation, confirming that Condition No. 12 only applies where the appointment letter is silent on a term, which was not the case here regarding the professional fee.

Why it matters: This ruling clarifies that specific terms in an appointment letter supersede general policy circulars, impacting consultants negotiating contracts with clear remuneration clauses. Practitioners should ensure clients’ employment contracts are precise to avoid disputes over additional compensation.

3. Petitioner allowed to withdraw writ petition with liberty to pursue other remedies

CWP/3321/2026 · Administrative Law [19-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Parties: VIRENDER SHARMA vs STATE OF H.P. AND OTHERS

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in CWP No.3321 of 2026, permitted the petitioner, Virender Sharma, to withdraw the writ petition with liberty to seek appropriate remedy in accordance with law. The decisive ground for this disposition was the submission by the learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Kulwant Singh Gill, that a public interest element was involved in the writ petition, necessitating its withdrawal to pursue alternative legal avenues. Consequently, the Court, presided over by Justice Jyotsna Rewal Dua, disposed of the present writ petition as withdrawn, along with any pending miscellaneous application(s). This decision reflects the Court’s recognition of the petitioner’s right to choose the most suitable legal recourse, particularly when public interest considerations are raised, allowing for a more appropriate forum or procedure to address the substantive issues. The Court did not delve into the merits of the case, but rather acceded to the petitioner’s request for withdrawal, preserving their right to initiate fresh proceedings.

Why it matters: Practitioners can advise clients that withdrawal of a writ petition due to public interest elements does not prejudice their right to pursue other legal avenues for the same cause of action.

4. University must issue LLB degree despite administrative errors in records

CWP/3326/2026 · Education Law [19-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Parties: AKASH SONI vs STATE OF H.P. AND OTHERS

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh disposed of the writ petition, directing the issuance of the petitioner’s LLB Degree Certificate, subject to a procedural clarification regarding second-semester marks. The Court found the petitioner to be a bona fide student who had cleared all examinations, and the non-issuance of the degree was due to no fault of his, but rather administrative discrepancies by the University, including the absence of his name in the approved list and an unrecorded entry for his second-semester marks. The decisive ground for this decision was the precedent set in *Pratima Das Versus State of Himachal Pradesh and Ors.* (SLP (Civil) No.15180 of 2025, decided on 06.01.2026), which established that a bona fide student should not suffer due to university errors in record-keeping. However, acknowledging the unrecorded second-semester marks, the Court, relying on *Priya Thakur Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh and others* (CWP No.2690 of 2024, decided on 22.04.2025), directed the petitioner to move an appropriate application before the learned Trial Court where the original mark sheets were deposited, for necessary orders regarding the correction. This ensures the petitioner receives his degree while addressing the specific administrative lacuna.

Why it matters: Universities cannot penalise students for administrative mistakes in record-keeping when students have genuinely completed their courses. Practitioners should note that while universities must issue degrees, students may need to formally apply to the relevant trial court for corrections where original records are deposited.

5. Petitioner withdraws writ petition with liberty to file fresh claims

CWP/3333/2026 · Administrative Law [19-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Parties: MUSTAQ MOHAMMAD vs STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH & ORS

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in CWP No.3333 of 2026, decided on March 19, 2026, permitted the petitioner, Mustaq Mohammad, to withdraw the present writ petition with liberty to file a fresh one. This decision was predicated on the submission by the petitioner’s counsel, Ms. Madhurika Sekhon, that the existing writ petition contained inadvertent errors requiring rectification through a comprehensive fresh petition incorporating proper pleadings. The Court noted that this prayer was not objected to by the respondents, represented by Ms. Menka Raj Chauhan, Deputy Advocate General. Consequently, the writ petition was dismissed as withdrawn, granting the requested liberty. This procedural order reflects the Court’s discretion to allow withdrawal of a petition with leave to file afresh, particularly when the initial filing is acknowledged to contain defects that can be cured through a more meticulously drafted subsequent petition, thereby ensuring that substantive issues can be properly adjudicated without being hampered by initial procedural infirmities. The Court’s approach aligns with the principle of facilitating justice by allowing parties to present their case effectively, provided no prejudice is caused to the opposing side, which was confirmed by the lack of objection in this instance.

Why it matters: Practitioners can note that the court allows withdrawal of a writ petition to refile with corrected pleadings, ensuring due process and precise representation.

6. Interim order protecting property from demolition extended pending statutory remedy

CWP/10671/2025 · Administrative Law [19-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Parties: KEHAR SINGH vs STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH & ORS

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh disposed of the writ petition, CWP No.10671 of 2025, filed by Kehar Singh, by directing the continuation of the interim order dated 04.07.2025, which stayed the operation of notice dated 28.06.2025 and any demolition pursuant thereto, until the Divisional Commissioner, Mandi, decides the petitioner’s application for interim relief. The Court’s decision was predicated on the undisputed fact that the petitioner possessed an efficacious statutory remedy under the Himachal Pradesh Land Revenue Act, 1954, against the impugned order dated 24.06.2025, and had, in fact, already availed this remedy by filing a revision petition before the Divisional Commissioner. The Court, while acknowledging its indulgence under Article 226 of the Constitution of India due to the imminent threat of demolition, emphasized that the pendency of the writ petition should not excuse the petitioner from pursuing the statutory remedy. This approach aligns with the principle of exhaustion of statutory remedies, a cornerstone of writ jurisdiction, ensuring that specialized tribunals address matters within their purview before High Courts intervene. The Court effectively balanced the need to prevent immediate irreparable harm with the established legal framework for dispute resolution.

Why it matters: Practitioners should note that while statutory remedies are encouraged, High Courts may grant interim relief in writ petitions to prevent coercive action until an application for interim relief in the statutory forum is decided.

7. Petitioners allowed to withdraw land dispute for appropriate remedy

CWP/3446/2023 · Property Law [19-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Parties: DR. RAM KRISHAN SHANDIL & ANR. vs STATE OF H.P. & ORS.

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh dismissed CWP No. 3446/2023 as withdrawn, granting the petitioners liberty to pursue appropriate remedies before the competent forum for their grievances concerning the restoration of a main gate, iron sheet fencing, and damaged slab in Khasra Nos. 1332, 4, and 8 respectively. The decisive ground for this disposition was the petitioners’ request, through their Senior Advocate, to withdraw the petition with the aforementioned liberty. The Court, without delving into the merits of the case, explicitly kept all rights and contentions of the parties open, thereby ensuring that the withdrawal would not prejudice future legal action. Crucially, the Court directed that the period spent in prosecuting the instant writ petition shall be excluded for the purposes of limitation, a significant relief preventing the petitioners from being time-barred in subsequent proceedings. This order reflects the Court’s adherence to the principle of allowing parties to choose their forum and strategy, while safeguarding their substantive rights regarding limitation.

Why it matters: Practitioners should note that the court granted liberty to file a fresh petition and excluded the time spent on this petition from the limitation period, preserving the petitioners’ right to pursue their claims.

8. Contempt proceedings closed after government complies with judgment

COPC/1444/2025 · Civil Law [19-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Parties: SUNIL KUMAR & ORS. vs M. SUDHA DEVI & ANR.

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh closed the contempt proceedings in COPC No. 1444/2025, noting that the judgment in question stood complied with. The learned Additional Advocate General placed on record a copy of the consideration order dated 19.03.2026, confirming compliance, a position admitted by the learned counsel for the petitioners. The Court, therefore, discharged the notices issued to the respondents and disposed of any pending miscellaneous applications. Crucially, the Court reserved liberty to the petitioners to seek appropriate remedy for the redressal of any surviving grievances, in accordance with law, at an appropriate stage, should the necessity arise in the future. This decision effectively concludes the contempt action based on the respondents’ demonstrated compliance with the underlying judgment, while prudently safeguarding the petitioners’ right to pursue further legal recourse for any remaining issues. The Court’s approach aligns with the principle that contempt proceedings are primarily for ensuring compliance with judicial orders, and once compliance is achieved, the proceedings are to be closed, without prejudice to other remedies available to the aggrieved party.

Why it matters: This order closes existing contempt proceedings, but provides flexibility for petitioners to pursue other remedies if they still have grievances, offering an important safeguard for claimants.

9. Contempt proceedings closed after Supreme Court stays original judgment

COPC/1061/2025 · Civil Law [19-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Parties: RAJU ALIAS RAJINDER SINGH vs KAMLESH KUMAR & ORS.

The High Court, in COPC No. 1061/2025, closed the contempt proceedings initiated by Raju alias Rajinder Singh against Kamlesh Kumar & Ors., discharging the notices issued to the respondents. This decision was predicated on the joint submission by counsel for both parties, confirming that the operation of the judgment in question, which formed the basis of the contempt petition, had been stayed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in *State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. Vs. Raju Alias Rajinder* (SPL(C) Diary No(s). 64879/2025, decided on 16.02.2026). The Court, acknowledging the supervening stay order from the Supreme Court, found no further basis to continue the contempt proceedings. While closing the matter, the High Court expressly reserved liberty to the petitioner to avail appropriate legal remedies for any surviving grievances at a later stage, should the need arise, thereby ensuring that the petitioner’s rights are not foreclosed by the present closure. This approach aligns with the principle that contempt proceedings are ancillary and cannot proceed when the underlying order is under a stay from a superior court.

Why it matters: Practitioners should note that a stay from the Supreme Court can lead to the closure of ongoing contempt proceedings related to the stayed judgment. The petitioner retains the right to pursue other remedies if their grievances persist.

10. Court disposes of execution petition regarding Horticulture Department decision

EX.P./2163/2025 · Administrative Law [19-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Parties: POOJA RANI vs STATE OF HP AND ORS.

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh disposed of the execution petition, Ex. Pet No.2163 of 2025, filed by Pooja Rani, noting that the respondents had complied with the Court’s previous order dated 17.01.2026. The decisive ground for disposal was the production of office instructions dated 10.02.2026 from the Director of Horticulture, Himachal Pradesh, which conveyed the decision regarding the petitioner’s case, along with a copy of the consideration order. This demonstrated that the State of HP and Ors. had undertaken the required consideration, thereby fulfilling the mandate of the earlier judicial directive. The Court, however, prudently reserved liberty to the petitioner to pursue appropriate remedies for any surviving grievances in accordance with law, acknowledging the possibility of further issues despite the initial compliance. This approach ensures that while the immediate execution is satisfied, the petitioner’s fundamental right to seek redressal for any remaining concerns is preserved, aligning with principles of natural justice and effective judicial oversight. The judgment implicitly reinforces the judiciary’s role in ensuring executive compliance with its orders while maintaining avenues for further legal recourse.

Why it matters: The court disposed of an execution petition after the Horticulture Department conveyed its decision. Petitioners can still pursue other legal remedies if grievances remain.

11. Himachal Pradesh High Court refuses to quash FIR despite disability claim

CRMMO/159/2026 · Criminal Law [19-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Parties: HIMANSHU vs STATE OF H.P. AND ANOTHER

The High Court dismissed the petition seeking to quash FIR No. 207 of 2023, registered under Sections 323, 325, 504, 506, and 201 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, holding that the allegations in the FIR, taken at face value, prima facie disclose the commission of cognizable offences. The Court relied on the principles established in *State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335*, which outlines categories for quashing FIRs, emphasizing that courts should not conduct a mini-trial or delve into the truthfulness of allegations at this preliminary stage. The petitioner’s argument regarding his specially-abled status and a pending civil dispute was rejected, as per *Punit Beriwala v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2025 SCC OnLine SC 983*, which mandates treating complaint allegations as correct, and *Maneesha Yadav v. State of U.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 643*, which prohibits examining the reliability of allegations under Section 482 Cr.P.C. The Court further noted, citing *Iqbal v. State of U.P., (2023) 8 SCC 734*, that once a charge sheet is filed, the trial court should be allowed to appreciate the evidence, and the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is to be exercised sparingly, as reiterated in *Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185*.

Why it matters: A High Court generally will not quash an FIR if it establishes a cognizable offense, even if the accused claims disability or pending civil disputes. Practitioners should advise clients that such claims are typically matters for trial, not for quashing proceedings.

12. High Court Refuses to Quash FIR Against Manager in CBI Grabbing Case

CRMMO/741/2023 · Criminal Law [19-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Parties: VIKRAM SINGH vs CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (CBI)

The High Court dismissed the petitioner’s plea to quash FIR No. RC0962016A0008 and consequential proceedings under Sections 13(2) & 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 read with Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code, finding *prima facie* involvement in a cognizable offence. The Court relied on the principles for quashing FIRs established in *State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335*, reiterated in *B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7* and *Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185*, particularly the criterion that allegations, taken at face value, must not *prima facie* constitute an offence. The petitioner, as Manager of IL&FS Cluster Development Initiative Ltd., was found to have prepared incorrect inspection reports, leading to the fraudulent release of grant-in-aid by the Ministry of Food Processing Industries. The Court rejected the argument that the petitioner was not the sanctioning authority, holding that a false recommendation facilitating sanction establishes *prima facie* involvement. The Court also dismissed the contention that other signatories not being arrayed as accused lessened the petitioner’s liability, noting that the superior merely forwarded the report without verification. Thus, the FIR and charge-sheets sufficiently demonstrated the petitioner’s *prima facie* role in the conspiracy.

Why it matters: A High Court generally refuses to quash an FIR if a prima facie case exists against the accused. Practitioners should note that making false recommendations that result in the sanctioning of funds can constitute a cognisable offence, even if the individual was not the sanctioning authority.

13. Himachal Pradesh High Court grants bail in NDPS case with intermediate quantity of poppy husk

CRMPM/286/2026 · Criminal Law [19-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Parties: SHIV KUMAR ALIAS SHANKAR vs STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH

The High Court granted regular bail to the petitioner, Shiv Kumar alias Shankar, in FIR No. 23/2026, registered under Sections 15 and 25 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act), for the recovery of 6.11 kilograms of opium poppy husk. The Court held that since the recovered quantity was intermediate, the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act did not apply. The Court relied on the principles for granting bail enunciated in *Pinki v. State of U.P., (2025) 7 SCC 314*, which reiterated the factors from *Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P., (1978) 1 SCC 240*, *Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 4 SCC 280*, and *Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC 496*, emphasizing the nature of accusation, severity of punishment, and likelihood of absconding or tampering with evidence. Further, the Court noted that the petitioner was a first-time offender, and his continued custody was not required for interrogation, aligning with the “bail, not jail” principle from *State of Rajasthan v. Balchand, (1977) 4 SCC 308*. Consequently, the petitioner was released on bail subject to furnishing a bond of ₹1,00,000/- and stringent conditions to ensure his presence and prevent witness intimidation or repetition of the offence.

Why it matters: The High Court reiterates that Section 37 NDPS Act rigors do not apply to intermediate quantity cases and emphasizes reformation for first-time offenders, providing a framework for bail conditions to mitigate flight risk and potential re-offense.

14. Bail granted when evidence solely rests on co-accused confession and financial transactions

CRMPM/287/2026 · Criminal Law [19-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Parties: REVAT RAM vs STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH

The High Court granted regular bail to the petitioner, Revat Ram, in FIR No. 204 of 2025 under Sections 20, 25, and 29 of the NDPS Act, finding insufficient material to connect him to the crime. The Court critically noted that the petitioner was not apprehended at the scene, no contraband was recovered from him, and his implication rested solely on co-accused statements and a financial transaction. Relying on *Dipakbhai Jagdishchandra Patel v. State of Gujarat*, (2019) 16 SCC 547, the Court reiterated that co-accused statements during investigation are inadmissible under Section 162 Cr.P.C., and confessions to police officers are barred by Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act. Further, citing *Tofan Singh Versus State of Tamil Nadu*, 2021 (4) SCC 1, it was emphasized that such confessions are not saved by Section 67 of the NDPS Act and cannot be used as substantive evidence against a co-accused. The Court also referenced *Amal E vs State of Kerala*, 2023:KER:39393, which held that financial transactions alone are insufficient to establish involvement in drug trafficking without further corroboration. Given the completion of the investigation and the inadmissibility of the primary evidence against the petitioner, his continued custody was deemed unnecessary, aligning with the principle of “bail, not jail” from *State of Rajasthan v. Balchand*, (1977) 4 SCC 308.

Why it matters: Confessions of co-accused and financial transactions alone are not a sufficient basis to deny bail in cases, including those under the NDPS Act. Practitioners should note that unless other corroborating evidence is presented, bail applications may be successful in such circumstances.

15. Bail denied in NDPS case due to commercial quantity and no significant trial delay

CRMPM/2873/2025 · Criminal Law [19-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Parties: SANJU vs STATE OF HP

The High Court dismissed the petitioner’s regular bail application under Sections 20 and 25 of the NDPS Act, 1985, finding no material change in circumstances since the previous dismissal and that the twin conditions of Section 37 of the NDPS Act were not satisfied. The Court reiterated that successive bail applications require a substantial change in the fact situation, as established in *State of Maharashtra v. Captain Buddhikota Subha Rao (1989) Suppl. 2 SCC 605* and *Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan @ Pappu Yadav (2004) 7 SCC 528*, which mandates specific reasons for granting bail despite prior rejections. The argument of delayed trial was rejected, as nine out of twenty-six witnesses had been examined, distinguishing it from *Rabi Prakash v. State of Odisha 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 533*. The Court, relying on *Union of India v. Vijin K. Varghese 2025:INSC:1316*, held that bail for commercial quantity offences cannot be granted solely on prolonged incarceration without satisfying Section 37’s twin conditions, which require reasonable grounds to believe the accused is not guilty and will not commit further offences. The recovery of 2.603 kg of charas constituted a huge quantity, necessitating strict adherence to Section 37.

Why it matters: This ruling clarifies that even with some trial delay, bail cannot be granted in NDPS cases involving commercial quantities unless the stringent twin conditions of Section 37 are met, reinforcing the high bar for bail in such matters.

16. Himachal Pradesh High Court denies bail in POCSO case, citing severity and ongoing trial

CRMPM/3055/2025 · Criminal Law [19-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Parties: ABHAY KUMAR ALIAS NISHU vs STATE OF HP & ORS.

The High Court dismissed the regular bail petition filed by Abhay Kumar alias Nishu, accused under Sections 137(2) and 64 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023, and Section 4 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act (POCSO Act), 2012. The Court, applying the principles laid down in *Pinki v. State of U.P.* (2025) 7 SCC 314, which reiterated *Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P.* (1978) 1 SCC 240 and *Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi)* (2001) 4 SCC 280, held that bail is not to be granted as a matter of course, particularly in heinous offences. The Court emphasized that the nature of the charge, the severity of punishment, and the likelihood of the accused thwarting justice are vital factors. It rejected the petitioner’s argument regarding discrepancies in the victim’s statements, citing *X Vs. State of Rajasthan* MANU/SC/1267/2024, which cautions against granting bail based on minor discrepancies after trial commencement, and *Suraj Singh v. State of H.P.* 2022 SCC OnLine HP 268, which states that a bail court cannot appreciate contradictions in evidence. Given the victim’s consistent statement and the heinous nature of the offence, the Court found sufficient prima facie material connecting the petitioner to the crime, thus denying bail.

Why it matters: Practitioners should note that discrepancies in victim statements or the start of a trial do not automatically warrant bail, especially in heinous crimes like those under POCSO, where the court prioritizes the gravity of the offence and the need to secure the accused’s presence.

17. Petition rendered infructuous as petitioner allowed to take examination

CWP/688/2026 · Education Law [18-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE VIVEK SINGH THAKUR, JUSTICE RANJAN SHARMA

Parties: REENA KUMARI vs STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH & ORS.

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in CWP No.688 of 2026, disposed of the petition filed by Reena Kumari as having become infructuous, based on the submission of the petitioner’s counsel. The decisive ground for this disposition was the petitioner’s counsel’s statement that the petitioner had been allowed to appear in the examination, thereby rendering the relief sought in the petition redundant. The Court, comprising Hon’ble Mr. Justice Vivek Singh Thakur and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Ranjan Sharma, accepted this submission without delving into the merits of the original prayer. This summary disposal reflects the principle that courts will not adjudicate on matters that no longer present a live controversy, consistent with the doctrine of mootness. The judgment did not cite any specific statutory sections or precedents, as the matter was resolved on a procedural ground stemming from a change in circumstances rather than a substantive legal determination. Consequently, the Court found no further action necessary, disposing of the petition along with any pending miscellaneous applications.

Why it matters: Lawyers should note that courts will dispose of petitions as infructuous when the relief sought has already been granted, saving court time and resources.

18. Petitioners allowed to withdraw writ due to alternative statutory remedy

CWP/3018/2026 · Banking Law [18-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Parties: DHANI RAM AND ANOTHER vs H.P. STATE CO-OPERATIVE BANK LTD. AND OTHERS

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in CWP No.3018 of 2026, dismissed the writ petition filed by Dhani Ram and another as withdrawn, following a submission by the petitioners’ counsel. The decisive ground for this dismissal was the petitioners’ express intention to avail themselves of a statutory remedy against the impugned award, thereby rendering the writ petition unnecessary. The Court, presided over by Ms. Justice Jyotsna Rewal Dua, acceded to this request, allowing the petitioners to pursue the alternative legal recourse available to them. This action aligns with the principle that parties should exhaust statutory remedies before invoking the extraordinary writ jurisdiction, a well-established tenet of Indian administrative law. While no specific precedents were cited in this brief order, the underlying principle reflects the judicial reluctance to entertain writ petitions where an effective and adequate statutory alternative exists, thereby upholding the hierarchy of legal remedies and ensuring judicial economy. The dismissal was recorded on March 18, 2026, along with any pending miscellaneous applications.

Why it matters: Practitioners should note that a writ petition may be withdrawn by the High Court when a statutory remedy for challenging the impugned award is available and intended to be used by the petitioner. This affirms that courts generally prefer disputes to be resolved through prescribed statutory mechanisms first.

19. Divisional Commissioner’s remand order for fresh decision is legal and justified

CWP/3185/2026 · Property Law [18-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Parties: RAMESH CHAND vs STATE OF H.P. & ORS.

The High Court dismissed the petitioner’s challenge to the Divisional Commissioner’s order dated 07.01.2026, which remanded a partition appeal for fresh decision, holding that the remand was legal and justified. The decisive ground was the non-speaking nature of the Sub Divisional Collector’s order dated 13.11.2018, which failed to address the specific challenge against the Assistant Collector First Grade’s order dated 18.05.2017 and did not adjudicate upon the maintainability of the appeal before him. The petitioner contended that the appeal before the Sub Divisional Collector was not maintainable against the 18.05.2017 order and that the Assistant Collector had adhered to the notification dated 26.06.2012 issued by the Government of Himachal Pradesh, Department of Revenue. However, the Court found that these very submissions reinforced the necessity for a fresh decision by the Collector to address these unadjudicated aspects. The Court clarified that the Sub Divisional Collector must take an independent call without being influenced by the Divisional Commissioner’s observations on merits and directed expedition of the appeal within six months.

Why it matters: The High Court emphasized that a remand order to a lower authority for a fresh, speaking decision, especially when previous orders were non-speaking, is legally sound. Practitioners should note that appellate authorities can order fresh adjudication if relevant issues were not properly addressed earlier.

20. Writ petition dismissed on petitioner’s request for withdrawal

CWP/3219/2022 · Civil Law [18-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Parties: YOGINDER CHAND KHANNA vs STATE OF H.P. AND OTHERS

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in CWP No.3219 of 2022, dismissed the writ petition as withdrawn on March 18, 2026, following a submission by the petitioner’s counsel that the petitioner no longer wished to pursue the matter due to intervening developments. The Court, presided over by Ms. Justice Jyotsna Rewal Dua, accepted the petitioner’s request, thereby concluding the proceedings without adjudicating on the merits of the original petition. This decision aligns with the established legal principle that a petitioner has the right to withdraw a petition, provided such withdrawal does not prejudice the rights of other parties or involve a matter of public interest requiring adjudication. The Court’s action reflects a procedural closure based on the petitioner’s express intent, rather than a substantive ruling on the legal issues initially raised. The order also encompassed the dismissal of any pending miscellaneous application(s) associated with the withdrawn writ petition, ensuring a complete cessation of the matter before the Court. This procedural disposition underscores the Court’s role in facilitating the resolution of disputes, including through voluntary withdrawal by the parties involved.

Why it matters: The High Court dismissed a writ petition as withdrawn after the petitioner stated they no longer wished to pursue the matter due to intervening developments. This order highlights that petitioners can withdraw their cases if circumstances change, leading to dismissal without further adjudication.

21. Landowners must receive same enhanced compensation on par with co-owners

CWP/8104/2010 · Land Acquisition Law [18-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE GURMEET SINGH SANDHAWALIA, JUSTICE BIPIN CHANDER NEGI

Parties: SOHAN LAL (DECEASED) THROUGH LRS. vs HP ELECTRICITY BOARD AND OTHERS.

The High Court allowed the petition, directing the respondents to pay the petitioners, as legal representatives of the deceased co-owner Kali Ram, compensation for acquired land at the enhanced rate of Rs. 48,400/- per bigha, consistent with the award granted to the other co-owner, Bahu Ram. The Court held that denying fair compensation to a co-owner on mere technicalities, especially when a higher compensation has been judicially determined for a blood relative and co-owner, would be a travesty of justice and discriminatory. The decisive ground was the principle that acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, operates on the principle of *eminent domain*, necessitating fair and just compensation for all landowners whose land is acquired under the same notification. The Court relied on *Ramphal and Ors. Vs. Haryana State Industrial and Infrastructure Development Corporation Limited and Ors.*, which held that a land loser cannot be deprived of legitimate compensation when blood relatives received higher compensation, and *Jalandhar Improvement Trust Vs. State of Punjab and Others (2003) 1 SCC 526*, affirming a co-owner’s entitlement to enhanced compensation. The Court also referenced *Narendra and Others Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, (2017) 9 SCC 426*, emphasizing that strict rules of pleadings should not deny substantial justice in compulsory acquisition cases. The Court further noted that while Section 28-A of the Act was not directly invoked, its beneficial nature, as discussed in *Banwari and Others Vs. Haryana State Industrial and Infrastructure Development Corporation Limited, 2024 SCC Online SC 3685*, supports extending benefits to all affected landowners.

Why it matters: This ruling ensures that all landowners whose land is acquired under the same notification receive uniform compensation, preventing discrimination on technical grounds. Practitioners should note that co-owners can seek redetermination of compensation based on a higher amount awarded to family members, even if they did not initially challenge the award or filed late.

22. Arbitrary termination of parking contract for requesting additional space set aside

CWP/11981/2025 · Contract Law [18-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Parties: M/S PROJECT METALS AND MACHINERY GHAZIABAD vs NORTHERN RAILWAY AND ANR

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh allowed the writ petition, quashing the termination notice dated 15.07.2025 issued by Northern Railway to M/s Project Metals and Machinery Ghaziabad, thereby permitting the petitioner to continue operating the parking lot contract. The Court found the termination of the contract, solely based on the petitioner having applied for additional parking area, to be an unreasonable and arbitrary exercise of power. The decisive ground was that the respondents could have simply rejected the request for additional area without terminating the entire contract, especially since the petitioner had not refused to operate the existing allotted area. The Court relied upon the Supreme Court’s decision in *Subodh Kumar Singh Rathour Vs. The Chief Executive Officer and Ors.* (AIR 2024 SC 3784), which emphasizes the duty of courts to interfere in contractual matters where public authorities act arbitrarily, illegally, unfairly, or unreasonably, and highlights the sanctity of contracts and the legitimate expectation that public authorities will honour their obligations, consistent with Article 14. The Court held that the termination defied common prudence and constituted an illegal, unreasonable, and arbitrary action, directing the respondents to allow the petitioner to continue the contract as per the agreement.

Why it matters: High Courts will intervene in contractual matters where public authorities act arbitrarily, even without specific contract violations. This reinforces that public bodies cannot terminate contracts without bona fide reasons, ensuring stability for contractors.

23. M.V. Act accident claims: High Court clarifies future prospects, multiplier, and income tax deductions

FAO/167/2017 · Insurance Law [18-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE VIRENDER SINGH

Parties: RELIANCE GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY LTD. vs SAPNA DEVI AND OTHERS

The High Court dismissed the insurer’s appeal (FAO No. 167 of 2017) and allowed the claimants’ appeal (FAO No. 475 of 2017), enhancing the compensation awarded under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act. The Court found that the factum of the accident and the rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle were proved on a preponderance of probability, relying on the testimony of PW-3 Balak Ram and drawing an adverse inference from the driver’s failure to depose. The Court rejected the insurer’s contention regarding the FIR’s delayed registration and lack of initial vehicle particulars, holding that proceedings under the M.V. Act are summary and decided on a preponderance of probability. Applying the principles from *National Insurance Company Limited vs. Pranay Sethi and others* (2017) 16 SCC 680, the Court added 50% for future prospects to the deceased’s income, as he was a public sector employee, and deducted income tax at 10%. Further, in line with *Sarla Verma versus Delhi Transport Corporation and Another* (2009) 6 Supreme Court Cases 121, a multiplier of 17 was applied, and 1/3rd was deducted for personal expenses. The Court also enhanced amounts for loss of estate, funeral expenses, and consortium, citing *Magma General Insurance Company Limited vs. Nanu Ram @ Chuhru Ram and others* (2018) 18 SCC 130, to ensure “just compensation” as mandated by *Oriental Insurance Company Limited vs. Mohd. Nasir and another* (2009) 2 SCC (Cri.) 987. The total compensation was thus enhanced to Rs. 31,07,018/- with 7.5% interest.

Why it matters: Lawyers handling motor accident claims must note this ruling from the Himachal Pradesh High Court, which provides clarity on the calculation of future prospects for salaried individuals, applicable multiplier, and income tax deductions to determine “just compensation” under the Motor Vehicles Act.

24. Insurance company must pay enhanced compensation for motor accident death

FAO/254/2017 · Insurance Law [18-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE VIRENDER SINGH

Parties: RELIANCE GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY LTD. vs JEEWANA DEVI AND OTHERS

The High Court, in disposing of cross-appeals arising from a Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal award under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, enhanced the compensation awarded to the claimant mother for the death of her son. The Court rejected the insurer’s contention regarding non-involvement of the offending vehicle, holding that proceedings under the M.V. Act are summary in nature and decided on the preponderance of probability, which was satisfied by the eyewitness testimony of PW-3 and the adverse inference drawn from the driver’s failure to depose. Relying on *Oriental Insurance Company Limited vs. Mohd. Nasir and another*, the Court reiterated that the M.V. Act is a beneficial legislation aiming for “just compensation.” Applying *National Insurance Company Limited vs. Pranay Sethi and others*, the Court correctly added 50% for future prospects to the deceased’s income, as he was employed in the public sector, and deducted income tax at 10%. Further, it applied a multiplier of 17 based on the deceased’s age of 28 years, as per *Sarla Verma versus Delhi Transport Corporation and Another*, and deducted 50% for personal expenses as the deceased was a bachelor. The Court also awarded enhanced amounts for loss of estate, funeral expenses, and consortium, citing *Magma General Insurance Company Limited vs. Nanu Ram @ Chuhru Ram and others*, ultimately awarding Rs. 27,22,600/- with 7.5% interest.

Why it matters: The High Court emphasized that Motor Vehicles Act proceedings are summary and decided on a ‘preponderance of probability,’ allowing claims even when initial FIRs lack specific vehicle details. Practitioners should note that the driver’s non-appearance in court can lead to adverse inferences against them.

25. Motor Accident Claim: Compensation Increased for Unorganised Sector Worker’s Dependents

FAO/424/2017 · Insurance Law [18-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE VIRENDER SINGH

Parties: NEW INDIA ASSURANCE CO. LTD. vs KAMLA & OTHERS

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in a common judgment for FAO Nos. 424 and 473 of 2017, enhanced the compensation awarded by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal-II, Solan, from Rs. 17,65,000/- to Rs. 23,45,400/- with interest at 7.5% per annum, modifying the award dated 1.4.2017. The Court, guided by the beneficial nature of the M.V. Act as established in *Oriental Insurance Company Limited vs. Mohd. Nasir and another*, (2009) 2 SCC (Cri.) 987, aimed to provide “just compensation” under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act. It reassessed the deceased’s monthly income, rejecting the Tribunal’s Rs. 7,500/- and the Insurance Company’s minimum wage argument, instead accepting the oral evidence of Rs. 12,000/- per month, citing *Laxmibai (dead) through LRs versus Bhagwantbuva (dead) through LRs & others*, (2013) 4 Supreme Court Cases 97, which underscores the credibility of unchallenged witness testimony. Further, applying *Pranay Sethi vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.*, (2017) 16 SCC 680, the Court added 40% for future prospects for the deceased in the unorganized sector, deducted 1/3rd for personal expenses, and applied a multiplier of 16 as per *Sarla Verma & others versus Delhi Transport Corporation & Anr.*, AIR 2009 SC 3104, while also revising conventional heads of compensation.

Why it matters: The ruling guides how courts calculate future prospects and non-pecuniary compensation for accident victims in the unorganised sector, ensuring ‘just compensation’ despite lack of documentary proof of income. Practitioners should note the emphasis on oral evidence and the application of Supreme Court guidelines for multiplier and fixed compensation heads.

26. Interference with land ownership requires clear evidence through demarcation, not oral statements

RSA/23/2019 · Property Law [18-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE ROMESH VERMA

Parties: HARI SINGH &ORS. vs RUP SINGH

The High Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the First Appellate Court’s judgment and restoring the Trial Court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s injunction suit, finding that the First Appellate Court erroneously reversed the burden of proof and relied on evidence not on record. The Court held that the plaintiff, seeking a permanent prohibitory injunction to prevent interference with land and tree cutting on Khasra No. 230, failed to discharge the initial burden of proving his claim, offering only bald oral testimony without cogent and convincing evidence, such as a demarcation report or revenue documents, to establish that the ‘beed’ and trees were on his land. Crucially, the First Appellate Court wrongly relied on a “Wajib-ul-Arz” which was not part of the record or pleadings, thereby carving out a new case for the plaintiff and reversing the onus of proof onto the defendants. The Court reiterated the settled principle that presumption of truth attaches to revenue records, and the defendants successfully demonstrated through Jamabandi (Ext. PC) that the ‘gairmumkin beed’ was on their Khasra No. 229, a presumption the plaintiff failed to rebut. The Court emphasized that injunction is a discretionary and equitable relief, requiring the plaintiff to approach with clean hands, which was not the case here, as the suit appeared to be a counterblast to a demarcation report unfavorable to the plaintiff.

Why it matters: Lawyers should advise clients that in land and boundary disputes, especially concerning ‘beed’ (a specific type of land), reliance on oral testimony without supporting revenue records or proper demarcation reports is insufficient to prove ownership or prevent interference. The ruling emphasises the importance of official demarcation and the presumption of truth attached to revenue records.

27. Pujari cannot withdraw writ petition to claim new relief after adverse judgment

LPA/488/2024 · Administrative Law [18-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE GURMEET SINGH SANDHAWALIA, JUSTICE BIPIN CHANDER NEGI

Parties: HARI RAM (DECEASED) THROUGH LRS vs STATE OF HP AND OTHERS

The High Court dismissed the Letters Patent Appeal, affirming the Single Judge’s decision that the appellant’s claim to be the sole Pujari and Mohtamin of Shri Shiv Mandir Nayas was not determinable under Article 226 of the Constitution, particularly as the temple was acquired under the Himachal Pradesh Hindu Public Religious Institutions and Charitable Endowments Act, 1984. The Court rejected the appellant’s belated attempt to withdraw the writ petition to file a fresh one asserting a Mohtamin claim, holding that such a claim was barred by the principles of constructive res judicata, as articulated in Explanation IV of Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and by limitation under Article 107 of the Limitation Act, 1963, given the temple’s government takeover in 2006. Relying on *Bharat Amratlal Kothari v. Dosukhan Samadkhan Sindhi, (2010) 1 SCC 234*, the Court reiterated that reliefs not prayed for cannot ordinarily be granted in writ jurisdiction, and per *M. Nagabhushana v. State of Karnataka, (2011) 3 SCC 408*, the principle of constructive res judicata applies to writ petitions to prevent abuse of process. The Court further cited *R. Rathinavel Chettiar v. V. Sivaraman, (1999) 4 SCC 89*, to reject the withdrawal request, emphasizing that vested rights under a decree cannot be destroyed by withdrawal at the appellate stage without strong reasons.

Why it matters: Practitioners cannot withdraw a writ petition after an adverse ruling to effectively re-litigate the same cause of action by presenting a new claim. Courts will apply principles of constructive res judicata and ensure litigants approach with clean hands, deterring a ‘hide and seek’ approach to justice.

28. Execution petition disposed after compliance, petitioner free to seek further remedies

EX.P./8/2026 · Civil Law [18-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Parties: MOHANI KUMAR vs STATE OF HP AND ORS.

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in Ex. Pet No.8 of 2026, disposed of the execution petition filed by Mohani Kumar against the State of HP and Ors., noting the respondents’ submission of a compliance affidavit appending consideration order dated 31.01.2026. The Court held that with the filing of the said compliance affidavit, the execution petition stood disposed of, thereby fulfilling the immediate requirement for which the petition was initiated. The decisive ground for this disposition was the production of the consideration order, indicating compliance with the underlying directive that led to the execution proceedings. The Court explicitly clarified that the petitioner retains the liberty to pursue appropriate remedies for any surviving grievances, including those arising from or against the aforementioned consideration order, in accordance with law. This judgment underscores the principle that an execution petition serves to ensure compliance with a prior order, and once such compliance, even if partial or contested, is formally demonstrated through a relevant document like a consideration order, the execution proceedings conclude, shifting the onus to the aggrieved party to challenge the compliance itself through fresh legal avenues. No specific precedents or statutory sections were cited in this brief order.

Why it matters: Lawyers should note that even after a compliance affidavit is filed in an execution petition, the petitioner retains the right to pursue further legal recourse if they have outstanding grievances, including against the consideration order itself. This means execution proceedings may not be the final word.

29. Disposing of Execution Petition with Liberty to Seek Further Remedies

EX.P./1971/2025 · Administrative Law [18-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Parties: KANCHAN DEVI vs STATE OF HP AND ORS.

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh disposed of the execution petition, Ex. Pet No.1971 of 2025, filed by Kanchan Devi against the State of HP and Ors., following the respondents’ submission of a compliance affidavit incorporating a consideration order dated 11.11.2025. The Court noted the petitioner’s reservations regarding this consideration order but, rather than adjudicating its merits within the execution proceedings, opted to close the petition. The decisive ground for this disposition was the Court’s decision to reserve liberty to the petitioner to pursue appropriate remedies for her surviving grievances, including those pertaining to the aforementioned consideration order, in accordance with law. This approach reflects the principle that execution proceedings are primarily concerned with enforcing existing orders, and new disputes or challenges to compliance actions are best addressed through substantive proceedings. The Court did not cite any specific precedents or statutory sections, but its decision implicitly relies on the procedural distinction between execution and original jurisdiction, ensuring that complex challenges to compliance are not summarily decided in execution but are given due process in separate, appropriate legal avenues. The pending miscellaneous application(s) were also disposed of accordingly.

Why it matters: Practitioners should note that the court has closed the execution petition but granted the petitioner the flexibility to pursue other legal avenues regarding their outstanding grievances, including challenging the consideration order. This allows parties to transition from compliance enforcement to new litigation if unsatisfied.

30. POCSO Conviction Upheld: Minor Discrepancies Do Not Undermine Credible Witness Testimony

CR.A/231/2015 · Criminal Law [18-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Parties: PARAMJEET SINGH @ PAMMA vs STATE OF H.P.

The High Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the conviction and sentence of the appellant under Section 4 of the POCSO Act and Section 293 of the IPC, finding no infirmity in the trial court’s judgment. The Court held that the victim’s testimony was natural and creditworthy, establishing the foundational facts for the offences, thereby shifting the burden to the accused to rebut the presumption under Section 29 of the POCSO Act, which he failed to do. The Court rejected arguments regarding delay in FIR, citing *State of H.P. v. Sanjay Kumar, (2017) 2 SCC 51*, which held that delay in sexual offence cases is not a ritualistic formula to discard the prosecution’s case, and *Sekaran v. State of T.N., (2024) 2 SCC 176*, emphasizing a pragmatic approach to delay. Minor discrepancies in witness statements were deemed insufficient to discredit the prosecution, relying on *Rajan v. State of Haryana, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1952*, which states that discrepancies must shake the core of testimonies. The absence of medical injuries around the anus was not fatal, as medical evidence confirmed discomfort, and corroboration of a sexual abuse victim’s testimony is not a strict requirement, as per *Childline India Foundation v. Allan John Waters, (2011) 6 SCC 261*. The presence of a porn clip on the accused’s phone corroborated the victim’s statement, and the defence’s failure to cross-examine on this point meant the testimony remained unchallenged, as per *State of Uttar Pradesh Versus Nahar Singh 1998 (3) SCC 561*.

Why it matters: This judgment clarifies High Court’s stance on minor discrepancies and delay in reporting sexual offenses in POCSO cases, reaffirming that such issues do not automatically undermine victim testimony, especially when foundational facts are established. Practitioners should note that unless inconsistencies strike at the core of the prosecution’s case, they are unlikely to negate a conviction under POCSO.

31. Acquittal upheld in grievous hurt case due to victim’s inconsistent statements

CR.A/270/2014 · Criminal Law [18-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Parties: STATE OF H.P. vs NISHA KUMARI

The High Court dismissed the State’s appeal against the acquittal of the respondent under Section 325 IPC, affirming the trial court’s finding that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. The Court held that interference with an acquittal judgment is warranted only if it is patently perverse, based on misreading of evidence, or omits material evidence, such that no reasonable person could have recorded the acquittal, as established in *Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, (2025) 5 SCC 433* and reiterated in *State of M.P. v. Ramveer Singh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1743*. The Court found the trial court’s view reasonable, noting the strained relationship between the parties, the victim’s pre-existing fracture, and the lack of corroboration for the informant’s and eyewitness’s testimonies, which contained material contradictions and improvements not present in the FIR (Ext. PW5/E). Specifically, the Court highlighted the informant’s failure to disclose the earlier fracture to the medical officer (PW-4) and the inconsistencies regarding the genesis of the incident, particularly the claim of a common kitchen when the accused had a separate one. Thus, as two reasonable views were possible, the appellate court declined to interfere with the acquittal. The respondent was directed to furnish bail bonds under Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Why it matters: High Court maintains acquittal, emphasising that strained relationships between parties necessitate corroboration of statements, especially when contradictions and improvements appear in the victim’s testimony. Practitioners should note that appeals against acquittal are only allowed if the trial court’s decision is perverse or based on misreading evidence, not merely because another view exists.

32. Court Upholds Acquittal Due to Unexplained FIR Delay and Identification Issues

CR.A/4184/2013 · Criminal Law [18-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Parties: STATE OF HP vs NARESH THAKUR AND OTHERS

The High Court dismissed the State’s appeal against the acquittal of the respondents for offences under Sections 147, 148, 323, and 325 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code, upholding the trial court’s finding that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. The Court applied the principle from *Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, (2025) 5 SCC 433*, reiterated in *State of M.P. v. Ramveer Singh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1743*, that interference with an acquittal is warranted only if it is patently perverse or based on misreading of evidence, and no two reasonable views are possible. The decisive grounds for dismissal included the unexplained two-day delay in lodging the FIR, which, as per *Mehraj Singh v. State of U.P. (1994) 5 SCC 188* and *P Rajagopal v. State of Tamil Nadu 2019 (5) SCC 40*, casts doubt on the prosecution’s case, especially when the informant disowned the written complaint. Furthermore, the Court found the identification of the accused suspect, citing *Pandurang vs. State of Hyderabad, AIR 1955 SC 216*, which cautions against omnibus statements, and *P. Sasikumar v. State of T.N., (2024) 8 SCC 600*, which holds that dock identification without a prior Test Identification Parade is unreliable when the accused were strangers and the incident occurred in darkness, as admitted by PW5. The medical evidence also lacked unequivocal corroboration. The Court concluded that the trial court took a reasonable view, precluding appellate interference. The respondents were directed to furnish personal bonds under Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Why it matters: This ruling highlights the critical importance of a prompt First Information Report (FIR) and proper identification procedures, especially when witnesses are unfamiliar with the accused or incidents occur in poor light. Practitioners must ensure police investigations meticulously document these elements to avoid acquittal on appeal.

33. Charges for murder cannot be quashed when medical report links injury to death

CR.R/401/2025 · Criminal Law [18-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Parties: FARMAN & ANR. vs STATE OF H.P.

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh dismissed the revision petition, affirming the Additional Sessions Judge’s order to frame charges under Sections 302, 147, 148, 341, 427 read with Sections 149 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, against the petitioners. The Court held that a grave suspicion is sufficient to frame charges, and at this preliminary stage, a threadbare analysis of evidence or determination of likely conviction is impermissible. The decisive ground was the existence of a prima facie case, supported by the victim’s initial statement implicating the petitioners in the assault and the Medical Officer’s post-mortem report attributing death to vascular degeneration of the kidney consequent to the left leg injury. The Court relied on *Vishnu Kumar Shukla v. State of U.P., (2023) 15 SCC 502*, which established that the primary consideration at the charge framing stage is a prima facie case, and *Ram Prakash Chadha v. State of U.P., (2024) 10 SCC 651*, which permits sifting and weighing evidence for a prima facie determination without delving into probative value. The petitioners’ argument, based on a prior bail cancellation order and alternative causes of death like Dengue Shock Syndrome, was rejected, as observations in bail matters are confined to that context and the parameters for framing charges differ significantly, requiring only grave suspicion.

Why it matters: This ruling clarifies that courts can frame murder charges if a medical report suggests a link between an injury and death, even if other reports suggest alternative causes. This prevents premature quashing of charges and allows the prosecution to present its full case at trial.

34. Bail denied in rape case of intellectually disabled victim

CRMPM/146/2026 · Criminal Law [18-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Parties: ASHOK KUMAR SHARMA vs STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh dismissed the petitioner’s application for regular bail in FIR No. 142 of 2025, registered under Section 64 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS), for alleged rape. The Court found a prima facie case against the petitioner, noting that the prosecutrix, suffering from Moderate Intellectual Disability, was allegedly raped in the petitioner’s shop, with medical evidence showing lacerations on the petitioner’s penis and bruises on the prosecutrix, alongside blood stains found at the scene. The Court emphasized that the nature of the offence was heinous and the potential punishment, life imprisonment under Section 64(1) BNS, was severe. Relying on the principles established in *Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P.*, (1978) 1 SCC 240, and reiterated in *Pinki v. State of U.P.*, (2025) 7 SCC 314, the Court held that the severity of the punishment and the nature of the charge are vital factors in bail considerations, making it unlikely that the accused would appear for judgment if released. The Court rejected the argument that the absence of an FSL report negated the prosecution’s case, holding that the prosecutrix’s statement, corroborated by medical and circumstantial evidence, constituted primary evidence.

Why it matters: Practitioners should note that bail will likely be denied in heinous offenses, especially those involving vulnerable victims, where medical evidence corroborates the victim’s statement, even if forensic reports are pending.

35. Bail denied in NDPS case due to commercial quantity and prior dismissals

CRMPM/3007/2025 · Criminal Law [18-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Parties: DIMPAL ALIAS DIMPLE DHIMAN vs STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH

The High Court dismissed the petitioner’s regular bail application under Section 20 of the NDPS Act, primarily because it constituted a successive bail application without a substantial change in circumstances, and the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act were not satisfied. The Court, relying on *State of Maharashtra Vs. Captain Buddhikota Subha Rao (1989) Suppl. 2 SCC 605*, reiterated that once a bail application is rejected, a subsequent application requires a substantial change in the fact situation, not merely cosmetic changes, to avoid virtually overruling the earlier decision. Further, *Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan @ Pappu Yadav (2004) 7 SCC 528* mandated that courts consider the grounds of earlier rejections and provide specific reasons for granting subsequent bail. The Court rejected the argument that the presence of the petitioner’s Aadhar card with contraband made the prosecution’s case suspicious, stating no presumption exists against such a possibility. The contention regarding violation of speedy trial was also dismissed, noting that seven witness statements were recorded within a year. Crucially, the Court found the petitioner failed to satisfy the twin conditions of Section 37 of the NDPS Act, as the recovery involved a commercial quantity of charas, and no material suggested the petitioner would not commit further offences. The Court, citing *Union of India vs. Vijin K. Varghese 2025:INSC:1316*, held that bail cannot be granted solely on prolonged incarceration without satisfying Section 37. The argument regarding non-communication of arrest grounds was also rejected, as *Mihir Rajesh Shah v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2356* made this requirement prospective.

Why it matters: Practitioners seeking bail in NDPS cases must demonstrate a material change in circumstances for successive applications to succeed, and the twin conditions under Section 37 NDPS Act remain paramount, even with prolonged incarceration.

36. Petitioner withdraws writ to file Public Interest Litigation on same subject

CWP/3066/2026 · Administrative Law [17-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Parties: SANJAY KUMAR SHARMA vs STATE OF H.P.

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in CWP No. 3066/2026, dismissed the petition filed by Sanjay Kumar Sharma as withdrawn, following a request from the petitioner’s counsel. The decisive ground for this dismissal was the petitioner’s stated intention to withdraw the present writ petition to instead prefer a Public Interest Litigation concerning the same subject matter. The Court, presided over by Ms. Justice Jyotsna Rewal Dua, acceded to this request after the matter had been argued for some time. This procedural dismissal, based on the petitioner’s voluntary withdrawal, effectively concludes the proceedings in this specific writ petition without an adjudication on the merits of the claims raised. Consequently, all pending miscellaneous applications were also disposed of. The judgment reflects a standard procedural outcome where a petitioner elects to discontinue a proceeding, reserving the right to pursue the issue through an alternative legal avenue, in this instance, a Public Interest Litigation. The Court’s action is consistent with the principle that a party may withdraw a petition if they so choose, provided there is no legal impediment or prejudice to other parties that would necessitate a continuation.

Why it matters: Practitioners should note that a writ petition can be withdrawn to pursue a Public Interest Litigation, indicating a shift in strategic legal approach on the same issue.

37. Petitions withdrawn, dismissed as such by Himachal Pradesh High Court

CWP/7610/2025 · Administrative Law [17-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Parties: MS. NEHA SINGH vs STATE OF H.P. AND OTHERS

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in CWP No.7610/2025 and CWP No.7615/2025, dismissed both writ petitions as withdrawn based on the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners. The Court recorded that the counsel was under instructions to withdraw the petitions, thereby concluding the proceedings without adjudicating on the merits of the claims. This procedural dismissal signifies that the petitioners voluntarily opted not to pursue their grievances further before the Court. Consequently, all pending miscellaneous application(s) in both matters were also disposed of, aligning with the principle that ancillary applications cease to have independent existence once the main petition is withdrawn. The Court’s decision reflects a standard practice where, upon a party’s request for withdrawal, and in the absence of any compelling reason to continue the proceedings, the petitions are formally closed, leaving the substantive issues unaddressed by judicial pronouncement. The order, therefore, is a procedural closure rather than a substantive determination of rights or liabilities.

Why it matters: Practitioners should note that these specific writ petitions have been dismissed as withdrawn, indicating no legal precedent was set but confirming the outcome for the parties involved.

38. Student withdraws petition for matriculation marksheet to approach authorities

CWP/12351/2025 · Education Law [17-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Parties: HARSH vs UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh dismissed CWP No.12351/2025 as withdrawn, following a submission by the petitioner’s counsel indicating an intention to approach the respondents directly for the supply of the petitioner’s Class-X examination mark-sheet. The Court’s decision was predicated solely on the petitioner’s request to withdraw the writ petition, thereby not adjudicating on the merits of the claim for the mark-sheet itself. This procedural dismissal reflects the principle that a court will generally permit withdrawal of a petition where the petitioner expresses a desire to pursue alternative remedies or approaches, provided no prejudice is caused to the respondent or public interest. The Court did not delve into any substantive legal arguments or precedents, as the matter was resolved on a procedural withdrawal. Consequently, all pending miscellaneous applications were also disposed of. The judgment, delivered by Ms. Justice Jyotsna Rewal Dua, thus concludes the proceedings without a substantive ruling, leaving the petitioner free to pursue the stated administrative recourse.

Why it matters: Lawyers should note that courts may allow withdrawal of petitions if the petitioner intends to pursue an alternate remedy, especially when the initial approach to authorities has not been exhausted.

39. Himachal Pradesh High Court directs resolution of error in ‘Parivaar Register’ entries

CWP/17743/2025 · Administrative Law [17-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Parties: KAMAL SINGH vs STATE OF H.P. AND OTHERS

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh disposed of the writ petition, CWP No.17743 of 2025, by directing respondent No.3, the Competent Authority, to bring the proceedings concerning erroneous entries in the Parivaar Register to their logical conclusion within three weeks, specifically by April 9, 2026. The petitioner had sought quashing of illegal entries made by respondents No.8 and 9 in the Panchayat records of Gram Panchayat Koti-Uttrou and directions for verification and appropriate action under the H.P. Panchayati Raj Act, 1994. The respondents, through the Deputy Commissioner, Sirmour, submitted that an inquiry had already been conducted into complaints regarding illegal shifting of persons between Gram Panchayats and their names being entered in the Pariwar Register and Electoral Roll of Gram Panchayat Koti Utrou. While the matter pertaining to the Electoral Rolls had been decided, the issue of the Parivaar Register was still in progress, with show cause notices issued to erring Panchayat Secretaries. The Court, noting the stand taken by the respondents and the petitioner’s counsel, who sought a time-bound conclusion to the Parivaar Register proceedings, refrained from adjudicating the merits of the matter, leaving all rights and contentions of the parties open.

Why it matters: The Himachal Pradesh High Court’s directive for a time-bound resolution of erroneous ‘Parivaar Register’ entries impacts local governance and administrative procedures, ensuring accountability and accuracy in official records. Practitioners should note that courts will enforce specific deadlines for government agencies to rectify errors.

40. Insurance Company Not Liable for Pillion Rider Death on Act Policy

FAO/4207/2013 · Insurance Law [17-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE SUSHIL KUKREJA

Parties: THE NEW INDIA ASSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED vs NANAK CHAND AND OTHERS

The High Court allowed the insurer’s appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, exonerating it from liability to pay compensation for a fatal motorcycle accident. The decisive grounds were that the driver possessed a driving licence only for LMV (NT) and not for a motorcycle, constituting a violation of Section 10(2) of the MV Act, and that the deceased was a gratuitous pillion rider under an ‘Act Policy’ which did not cover such risk without additional premium. The Court relied on *Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. V. Zaharulnisha and others, 2008 ACJ 1928*, which held that an insurer is not liable when a driver operates a different class of vehicle than licensed for, and *United India Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Tilak Singh and others, 2006 (4) SCC 404*, establishing that a gratuitous pillion rider is not covered under an ‘Act Policy’. The Court rejected the argument for ‘pay and recover’ against the insurer, noting that such directions by the Supreme Court in cases like *National Insurance Company Limited vs. Baljit Kaur & others, (2004) 2 SCC 1*, were in exercise of Article 142 of the Constitution, a power not available to the High Court. Consequently, the owner of the motorcycle was held solely liable to satisfy the award.

Why it matters: Insurance companies are not liable for compensation to a pillion rider under an ‘Act Only’ policy if no additional premium covers this risk. Furthermore, High Courts cannot issue ‘pay and recover’ directions against insurers in such cases, a power reserved for the Supreme Court under Article 142.

41. Contractual employees regularisation by High Court with retrospective benefits

LPA/841/2025 · Service Law [17-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE GURMEET SINGH SANDHAWALIA, JUSTICE BIPIN CHANDER NEGI

Parties: STATE OF HP AND OTHERS vs BHUPINDER SINGH MEHTA & ORS.

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh dismissed the State’s appeal, upholding the Single Judge’s direction to regularize the services of contractual computer operators, finding that the State CAMPA, where they were re-engaged, was an extension of the government and their continuous service warranted regularization. The Court reasoned that the nature of the work performed by the respondents was perennial and fundamental, not temporary, and refusing regularization would be contrary to principles of fairness and equity, especially given the communication/instructions dated 04.05.2017 regarding regularization of contractual appointees. The Court relied on *Jaggo Versus Union of India and Others, 2024 INSC 1034* and *Bhola Nath Versus State of Jharkhand and Others, 2026 INSC 99*, which deprecated the practice of exploiting employees through perpetual contractual engagements and emphasized that *Uma Devi* does not penalize long-serving employees fulfilling necessary functions. Further, the Court, citing *Central Inland Water Transport Corpn. v. Brojo Nath Ganguly* and *Pani Ram v. Union of India*, held that contracts between parties with unequal bargaining power, such as the State and its employees, are subject to judicial scrutiny under Article 14, and unconscionable clauses can be struck down, thus rejecting the State’s reliance on the contractual terms. The Court also found the legitimate expectation doctrine applicable, given the respondents’ long and continuous service.

Why it matters: High Court directs the state to regularise contractual computer operators, noting extensive service creates a legitimate expectation of regularization, especially when the state is the ‘mighty’ contracting party. This decision reinforces the principle that long-term contractual engagements performing perennial duties can lead to an entitlement to regularization, even if the initial appointment was not in a government department proper.

42. Laboratory Attendants entitled to Junior Lecturer pay scale for performing similar duties

CWPOA/172/2019 · Service Law [17-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE JIYA LAL BHARDWAJ

Parties: ROSHAN LAL AND OTHERS vs STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH AND ANOTHER

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh allowed the petition, directing the respondents to grant Laboratory Attendants the pay scale of Rs.4400-7000 notionally from 01.01.1996, with actual monetary benefits three years prior to the petition’s filing. The Court found that despite being designated Laboratory Attendants, the petitioners were performing duties identical to those of Junior Lecturer Assistants, a post that does not exist in schools but is a promotional avenue for Laboratory Attendants. The Court emphasized that the respondents did not dispute the similarity of duties, rendering their denial of equal pay unreasonable, unjust, and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. Relying on the principle of “equal pay for equal work” as a constitutional goal under Article 39(d) read with Articles 14 and 16, as established in *Randhir Singh vs. Union of India*, (1982) 1 SCC 618, and affirmed in *D.S. Nakara and others vs. Union of India*, (1983) 1 SCC 305, the Court held that while pay fixation is an executive function, judicial interference is warranted when decisions are unreasonable or prejudicial, as reiterated in *K.T. Veerappa and others vs. State of Karnataka and others*, (2006) 9 SCC 406. The Court concluded that the petitioners had discharged their burden of proving parity of work.

Why it matters: This ruling reinforces ‘equal pay for equal work’ under Article 39(d) for government employees, even when job titles differ. Practitioners should note that courts may intervene in pay fixation if it’s unreasonable or unjust, particularly when duties are identical despite differing designations between departments.

43. Courts Cannot Direct Government to Create Posts or Frame Recruitment Rules

CWPOA/373/2019 · Service Law [17-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE JIYA LAL BHARDWAJ

Parties: ASHWANI KUMAR AND ANOTHER vs STATE OF H.P AND ANOTHER

The High Court dismissed the petitioners’ writ petition seeking directions to create Law Officer posts and frame Recruitment and Promotion Rules, along with considering their promotion to such posts. The Court held that the communication dated 24.08.2009, rejecting the creation of Law Officer posts in the Forest Department, was valid, as the scope of judicial review in matters concerning the constitution, pattern, nomenclature of posts, and conditions of service, including avenues of promotion, falls within the exclusive discretion and policy domain of the State. The Court emphasized that it is not within the judiciary’s purview to direct the government on recruitment methods or eligibility criteria, citing *P.U. Joshi and others vs. Accountant General, Ahmedabad and others (2003) 2 SCC 632*, which established that such matters pertain to policy and are within the State’s exclusive discretion, subject to constitutional limitations. Furthermore, relying on *Union of India vs. Indian Navy Civilian Design Officers Association and another (2023) 19 SCC 482*, the Court reiterated that file notings are mere expressions of opinion and not government decisions, and judicial review in financial matters is limited unless gross arbitrariness is shown. The Court also referenced *V.K. Naswa vs. Home Secretary, Union of India and others (2012) 2 SCC 542* to underscore that courts cannot legislate or direct the legislature to enact laws in a particular manner. Since the petitioners already had promotion avenues, their claim for inclusion in Law Officer posts was deemed unsustainable.

Why it matters: This ruling firmly establishes that courts will not overstep into policy-making by compelling the government to create new posts, amend recruitment rules, or dictate promotion avenues. Practitioners should advise clients that such matters remain exclusively within the state’s discretion, and not within the judiciary’s power to direct, unless a clear case of arbitrariness is proven.

44. Himachal Pradesh not bound to adopt Punjab pay scales for state employees

CWPOA/1556/2019 · Service Law [17-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE JIYA LAL BHARDWAJ

Parties: NEK RAM AND OTHERS vs STATE OF H.P AND OTHERS

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh dismissed the petition seeking revision of pay scales for Junior Technicians (Weaving Master/Instructor and Carpenter Master) from Rs. 3120-5150 to Rs. 3330-6200 with retrospective effect from 01.01.1996, rejecting the argument for parity with Punjab Government employees. The Court held that the State of Himachal Pradesh is not legally bound to adopt the pay scales of the Punjab Government, even if it has historically followed a similar pattern, as each State has its own distinct service conditions and recruitment rules. Relying on *State of Himachal Pradesh vs. P.D. Attri and others* (1999) 3 SCC 217, the Court reiterated that one State is not obligated to follow the rules and regulations, including pay scales, of another State. Further, citing *P.U. Joshi and others vs. Accountant General, Ahmedabad and others* (2003) 2 SCC 632 and *Union of India vs. Indian Navy Civilian Design Officers Association and another* (2023) 19 SCC 482, the Court emphasized that the determination of service conditions, including pay scales, falls within the exclusive domain of the executive, being a complex matter best left to expert bodies, and judicial interference is warranted only in cases of clear violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. The Court concluded that recommendations by departmental officers do not constitute a binding decision of the Government.

Why it matters: State governments have the prerogative to determine their employees’ pay scales based on their own policies and financial resources. Courts will not direct a state to adopt another state’s pay structure unless there is a violation of constitutional rights or an expert body’s recommendation is arbitrarily ignored.

45. Himachal Pradesh High Court closes execution petition, grants liberty to challenge order

EX.P./2298/2025 · Administrative Law [17-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Parties: MOHIT SHARMA & ANR. vs STATE OF H.P. & ORS.

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in Ex. Pet. No. 2298/2025, disposed of the execution petition on March 17, 2026, following the respondents’ submission of office instructions dated March 16, 2026, from the Director General Prisons & Correctional Services, Himachal Pradesh. These instructions conveyed the decision regarding the petitioners’ cases, as per a consideration order dated March 13, 2026. The petitioners’ counsel acknowledged the consideration order but expressed a grievance against it, seeking liberty to challenge the same in accordance with law. The Court, therefore, granted this permission, allowing the petitioners to assail the consideration order. Consequently, the execution petition was disposed of, along with any pending miscellaneous applications. The core reasoning was to facilitate the petitioners’ right to challenge the administrative decision, ensuring due process while acknowledging the respondents’ compliance with the initial directive to consider the petitioners’ cases. This approach aligns with the principle that while administrative actions may resolve immediate issues, they remain subject to judicial review if a party demonstrates a legitimate grievance. The judgment did not explicitly rely on specific precedents or statutory sections beyond the administrative orders presented.

Why it matters: Practitioners now know that while the execution petition is closed, the court has explicitly allowed parties to challenge the underlying consideration order, providing a clear path for further legal action.

46. Magistrate can accept police cancellation report if informant fails to prove possession

CRMMO/1046/2025 · Criminal Law [17-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Parties: KANSHI RAM vs STATE OF H.P.

The High Court dismissed the petitioner’s challenge to the Judicial Magistrate First Class’s order accepting a police cancellation report, thereby upholding the rejection of the informant’s objections. The Court reasoned that the police investigation, which led to the cancellation report, was appropriate given the absence of material corroborating the informant’s claim of possession over the disputed land. Crucially, the Court noted that a civil suit was pending between the parties, and revenue records indicated the accused as owners in possession of Khasra Nos. 65 and 83. Furthermore, a specific finding in a related civil proceeding by the Additional District Judge, Solan, had already determined that the informant was not in possession of Khasra No. 83, a finding undisturbed by a subsequent status quo order from the High Court. The Court emphasized that revenue entries carry a presumption of correctness and could not be ignored. Since the informant failed to establish possession, the police’s cancellation report regarding alleged offences under Sections 379, 447, and 430 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code was rightly submitted and accepted. The Court found no infirmity in the Trial Court’s order and declined to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, as no case was made out for such intervention.

Why it matters: This ruling clarifies that if an informant cannot establish possession of disputed land, a Magistrate correctly accepts a police cancellation report, particularly when civil litigation over the land is ongoing and revenue records contradict the informant’s claim. Practitioners should advise clients that police will not act on criminal complaints where a civil title dispute is unresolved and no clear criminal act is apparent.

47. High Court quashes FIR due to voluntary compromise between parties

CRMMO/1205/2025 · Criminal Law [17-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Parties: CHANDER MANI vs STATE OF H.P. & ANR.

The High Court quashed FIR No. 40 of 2020, registered under Sections 354A and 323 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), and all consequential proceedings, based on a compromise between the parties. The Court noted that the offence under Section 323 IPC is compoundable under Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Crucially, for the non-compoundable offence under Section 354A IPC, the Court relied on binding precedents from its own jurisdiction, specifically citing *Vidya Devi Vs. State of HP and others 2022 STPL 13724 HP*, *Ameen Vs. State of HP and others 2022 STPL 13743 HP*, *Raj Kumar Vs. State of HP and others 2022(2) Him. L.R. 1150*, *Mukesh Kumar and others Vs. State of HP and others 2022 STPL 9742 HP*, and *Sunil Kumar and State of HP and others 2022(1) Him. L.R. 280*, which established the principle that FIRs for Section 354A IPC can be quashed on the basis of a voluntary compromise. The informant’s statement, recorded by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, confirmed the voluntary nature of the compromise and her unwillingness to pursue the matter further, particularly given the familial relationship between the parties. This established judicial precedent, coupled with the voluntary settlement, formed the decisive ground for quashing the FIR and all related criminal proceedings.

Why it matters: Practitioners can advise clients that High Courts may quash FIRs under Sections 354A and 323 IPC if a voluntary compromise is reached, especially when parties are family members. This provides a clear precedent for out-of-court settlements in similar cases.

48. High Court quashes FIR due to compromise in IPC Sections 279 and 337 case

CRMMO/1333/2024 · Criminal Law [17-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Parties: HEMANT KUMAR SHARMA vs STATE OF HP & ORS.

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh quashed FIR No. 28 of 2012, registered under Sections 279 and 337 of the Indian Penal Code, and all consequential proceedings against the petitioner, Hemant Kumar Sharma, based on a compromise reached between the parties. The Court’s decisive reasoning rested on the established legal principle that where offences, even if non-compoundable, are primarily private in nature and do not involve grave moral turpitude or serious public wrong, and the parties have genuinely compromised, the continuation of criminal proceedings would constitute an abuse of the process of law. The Court explicitly relied upon its own binding precedents, including *Sushant vs State of H.P. 2023 HLJ 531*, *Vikas Huda vs. State of H.P. 2023 STPL 3009*, *Kulwidner Singh vs Ankush Kumar 2023 HLR 384*, and *Nishant vs. State 2022 Suppl. Law Cases 45*, which similarly quashed FIRs involving Sections 279, 337, and 338 IPC on the basis of compromise. The Court noted that the victims and the legal representatives of a deceased victim had voluntarily entered into the compromise, expressing no desire to pursue the matter further, thereby ensuring that the ends of justice would be met by allowing the compromise.

Why it matters: Practitioners can leverage this ruling in the High Court of Himachal Pradesh to quash criminal proceedings in compoundable offenses like IPC Sections 279 and 337, even after charges are framed, if the parties reach a genuine compromise. The judgment reinforces that compromise between parties, even legal representatives of a deceased victim, can lead to quashing FIRs and subsequent proceedings.

49. Confirmation of interim bail for accused in forged sale deed fraud case

CRMPM/42/2026 · Criminal Law [17-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE SANDEEP SHARMA

Parties: AVTAR SINGH vs STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh confirmed the interim bail granted to the petitioners, Avtar Singh and Ajay Mahajan, in FIR No.1/2025 under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 read with Section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code. The Court found that since the petitioners had already joined the investigation and nothing further remained to be recovered from them, their continued custodial interrogation was unwarranted. The Court emphasized that the object of bail is to secure the accused’s attendance at trial, not to inflict punishment, and that freedom of an individual is paramount until guilt is proven. Relying on the principles established in *Dataram Singh vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr* (Criminal Appeal No.227/2018), which underscores the presumption of innocence and that bail is the general rule, and *Sanjay Chandra vs Central Bureau of Investigation* (2012) 1 SCC 49, which reiterates that deprivation of liberty before conviction is punitive, the Court held that the petitioners’ guilt was yet to be established. The Court also considered the guidelines from *Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee and Another* (2010) 14 SCC 496 regarding bail considerations, concluding that no grounds existed to deny regular bail, subject to conditions ensuring cooperation with investigation and trial.

Why it matters: This ruling highlights the importance of individual liberty and the principle that bail is the rule, not the exception, especially when no further custodial interrogation or recovery is needed. Practitioners should note that completed investigations and cooperation with authorities weigh heavily in favor of confirming interim bail.

50. Bail denied in NDPS case due to commercial quantity and conscious possession

CRMPM/250/2026 · Criminal Law [17-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE JIYA LAL BHARDWAJ

Parties: SALIMA vs STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH

The High Court dismissed the petitioner’s bail application under Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, for an offence under Section 20 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act), involving the recovery of 1.402 kg of charas, a commercial quantity. The Court held that the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act applied, requiring satisfaction that there are reasonable grounds for believing the accused is not guilty and is unlikely to commit further offences while on bail. The petitioner’s plea of lack of conscious possession was rejected, relying on *Madan Lal and another versus State of H.P.* (2003) 7 SCC 465, which established that all occupants of a vehicle from which contraband is recovered are in conscious possession, shifting the burden to the accused under Sections 35 and 54 of the NDPS Act to prove otherwise. The Court further cited *Union of India Versus Niyazuddin S.K.* (2018) 13 SCC 738 and *State of Kerala Versus Rajesh* (2020) 12 SCC 122, reiterating that the twin conditions of Section 37 are cumulative and mandatory, and a liberal approach is impermissible. The Court also noted, per *Narcotics Control Bureau v. Kashif* (2024) 11 SCC 372, that negation of bail is the rule in NDPS cases involving commercial quantities. Consequently, the petitioner failed to satisfy the stringent conditions for bail under the NDPS Act.

Why it matters: Practitioners must understand that demonstrating ‘conscious possession’ is crucial in NDPS cases; simply denying knowledge of contraband in a vehicle one is driving is insufficient to overcome the Section 37 bar on bail when commercial quantities are involved, as the burden shifts to the accused.

51. Bail denied in murder case despite trial delay

CRMPM/2445/2025 · Criminal Law [17-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Parties: INDERJEET SINGH @ INDRA vs STATE OF H.P.

The High Court dismissed the bail petition under Sections 302, 382, and 120B IPC, finding a prima facie case against the petitioner for murder. The Court relied on witness statements identifying the petitioner and the admissibility of his disclosure under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, which led to the discovery of a co-accused and the murder weapon, a knife matching the victim’s DNA. The Court reiterated that a Test Identification Parade is corroborative, not substantive evidence, and its absence does not vitiate in-court identification, as held in *Mukesh Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi)* and *Jayawant Dattatraya Suryarao v. State of Maharashtra*. Rejecting the argument for bail based on trial delay, the Court cited *Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi)*, which established that incarceration period alone does not entitle an accused to bail in murder cases. Further, applying principles from *Pinki v. State of U.P.* and *Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P.*, the Court emphasized that the severity of punishment for a heinous crime like murder weighs against granting bail, as it increases the likelihood of the accused absconding or thwarting justice.

Why it matters: This ruling clarifies that incarceration duration alone does not automatically entitle a murder accused to bail if the evidence prima facie indicates guilt, even with trial delays.

52. High Court directs authorities to address complaint regarding ‘Shakti Vahini’ judgment implementation

CWP/3011/2026 · Administrative Law [16-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Parties: NEERAJ SINGH vs THE STATE OF H.P. & ORS

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh disposed of the writ petition, CWP No.3011 of 2026, by directing respondent No.2/competent authority to examine and take appropriate action on the petitioner’s complaint in accordance with law, without delving into the merits of the matter. The petitioner sought a writ of mandamus to compel the State of H.P. to comply with the judgment dated 27.03.2018 in *Shakti Vahini V/s Union of India and others*, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 231 of 2010, and to consider their complaint in terms of the directions issued therein. The Court’s decision was predicated on the petitioner’s counsel expressing contentment with a direction to the competent authority to merely look into the complaint and take appropriate action, a prayer to which the learned Additional Advocate General was not averse. This approach reflects the Court’s exercise of its writ jurisdiction to ensure administrative action on a grievance, while deferring substantive adjudication to the executive, consistent with the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the Court’s role in ensuring due process. The judgment in *Shakti Vahini V/s Union of India and others* (Writ Petition (Civil) No. 231 of 2010, decided on 27.03.2018) served as the foundational precedent, establishing the legal framework within which the petitioner’s complaint was to be considered.

Why it matters: Practitioners can use this ruling to compel authorities to address complaints related to the implementation of Supreme Court judgments, ensuring timely action and compliance. It reinforces the High Court’s role in overseeing the execution of higher court directives.

53. High Court affirms recovery decree for unpaid furniture supply

RSA/90/2025 · Civil Law [16-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE ROMESH VERMA

Parties: M/S LOKPRIYA BUIDWELL PVT. LTD. vs PUNEET SINGH SEEHRA

The High Court dismissed the appellant’s second appeal, affirming the concurrent findings of the lower courts which decreed the respondent’s suit for recovery of Rs. 19,90,082/- with interest. The decisive ground for upholding the recovery was the admission by the appellant’s witness (DW-1) during cross-examination that the defendant company had a pending liability of Rs. 19,90,082/- towards the plaintiff, which, when read with the plaintiff’s evidence (PW-1 and PW-2), conclusively established the claim. The Court rejected the appellant’s contention that the suit was time-barred, noting that the Delhi Court had granted extensions for filing the suit, making it within the limitation period. Relying on *Navaneethammal vs. Arjuna Chetty AIR 1996 SC 3521* and *Kondiba Dagadu Kadam vs. Savitribai Sopan Gujar and others AIR 1999 SC 2213*, the Court reiterated that its scope of interference under Section 100 CPC is limited to cases where findings are perverse or based on no evidence, and it cannot re-appreciate evidence to substitute the lower courts’ findings, especially when two inferences are possible. Finding no substantial question of law, the Court held the concurrent findings to be legal and sustainable.

Why it matters: This ruling highlights the importance of clear accounting and the evidential weight of a defendant’s admission during cross-examination in recovery suits. Practitioners should ensure detailed records and be aware of how an opponent’s testimony can clinch a case, affirming a clear path for creditors to recover dues.

54. Landowners not entitled to additional market value under Section 23(1A) of Land Acquisition Act

ARB.A/548/2025 · Land Acquisition Law [16-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE ROMESH VERMA

Parties: BALWANT & ORS. vs NATIONAL HIGHWAY AUTHORITY OF INDIA & ORS.

The High Court dismissed the appeal, affirming that landowners are not entitled to additional market value under Section 23(1A) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, for acquisitions made under the National Highways Act, 1956. The Court’s reasoning hinged on the Supreme Court’s clarification in *National Highway Authority of India & Anr. Vs. Tehal Singh & Ors.* (decided on 30.07.2021) and *Union of India & Anr. Vs. Tarsem Singh & Ors.* (decided on 04.02.2025), which modified the earlier *Tarsem Singh* judgment by deleting the expression “(1-A)” from the benefits applicable. This position was further solidified by the Supreme Court’s dismissal of SLP (C) Diary No. 52538/2023, *Raj Kumar & Anr. Vs. Union of India & Ors.*, which challenged the Punjab & Haryana High Court’s refusal to grant additional market value, relying on *National Highway Authority of India Vs. Resham Singh*. The Court reiterated that while solatium and interest under Sections 23(2) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act are applicable, the additional market value under Section 23(1A) is not, thereby upholding the District Judge’s partial setting aside of the Arbitrator’s award.

Why it matters: This ruling clarifies that landowners whose property is acquired under the National Highways Act are not entitled to additional market value under Section 23(1A) of the Land Acquisition Act, even though they receive solatium and interest. Practitioners should advise clients accordingly when dealing with national highway acquisitions.

55. Acquittal upheld for motorcyclist, truck driver negligent as per road rules

CR.A/163/2014 · Criminal Law [16-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Parties: STATE OF H.P. vs SANJAY KUMAR

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh dismissed the State’s appeal against the acquittal of the respondent, Sanjay Kumar, for offences under Sections 279, 337, 338, and 304A of the Indian Penal Code, affirming the Trial Court’s finding that the accident was caused by the truck driver’s negligence, not the motorcyclist’s. The Court, applying the principles from *Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, (2025) 5 SCC 433* and *State of M.P. v. Ramveer Singh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1743*, held that interference with an acquittal is warranted only if the judgment is patently perverse, based on misreading of evidence, or if no reasonable person could have recorded the acquittal. The Court found the Trial Court’s view reasonable, noting that photographic evidence (Ext.P1, Ext.P2, Ext.P3) showed the truck’s right tyre had crossed the middle line, crushing the motorcyclist, and that the truck was positioned obliquely, covering the road. This contradicted eyewitness testimonies claiming the motorcyclist overtook a bus, a version further weakened by the absence of the bus at the scene and inconsistencies in cross-examination. The Court reiterated that driving on the right side of the road amounts to negligence, citing *Fagu Moharana vs. State, AIR 1961 Orissa 71*, *State of H.P. Vs. Dinesh Kumar 2008 H.L.J. 399*, and *State of H.P. vs. Niti Raj 2009 Cr.L.J. 1922*, and concluded that the truck driver breached Rule 2 of the Rules of the Road Regulations, 1989.

Why it matters: This ruling highlights the importance of photographs and eyewitness consistency in accident cases, emphasising that driving on the wrong side of the road constitutes negligence. Practitioners should ensure thorough evidence collection and cross-examination to corroborate accident narratives.

56. Himachal Pradesh High Court upholds acquittal in molestation case

CR.A/201/2013 · Criminal Law [16-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Parties: STATE OF H.P. vs RAMESH CHAND & ANR.

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh dismissed the State’s appeal against the acquittal of the respondents for offences under Sections 323 and 354 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, upholding the trial court’s decision. The Court, relying on the principles established in *Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand* (2025) 5 SCC 433 and *State of M.P. v. Ramveer Singh* 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1743, reiterated that interference with an acquittal is warranted only if it is patently perverse, based on misreading of evidence, or if no two reasonable views are possible. The Court found the trial court’s view reasonable, noting the unexplained delay in lodging the FIR, a factor that, as per *Mehraj Singh v. State of U.P.* (1994) 5 SCC 188 and *P Rajagopal vs State of Tamil Nadu* 2019 (5) SCC 40, leads to suspicion of embellishment. Further, material contradictions between the victim’s and PW2’s testimonies, the medical officer’s admission that injuries could be self-inflicted or from a fall, and the dental surgeon’s uncertainty regarding the bite mark, collectively rendered the prosecution’s case doubtful. The Court concluded that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, thus affirming the benefit of doubt extended to the accused. The respondents were directed to furnish bail bonds under Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Why it matters: The Court of Himachal Pradesh confirmed an acquittal, emphasising that in cases where two views are possible from the evidence, the appellate court should not interfere with a trial court’s reasonable view. This reinforces the high bar for overturning acquittals, requiring clear perversity or misreading of evidence.

57. Acquittal upheld for accused when victim and family deny kidnapping and rape

CR.A/481/2015 · Criminal Law [16-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE VIVEK SINGH THAKUR, JUSTICE RANJAN SHARMA

Parties: STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH vs AJAY KUMAR

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh dismissed the State’s appeal against the acquittal of the respondent, Ajay Kumar, for offences under Sections 363, 366, and 376 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012. The Court found no sufficient, cogent, reliable, and convincing evidence to establish the respondent’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The decisive ground for this conclusion was the complete negation of the prosecution’s case by the victim (PW-1), her father (PW-2), and her mother (PW-3), who all turned hostile. PW-1 explicitly stated she left home voluntarily, was not enticed, nothing wrong happened to her, and she was living happily with the respondent as his wife, having even borne a child with him. Despite the victim’s age being established as approximately 16 years at the time of the FIR through a School Leaving Certificate (Ex. PW5/B), this proof of minority was deemed unhelpful to the prosecution given the victim’s and her parents’ consistent denial of any wrongdoing by the respondent. The Court reiterated the settled law that an Appellate Court cannot substitute its opinion for that of the Trial Court if the latter’s findings are plausible and possible, which was the case here. The prosecution failed to extract any material in its favour even after lengthy cross-examination of its own witnesses, leading to the conclusion that the appeal lacked merit.

Why it matters: This ruling reinforces that courts require cogent evidence to overturn an acquittal, even in cases involving statutory rape, when the victim and family recant prior statements and deny any wrongdoing by the accused.

58. Tutored child witness testimony unreliable in sexual assault case without corroboration

CR.R/436/2015 · Criminal Law [16-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Parties: STATE OF H.P. vs MOHAN LAL

The High Court dismissed the State’s revision petition, upholding the concurrent acquittals by the learned Trial Court and Appellate Court in a case under Section 377 IPC, finding no infirmity in their judgments. The decisive ground for dismissal was the unreliability of the child victim’s testimony, who admitted in cross-examination to being tutored by his father regarding the core facts of sexual penetration. The Court, relying on *Chhagan Dame v. State of Gujarat, 1995 SCC (Cri) 182* and *Digamber Vaishnav v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2019) 4 SCC 522*, reiterated that while a child witness’s evidence must be evaluated carefully due to susceptibility to tutoring, if found tutored, no reliance can be placed on it. Further, the medical evidence, showing only abrasions that could be caused by scratching, did not unequivocally corroborate the prosecution’s version, and the absence of injury on the accused’s person made the case suspect. The Court also noted the strained relationship and civil litigation between the victim’s father and the accused, necessitating caution in evaluating testimonies. The Court emphasized its limited revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 Cr.P.C., as established in *Malkeet Singh Gill v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2022) 8 SCC 204* and *State of Gujarat v. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1294*, which permits interference only for patent defects, errors of jurisdiction or law, or perversity, not for re-appreciation of evidence unless glaring features indicate a gross miscarriage of justice.

Why it matters: A child witness’s testimony, if tutored by a parent, cannot solely prove a prosecution’s case in sexual assault matters. Practitioners must ensure independent corroboration, especially when evaluating child witness statements, to avoid dismissal of charges based on unreliability.

59. Bail denied due to serious charges, strong evidence, and prior dismissal

CRMPM/116/2026 · Criminal Law [16-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Parties: DEEPAK KUMAR vs STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh dismissed the petitioner’s regular bail application in Cr.MP(M) No. 116 of 2026, filed under Sections 64, 126(2), 351(2), 351(3) read with Section 3(5) of the Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) and Sections 66E and 67 of the Information and Technology (IT) Act, 2000. The Court primarily relied on the principle that a subsequent bail application requires a substantial change in circumstances, as established in *State of Maharashtra Vs. Captain Buddhikota Subha Rao* (1989) Suppl. 2 SCC 605, and reiterated in *Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan @ Pappu Yadav* (2004) 7 SCC 528, and *Prasad Shrikant Purohit v. State of Maharashtra* (2018) 11 SCC 458. The Court found no such change, noting the earlier dismissal of the petitioner’s bail plea. Furthermore, the Court rejected the argument that the victim’s recantation warranted bail, citing *X Vs. State of Rajasthan* MANU/SC/1267/2024, which cautions against granting bail in serious offences based on discrepancies in testimony once trial commences. The presence of the petitioner’s DNA on the victim’s clothing and the existence of a video recording constituted prima facie evidence. The Court also considered the severity of the punishment for Section 64 BNS, which extends to life imprisonment, a factor against bail as per *Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P.* (1978) 1 SCC 240.

Why it matters: Practitioners should note that a subsequent bail application requires demonstrating a substantive change in circumstances, and the court will not grant bail simply because a victim has resiled from an earlier statement when other evidence, such as forensic results and video recordings, strongly indicates guilt. The severity of potential punishment also remains a critical factor in bail considerations.

60. Bail Granted for NDPS Accused Due to Substantial Custody and Slow Trial

CRMPM/252/2026 · Criminal Law [16-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Parties: MOHIT SHARMA vs STATE OF HP

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh granted regular bail to the petitioner, Mohit Sharma, in FIR No. 5 of 2025 under Sections 21 and 29 of the NDPS Act, despite a previous bail application being dismissed, finding a material change in circumstances. The Court acknowledged the principle established in *State of Maharashtra v. Captain Buddhikota Subha Rao* (1989) Suppl. 2 SCC 605, and reiterated in *Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan @ Pappu Yadav* (2004) 7 SCC 528, that subsequent bail applications require a change in circumstances, but found such a change here. The decisive grounds for granting bail were that the recovered quantity of 6.730 grams of heroin was intermediate, thus the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act did not apply, and the petitioner had undergone a substantial period of incarceration (over one year) with the trial progressing slowly, violating his right to a speedy trial, as held in *Sachin Sharma vs. State of H.P.* 2026:HHC:6382. The Court also relied on *Ayub Khan v. State of Rajasthan*, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3763, to hold that criminal antecedents alone cannot be a reason to deny bail in cases of long incarceration. The petitioner was directed to furnish bail bonds of ₹1,00,000/- with one surety and abide by specific conditions.

Why it matters: Practitioners should note that prolonged incarceration, especially when the trial is delayed, can be a ground for bail even with prior denial or criminal antecedents, as it impacts the right to a speedy trial.

61. Bail denied in NDPS case despite medical condition due to commercial quantity seizure

CRMPM/2839/2025 · Criminal Law [16-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Parties: VIVEK SHARMA vs NCB

The High Court dismissed the petitioner’s application for regular bail in a case involving offences under Sections 8, 20, 25, and 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act (NDPS Act), specifically concerning the recovery of 1.950 kilograms of charas, a commercial quantity. The Court held that the petitioner failed to satisfy the twin conditions mandated by Section 37 of the NDPS Act, which require the Court to be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing the accused is not guilty and is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. Relying on *Union of India v. Niyazuddin & Another* (2018) 13 SCC 738 and *State of Kerala v. Rajesh* AIR 2020 SC 721, the Court reiterated that these conditions are cumulative and stringent, requiring more than prima facie grounds. The argument of conscious possession was established *prima facie* by *Madan Lal v. State of H.P.* (2003) 7 SCC 465, which holds that all occupants of a vehicle from which contraband is recovered are in conscious possession. The Court rejected arguments for bail based on prolonged incarceration, citing *Union of India v. Vijin K. Varghese* 2025:INSC:1316, and medical condition (80% paraplegia), referencing *State of Meghalaya v. Lalrintluanga Sailo* (2024) 15 SCC 36, as these do not override the mandatory requirements of Section 37. The Court affirmed that in NDPS cases involving commercial quantities, negation of bail is the rule, and its grant an exception, as held in *Narcotics Control Bureau v. Kashif* (2024) 11 SCC 372.

Why it matters: This ruling reaffirms that medical conditions or trial delays do not automatically override the strict twin conditions for bail under Section 37 of the NDPS Act, especially for commercial quantity offenses. Practitioners must satisfy the court that the accused is not guilty and unlikely to commit further offenses.

62. Accused granted bail in POCSO case due to DNA evidence ruling out paternity

CRMPM/2917/2025 · Criminal Law [16-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Parties: KISHAN CHAND vs STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh granted regular bail to the petitioner, Kishan Chand, in FIR No. 7 of 2024, registered under Sections 376(2)(n), 376(3), and 506 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act. The Court’s decisive ground was the DNA analysis report, which ruled out the petitioner as the biological father of the victim’s child, coupled with the victim’s initial failure to name the petitioner and the significant delay of approximately two years in trial proceedings since his arrest on 19.03.2024. The Court applied the principles for bail enunciated in *Pinki v. State of U.P.*, (2025) 7 SCC 314, which reiterated the factors from *Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P.*, (1978) 1 SCC 240, and *Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi)*, (2001) 4 SCC 280, emphasizing the nature of accusation, evidence, severity of punishment, and likelihood of tampering with witnesses or absconding. The Court found the apprehension of witness intimidation could be mitigated by imposing stringent conditions, including a bail bond of ₹1,00,000/- with one surety, regular trial attendance, and restrictions on leaving the address without intimation, thereby allowing bail.

Why it matters: DNA evidence ruling out paternity can be a crucial factor for granting bail in POCSO cases, particularly when the victim’s initial statement does not immediately implicate the accused. Practitioners should note that the court balances the gravity of the offense with other factors like delayed implication and the progress of the trial.

63. Bail denied in robbery case despite no direct crime scene presence

CRMPM/3070/2025 · Criminal Law [16-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Parties: SALMAN vs STATE OF HP

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh dismissed the regular bail petition filed by Salman, accused under Sections 309(6), 333, 127(2), 351, 115(2), 61(2), 24(a) of the Bharatiya Nayaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS) and Sections 25 and 27 of the Indian Arms Act, for his alleged involvement in a robbery. The Court, applying the principles for bail enunciated in *Pinki v. State of U.P.* (2025) 7 SCC 314, which reiterated the factors from *Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P.* (1978) 1 SCC 240 and *Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi)* (2001) 4 SCC 280, found prima facie evidence of the petitioner’s involvement, including recovery of identified jewellery and firearms, and mobile location data placing him in Himachal Pradesh during the incident. The Court emphasized that while bail is the normal rule as per *State of Rajasthan v. Balchand* (1977) 4 SCC 308, this principle yields to the gravity and heinousness of the offence, especially when the punishment is severe, as highlighted in *Gudikanti Narasimhulu*. The Court rejected the argument of delay in trial, citing *Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi)* (2018) 12 SCC 129, which held that incarceration period alone does not entitle bail in grave crimes, and distinguished *Manish Sisodia v. Directorate of Enforcement* 2024 INSC 595 due to the absence of trial delay in the present case.

Why it matters: This ruling highlights that involvement in a conspiracy, coupled with recovered stolen items and call records, can be sufficient grounds to deny bail for heinous offenses, even if the accused was not physically present at the crime scene. Practitioners should note that the gravity of the crime and potential for severe punishment weigh heavily against bail applications, even with arguments of delayed trial, unless significant delays are proven.

64. Maintenance Order Set Aside After Couple Agrees to Mutual Consent Divorce

Cr.Rev.(FC)/75/2025 · Family Law [16-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE VIVEK SINGH THAKUR, JUSTICE RANJAN SHARMA

Parties: TEK CHAND vs NARVADA KUMARI

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh disposed of a revision petition filed by the husband, Tek Chand, against a maintenance order passed under Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code, by setting aside the impugned order dated 06.10.2025 (sic 2022) in terms of a compromise reached between the parties. The decisive ground for this resolution was the successful mediation, wherein both parties amicably agreed to dissolve their marriage by mutual consent under Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. The Court recorded the statements of both parties, confirming their free will and consent to the settlement, which included provisions for the children’s custody with the father, visitation rights for the mother, and a mutual waiver of all claims for permanent alimony and past, present, or future maintenance. The Court directed the parties to file a joint petition under Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act on or before 31.03.2026, exempting them from the statutory six-month cooling period, thereby allowing for dissolution of marriage on the first or second hearing. The terms of the settlement deed, Exhibit C-1, were made part of the order, governing all rights related to maintenance, alimony, and child custody.

Why it matters: Practitioners should note that high courts facilitate out-of-court settlements in matrimonial disputes, including waiving the six-month cooling-off period for mutual consent divorces under the Hindu Marriage Act, if both parties agree to terms such as child custody and financial claims.

65. Writ petition dismissed as infructuous due to subsequent developments

CWP/222/2019 · Administrative Law [13-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Parties: ISHWAR SINGH MEHTA vs STATE OF H.P. & ORS.

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in CWP No. 222/2019, disposed of the writ petition filed by Ishwar Singh Mehta against the State of H.P. & Ors. as having been rendered infructuous due to subsequent developments. The learned vice counsel for the petitioner explicitly stated that the petition no longer required adjudication, leading the Court to conclude that the matter had become academic. This disposition effectively terminates the proceedings without a substantive ruling on the merits of the original claims. The Court’s decision to dispose of the petition on the ground of infructuousness aligns with the established legal principle that courts will not adjudicate matters that no longer present a live controversy or where the relief sought has become irrelevant or impossible to grant due to intervening events. Consequently, all pending miscellaneous applications were also disposed of. The judgment, delivered by Ms. Justice Jyotsna Rewal Dua, reflects a procedural closure based on the petitioner’s own submission regarding the changed circumstances, thereby avoiding an unnecessary expenditure of judicial resources on a matter that no longer requires judicial intervention.

Why it matters: Practitioners should note that this case is now irrelevant due to external factors, meaning the legal issues originally raised were not adjudicated. This signifies the importance of monitoring case developments post-filing.

66. Writ petition dismissed as subsequent developments render it infructuous

CWP/223/2019 · Administrative Law [13-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Parties: SAVITA & ANR. vs STATE OF H.P. & ORS.

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in CWP No. 223/2019, disposed of the writ petition filed by Savita & Anr. against the State of H.P. & Ors. as having been rendered infructuous. The decisive ground for this disposition was the statement made by the learned vice counsel for the petitioners, Mr. Atharv Sharma, indicating that subsequent developments had overtaken the subject matter of the petition, thereby removing the live controversy. The Court, therefore, found no further cause for adjudication on the merits of the petition. This procedural closure reflects the principle that courts will not decide academic or moot questions, a principle implicitly recognized in various procedural laws, though no specific statutory provision or precedent was explicitly cited by the Court in this brief order. Consequently, all pending miscellaneous applications were also disposed of as a necessary corollary to the main petition becoming infructuous. The Court’s action aligns with the fundamental judicial practice of addressing only subsisting disputes.

Why it matters: Practitioners should note that subsequent events can lead to a writ petition becoming infructuous, resulting in its disposal without a decision on merits. Regularly assess case viability based on new developments to avoid unnecessary litigation.

67. Writ Petition Withdrawn by Petitioner Due to Instructions

CWP/2913/2026 · Civil Law [13-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Parties: SANTOSH KUMAR vs STATE OF H.P. AND OTHERS

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in CWP No.2913 of 2026, disposed of the writ petition as withdrawn on March 13, 2026, following a submission by the learned counsel for the petitioner indicating instructions to withdraw the petition. This procedural outcome, while not delving into the substantive merits of the case, effectively terminates the proceedings without a judicial determination on the issues raised. The Court’s decision to allow withdrawal is a standard practice when a petitioner no longer wishes to pursue the matter, reflecting the principle of *dominus litis*, where the party initiating the litigation has control over its continuation. Consequently, all pending miscellaneous application(s) were also disposed of, rendering the entire matter closed before the Court. This judgment, delivered by Ms. Justice Jyotsna Rewal Dua, underscores the procedural aspect of litigation where parties retain the right to withdraw their petitions, thereby concluding the judicial process without a pronouncement on the substantive legal questions. The order is brief, reflecting a straightforward procedural closure rather than a complex legal analysis or the application of specific statutory provisions or precedents.

Why it matters: Practitioners should note that cases can be withdrawn at any stage if proper instructions are received, leading to the disposal of all pending applications without further judicial review.

68. High Court directs State to reassess transport subsidy eligibility for cement company

CWP/5704/2014 · Administrative Law [13-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Parties: M/S AMBUJA CEMENTS LIMITED vs STATE OF H.P. AND OTHERS

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh disposed of the writ petition filed by M/s Ambuja Cements Limited, seeking various declarations concerning the Transport Subsidy Scheme, 1971, and the quashing of the State Level Committee’s proceedings dated 30.01.2014 and order dated 20.02.2014. The Court, without delving into the merits, directed the petitioner to submit a comprehensive representation to the Chief Secretary of Himachal Pradesh within one week for the redressal of grievances raised in the petition. This direction was predicated upon the recent decision of a Committee, as reflected in the Minutes of Meeting (Annexure A-1 dated 19.02.2026), which clarified that the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) did not obligate the petitioner to convert 50% of clinker into cement within the State, and thus did not preclude the petitioner from availing the transport subsidy under the Government of India’s Transport Subsidy Scheme, 1971. The Court mandated that the Chief Secretary consider and decide the representation within three weeks, affording an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner’s authorized representative, and communicate the decision. This approach was adopted in light of the respondents’ non-objection to the petitioner’s prayer for filing a fresh representation, effectively allowing for an administrative resolution based on the Committee’s recent clarification.

Why it matters: This judgment clarifies that state-level committees cannot unilaterally add conditions, like mandatory clinker conversion percentages, to central subsidy schemes. It ensures companies can claim eligible transport subsidies based on central guidelines, prompting a re-evaluation of past rejected claims.

69. Himachal Pradesh High Court upholds Dharampur Nagar Panchayat formation

CWP/7980/2025 · Administrative Law [13-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE VIVEK SINGH THAKUR, JUSTICE RANJAN SHARMA

Parties: RAKESH KUMAR AND OTHERS vs STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH AND OTHERS

The High Court dismissed the petition challenging the constitution of Nagar Panchayat, Dharampur, finding no arbitrariness, illegality, or violation of Articles 14 and 243Q of the Constitution of India. The Court held that the impugned notification dated 20.12.2024 was issued after fulfilling all legal formalities, including due consideration of objections and relevant factors under Article 243Q(2) and Section 3 of the Himachal Pradesh Municipal Act. Specifically, the Court noted that the respondents had considered the area’s population, density, revenue generation, percentage of non-agricultural employment, and economic importance, as evidenced by the record produced by the Advocate General. The petitioners’ arguments regarding insufficient time for objections were rejected, as the amended law provided for a two-week period, which was duly followed. The Court distinguished the Apex Court’s ruling in *Champa Lal vs. State of Rajasthan and others* (Civil Appeal No. 4554 of 2018) and its own Division Bench judgment in *Ravi Chand vs. State of Himachal Pradesh and others* (CWP No. 6319 of 2025), finding them inapplicable as the present case demonstrated proper consideration of all statutory requirements and objections. The Court concluded that the area met the criteria for a transitional area, with a population exceeding two thousand and annual revenue exceeding Rs. 5,00,000/-, thus warranting no interference with the notification.

Why it matters: This ruling clarifies that the state government followed due process, including considering objections and statutory factors like population and revenue, when forming a new Nagar Panchayat. Practitioners should note that the court requires substantive evidence for objections, not just general dissent, to challenge such notifications.

70. Contempt proceedings closed after petitioner’s case decided

COPC/1299/2025 · Civil Law [13-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Parties: GURMAIL SINGH vs SMT. NARESH KUMARI

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in *Gurmail Singh v. Smt. Naresh Kumari*, COPC No.1299 of 2025, decided on March 13, 2026, closed the contempt proceedings, discharging the notice issued to the respondent. The decisive ground for this closure was the production of an office order dated December 20, 2025, by the learned Additional Advocate General, which demonstrated that the petitioner’s case had been decided. The Court, therefore, found that the original grievance leading to the contempt petition had been addressed, rendering further contempt proceedings unnecessary. While closing the present proceedings, the Court explicitly preserved the petitioner’s liberty to pursue appropriate legal remedies for any surviving grievances that might arise in the future, thereby ensuring that the petitioner’s rights were not foreclosed by the present order. This approach aligns with the principle that contempt actions are primarily intended to ensure compliance with judicial orders, and once compliance is achieved, the proceedings may be terminated, without prejudice to other legal avenues available to the aggrieved party. The Court’s decision reflects a pragmatic approach to judicial enforcement, focusing on the resolution of the underlying dispute.

Why it matters: Practitioners should note that a subsequent decision on the original matter typically closes contempt proceedings, though the petitioner retains the right to pursue other remedies for remaining grievances.

71. Co-owner cannot injunct another from construction on joint land unless causing prejudice

CMPMO/390/2025 · Property Law [13-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE ROMESH VERMA

Parties: RAM SINGH vs VARINDER KUMAR & OTHERS

The High Court dismissed the petitioner’s petitions under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, affirming the First Appellate Court’s decision to dismiss the petitioner’s application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC and allow the respondents’ application under Order 39 Rule 4 read with Section 151 CPC for vacation of stay. The Court reasoned that the petitioner, having himself raised construction on the joint land, did not approach the Court with clean hands, thereby disentitling him to the equitable and discretionary relief of injunction. The Court emphasized that a co-sharer cannot be restrained from raising construction on joint land unless such act amounts to ouster, prejudice, or diminution of the property’s value or utility, which the petitioner failed to establish. Relying on precedents such as *Smt. Kalawati vs. Netar Singh AIR 2016 HP 85* and *Raj Kumar versus Rakesh Kumar 2022 2 Shim LC 1083*, the Court reiterated the principle that “he who seeks equity must do equity” and that a party who has already constructed on joint land cannot prohibit another co-sharer from doing the same, especially when the construction is within their share and does not demonstrably prejudice the petitioner’s rights. The Court further noted that its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 is limited to correcting grave dereliction of duty or flagrant abuse, not re-appreciating evidence.

Why it matters: A co-owner can construct on joint land if it falls within their share and does not cause detriment or ouster to other co-owners. Courts will not grant injunctions against such construction unless the plaintiff proves material prejudice, especially if the plaintiff also built on joint property.

72. Execution petition closed with liberty to challenge new office order

EX.P./349/2026 · Administrative Law [13-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Parties: SAWROOP SINGH vs CSKHPKVP

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in Ex. Pet. No. 349/2026, disposed of the execution petition on 13.03.2026, following the respondent’s placement on record of an office order dated 27.11.2025. The petitioner’s counsel submitted that while the present proceedings could be closed in light of the said office order, the petitioner harbored a grievance against it and sought liberty to challenge the order in accordance with law. The Court, acknowledging this submission, granted the requested permission to the petitioner to assail the office order dated 27.11.2025 through appropriate legal channels. Consequently, the execution petition was disposed of, along with any pending miscellaneous applications. The judgment reflects a procedural closure of the execution proceedings, preserving the petitioner’s right to initiate fresh proceedings to challenge the underlying administrative order, thereby ensuring adherence to principles of natural justice and due process. This approach aligns with the Court’s inherent power to regulate its proceedings while safeguarding the rights of litigants to pursue remedies against adverse administrative actions.

Why it matters: Practitioners can advise clients that closing an execution petition due to a new office order does not bar challenging that order separately. This helps strategize the next legal steps.

73. Execution petition disposed after judgment compliance confirmed by parties

EX.P./2565/2025 · Service Law [13-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Parties: KAMLESH vs STATE OF H.P. & ORS.

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in Ex. Pet. No. 2565/2025, disposed of the execution petition filed by Kamlesh against the State of H.P. & Ors., upon confirmation by both parties that the judgment in question had been fully complied with. The decisive ground for this disposition was the explicit admission by the learned counsel for respondent No. 5 that the Pension Payment Order had been placed on record, thereby fulfilling the judgment’s requirements. This assertion was unequivocally admitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner, signifying complete satisfaction of the decree. Consequently, the Court found no further cause to proceed with the execution, rendering the petition infructuous. This outcome aligns with the fundamental principle that execution proceedings cease once the underlying judgment or order has been satisfied, thereby achieving the purpose for which the execution was initiated. The Court’s action reflects the procedural efficiency of concluding matters where the substantive relief sought has been granted and acknowledged by all concerned parties.

Why it matters: Lawyers should note that execution petitions will be disposed of when both parties confirm compliance with the original judgment, highlighting the importance of timely reporting on compliance status.

74. High Court quashes FIR due to compromise in minor accident case

CRMMO/381/2025 · Criminal Law [13-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Parties: HARPREET SINGH vs STATE OF HP & ANR.

The High Court allowed the petition to quash FIR No. 26 of 2024, registered under Sections 279 and 337 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), and all consequential proceedings, based on a compromise between the parties. The Court’s decisive ground was the established legal principle that FIRs for offences under Sections 279 and 337 IPC can be quashed on the basis of a compromise, particularly where the injured party or their legal representative expresses no objection to such quashing. The Court noted that the injured Gaurav Thakur’s death was natural and not a result of the incident. This decision was reached by relying on binding precedents from the same Court, specifically citing *Sushant vs State of H.P. 2023 HLJ 531*, *Vikas Huda vs. State of H.P. 2023 STPL 3009*, *Kulwidner Singh vs Ankush Kumar 2023 HLR 384*, and *Nishant vs. State 2022 Suppl. Law Cases 45*, all of which similarly quashed FIRs involving Sections 279, 337, and 338 IPC on the basis of compromise. The Court thus concluded that in light of these precedents, the present FIR and all related criminal proceedings against the petitioner-accused must be quashed.

Why it matters: The Himachal Pradesh High Court reiterates its stance that FIRs for less serious offences like rash driving and causing hurt (Sections 279, 337 IPC) can be quashed if parties settle. Practitioners can seek quashing in similar cases where the dispute has been amicably resolved.

75. High Court quashes FIR for motor vehicle offenses based on victim compromise

CRMMO/1007/2025 · Criminal Law [13-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Parties: VISHAL KUMAR vs STATE OF HP & ORS.

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh allowed the petition to quash FIR No. 76 of 2024, registered under Sections 279 and 337 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 187 of the Motor Vehicles Act, along with all consequential proceedings, based on a compromise reached between the parties. The Court’s decision was predicated on the established principle that where parties have voluntarily entered into a compromise, particularly in cases involving offences that are not of a grave nature or do not involve moral turpitude, the High Court can exercise its inherent powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. to quash criminal proceedings. The informant and victim had unequivocally stated their voluntary compromise and lack of objection to the quashing. The Court relied on several binding precedents, including *Sushant vs State of H.P. 2023 HLJ 531*, *Vikas Huda vs. State of H.P. 2023 STPL 3009*, *Kulwidner Singh vs Ankush Kumar 2023 HLR 384*, and *Nishant vs. State 2022 Suppl. Law Cases 45*, which had previously quashed FIRs for similar offences under Sections 279, 337, and 338 IPC based on compromise. Furthermore, the Court cited *Rajender Thakur Vs. State of H.P. and others 2022 STPL 10700 HP* and *Akshay Kumar and others Vs. State of HP and others 2022 STPL 9456 HP* for quashing FIRs involving Sections 181, 187, and 196 of the MV Act on similar grounds, thereby affirming the consistent judicial approach in such matters.

Why it matters: Lawyers can use this judgment to quash FIRs under Sections 279, 337 IPC and Section 187 MV Act when parties reach a compromise. The court cited binding precedents, reinforcing judicial willingness to allow such quashing in similar cases.

76. High Court quashes driving offense FIR after parties compromise, no injury involved

CRMMO/1119/2025 · Criminal Law [13-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Parties: PARSHOTTAM SINGH vs STATE OF HP & ANR.

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh quashed FIR No. 45 of 2023, registered under Section 279 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 187 of the Motor Vehicles Act, along with all consequential proceedings, based on a compromise effected between the parties. The Court’s decision was predicated on the principle that where a dispute primarily involves damage to property, with no personal injury, and the parties have amicably resolved the matter, the continuation of criminal proceedings would be an abuse of the process of law. The informant/victim explicitly stated that he had compromised with the accused and had no objection to the FIR being quashed. The Court relied upon several binding precedents, including *Sushant vs State of H.P. 2023 HLJ 531*, *Vikas Huda vs. State of H.P. 2023 STPL 3009*, *Kulwidner Singh vs Ankush Kumar 2023 HLR 384*, and *Nishant vs. State 2022 Suppl. Law Cases 45*, which had similarly quashed FIRs involving offences under Section 279 IPC, and *Rajender Thakur Vs. State of H.P. and others 2022 STPL 10700 HP* and *Akshay Kumar and others Vs. State of HP and others 2022 STPL 9456 HP* for offences under the MV Act, all based on compromise. These precedents established the Court’s consistent approach to quashing such FIRs when a genuine compromise is reached, thereby ensuring cordial relations between parties.

Why it matters: Practitioners can advise clients that FIRs for offenses like rash driving or Motor Vehicle Act violations, especially those without personal injury and involving property damage, are likely to be quashed if parties reach a compromise, based on established precedents.

77. Bail Granted in NDPS Case for Intermediate Heroin Despite State Opposition

CRMPM/245/2026 · Criminal Law [13-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Parties: ASHU vs STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH

The High Court granted regular bail to the petitioner, Ashu, in FIR No. 309/2025 under Sections 21 and 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (NDPS) Act, for possession of 12 grams of heroin, an intermediate quantity. The Court reasoned that the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act were inapplicable as the quantity was not commercial, and the petitioner had no criminal antecedents, being a first offender. Relying on principles from *Pinki v. State of U.P.*, (2025) 7 SCC 314, which reiterated the factors for bail laid down in *Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P.*, (1978) 1 SCC 240, and *Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi)*, (2001) 4 SCC 280, the Court emphasized that bail cannot be denied as punishment without trial and that continued detention could hinder reformation. The Court rejected the State’s argument against leniency, noting that the petitioner, a permanent resident of Mohali, had deep roots in society and was unlikely to abscond. Bail was granted subject to conditions including a bond of ₹1,00,000/-, non-intimidation of witnesses, regular court attendance, and restrictions on leaving the address without intimation.

Why it matters: Practitioners should note that bail in NDPS cases involving intermediate quantities can be secured if the accused lacks prior criminal records, even when the State argues against leniency due to drug severity. The court will prioritize individual reform over punitive pre-trial detention when Section 37 rigours do not apply.

78. Bail granted in NDPS case because trial concluded slowly and quantity wasn’t commercial

CRMPM/279/2026 · Criminal Law [13-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE VIRENDER SINGH

Parties: SIKANDER LAL vs STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh granted bail to the applicant, Sikander Lal, under Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, in connection with FIR No. 36/2025, registered under Sections 21 and 25 of the Narcotic Drugs & Psychotropic Substances Act. The Court’s decisive reasoning rested on the fact that the 6.08 grams of ‘chitta’ recovered did not constitute a commercial quantity, thereby rendering the stringent provisions of Section 37 of the ND&PS Act inapplicable. While acknowledging the applicant’s prior involvement in multiple other cases, including ND&PS Act offences, the Court emphasized that he had not been convicted in any of them, and pre-trial punishment is prohibited. The Court further noted the prolonged period of judicial custody since 28.03.2025 and the unlikelihood of the trial concluding in the near future, with only 11 out of 19 witnesses examined. Consequently, the Court held that no useful purpose would be served by continued incarceration, imposing conditions to address concerns regarding potential tampering or flight risk.

Why it matters: This ruling emphasizes that a slow trial and non-commercial quantity recovered are grounds for bail in NDPS cases, even with prior criminal records, reinforcing the principle against pre-trial punishment for practitioners.

79. Delay in SC/ST Act appeal not condoned without sufficient cause

CRMPM/487/2025 · Criminal Law [13-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Parties: ANITA & ANR. vs STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH & ORS.

The High Court dismissed the applicants’ plea for condonation of 349 days’ delay in filing an appeal against an acquittal, holding that no sufficient cause was demonstrated. The Court rejected the applicants’ contention that they were unaware of the trial’s progress or judgment, noting that the District Attorney had informed applicant No.1 via letter dated 01.04.2024, a fact supported by the presumption under Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act (corresponding to Section 119 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam 2023) regarding the regularity of official acts, even if sent by ordinary post. The argument that Section 15A(3) of the SC & ST Act mandated separate notices for hearing dates was also dismissed, as applicants, having appeared as witnesses, were aware of proceedings and chose not to participate further. Relying on *Bharat Barrel & Drum MFG Co. v. Employees State Insurance Corporation, (1971) 2 SCC 860*, the Court reiterated that limitation periods ensure timely action and prevent stale claims, emphasizing the maxim *vigilantibus non dormientibus, jura subveniunt*. Furthermore, citing *H. Guruswamy v. A. Krishnaiah, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 54*, the Court affirmed that delay cannot be condoned merely on the merits of the claim, as rules of limitation are based on sound public policy and equity, requiring a bona fide explanation for delay. Consequently, the application and the appeal were dismissed as time-barred.

Why it matters: Victims under the SC/ST Act must demonstrate sufficient cause for significant delays in filing appeals, as the court stresses adherence to limitation periods even for victims, reinforcing that mere lack of communication about trial progress is insufficient to disregard statutory timelines if the victim was aware of the proceedings.

80. Bail cancellation denied: No perversity in trial court’s decision

CRMPM/1551/2025 · Criminal Law [13-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Parties: CHANCHAL SINGH vs MANJEET SINGH AND ANOTHER

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh dismissed petitions seeking cancellation of bail granted to the respondents in FIR No. 38 of 2025 under Section 108 read with Section 3(5) of the Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS), finding no perversity or arbitrariness in the lower court’s order. The Court, relying on *Zeba Khan v. State of U.P., 2026 SCC OnLine SC 188*, *State of Karnataka v. Sri Darshan 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1702*, and *Manik Madhukar Sarve v. Vitthal Damuji Meher (2024) 10 SCC 753*, reiterated that interference with a bail order is warranted only if it is arbitrary, perverse, or disregards material considerations, distinguishing it from cancellation due to post-bail misconduct. The Court noted that the Trial Court considered relevant factors, including the principle that “bail is the rule and jail is the exception,” and acknowledged the gravity of the offence without prematurely appreciating evidence. Crucially, the Court found the suicide note’s authorship unconfirmed by RFSL and observed the petitioner’s inaction following alleged harassment calls, casting doubt on the informant’s version. Thus, the High Court concluded that the order granting bail was not flawed and did not warrant interference.

Why it matters: A High Court will not cancel bail merely because the informant disagrees with the trial court’s assessment. Practitioners must show the bail order was perverse, arbitrary, or ignored material facts, distinguishing it from an appeal against initial bail. This ruling reinforces the high bar for cancelling bail.

81. Bail denied in NDPS case due to commercial quantity and non-compliance with Section 37

CRMPM/2975/2025 · Criminal Law [13-03-2026]

Bench: JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Parties: GOVIND RAM vs STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH

The High Court dismissed the petitioner’s application for regular bail under Section 20 of the NDPS Act, finding that the twin conditions mandated by Section 37 of the NDPS Act were not satisfied. The Court noted the recovery of 1.916 kilograms of charas, a commercial quantity, from the petitioner, thereby attracting the rigours of Section 37. The Court, relying on *Union of India Versus Niyazuddin & Another* (2018) 13 SCC 738 and *State of Kerala Versus Rajesh* AIR 2020 SC 721, reiterated that for offences involving commercial quantities, bail cannot be granted unless the Court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe the accused is not guilty and is unlikely to commit further offences while on bail. The argument of delayed trial and violation of speedy trial rights was rejected, as the petitioner himself contributed to the delays, and *Union of India vs. Vijin K. Varghese* 2025:INSC:1316 held that prolonged incarceration alone does not dispense with Section 37 requirements. Furthermore, the Court, citing *Narcotics Control Bureau v. Kashif* (2024) 11 SCC 372, affirmed that in NDPS cases involving commercial quantities, negation of bail is the rule and its grant an exception, and discrepancies in witness statements cannot be appreciated at the bail stage, as held in *X Vs. State of Rajasthan* MANU/SC/1267/2024.

Why it matters: This ruling highlights the stringent bail conditions under Section 37 of the NDPS Act, especially for commercial quantity offenses. Practitioners must demonstrate reasonable grounds for belief of innocence and no likelihood of future offenses, even with prolonged incarceration or trial delays, as the ‘bail is the rule, not jail’ principle is reversed in these cases.

Parties: SHARMILA DEVI ALIAS RAMILA DEVI VS STATE OF H.P AND OTHERS

Date: 12-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Administrative Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in CWP No. 8293 of 2025, disposed of the writ petition filed by Sharmila Devi alias Ramila Devi against the State of H.P. and others, on the ground that it had been rendered infructuous due to intervening developments. The learned counsel for the petitioner explicitly submitted that subsequent events had overtaken the subject matter of the petition, thereby negating the need for further adjudication. Consequently, the Court, presided over by Ms. Justice Jyotsna Rewal Dua, found no live controversy remaining to be addressed. This disposition effectively concludes the proceedings without delving into the merits of the original claims, as the very foundation for the petition’s existence had ceased. The Court’s decision aligns with the fundamental principle that courts should not adjudicate on academic or infructuous matters, a principle often reflected in the maxim *lex non cogit ad impossibilia*, though not explicitly cited here, which underpins the pragmatic approach to judicial review where the relief sought becomes otiose. All pending miscellaneous applications were also disposed of accordingly, reflecting the complete closure of the matter.

CWP/17907/2025

Parties: AJAY TANTA VS UNION OF INDIA & OTHERS

Date: 12-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE VIVEK SINGH THAKUR, JUSTICE RANJAN SHARMA

Area of Law: Civil Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in CWP No. 17907 of 2025, dismissed the petition as withdrawn following a request from the petitioner’s counsel, Mr. Abhimanu Ghabroo, acting under instructions from the petitioner. The Court, comprising Hon’ble Mr. Justice Vivek Singh Thakur and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Ranjan Sharma, accepted the prayer for withdrawal, thereby disposing of the main petition and all pending applications in the same terms. This decision reflects the fundamental principle of procedural law allowing a party to withdraw their petition, provided such withdrawal is sought voluntarily and without any apparent prejudice to the respondents that cannot be compensated. The Court’s action is a straightforward application of its inherent power to manage its docket and facilitate the resolution of disputes in accordance with the parties’ wishes, particularly when no substantive adjudication on the merits has occurred. The order implicitly acknowledges the petitioner’s right to discontinue proceedings initiated by them, a common practice in civil litigation, and underscores the Court’s role in formalizing such requests. The case did not delve into complex legal principles or statutory interpretations, but rather focused on the procedural aspect of withdrawal, which is a well-established facet of judicial process.

CMPMO/588/2025

Parties: SMT. KAMLA & ORS VS AJAY SAUTHA & ANOTHER

Date: 12-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE ROMESH VERMA

Area of Law: Civil Law

The High Court dismissed the petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, affirming the Additional District Judge’s rejection of the petitioners’ application for amendment under Order VI Rule 17 CPC. The Court held that the proposed amendment, which sought to change the fundamental narrative from the deceased being a passenger in the accident vehicle to being crushed by it while working on a retaining wall, would alter the basic structure, nature, and character of the claim petition and withdraw admissions. This was deemed impermissible, particularly as the amendment was sought after the Insurance Company disclosed its defence regarding policy violation due to gratuitous passengers, suggesting a lack of due diligence and an attempt to fill lacunas. The Court relied on the Supreme Court’s ruling in *Basavaraj vs. Indira and others* (Civil Appeal No. 2886 of 2012, dated 29.02.2024), which established that amendments introducing a totally different, new, and inconsistent case, or changing the fundamental character of the suit, should be rejected, especially if due diligence is not shown for amendments sought after trial commencement. Furthermore, a co-ordinate Bench had already dismissed similar petitions arising from the same accident, reinforcing the view that the petitioners’ revised account contradicted earlier statements, including an FIR lodged by another claimant.

FAO/1/2014

Parties: TEG RAM VS DEPUTY DIRECTOR, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE & ORS.

Date: 12-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE SUSHIL KUKREJA

Area of Law: Labor Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh dismissed the appeal filed under Section 30 of the Employee’s Compensation Act, 1923, upholding the award dated 12.09.2013, which had rejected the appellant’s claim for compensation. The decisive ground for dismissal was the appellant’s failure to establish an employer-employee relationship with the respondents. The Court meticulously examined the evidence, noting the appellant’s admission in cross-examination that he was assigned work based on the lowest quotation and subsequently engaged 5-6 labourers for execution, receiving Rs. 17,900/- for services rendered. This evidence, including Exts. DW-1/B and DW-1/C, conclusively demonstrated that the appellant acted as an independent contractor, not an employee, thereby negating the foundational requirement for compensation under the Act. The Court found no infirmity or illegality in the learned Commissioner’s finding that the accident did not occur during the course of employment with the respondents, as the work was completed before the alleged accident date of 03.05.2010. Consequently, the substantial question of law regarding misappreciation of evidence was answered in the negative, affirming the lower court’s conclusion that the appellant was not a “workman” as per the Act.

RFA/384/2014

Parties: THE COLLECTOR LAND ACQUISITION HPPWD & OTHERS VS BANSI RAM & OTHERS

Date: 12-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE SUSHIL KUKREJA

Area of Law: Land Acquisition Law

The High Court dismissed the State’s appeal under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, affirming the enhanced compensation awarded by the Reference Court. The Court held that the Reference Court correctly determined the market value of the acquired land at Rs. 31.30 per square meter, along with solatium, interest, and additional compensation, by relying on Sale Deed Ex. PW-1/A as a valid exemplar. This exemplar, executed on 26.08.1993, was deemed appropriate as it was closer to the Section 4 notification date (01.08.1992) and reflected a market value of Rs. 46.94 per square meter, from which a 33.33% deduction was applied. The Court rejected other sale deeds (Ex. RX, Ex. PW-2/A, Ex. PW-2/B) due to their temporal distance from the notification or lack of established proximity to the acquired land. Relying on *Mehta Ravindrarai Ajitrai (deceased) through his heirs and LRs & others v. State of Gujarat (1989) 4 SCC 250* and *Atma Singh & others vs. State of Haryana & another (2008) 2 SCC 568*, the Court reiterated that market value is the price a willing purchaser would pay a willing seller, considering existing advantages and potential possibilities, and that the classification of land loses significance when acquired for public purpose, as held in *Gulabi & etc. vs. State of H.P., AIR 1998 HP 9*.

RSA/599/2005

Parties: SUKH DEV GIR VS THE BLOCK DEVELOPMENT OFFICER & ORS.

Date: 12-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE ROMESH VERMA

Area of Law: Civil Law

The High Court dismissed the appellant’s second appeal, affirming the concurrent findings of the lower courts that the appellant failed to establish his claim as Mohtmim of Mandir Balak Rupi and to invalidate the Deputy Commissioner’s orders constituting a managing committee. The Court found that the primary document relied upon by the appellant, Ext. PW3/A, was riddled with inconsistencies, including conflicting dates of signatures relative to the death of the previous Mohtmim, rendering it suspicious and fabricated, thus discrediting the appellant’s assertion of succession by custom. Furthermore, the appellant’s pleadings and evidence failed to adequately establish the ingredients of a valid custom, as required by Section 3(a) of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, and as repeatedly emphasized by the Supreme Court in cases like *Ratanlal alias Babulal Chunilal Samsuka vs. Sundarabai Govardhandas Samsuka (dead) through legal representatives, (2018) 11 SCC 119*, which mandates strict proof of custom. The Court reiterated that a second appellate court, under Section 100 CPC, cannot re-appreciate evidence unless findings are perverse or based on inadmissible evidence, a threshold not met here, as highlighted in *Gurnam Singh vs. Lehna Singh, 2019 (7) SCC 641*.

EX.P./1078/2025

Parties: JAI PARKASH VS STATE OF H.P AND OTHERS

Date: 12-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Administrative Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in *Jai Parkash v. State of H.P and others*, disposed of Ex. Petition No. 1078 of 2025, noting the respondents’ compliance affidavit which included a consideration order dated 18.11.2025 addressing the petitioner’s case. The Court found that with the submission of this order, the immediate purpose of the petition had been served, thereby rendering further adjudication on the existing petition unnecessary. The decisive ground for this disposition was the production of the compliance affidavit and the appended consideration order, signifying that the respondents had acted upon the matter as directed or expected. Consequently, the Court granted the petitioner liberty to pursue appropriate legal remedies for any remaining grievances in accordance with law, implicitly acknowledging that the consideration order might not fully resolve all aspects of the petitioner’s claims. This approach aligns with the principle of judicial economy, ensuring that the Court’s resources are not expended on matters already addressed by the parties, while preserving the litigant’s right to further recourse. All pending miscellaneous applications were also disposed of as a result.

CRMMO/430/2025

Parties: SHRI RAJINDER SINGH VS SHRI PRASHANT SHARMA

Date: 12-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE SANDEEP SHARMA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh dismissed the petition filed under Section 528 of the BNSS, affirming the Judicial Magistrate First Class’s rejection of the accused’s application under Section 45 read with Section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, for handwriting comparison. The Court found no illegality or infirmity in the lower court’s order, noting that the cheque (Ex.RW1/D) sought to be compared pertained to May 2013 for ₹1,50,000/-, while the subject matter of the Section 138 Negotiable Instruments Act complaint was a cheque dated 12.02.2014 for ₹10,00,000/-. The Court highlighted the accused’s shifting defence, initially claiming a blank security cheque in his Section 313 Cr.P.C. statement, then seeking comparison of the complainant’s signatures on documents like Ex.DX-4, Ex.RW1/D, and Ex.DX-3 with admitted signatures, rather than his own on the disputed cheque. The Court reiterated that it is not always mandatory to send disputed signatures for expert examination, as the Court itself is competent to compare them, and importantly, a complainant cannot be compelled to provide evidence against himself.

CRMMO/927/2025

Parties: NANDAN SHARMA VS STATE OF HP & ORS.

Date: 12-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh quashed FIR No. 38 of 2023, registered under Sections 279, 337, and 338 of the Indian Penal Code, and all consequential proceedings, based on a compromise between the parties. The Court noted that the informant and injured parties, including minors represented by their fathers, had voluntarily settled the matter. Crucially, the Court invoked Section 320(4)(a) of the Cr.P.C., which permits compounding of offences by a person competent to contract on behalf of a minor with the Court’s permission, thereby granting permission for compounding the offences under Sections 337 and 338 IPC. The Court relied on binding precedents, specifically citing *Sushant vs State of H.P. 2023 HLJ 531*, *Vikas Huda vs. State of H.P. 2023 STPL 3009*, *Kulwidner Singh vs Ankush Kumar 2023 HLR 384*, and *Nishant vs. State 2022 Suppl. Law Cases 45*, which had similarly quashed FIRs involving these sections based on compromise. This decision underscores the principle that where a genuine compromise is reached, particularly in cases involving compoundable offences and where minors’ interests are adequately represented, the Court may exercise its inherent powers to quash criminal proceedings to foster cordial relations between parties.

CRMMO/972/2022

Parties: M/S BIRLA TEXTILE MILLS VS STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH AND ANOTHER

Date: 12-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE SANDEEP SHARMA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The Himachal Pradesh High Court dismissed a petition under Section 482 CrPC, affirming the lower courts’ decisions to reject an application under Section 156(3) CrPC for FIR registration and instead treat it as a private complaint. The petitioner sought registration of an FIR for offences under Sections 467, 468, 420, and 471 IPC, alleging forgery of a death certificate. The Court held that the Magistrate’s discretion under Section 156(3) CrPC to order an investigation is not mandatory, and the Magistrate must first satisfy itself that a cognizable offence is prima facie disclosed. Crucially, the Court noted that while a civil court had found the death certificate “not genuine,” it had not specifically concluded that it was “forged” by the accused. Therefore, in the absence of cogent and convincing evidence of forgery, the Magistrate was justified in declining to direct FIR registration and instead converting the application into a private complaint, allowing the complainant to lead evidence. The Court rejected the argument that forgery cannot be proved by an individual without police investigation, stating that scientific evidence and expert opinions can be procured even in private complaints. The decision in *Surjit Singh and others v. State of Haryana* was noted by the Magistrate for the maintainability of the complaint by an aggrieved party, though the High Court’s reasoning primarily focused on the discretionary nature of Section 156(3) CrPC and the lack of prima facie evidence of forgery.

CRMMO/975/2025

Parties: KUNDAN LAL & ORS. VS STATE OF HP & ORS.

Date: 12-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court quashed FIR No. 55 of 2024, registered under Section 376 IPC, Sections 6, 17, and 21 of the POCSO Act, and Sections 9 and 10 of the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006, and all consequential proceedings, based on a compromise between the parties. The Court found that the victim, who was initially a minor, had subsequently married petitioner No.1 and was residing with him, having also given birth to their child. Crucially, the status report indicated the marriage occurred after the victim attained 18 years, negating offences under the Child Marriage Act. Relying on *Shri Devi Vs. State of H.P. 2019 (3) ShimLC 1746*, which held that continuation of proceedings is futile where the accused and victim are married and have children, and *Ranjeet Kumar v. State of H.P., 2023 SCC OnLine HP 1625*, which affirmed quashing FIRs in such cases to promote justice and avoid disturbing happy family life, the Court concluded that no purpose would be served by continuing the prosecution. The Supreme Court’s decision in *Mahesh Mukund Patel vs. State of U.P. & others 2025 SCC OnLine SC 614*, emphasizing the High Court’s power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash proceedings when parties are happily married, further supported this conclusion.

CRMMO/1057/2025

Parties: NITISH RANA VS STATE OF HP & ORS.

Date: 12-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh allowed the petition to quash FIR No. 309 of 2021, registered under Sections 354A, 504, 506, and 509 of the Indian Penal Code, along with all consequential proceedings, on the basis of a voluntary compromise between the parties. The Court noted that while offences under Sections 504, 506, and 509 IPC are compoundable under Section 320 of the Cr.P.C., the offence under Section 354A IPC is not. However, the decisive ground for quashing the FIR, including the non-compoundable offence, was the established legal principle that High Courts can quash FIRs even for non-compoundable offences where a genuine compromise has been reached and continuing the proceedings would be an abuse of the process of law. The Court relied upon and found itself bound by its own precedents, specifically citing *Vidya Devi Vs. State of HP and others 2022 STPL 13724 HP*, *Ameen Vs. State of HP and others 2022 STPL 13743 HP*, *Raj Kumar Vs. State of HP and others 2022(2) Him. L.R. 1150*, *Mukesh Kumar and others Vs. State of HP and others 2022 STPL 9742 HP*, and *Sunil Kumar and State of HP and others 2022(1) Him. L.R. 280*, which consistently permitted quashing of FIRs involving Section 354A IPC based on compromise.

CRMMO/1059/2025

Parties: RAJAT SHARMA VS STATE OF HP & ANR.

Date: 12-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh quashed FIR No. 308 of 2021, registered under Sections 341, 504, 506, 427, and 201 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), and all consequential proceedings, based on a compromise between the parties. The Court noted that the informant/victim had voluntarily entered into a compromise and expressed no objection to the quashing of the FIR. The decisive ground for this decision was the established legal position that offences under Sections 341, 504, and 506 of IPC are compoundable under Section 320 of the Cr.P.C. Furthermore, the Court relied on binding precedents, including *Ram Krishan alias Ramu vs. State of H.P. & others* (Latest HLJ 2021(2)(HP) 1327) and *Narayan Singh vs State of H.P. & others* (2022 STPL 9676 HP), which had previously quashed FIRs involving Section 201 of IPC based on compromise. These precedents affirmed the Court’s power to quash non-compoundable offences when a genuine compromise has been reached, promoting cordial relationships between parties. Accordingly, the petition was allowed, and the FIR and all related criminal proceedings against the petitioner were quashed.

CRMMO/1171/2025

Parties: SUSHIL KUMAR VS STATE OF HP & ORS.

Date: 12-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh quashed FIR No. 121 of 2024, registered under Sections 281 and 125(a) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS), and all consequential proceedings, based on a voluntary compromise between the parties. The Court noted that Section 281 BNS corresponds to Section 279 IPC, and Section 125(a) BNS corresponds to Section 337 IPC. The decisive ground for this decision was the established legal principle that FIRs for offences corresponding to Sections 279 and 337 IPC can be quashed on the basis of a compromise, particularly when the informant and victim confirm the settlement and express no desire to proceed. The Court relied on binding precedents, including *Sushant vs State of H.P. 2023 HLJ 531*, *Vikas Huda vs. State of H.P. 2023 STPL 3009*, *Kulwidner Singh vs Ankush Kumar 2023 HLR 384*, and *Nishant vs. State 2022 Suppl. Shim Law Cases 45*, which consistently held that such FIRs can be quashed when a compromise is reached. Accordingly, the petition was allowed, and the criminal proceedings against the petitioner were terminated.

CRMMO/1213/2025

Parties: AKSHAY THAKUR VS STATE OF HP & ORS.

Date: 12-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh quashed FIR No. 222 of 2024, registered under Sections 281 and 125(a) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS), and all consequential proceedings, based on a compromise effected between the parties. The Court found that the offences, corresponding to Sections 279 and 337 of the Indian Penal Code, were amenable to quashing by compromise, as the informant and victim voluntarily stated they did not wish to proceed further. The decisive ground for this decision was the binding precedents established by the Court in similar matters, specifically citing *Sushant vs State of H.P. 2023 HLJ 531*, *Vikas Huda vs. State of H.P. 2023 STPL 3009*, *Kulwidner Singh vs Ankush Kumar 2023 HLR 384*, and *Nishant vs. State 2022 Suppl. Shim Law Cases 45*. These judgments consistently held that FIRs for offences under Sections 279 and 337 IPC could be quashed on the basis of a compromise between the parties, thereby establishing a clear legal principle that such offences, being of a less grave nature and primarily affecting private individuals, can be resolved through amicable settlement. The Court thus allowed the petition, ensuring the maintenance of cordial relations between the parties.

CRMMO/1222/2025

Parties: GAURAV NADDA VS STATE OF HP AND ANOTHER

Date: 12-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court quashed FIR No. 118 of 2025, registered under Sections 87, 64, 115(2), 324(4), and 351(2) of the Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), and all consequential proceedings, based on a compromise between the petitioner and the victim, who have since married and are residing together. The Court noted that offences under Sections 115(2), 324(4), and 351(2) of BNS are compoundable under Section 359 of the Bhartiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS). Relying on its previous decision in *Shri Devi Vs. State of H.P.* 2019 3 SLC 1746, which held that continuation of proceedings becomes a futile exercise when the victim and accused marry, and *Ranjeet Kumar v. State of H.P.*, 2023 SCC OnLine HP 1625, which affirmed quashing FIRs in such circumstances to prevent disturbance to happy family life, the Court emphasized that allowing prosecution to continue would cause undue harassment. The Court also cited *Mahesh Mukund Patel vs. State of U.P. & others* 2025 SCC OnLine SC 614, where the Supreme Court held that no fruitful purpose is served by continuing prosecution when parties are happily married, making it a fit case for exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. The Court concluded that quashing the proceedings would promote justice and prevent injustice.

CRMMO/1247/2025

Parties: RAM KRISHAN VS STATE OF HP & ORS.

Date: 12-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh quashed FIR No. 42 of 2025, registered under Sections 281 and 125(a) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS), and all consequential proceedings, based on a compromise between the parties. The Court’s decision was predicated on the established principle that where parties have voluntarily compromised, and the informant and victim express no interest in pursuing the matter, the FIR can be quashed, particularly when the offences are amenable to compromise. The Court noted that Section 281 BNS corresponds to Section 279 IPC, and Section 125(a) BNS corresponds to Section 337 IPC. Crucially, the Court relied on binding precedents from its own jurisdiction, specifically citing *Sushant vs State of H.P. 2023 HLJ 531*, *Vikas Huda vs. State of H.P. 2023 STPL 3009*, *Kulwidner Singh vs Ankush Kumar 2023 HLR 384*, and *Nishant vs. State 2022 Suppl. Shim Law Cases 45*, all of which involved quashing FIRs for similar offences based on compromise. The statements of the informant and victim, confirming their voluntary compromise and lack of objection to quashing, further solidified the Court’s decision to allow the petition.

CRMMO/1325/2024

Parties: AJAY KUMAR VS STATE OF HP & ORS.

Date: 12-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh allowed the petition to quash FIR No. 33 of 2022, registered under Sections 279 and 337 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Sections 192 and 196 of the Motor Vehicles Act (MV Act), along with all consequential proceedings, based on a compromise effected between the parties. The Court’s decision was predicated on the principle that where parties have amicably settled a dispute, particularly in cases involving offences that are not of a grave or heinous nature, the High Court can exercise its inherent powers to quash criminal proceedings to secure the ends of justice. The informant and victims explicitly stated their lack of objection to the quashing of the FIR due to the compromise. The Court relied on several binding precedents, including *Sushant vs State of H.P. 2023 HLJ 531*, *Vikas Huda vs. State of H.P. 2023 STPL 3009*, *Kulwidner Singh vs Ankush Kumar 2023 HLR 384*, and *Nishant vs. State 2022 Suppl. Law Cases 45*, which had previously quashed FIRs for similar IPC offences based on compromise. Additionally, *Rajender Thakur Vs. State of H.P. and others 2022 STPL 10700 HP* and *Akshay Kumar and others Vs. State of HP and others 2022 STPL 9456 HP* were cited for quashing FIRs involving MV Act offences. These precedents established the legal principle that a compromise between parties can be a valid ground for quashing an FIR, even for non-compoundable offences, when the Court is satisfied that the settlement is genuine and serves the interest of justice.

CRMMO/1251/2025

Parties: MUKUL SAINI VS STATE OF HP & ORS.

Date: 12-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh allowed the petition to quash FIR No. 42 of 2025, registered under Sections 281 and 125(a) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS), and all consequential proceedings, based on a compromise effected between the parties. The Court’s decisive reasoning rested on the established principle that where parties have amicably settled a dispute, particularly in offences corresponding to those under Sections 279 and 337 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC), and the victim expresses no desire to pursue the matter, quashing the FIR is appropriate to maintain cordial relations. The Court explicitly noted that Section 281 BNS corresponds to Section 279 IPC, and Section 125(a) BNS corresponds to Section 337 IPC. This decision was guided by binding precedents from the same Court, specifically citing *Sushant vs State of H.P. 2023 HLJ 531*, *Vikas Huda vs. State of H.P. 2023 STPL 3009*, *Kulvinder Singh vs Ankush Kumar 2023 HLR 384*, and *Nishant vs. State 2022 Suppl. Shim Law Cases 45*, all of which involved quashing FIRs for similar offences based on compromise. Consequently, the FIR and all criminal proceedings against the petitioner were quashed.

CRMPM/38/2026

Parties: MEHBOOB VS STATE OF HP

Date: 12-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh dismissed the petitioner’s application for regular bail in FIR No. 264 of 2025, registered under Section 20 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act (NDPS Act), for possession of 155 grams of charas. The Court, relying on the principles for granting bail enunciated in *Pinki v. State of U.P.*, (2025) 7 SCC 314, which reiterated the factors from *Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P.*, (1978) 1 SCC 240, and *Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi)*, (2001) 4 SCC 280, held that while bail is the normal rule as per *State of Rajasthan v. Balchand*, (1977) 4 SCC 308, this is subject to considerations such as the nature of the charge, evidence, severity of punishment, likelihood of absconding, tampering with witnesses, and repeating offences. The Court rejected the argument that the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act did not apply, emphasizing that bail cannot be claimed as a matter of right even in such cases, as established in *Bunty Yadav v. State of H.P.*, 2022 SCC OnLine HP 4996. Further, the Court noted the petitioner’s criminal antecedents, specifically a previous FIR under Section 20 of the NDPS Act, which, as held in *Champa vs. State of H.P.*, 2025:HHC:28899 (upheld by the Supreme Court in SLP(Criminal) 19120 of 2025), disentitles an accused from bail, particularly given the societal menace of drug abuse highlighted in *Union of India v Namdeo Ashruba Nakade*, SLP (Crl.) 9792/2025.

CRMPM/23/2026

Parties: GUDDU RAM VS STATE OF HP

Date: 12-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh dismissed the regular bail petition filed by Guddu Ram, accused under Sections 302, 307, 324, and 120B of the Indian Penal Code, finding a prima facie case of his involvement in the murder and assault. The Court reasoned that the petitioner’s act of driving the co-accused to and from the crime scene, and attempting to flee, indicated a shared common intention, relying on the principle from *Barendra Kumar Ghosh versus Emperor, AIR 1925 (PC) 1*, that “they also serve who only stand and wait,” and *Thoti Manohar vs State of Andhra Pradesh (2012) 7 SCC 723*, which held that common intention can be inferred from conduct and circumstances. The Court rejected arguments for bail based on alleged trial delay, citing *Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2018) 12 SCC 129*, which states that incarceration period alone does not entitle bail in murder cases, and dismissed the reliance on witness statements, affirming that a bail court cannot appreciate evidence, as held in *X Vs. State of Rajasthan MANU/SC/1267/2024* and *Suraj Singh v. State of H.P., 2022 SCC OnLine HP 268*. The Court emphasized the severity of punishment for Section 302 IPC, aligning with *Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P., (1978) 1 SCC 240*, where severe punishment weighs against bail.

CRMPM/77/2026

Parties: SHUBHAM CHAUDHARY VS STATE OF HP

Date: 12-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court granted regular bail to the petitioner, Shubham Chaudhary, in FIR No. 43 of 2025 under Section 21 of the NDPS Act, primarily on the ground of violation of his fundamental right to a speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution, despite a previous bail application being dismissed. The Court acknowledged the principle from *State of Maharashtra v. Captain Buddhikota Subha Rao* (1989) Suppl. 2 SCC 605 and *Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan* (2004) 7 SCC 528, that a subsequent bail application requires a substantial change in circumstances. The decisive change here was the prosecution’s failure to expeditiously conclude the trial, leading to the petitioner’s incarceration for approximately one year for possession of an intermediate quantity (12 grams) of heroin. Relying on *Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra* (2024) 9 SCC 813 and *Mohd. Muslim v. State (NCT of Delhi)* (2023) 18 SCC 166, the Court held that inordinate delay in trial, especially when the State lacks the wherewithal to ensure speedy justice, justifies bail, overriding the seriousness of the crime or even criminal antecedents, as per *Ayub Khan v. State of Rajasthan* 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3763. The Court directed release on furnishing bail bonds of ₹1,00,000 with conditions to ensure trial attendance and prevent witness intimidation.

CRMPM/143/2026

Parties: NISHA DEVI VS STATE OF HP

Date: 12-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court dismissed the petitioner’s regular bail application under Sections 20 and 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act (NDPS Act), 1985, finding that the twin conditions of Section 37 of the NDPS Act were not satisfied. The Court noted that 1968 grams of charas, a commercial quantity, was recovered from the petitioner, establishing a prima facie case of possession, and the burden under Sections 35 and 54 of the NDPS Act lay with her to prove non-conscious possession. The Court rejected the petitioner’s reliance on a co-accused’s statement, citing *Dipakbhai Jagdishchandra Patel v. State of Gujarat, (2019) 16 SCC 547* and *Tofan Singh Versus State of Tamil Nadu 2021 (4) SCC 1*, which held such statements inadmissible under Section 162 Cr.P.C. and Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act. Emphasizing the stringent parameters for bail in NDPS cases involving commercial quantities, as reiterated in *Union of India v. Mohd. Nawaz Khan, (2021) 10 SCC 100* and *Narcotics Control Bureau v. Kashif, (2024) 11 SCC 372*, the Court concluded that there were no reasonable grounds to believe the petitioner was not guilty or unlikely to commit further offences, thus negating the “bail, not jail” principle in this context.

CRMPM/2997/2025

Parties: NOOR MOHAMMAD @ LALI VS STATE OF H.P.

Date: 12-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE VIRENDER SINGH

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court granted bail to the applicant, Noor Mohammad @ Lali, under Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, in connection with FIR No. 47 of 2025, registered under Sections 331(4), 305, and 3(5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita. The decisive grounds for this decision were primarily the completion of the investigation, with the charge sheet already filed, rendering the applicant no longer required for police interrogation, and the principle of parity, as co-accused Laldeen and Abdul Farukh had previously been granted bail by the same Court in Cr.M.P. (M) Nos. 2397 of 2025 and 2535 of 2025. The Court rejected the State’s argument regarding the 32 other cases against the applicant, noting that there was no record of conviction in any of them, nor had efforts been made to cancel bail in those cases, emphasizing that pre-trial punishment for an indefinite period is prohibited. The Court further observed that the applicant had been in judicial custody since 31.7.2025 and the trial’s conclusion was not imminent. The bail was granted subject to conditions including regular attendance, non-tampering with evidence, and not leaving India without permission.

CRMPM/3041/2025

Parties: VIKAS BANSAL VS DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT (ED)

Date: 12-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE TARLOK SINGH CHAUHAN, ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE JUSTICE VIRENDER SINGH

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court granted bail to the applicant, Vikas Bansal, in a case registered under Sections 3 and 4 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA), arising from ECIR/SHSZO/04/2019. The Court held that the twin conditions under Section 45 of the PMLA were satisfied due to the applicant’s prolonged incarceration and the unlikelihood of the trial concluding in the near future, thereby invoking the constitutional right to speedy trial under Article 21. The Court relied significantly on the Supreme Court’s pronouncements in *V. Senthil Balaji versus Deputy Director, Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2626*, and *Manish Sisodia versus Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1920*, which established that stringent bail conditions in special statutes like PMLA cannot justify indefinite detention when trial is unduly delayed, and that Constitutional Courts can intervene to safeguard personal liberty. Further reliance was placed on *Union of India versus K.A. Najeeb, (2021) 3 SCC 713*, affirming that rigours of statutory restrictions melt down with prolonged incarceration. The Court also noted the principle of parity, as co-accused had been granted bail, and rejected the ED’s argument that the applicant’s role was distinct or that parity required an equivalent period of custody, emphasizing that the stage of trial is paramount.

CWP/2192/2026

Parties: TIRLOK CHAND AND ANOTHER VS STATE OF H.P. AND OTHERS

Date: 11-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Contract Law

The High Court dismissed the writ petition seeking enforcement of a contract agreement between the petitioners and respondent No.4, holding that such contractual disputes are not amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The Court reasoned that the appropriate remedy for enforcing contractual obligations lies in other forums, not through the extraordinary powers of judicial review. Relying on the Supreme Court’s pronouncement in *Silppi Constructions Contractors Versus Union of India and another* (2020) 16 SCC 489, the Court reiterated the principle that judicial restraint must be exercised in contractual and commercial matters, particularly where no clear-cut case of arbitrariness, mala fides, bias, or irrationality is established. The Court emphasized that while bodies falling within the definition of “State” under Article 12 are bound to act fairly and are amenable to writ jurisdiction, this discretionary power should be exercised with caution, avoiding interference in technical or commercial issues that could cause unnecessary loss to the public exchequer. Consequently, the Court declined to grant the relief sought, reserving liberty for the petitioners to pursue appropriate remedies in accordance with law.

CWP/2026/2017

Parties: KANSHI RAM VS STATE OF H.P. & ANR.

Date: 11-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Labor Law

The High Court set aside the Labour Court’s order dated 10.12.2012, which had dismissed the petitioner’s claim petition as not maintainable, and remanded the matter for a fresh decision. The Court held that the Labour Court erred by concluding the claim petition was not maintainable based on a discrepancy in the petitioner’s stated termination date versus evidence of subsequent work, rather than confining its adjudication to the specific reference. The reference concerned the verbal termination of the petitioner’s services from May 2008 without charge sheet, inquiry, or compliance with the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, specifically Sections 25-F and 25-G. The Labour Court failed to return conclusive findings on the petitioner’s allegations of unlawful termination, despite acknowledging the respondent’s admission of not issuing notice or conducting an inquiry. Relying on *Oshiar Prasad & Ors. Vs. Employers in Relation to Management of Sudamdih Coal Washery of M/s Bharat Coking Coal Limited, Dhanbad, Jharkhand* (2015) 4 SCC 71, the Court reiterated the principle that Industrial Tribunals must confine adjudication to the points referred. The Court found the Labour Court’s approach inconsistent with law, as the petitioner’s working in May 2008 would not have impacted the core reference. The matter was remanded for expeditious decision, preferably within six months.

CWP/2194/2026

Parties: KAMLADEVI VS STATE OF H.P. AND OTHERS

Date: 11-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Administrative Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh disposed of the writ petition, directing respondent No. 2/competent authority to consider and decide the petitioner’s representation dated 19.12.2025 (Annexure P-4) within six weeks, with the decision to be communicated to the petitioner. The Court’s decision was predicated on the petitioner’s previous writ petition, *Kamla Devi versus State of Himachal Pradesh and others* (CWP No.16762/2025, decided on 03.12.2025), which was allowed to be withdrawn with liberty to the petitioner to approach the authorities concerned afresh, and subsequently, the Court if necessary. The present petition was filed because the respondents had not decided the representation made pursuant to this liberty. The Court, without examining the merits of the matter, found it appropriate to issue a time-bound direction for the consideration of the representation, a prayer to which the learned Additional Advocate General was not averse. This approach ensures that the petitioner’s right to have her grievance addressed by the appropriate authority, as contemplated by the liberty granted in the prior proceedings, is upheld.

CWP/2195/2026

Parties: KRISHAN CHAND AND OTHERS VS STATE OF H.P. AND OTHERS

Date: 11-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Administrative Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh disposed of the writ petition, CWP No.2195 of 2026, by directing respondent No.2, the Divisional Commissioner/Competent Authority, to consider and decide the petitioners’ representation dated 19.12.2025 (Annexure P-7) within eight weeks from the date of the order, communicating the decision to the petitioners. The petitioners, Krishan Chand and others, sought a writ of mandamus to direct the respondent to decide their representation, which requested a decision on Appeals Nos. 49/2018, 50/2018 & 51/2018, concerning the removal of encroachments from government, forest, and Shamlat land to provide access to their properties. This direction stemmed from a previous order in *Krishan Chand and others versus State of Himachal Pradesh and others* (CWP No.16649/2020, decided on 03.12.2025), which allowed the petitioners to withdraw their earlier petition with liberty to approach the authorities afresh. The Court, without examining the merits of the underlying dispute, focused solely on ensuring the administrative authority fulfills its duty to address the representation in a time-bound manner, thereby upholding the principle of expeditious disposal of grievances by statutory bodies.

CWP/3169/2025

Parties: VINAY KUMAR VS STATE OF H.P. AND OTHERS

Date: 11-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Administrative Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh disposed of the writ petition filed by Vinay Kumar, seeking various reliefs concerning bus route permits and timings, noting that the primary grievance regarding the Intra-State permit for the Dharamshala-Shimla-Tapri route had been redressed with the issuance of the permit on 07.01.2025. The Court observed that the petitioner’s remaining concern pertained to the impractical time table allotted for the said route, specifically the insufficient 10-minute turnaround time at Tapri after a 400 km journey, a matter for which the petitioner had already submitted a representation to the Regional Transport Officer, Bilaspur on 27.01.2026. Consequently, the Court, acknowledging the subsequent events and the partial redressal of the petitioner’s claims, directed the concerned Regional Transport Officer/Competent Authority to consider and decide the petitioner’s representation regarding the change in the time table in accordance with law within a period of three weeks, with the decision to be communicated to the petitioner. This disposition effectively addressed the residual issues without delving into the initial substantive reliefs sought, which had largely become infructuous.

CWP/11486/2024

Parties: NARINDER KUMAR VS STATE OF H.P. AND OTHERS

Date: 11-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Civil Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in CWP No.11486 of 2024, disposed of the writ petition as withdrawn on March 11, 2026, following a direct statement by the petitioner, Narinder Kumar, expressing his unequivocal desire to discontinue the proceedings. The petitioner appeared in person, identified by respondent No.4, Narinder Kumar S/o Sh. Hans Raj Sharma, and explicitly stated that he no longer wished to pursue the case, having requested his counsel to withdraw it, a request which, according to the petitioner, was not acted upon. Furthermore, the petitioner declared that the Power of Attorney granted to Sh. Atharv Sharma, Advocate, should be considered withdrawn. Despite the petitioner’s counsel denying receipt of such a withdrawal request, the Court recorded the petitioner’s separate statement, along with the identification by respondent No.4, thereby establishing the petitioner’s clear intent to withdraw. Consequently, the Court held that in light of the petitioner’s direct and unambiguous expression of intent to withdraw, the writ petition stood disposed of as withdrawn, along with any pending miscellaneous applications.

CWP/12205/2025

Parties: KEDAR CHAND VS STATE OF H.P. & ORS.

Date: 11-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Property Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh disposed of the writ petition as withdrawn, granting the petitioner liberty to pursue statutory remedies against the impugned order dated 11.07.2025, passed by the Tehsildar-cum-Assistant Collector First Grade, Nerwa, under Section 163 of the H.P. Land Revenue Act, 1954. The petitioner had challenged the said order, which found him to have encroached upon Government land, alleging violations of the prescribed procedure under the H.P. Land Revenue Act, 1954, and principles of natural justice. The Court noted that the petitioner possessed statutory remedies under Sections 14 & 17 of the H.P. Land Revenue Act, 1954. Crucially, the Court acceded to the petitioner’s request to exclude the period spent prosecuting the instant writ petition from the computation of limitation for availing the statutory remedies. This decision reflects the principle of judicial economy and the importance of exhausting statutory remedies before invoking extraordinary writ jurisdiction, while simultaneously safeguarding the petitioner’s right to a substantive hearing by preserving the limitation period. The Court’s direction ensures that the petitioner is not prejudiced by the time spent in bona fide pursuit of a perceived remedy.

CWP/13984/2025

Parties: ANAND MOUDGIL VS STATE OF H.P. THROUGH CHIEF SECRETARY AND OTHERS

Date: 11-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE VIVEK SINGH THAKUR JUSTICE RANJAN SHARMA

Area of Law: Administrative Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, exercising its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution, held that the appointments of Respondent No. 2 (Principal Secretary/Additional Chief Secretary, Transport) as Chairman of the State Transport Authority (STA-HP) and Respondent No. 3 (Director, Transport) as Chairman of all Regional Transport Authorities (RTAs-HP) were void ab initio, illegal, and in direct contravention of Section 68(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. The Court reasoned that both officials, by virtue of their ex officio directorships on the Board of Directors of the Himachal Roadways Transport Corporation (HRTC), a State Transport Undertaking, possessed a “financial interest” in a transport undertaking, thereby attracting the disqualification stipulated in Section 68(2) of the M.V. Act. The Court rejected the respondents’ argument that their roles were merely advisory or supervisory, emphasizing that all Directors of HRTC have equal status and responsibility in the management and operation of the Corporation, including financial decisions, as per the Road Transport Corporations Act, 1950. The Court relied heavily on the Supreme Court’s interpretation of “financial interest” in *Mor Modern Transport Company vs. State of Haryana, (2002) 6 SCC 511*, which clarified that this term encompasses both direct personal benefit and indirect interest, including that of an employee or official managing finances. The Court also applied the *de facto* doctrine, as articulated in *Gokaraju Rangaraju vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1981) 3 Supreme Court Cases 132*, to protect actions already taken by the disqualified Chairmen, while quashing the appointments and directing reconstitution of the authorities by March 31, 2026.

CWP/15206/2025

Parties: HARBANSH LAL VS STATE OF H.P. AND OTHERS

Date: 11-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Property Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh disposed of the writ petition filed by Harbansh Lal challenging an ejectment order, holding that efficacious statutory remedies were available under the Himachal Pradesh Land Revenue Act, 1954, and therefore the writ petition could not be entertained. Proceedings under Section 163 of the Act were initiated against the petitioner for ejectment from land. The Assistant Collector Second Grade, Palampur, District Kangra passed an ejectment order dated 15.09.2023 against the petitioner. The petitioner filed an appeal under Section 14 of the Act before the Sub-Divisional Collector, which was dismissed on 17.02.2025. The petitioner then filed a writ petition before the High Court challenging both the ejectment order and the appellate dismissal order. The High Court examined whether it could entertain the writ petition and found that the Himachal Pradesh Land Revenue Act, 1954 provides specific statutory remedies under Sections 14-17 for challenging orders passed under the Act. These statutory remedies are efficacious and provide adequate recourse for aggrieved persons. The High Court applied the well-established principle that the High Court should not exercise its extraordinary writ jurisdiction when adequate and efficacious statutory remedies are available. This principle is based on the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies, requiring persons to exhaust statutory remedies before approaching the High Court. The High Court held that the statutory remedies under Sections 14-17 of the Act constitute adequate and efficacious remedies, making the writ petition unmaintainable. The court disposed of the writ petition with liberty reserved to the petitioner to pursue appropriate statutory remedies. Importantly, the High Court clarified that the period spent pursuing the unsuccessful writ petition would not be computed for limitation purposes, protecting the petitioner from time-bar issues. The judgment reflects the High Court’s commitment to maintaining the hierarchy of remedies and ensuring statutory mechanisms are given due respect, and that extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution should not be invoked when adequate statutory remedies exist.

CMPMO/99/2024

Parties: KANTA DEVI VS KIRAN BALA

Date: 11-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE ROMESH VERMA

Area of Law: Civil Law

The High Court dismissed the petitioner’s CMPMO, affirming the Senior Civil Judge’s rejection of her application under Order 23 Rule 1(4)(b) CPC, which sought dismissal of the respondent’s suit on grounds of unconditional withdrawal of a previous suit. The Court reasoned that the petitioner failed to demonstrate due diligence, having not agitated the Order 23 CPC plea in her pleadings, nor sought to treat maintainability as a preliminary issue under Order 14 Rule 2 CPC, despite issues being framed seven years prior. The Court emphasized that objections regarding maintainability, including under Order 2 Rule 2 CPC and Section 11, were already framed as issues for trial, requiring evidence from both parties. It held that the application, filed at the stage of leading evidence after nine years of litigation, lacked merit and was an attempt to prolong proceedings. Relying on *Garment Craft versus Prakash Chand Goel* (2022 (4) S.C.C 181) and *Estralla Rubber v. Dass Estate (P) Ltd.*, the Court reiterated its limited supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, which is not to re-appreciate facts or correct every legal flaw, but to address grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of fundamental principles of law. The Court concluded that no error or infirmity existed in the trial court’s order, directing the trial court to proceed uninfluenced by its observations.

CMPMO/134/2017

Parties: MAHINDRA & MAHINDRA FINANCIAL SERVICE LTD. & ANR. VS GURDIT SINGH & ANR.

Date: 11-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE ROMESH VERMA

Area of Law: Civil Law

The High Court dismissed the petition under Article 227 of the Constitution, affirming the Civil Judge’s order which rejected the petitioners’ application under Order 8, Rule 3-A read with Section 151 CPC to introduce new documents during execution proceedings. The Court held that the executing court cannot go behind the decree, especially when the judgment debtors had been proceeded ex-parte in the original suit, failed to file a written statement, did not appeal the decree dated 12.09.2011, and their application under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC to set aside the ex-parte decree was dismissed. The petitioners’ attempt to introduce documents like sale certificates and loan agreements at the execution stage, without demonstrating due diligence or relevance to the execution, was deemed an effort to prolong the matter and create evidence to fill lacunae. Relying on *Garment Craft vs. Prakash Chand Goel, 2022 (4) SCC 181* and *Estralla Rubber v. Dass Estate (P) Ltd. (2001) 8 SCC 97*, the Court reiterated that its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 is not appellate, but correctional, to address grave dereliction of duty or flagrant abuse, and not to re-appreciate evidence or substitute its judgment. The Court directed the executing court to expedite the execution petition.

FAO/293/2016

Parties: UNITED INDIA INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED VS NIRMALA DEVI AND OTHERS

Date: 11-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE SUSHIL KUKREJA

Area of Law: Insurance Law

The High Court modified an award under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, holding the appellant insurer liable despite the driver possessing a fake license, as the insurer failed to prove the owner’s knowledge of its falsity or willful breach of policy conditions. The Court, relying on *Hind Samachar Ltd. (Delhi Unit) Versus National Insurance Company Ltd. & ors.* (2025) and *Nirmala Kothari Vs. United India Insurance Company Limited* (2020) 4 SCC 49, reiterated that an owner is not expected to verify the authenticity of a seemingly genuine license from the issuing authority. The compensation was recalculated based on the deceased’s notional income of Rs. 10,000/-, adding 40% for future prospects as per *National Insurance Company Limited Versus Pranay Sethi & others* (2017) 16 SCC 680, and deducting 50% for personal expenses since the deceased was a bachelor, applying a multiplier of 18 as per *Sarla Verma and others Versus Delhi Transport Corporation and another* (2009) 6 SCC 121. The Court also standardized conventional heads of compensation as per *Pranay Sethi*, ultimately awarding Rs. 15,82,000/-, payable solely to the deceased’s mother.

FAO/4114/2013

Parties: SUNIL KUMAR VS HRTC & OTHERS

Date: 11-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE SUSHIL KUKREJA

Area of Law: Civil Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in an appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, enhanced the compensation awarded to the appellant-claimant for injuries sustained in a motor accident. The Court found that while the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal had correctly assessed medical expenses, transportation, and attendant charges, the award for pain and suffering was on the lower side given the grievous nature of the injuries, two surgeries, and 15 days of hospitalization. Consequently, the Court increased the compensation for pain and suffering from Rs. 50,000/- to Rs. 75,000/-, thereby modifying the total award from Rs. 1,00,728/- to Rs. 1,25,728/-, with the interest component and other terms of the original award remaining undisturbed. The Court’s reasoning was rooted in the principle of ensuring just compensation for the pain and suffering endured by the claimant, acknowledging the inadequacy of the initial assessment in light of the severity and prolonged impact of the injuries.

EX.P./270/2026

Parties: KUSHAL SINGH VS HIMACHAL ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION AND ANOTHER

Date: 11-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Service Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in Ex. Pet. No. 270 of 2026, disposed of the execution petition filed by Kushal Singh against the Himachal Road Transport Corporation, noting that the amount due to the petitioner in terms of the judgment had been released. The Court recorded the submission by the respondents’ counsel, supported by an office letter dated 10.03.2026, confirming the release of funds. Crucially, the Court granted liberty to the petitioner’s counsel to pursue appropriate remedies for the computation of the amount and any other surviving grievances in accordance with law. This disposition effectively closed the present execution proceedings while preserving the petitioner’s right to agitate further claims related to the quantum or other aspects of the original judgment. The Court’s decision reflects a pragmatic approach to execution, acknowledging compliance with the primary judgment while allowing for subsequent legal recourse on ancillary matters, thereby ensuring that the petitioner’s full entitlements are ultimately realized through due process. The order implicitly relies on the principle that execution proceedings are primarily for enforcing existing judgments, but do not preclude further litigation on unresolved aspects of the underlying dispute.

CRMMO/53/2026

Parties: ANAND KUMAR @ RITESH KUMAR AND ORS VS STATE OF H.P. & ANR.

Date: 11-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court dismissed the petition seeking to quash FIR No. 64 of 2022, registered under Sections 420, 471, and 201 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, despite a compromise between the parties. The Court held that offences involving financial fraud and forgery, which have a significant societal impact, cannot be quashed merely on the basis of a settlement. Relying on the Supreme Court’s pronouncements in *Parbatbhai Aahir v. State of Gujarat* (2017) 9 SCC 641 and *CBI v. Hari Singh Ranka* (2019) 16 SCC 687, the Court reiterated that while Section 482 Cr.P.C. preserves inherent powers to secure justice or prevent abuse of process, this power is not to be exercised in cases of heinous and serious offences involving mental depravity or economic offences that affect the financial well-being of the State. The Court distinguished the present case from *N.S. Gnaneshwaran Etc. v. The Inspector of Police & Anr.* (SLP Crl. Nos. 17481-17482 of 2024), noting that the latter involved a one-time settlement where the bank had no objection, unlike the present matter which involved impersonation and forged documents. The Court emphasized that quashing such an FIR based on compromise would encourage similar offences, as the gravity of the financial fraud impacts the economic spine of the nation, making it a social wrong rather than a mere private dispute.

CRMMO/1041/2025

Parties: KANISHK SHARMA VS STATE OF H.P. AND ANOTHER

Date: 11-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh dismissed the petition seeking to quash FIR No. 124 of 2025, registered under Sections 62, 64, 74, 75, 76, 115(2) read with Section 3(5) of the Bhartiya Nayaya Sanhita, 2023, despite a purported compromise between the parties. The Court held that offences involving an attempt to commit rape are heinous and cannot be quashed based on a compromise, even where the informant denies the incident. Relying on the Supreme Court’s pronouncements in *Narender Singh versus State of Punjab, 2014 (6) SCC 466*, *Parbatbhai Aahir v. State of Gujarat, (2017) 9 SCC 641*, *State of M.P. v. Laxmi Narayan, (2019) 5 SCC 688*, and *Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303*, the Court reiterated that while inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, allow quashing of non-compoundable offences, this power is to be exercised sparingly and not for heinous crimes like murder, rape, or dacoity, which are not private in nature and have a serious societal impact. The Court emphasized that only criminal cases with an overwhelming civil character or those arising from commercial/matrimonial disputes, where the possibility of conviction is remote, may be quashed on compromise. The allegations in the FIR prima facie indicated an attempt to commit rape, a heinous offence, thus precluding quashing on the basis of compromise.

CR.A/180/2013

Parties: STATE OF H.P. VS PUNJAB SINGH

Date: 11-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court dismissed the State’s appeal against the acquittal of the respondent for offences under Sections 341 and 427 of the Indian Penal Code, upholding the Trial Court’s finding that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. The Court, relying on *Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand* (2025 SCC OnLine SC 176) and *P. Somaraju v. State of A.P.* (2025 SCC OnLine SC 2291), reiterated that interference with an acquittal is warranted only if the judgment is patently perverse, based on misreading/omission of material evidence, or reaches a conclusion no reasonable person could. The Court found the informant’s testimony unreliable due to material improvements and contradictions between the FIR and his deposition, noting the absence of corroborating physical evidence like damaged glass or dents, as admitted by the investigating officer (PW5). The principle from *Badri v. State of Rajasthan* ((1976) 1 SCC 442) and *Ram Kumar Pandey v. State of M.P.* ((1975) 3 SCC 815) that a witness modulating evidence or a material departure in the prosecution’s case dents its edifice was applied. Given the strained relationship between the parties, the Trial Court was justified in requiring corroboration, and its reasonable view, even if another is possible, should not be disturbed. The respondent was directed to furnish bail bonds under Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

CRMPM/24/2026

Parties: RAJANDEEP @ RAJA VS STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH

Date: 11-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court granted regular bail to the petitioner, Rajandeep @ Raja, in FIR No. 103 of 2025, registered under Sections 137(2), 105, and 238 of the Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) 2023, primarily on the ground that the prosecution’s own case, even if taken as true, did not prima facie establish an offence of murder. The Court relied on the principle established in *Palani Goundan v. Emperor*, 1919 SCC OnLine Mad 67, and reiterated in *Prathibha v. State of Kerala*, 2023 SCC OnLine Ker 10136, that an accused is not guilty of culpable homicide if their intention was directed only towards what they believed to be a lifeless body. Here, the petitioner’s WhatsApp voice recording and interrogation statement indicated he threw the deceased into a canal believing him to be dead after a drug overdose, which, at best, could amount to culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304A BNS. The Court further considered the parameters for bail laid down in *Pinki v. State of U.P.*, (2025) 7 SCC 314, which referenced *Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P.*, (1978) 1 SCC 240, and *Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi)*, (2001) 4 SCC 280, emphasizing the nature of accusation, severity of punishment, and likelihood of absconding. Given the charge sheet had been filed, the petitioner’s roots in society, and the absence of justification for continued pre-trial detention, bail was granted subject to conditions including a bond of ₹1,00,000/-.

CRMPM/127/2026

Parties: DHARAM CHAND VS STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH

Date: 11-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court dismissed the petitioner’s regular bail application under Section 20 of the NDPS Act, finding no material change in circumstances to warrant reconsideration of previously rejected bail pleas. The Court, relying on *State of Maharashtra v. Captain Buddhikota Subha Rao* (1989) Suppl. 2 SCC 605 and *Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan @ Pappu Yadav* (2004) 7 SCC 528, reiterated that successive bail applications require a substantial change in the fact situation or law, not merely cosmetic alterations, and the Court must record specific reasons for granting bail despite prior rejections. The Court rejected the argument of delayed trial, noting that 15 of 18 prosecution witnesses had been examined, distinguishing *Dayanand v. State of H.P.*, Cr.MP(M) No. 1752 of 2025. Crucially, the Court emphasized that bail for commercial quantity offences under the NDPS Act is governed by the stringent twin conditions of Section 37, which cannot be circumvented by prolonged incarceration alone, as held in *Union of India v. Vijin K. Varghese* 2025:INSC:1316 and *Union of India v. Namdeo Ashruba Nakade* SLP (Crl.) 9792/2025. Sympathetic considerations, such as personal difficulties, were deemed insufficient to override the statutory mandate of Section 37.

CRMPM/221/2026

Parties: JASVEEER SINGH VS STATE OF HP

Date: 11-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh dismissed the petitioner’s regular bail application under Sections 15 and 18 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act (NDPS Act), finding sufficient prima facie material connecting him to the recovery of 1.97 kg of poppy straw and 200 grams of opium. The Court rejected the argument that Section 37 of the NDPS Act rigours did not apply, emphasizing that bail is not a matter of right even for intermediate quantities, citing *Khushi Ram Gupta v. State of H.P., 2022 SCC OnLine HP 3779* and *Bunty Yadav v. State of H.P., 2022 SCC OnLine HP 4996*, which highlight the societal menace of drug addiction. The Court further noted the petitioner’s prior conviction in FIR No. 129 of 2003 for a similar offence, holding that criminal antecedents disentitle an accused from bail, particularly for repeat offences, as established in *Champa vs. State of H.P.: 2025:HHC:28899*, upheld by the Supreme Court in *SLP(Criminal) 19120 of 2025*. The Court relied on *Pinki v. State of U.P., (2025) 7 SCC 314* and *Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC 496* to reiterate that bail discretion must be exercised judiciously, considering factors like the nature of the accusation, severity of punishment, and likelihood of repeating the offence, concluding that the recovered quantity was not for self-consumption.

FAO(FC)/7/2026

Parties: PANKAJ RANA VS KUSHMA DEVI

Date: 11-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE VIVEK SINGH THAKUR, JUSTICE RANJAN SHARMA

Area of Law: Family Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh dismissed FAO(FC) No. 7 of 2026 as withdrawn, following a submission by the appellant’s counsel that the matter had been amicably settled between the parties. The Court accepted the prayer for withdrawal, thereby concluding the appeal and any pending miscellaneous applications. This decision reflects the principle of judicial economy and the Court’s recognition of parties’ autonomy to resolve disputes through mutual agreement, thereby obviating the need for a contested adjudication. The Court’s action aligns with the general legal understanding that once parties reach a settlement, the judicial process can be terminated, provided the settlement is lawful and voluntary. This approach encourages alternative dispute resolution mechanisms and reduces the burden on the judicial system, allowing parties to achieve a resolution tailored to their specific circumstances without further litigation. The dismissal as withdrawn signifies that the Court did not delve into the merits of the original appeal, but rather acknowledged the parties’ consensual resolution.

CR.R/12/2024

Parties: PAWAN KUMAR VS SUMAN LATA & ANR.

Date: 11-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE VIVEK SINGH THAKUR, JUSTICE RANJAN SHARMA

Area of Law: Family Law

The High Court dismissed the revision petition challenging a maintenance order under Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, affirming the Family Court’s award of ₹9,000/- each per month to the wife and son. The Court held that the Family Court had duly considered all evidence, including the wife’s private employment and salary, and the husband’s medical condition and associated reimbursements. Crucially, the Court reiterated that revisional jurisdiction does not permit re-appreciation of evidence like an appeal, but rather interference only on grounds of illegality, material irregularity, or judicial impropriety. The argument that the wife was disentitled to maintenance due to a subsequent divorce decree on grounds of cruelty and desertion was rejected, as the said decree was not in existence when the maintenance order was passed and its operation was stayed pending appeal, thus lacking finality. The Court emphasized that it is the gross salary, not the net salary after deductions or loan instalments, that must be considered for maintenance, as a petitioner cannot evade responsibility under the garb of such deductions. Finding no infirmity or excessiveness in the maintenance awarded, given the petitioner’s gross salary ranging from ₹38,000/- to ₹78,000/- and the respondent’s meagre income, the petition was dismissed.

CWP/483/2024

Parties: DR. BHAWANI SINGH AND OTHERS VS HIMACHAL PRADESH UNIVERSITY AND OTHERS

Date: 10-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE AJAY MOHAN GOEL

Area of Law: Education Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh dismissed CWP No. 483 of 2024 and CWP No. 13520 of 2024 as infructuous, noting that the petitioners’ grievances had been redressed during the pendency of the petitions. The Court, however, granted liberty to any aggrieved private respondents to challenge subsequent orders passed by the University in accordance with law. This decision effectively vacates all interim directions previously issued by the Court, ensuring they do not impede the private respondents from pursuing their remedies. The Court’s action reflects a procedural closure where the primary dispute has been resolved extra-judicially, rendering judicial intervention unnecessary, while simultaneously safeguarding the rights of other affected parties to seek redressal for new causes of action arising from subsequent administrative decisions. The dismissal as infructuous, coupled with the grant of liberty, demonstrates the Court’s pragmatic approach to judicial economy and the preservation of legal recourse for all stakeholders.

CWP/1791/2026

Parties: NEHRU YUVA CLUB OF VILLAGE MANLOG-BADOG & ANR. VS STATE OF H.P. & ORS.

Date: 10-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE VIVEK SINGH THAKUR, JUSTICE RANJAN SHARMA

Area of Law: Administrative Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh set aside the notification dated 27.01.2026, which included Village Manlog Badog in Gram Panchayat Darlaghat after its exclusion from Gram Panchayat Hanuman Badog, along with the consequential delimitation notification dated 02.02.2026. The Court held that the State’s action under Section 3(2) of the Himachal Pradesh Panchayati Raj Act, 1994, was manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, and irrational, as it ignored crucial factors like geographical contiguity, population, and convenience, relying instead on outdated resolutions and an unreasonable calculation of distance. The Court noted that the objections raised by the petitioners were not properly considered, and the reorganization was not based on the factual matrix. Relying on *Kishorchandra Chhhanganlal Rathod vs. Union of India & Ors., (2024) 13 SCC 237*, which affirmed *Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) vs. Secretary, Governor’s Secretariat & Ors., (2020) 6 SCC 548* and *State of Goa and Anr. vs. Fouziya Imtiaz Shaikh & Anr., (2021) 8 SCC 401*, the Court reiterated that judicial review of delimitation orders is permissible in cases of mala fide or arbitrary exercise of power, despite Article 329. The Court directed the respondents to issue a fresh notification for constitution and delimitation within five days.

CWP/2747/2026

Parties: M/S JAI MAA SITALA SOLAR POWER PROJECT VS H.P. STATE ELECTRICITY REGULATORY COMMISSION AND ANOTHER

Date: 10-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Administrative Law

The High Court dismissed the writ petitions challenging orders dated 04.11.2023 and 23.02.2024 passed by the Himachal Pradesh Electricity Regulatory Commission fixing normative O&M charges for solar PV generators, and a demand notice dated 15.10.2025, primarily on the ground of availability of an efficacious alternate statutory remedy under Section 111 of the Electricity Act, 2003. The Court noted that the petitioners’ main grievance pertained to the Commission’s exercise of its mandate under Section 86(1)(e) of the Electricity Act, 2003, which is appealable to the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity. Relying on the principles laid down in *Radha Krishan Industries Versus State of Himachal Pradesh and others* (2021) 6 SCC 771, which delineates exceptions to the rule of alternate remedy, and *Himachal Pradesh Electricity Board Ltd. Versus Kundan Hydro (Luni) Pvt. Ltd. & another* (LPA No.492 of 2024), which emphasized that the Electricity Act is an exhaustive code requiring expert bodies to adjudicate electricity-related issues, the Court held that a writ petition should not be entertained when an efficacious alternate remedy is provided by law. Consequently, the petitions were disposed of, reserving liberty to the petitioners to pursue the statutory remedy, with the period spent in pursuing the writ petitions not to be computed for limitation purposes.

COPC/10/2026

Parties: KAMLESH CHAND VS M. SUDHA DEVI AND ANOTHER

Date: 10-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Service Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in COPC No.10 of 2026, closed the contempt proceedings initiated by Kamlesh Chand against M. Sudha Devi and another, discharging the notices issued to the respondents. The Court noted that the grievance of the petitioner had been redressed, as conveyed through office instructions dated 09.03.2026 from the Director School Education, Himachal Pradesh. These instructions confirmed that the petitioner had been considered a regular employee with effect from 24.07.2012, aligning with other counterparts. Furthermore, the Principal, GSSS Forsythganj, District Kangra, had been directed to release all due and admissible benefits to the petitioner from the date of actual joining the post. Crucially, the arrears were restricted to 36 months preceding the filing of the writ petition. The learned counsel for the petitioner affirmed that this decision, as communicated in the office instructions, satisfactorily addressed the petitioner’s concerns, leading the Court to conclude that no further action was required in the contempt petition.

COPC/1191/2025

Parties: SHAMBHU RAM VS RAKESH KANWAR

Date: 10-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Service Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh closed the contempt proceedings in COPC No. 1191/2025, noting that the respondent had substantially complied with the underlying order. The decisive ground for closure was the production of office instructions dated 09.03.2026 from the Director School Education, confirming that the petitioner’s revised pension case had been submitted to the Accountant General (A&E), H.P., Shimla on 15.01.2026, supported by office orders dated 24.11.2025 and 15.01.2026. This documentation demonstrated the respondent’s action in addressing the petitioner’s grievance regarding pension. Consequently, the learned counsel for the petitioner sought to close the present proceedings while reserving liberty to pursue appropriate remedies for any surviving grievances. The Court, acceding to this request, discharged the notice issued to the respondent and disposed of all pending miscellaneous applications, thereby concluding the contempt action based on the demonstrated compliance and the petitioner’s election to reserve further rights.

COPC/415/2025

Parties: BEAS VALLEY POWER CORPORATION LIMITED VS SSJV PROJECTS PRIVATE LIMITED

Date: 10-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Insolvency and Bankruptcy Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh dismissed a contempt petition filed by Beas Valley Power Corporation Limited against SSJV Projects Private Limited, finding that the continuation of proceedings was precluded by a moratorium declared under Section 14 of the Insolvency & Bankruptcy Code, 2016. The petitioner had alleged violation of a 21.07.2008 order in Arbitration Case No. 11/2008 and subsequent arbitral tribunal orders dated 14.12.2009 and 19.10.2013, primarily concerning the respondent’s failure to renew bank guarantees. While the respondent contended that the default was not intentional and attributed it to financial difficulties and the petitioner’s delayed request for renewal, the Court’s decisive ground was the admitted fact that a final arbitral award was passed on 07.07.2025, and crucially, a Resolution Professional had been appointed for the respondent by the National Company Law Tribunal, Bengaluru Bench, on 04.07.2025, imposing a moratorium under Section 14 of the Code. This moratorium expressly prohibits the institution or continuation of suits or proceedings, including execution of any judgment, decree, or order, against the Corporate Debtor. Consequently, the Court held that the contempt petition could not be continued, granting the petitioner liberty to pursue appropriate remedies.

COPC/1526/2025

Parties: JASPAL SINGH BAGHA VS ASHISH KOHLI

Date: 10-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Education Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in COPC No.1526 of 2025, decided on 10.03.2026, closed the contempt proceedings initiated by Jaspal Singh Bagha against Ashish Kohli. The decisive ground for this closure was the production of an office order dated 24.09.2025 from the Director of School Education, Himachal Pradesh, which addressed and decided the petitioner’s case. The Court, taking note of this development, discharged the notice previously issued to the respondent. This action effectively rendered the contempt petition infructuous, as the underlying grievance that led to the contempt proceedings had been addressed by the concerned authority. The Court clarified that should any grievances of the petitioner still survive, it remains open for the petitioner to pursue appropriate legal remedies in accordance with law. This judgment underscores the principle that contempt proceedings are primarily intended to ensure compliance with court orders, and once such compliance is demonstrated, the proceedings lose their substratum. The Court did not rely on any specific precedents or statutory sections in reaching this conclusion, as the matter was resolved by the executive action presented before it.

COPC/1540/2025

Parties: HAPPY THAKUR VS DR. GOPAL BERI

Date: 10-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Civil Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in COPC No. 1540/2025, closed the contempt proceedings initiated by Happy Thakur against Dr. Gopal Beri, following the respondent’s submission of a compliance affidavit dated 10.02.2026. The Court noted that the respondent had placed on record the consideration order, thereby fulfilling the directions that formed the basis of the contempt petition. This action by the respondent was deemed sufficient to discharge the notice issued and conclude the present proceedings. While closing the matter, the Court prudently reserved liberty to the petitioner to pursue appropriate remedies for any surviving grievances, ensuring that the closure of the contempt action does not prejudice the petitioner’s substantive rights. This approach aligns with the principle that contempt proceedings are primarily for ensuring compliance with court orders, and once compliance is demonstrated, the proceedings are typically terminated, albeit with safeguards for residual claims. The decision effectively balances the need for judicial finality with the protection of litigant interests.

RSA/36/2007

Parties: BAINSU (DECEASED) THROUGH LRS VS BUDHIA & OTHERS

Date: 10-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Tenancy Law

The High Court dismissed the appeal, affirming that tenancy rights under the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act cannot be bequeathed by Will and that Civil Courts retain jurisdiction in disputes concerning succession to tenancy where the landlord-tenant relationship is not in question. The Court rejected the appellant’s application for additional evidence, citing *Iqbal Ahmed v. Abdul Shukoor, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1787*, which mandates that a foundation for additional evidence must be laid in the pleadings, and further held that a pariwar register is inadmissible to prove the date of death, relying on *State of H.P. v. Janam Singh, 2010 SCC OnLine HP 649*. Crucially, the Court held that Panchi, as a tenant under a widow (Ishru), could not have acquired proprietary rights due to the protection afforded by Section 104(8) of the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, distinguishing *Daulat Ram and others versus State of Himachal Pradesh and others, 1979 Shim. LC 215*. Relying on *Devi Saran vs. Lekh Ram and others 1992 (1) Shim LC 46* and Section 45 of the Act, the Court reiterated that tenancy rights are not bequeathable. Furthermore, applying the principles from *Dhulabhai v. State of M.P., (1968) 3 SCR 662*, the Court concluded that the Civil Court’s jurisdiction was not barred under Sections 43, 57, and 58 of the Act, as the dispute was between successors of the tenant, not concerning the conferment of proprietary rights or the landlord-tenant status itself, as clarified in *Babu Ram v. Pohlo Ram, 1990 SCC OnLine HP 20*.

RSA/316/2022

Parties: SMT. DEVINDER KAUR SIDHU VS AMRIK SINGH ALIAS AMRIT JAIJEE & OTHERS

Date: 10-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE ROMESH VERMA

Area of Law: Civil Law

The High Court dismissed the Regular Second Appeal as withdrawn, accepting the appellant’s unconditional request, thereby affirming the principle that an appellant is *dominus litis* and possesses the right to control and unconditionally withdraw proceedings initiated at their behest. The Court noted that the appellant, Smt. Devinder Kaur Sidhu, sought to withdraw the appeal unconditionally, despite opposition from respondents who argued for the continuation of the lis due to their rights. The Court had previously allowed an application under Order 22 Rules 4, 9, and 11 read with Section 151 C.P.C. and Section 5 of the Limitation Act to bring legal representatives of a deceased respondent on record. However, the Court distinguished the present case from *R. Dhanasundari alias R. Rajeswari versus A.N. Umakanth and others (2020) 14 SCC 1*, which concerned transposition under Order XXIII Rule 1-A read with Order I Rule 10 CPC, finding it inapplicable where the appellant unequivocally desired to withdraw the entire appeal without adjudication. Consequently, the Court held that once an unconditional withdrawal is sought, it must be accepted, leading to the dismissal of the appeal as withdrawn.

RSA/441/2007

Parties: RAM LAL & ORS. VS SHIV LAL

Date: 10-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Family Law

The High Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the First Appellate Court’s judgment and restoring the Trial Court’s dismissal of the suit, holding that the property inherited by Budhi Ram was self-acquired, not ancestral. The Court reasoned that since Kanshi Ram died after the commencement of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, his estate devolved upon Budhi Ram under Section 8 of the Act, making it self-acquired property in Budhi Ram’s hands. The Court relied on *Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Kanpur and Others v. Chander Sen and Others* (1986) 3 SCC 567, which established that property acquired under Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act is held as self-acquired property. This principle was further affirmed in *Yudhishthar vs. Ashok Kumar* 1987(1) SCC 204. The Court emphasized that the burden of proving the ancestral nature of property lies with the claimant, as held in *Bhagwat Sharan v. Purushottam* (2020) 6 SCC 387 and *D.S. Lakshmaiah v. L. Balasubramanyam* (2003) 10 SCC 310. The First Appellate Court erred by misinterpreting *Yudhishthar’s case* and incorrectly applying *Anar Devi and others vs. Parmeshwar Devi & Ors* (2006)8 SCC 657, which pertains to Section 6 of the Act, to a situation where the property was not proven to be ancestral.

RSA/491/2006

Parties: DHARAM DASS (DECEASED) THROUGH HIS LRS VS INDER SINGH & ORS.

Date: 10-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE ROMESH VERMA

Area of Law: Contract Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh dismissed the regular second appeal, affirming the concurrent findings of the lower courts which decreed specific performance of an agreement to sell dated 31.03.1989. The Court held that the plaintiff successfully established the execution of the agreement, payment of Rs. 10,000/- as earnest money out of a total consideration of Rs. 15,547.50/-, and delivery of possession of the suit land. Crucially, the Court found that the plaintiff had always been ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, as evidenced by the substantial earnest money paid and the agreement stipulating that time was not of the essence. The Court rejected the appellant’s contention that the plaintiff failed to prove readiness and willingness under Section 16(C) of the Specific Relief Act, noting that the plaintiff’s pleadings and deposition corroborated his continuous willingness. Relying on *Hero Vinoth (minor) vs. Seshammal, (2006) 5 SCC 545* and *Annamalai vs. Vasanthi, 2025 INSC 1267*, the Court reiterated that interference under Section 100 CPC is limited to cases where findings are perverse or based on inadmissible evidence, which was not the case here, as the lower courts’ findings were well-reasoned and supported by evidence.

EX.P./242/2026

Parties: SURINDER KUMAR VS HRTC & ANR.

Date: 10-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Service Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh disposed of Execution Petition No. 242/2026, noting that the amount due to the petitioner, Surinder Kumar, in terms of the judgment had been released by the respondents, HRTC & Anr., as evidenced by an office letter dated 29.10.2025. The Court granted the petitioner’s counsel liberty to avail appropriate remedy for the computation of the amount and any other surviving grievance in accordance with law. This disposition effectively closed the execution proceedings, allowing for potential future litigation on specific aspects of the monetary claim. The Court’s decision reflects a pragmatic approach to execution, acknowledging the partial compliance by the judgment debtor while preserving the judgment creditor’s right to pursue further remedies for any remaining discrepancies or unaddressed issues. The core reasoning was based on the respondents’ submission of proof of payment and the petitioner’s request for liberty to address residual claims, thereby concluding the immediate execution phase without prejudice to further legal recourse.

EX.P./264/2026

Parties: VEENA VS HRTC & ANR.

Date: 10-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Service Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh disposed of Execution Petition No. 264/2026, noting that the respondents, HRTC & Anr., had released the amount due to the petitioner, Veena, in terms of the underlying judgment, as evidenced by an office letter dated 24.02.2026. The Court granted the petitioner liberty to pursue appropriate remedies for the computation of the amount and any other remaining grievances in accordance with law. This disposition effectively closed the execution proceedings, acknowledging the partial compliance by the respondents while preserving the petitioner’s right to address any outstanding issues related to the full and final settlement of the judgment amount. The Court’s decision reflects a pragmatic approach to execution petitions, allowing for closure when the primary relief has been granted, but ensuring that avenues remain open for ancillary or unresolved matters. The core reasoning was the acknowledgment of the payment made by the respondents and the petitioner’s request for further recourse on computation, which the Court deemed appropriate to grant. The order did not rely on specific precedents but rather on the procedural aspects of execution and the parties’ submissions.

EX.P./267/2026

Parties: SUBHASH SINGH VS HRTC & ANR.

Date: 10-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Service Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh disposed of Execution Petition No. 267/2026, noting that the respondents, HRTC & Anr., had released the amount due to the petitioner, Subhash Singh, as per the judgment, evidenced by an office letter dated 23.02.2024. The Court granted the petitioner liberty to pursue appropriate remedies for the computation of the amount and any other remaining grievances in accordance with law. This decision effectively closed the execution proceedings, acknowledging the partial compliance by the respondents while preserving the petitioner’s right to address further aspects of the judgment’s implementation. The Court’s approach reflects a pragmatic resolution of the execution petition, ensuring that while the primary financial obligation was met, avenues for addressing ancillary or disputed aspects of the judgment’s execution remain open to the petitioner. The order, delivered by Ms. Justice Jyotsna Rewal Dua, thus concludes the immediate execution phase without prejudice to the petitioner’s right to seek further legal recourse on outstanding issues.

EX.P./268/2026

Parties: MOHINDER SINGH VS HRTC & ANR.

Date: 10-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Service Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh disposed of Execution Petition No. 268/2026, noting that the respondents, HRTC & Anr., had released the amount due to the petitioner, Mohinder Singh, in terms of the judgment, as evidenced by an office letter dated 24.02.2026. The Court granted the petitioner liberty to pursue appropriate remedies for the computation of the amount and any other surviving grievances in accordance with law. This decision effectively closed the execution proceedings, allowing for potential future litigation on specific aspects of the monetary award. The Court’s action reflects a pragmatic approach to execution petitions where the primary relief has been granted, but ancillary issues, such as precise computation, remain open for adjudication through separate proceedings. The order implicitly acknowledges the principle that while execution ensures compliance with a judgment, it does not preclude further legal recourse for unresolved aspects of the awarded relief, thereby upholding the right to a complete and accurate satisfaction of a decree. The petition was thus disposed of, along with any pending miscellaneous applications.

EX.P./269/2026

Parties: ROSHAL LAL VS HRTC & ANR.

Date: 10-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Service Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh disposed of Execution Petition No. 269/2026, filed by Roshal Lal against HRTC & Anr., upon the respondents’ submission that the amount due to the petitioner under the judgment had been released. The Court noted the office letter dated 24.02.2026 confirming the release of funds. Crucially, the petitioner’s counsel sought and was granted liberty to pursue appropriate remedies for the computation of the amount and any other remaining grievances in accordance with law. This disposition, therefore, did not adjudicate the finality of the amount paid but rather acknowledged the initial compliance by the respondents while preserving the petitioner’s right to challenge the quantum or other issues. The Court’s decision reflects a pragmatic approach to execution proceedings, allowing for the closure of the immediate enforcement action while ensuring that the judgment-debtor’s full entitlements are not foreclosed from future legal recourse. The order effectively closes the execution petition without prejudice to the petitioner’s right to seek further relief regarding the precise calculation of dues.

EX.P./271/2026

Parties: RAM PAL VS HIMACHAL ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION AND ANOTHER

Date: 10-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Service Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh disposed of the execution petition, noting that the respondent-Corporation had placed on record an office letter dated 10.03.2026, confirming that the remaining amount due to the petitioner, as per the judgment in question, had been ordered to be released. The Court directed that this amount be credited to the petitioner’s account within two weeks. This decision effectively resolved the immediate execution proceedings, as the primary relief sought by the petitioner, concerning the release of due amounts, was addressed by the respondent’s submission and the Court’s subsequent direction. The Court further granted the petitioner liberty to pursue appropriate remedies for any surviving grievances in accordance with law, thereby ensuring that while the present petition was concluded, the petitioner’s broader rights were preserved. This approach reflects a pragmatic judicial disposition aimed at ensuring compliance with prior judgments while allowing for future recourse on distinct or unresolved issues. The Court’s order implicitly relies on the principle of *res judicata* for the matters already adjudicated and executed, while leaving open avenues for fresh litigation on new causes of action.

EX.P./285/2026

Parties: SUJAN SINGH VS HRTC & ORS.

Date: 10-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Service Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh disposed of the execution petition after noting that all retiral benefits due to the petitioner had been released, as confirmed by the respondents’ counsel through an office letter dated 18.11.2025 and acknowledged by the petitioner’s counsel. The core issue remaining was the non-payment of interest on account of late disbursement of these benefits. The respondents’ counsel assured the Court that the issue of interest payment would be examined, and if due in terms of the judgment, it would be released within four weeks. Consequently, the Court directed that any remaining liability, specifically concerning interest, be cleared by the respondents within four weeks, i.e., on or before 06.04.2026. The Court reserved liberty to the petitioner to pursue appropriate legal remedies for any surviving grievances, thereby ensuring complete compliance with the underlying judgment. This disposition reflects the Court’s pragmatic approach to execution, ensuring that while the primary relief was granted, ancillary claims like interest for delayed payment are also addressed, maintaining the integrity of the original decree. The Court did not explicitly rely on any specific statutory sections or precedents in this execution order, focusing instead on the parties’ submissions and assurances to achieve compliance.

EX.P./286/2026

Parties: GAURAV & ORS. VS STATE OF H.P. & ORS.

Date: 10-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Administrative Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh disposed of the execution petition, finding that the judgment in question had been complied with by the respondents. The decisive ground for this conclusion was the submission by the learned counsel for the petitioners, who confirmed that an office order dated 09.02.2026 had been issued by the respondents, thereby fulfilling the requirements of the original judgment. This office order was also placed on record, providing tangible evidence of compliance. Consequently, the Court held that no further action was required in the execution proceedings, rendering the petition infructuous. The Court’s decision reflects the fundamental principle that the purpose of execution proceedings is to ensure the enforcement of judgments, and once compliance is demonstrated, the execution petition ceases to have any operative effect. This pragmatic approach ensures judicial efficiency by concluding matters where the relief sought has already been granted. The Court did not rely on any specific statutory sections or precedents in this particular order, as the matter was resolved on the factual premise of compliance.

EX.P./998/2024

Parties: VIJAY KUMAR VS THE HIMACHAL PRADESH TOURISM DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION LTD.

Date: 10-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Service Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh disposed of the execution petition, noting that all benefits due and admissible to the petitioner, including revised pay scale and arrears, had been released by the respondent, The Himachal Pradesh Tourism Development Corporation Ltd., as confirmed by a computation sheet placed on record by the respondent’s senior counsel. The Court, therefore, found that the primary objective of the execution petition had been substantially met. This disposition was made while reserving liberty to the petitioner to pursue appropriate legal remedies for any remaining grievances in accordance with law, thereby ensuring that the petitioner’s rights were not foreclosed for any potential future claims not fully addressed by the current settlement. The Court’s decision reflects a pragmatic approach to execution proceedings, acknowledging compliance by the judgment debtor while safeguarding the decree holder’s right to address any residual issues. The pending miscellaneous applications were also disposed of accordingly.

EX.P./2480/2025

Parties: SOMA DEVI VS STATE OF H.P. & ANR.

Date: 10-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Service Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in Ex. Pet. No. 2480/2025, disposed of the execution petition filed by Soma Devi against the State of H.P. & Anr., following the respondents’ submission of a compliance affidavit incorporating consideration order dated 09.02.2026. The Court, presided over by Ms. Justice Jyotsna Rewal Dua, noted the petitioner’s counsel’s submission that while the proceedings could be closed in light of the said office order, the petitioner harbored a grievance against it and sought liberty to challenge the same in accordance with law. Granting this specific permission, the Court ordered the execution petition to stand disposed of, along with any pending miscellaneous applications. The core reasoning was the acknowledgment of the compliance affidavit and the petitioner’s reservation regarding the underlying order, necessitating the grant of liberty to pursue further legal recourse. This judgment primarily reflects a procedural closure of an execution petition, allowing for substantive challenge to the compliance action itself, thereby upholding the principle of due process and the right to contest adverse orders. No specific precedents or statutory sections were cited in this particular order, as it pertained to the procedural disposal of an execution petition with a reservation for future litigation.

CRMMO/809/2025

Parties: NIKHIL PATIYAL VS STATE OF HP AND ANOTHER

Date: 10-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh quashed FIR No. 51 of 2022 registered at Police Station Dharamshala, District Kangra for offences under Sections 279 and 337 IPC and Sections 181 and 196 Motor Vehicles Act, based on compromise effected between parties after charge sheet filing. Petitioner Nikhil Patiyal sought quashing of the FIR arising from motor vehicle accident involving informant/victim Joginder Pal. The FIR dated 22.3.2022 charged the petitioner for rash and negligent driving (Section 279 IPC), causing hurt without intent (Section 337 IPC), and Motor Vehicles Act violations (Sections 181 and 196). After charge sheet filing, parties negotiated and reached voluntary compromise settlement without external pressure. Informant Joginder Pal filed statement on 29.12.2025 confirming matter was settled voluntarily between parties with no objection to FIR quashing based on compromise. The High Court noted it had established consistent binding precedent for quashing FIRs in similar motor vehicle accident cases based on compromise. The court cited binding precedents: Sushant v. State of H.P. (2023 HLJ 531), Vikas Huda v. State of H.P. (2023 STPL 3009), Kulwidner Singh v. Ankush Kumar (2023 HLR 384), Nishant v. State (2022 Supp. Law Cases 45)—quashing FIRs under Sections 279, 337, 338 IPC based on compromise; and Rajender Thakur v. State of H.P. (2022 STPL 10700 HP), Akshay Kumar v. State of HP (2022 STPL 9456 HP)—quashing FIRs under Motor Vehicles Act Sections 181, 187, 196 based on compromise. The court held these binding precedents required quashing the instant FIR with identical offences. Accordingly, the High Court allowed the petition and ordered quashing of FIR No. 51 of 2022 and all consequential criminal proceedings. The court directed parties may produce judgment copies downloaded from High Court’s website to authorities; authorities shall not insist on certified copies but may verify from website if required, streamlining implementation without expensive certification procedures.

CRMMO/1132/2025

Parties: MOHIT CHAUDHARY VS STATE OF HP & ORS.

Date: 10-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court quashed FIR No. 03 of 2023, registered under Sections 354D, 323, and 504 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), and all consequential proceedings, based on a voluntary compromise between the parties. The Court noted that offences under Sections 323 and 504 IPC are compoundable under Section 320 of the Cr.P.C. Crucially, for the non-compoundable offence under Section 354D IPC, the Court relied on its binding precedents, specifically citing *Raj Kumar vs State of HP 2022(2) Him. L.R. 1150*, *Navneet Mehta vs State of HP. 2022(1) Him. L.R. 444*, *Anil Sharma vs State of HP 2020 (4) Shim. LC 1899*, and *Kushal Kumar vs State of HP. 2020 STPL 5621 HP*, which had similarly quashed FIRs for Section 354D IPC based on compromise. The Court found that the parties, being residents of adjoining villages, had settled the matter to maintain cordial relations, and the victim and injured had voluntarily stated no objection to the quashing. This decision underscores the High Court’s power to quash even non-compoundable offences where a genuine compromise has been reached, particularly when supported by established judicial precedents.

CRMMO/1147/2025

Parties: PRINCE SHARMA VS STATE OF HP & ORS.

Date: 10-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh quashed FIR No. 55 of 2025, registered under Sections 281 and 125(a) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS), and all consequential proceedings, based on a compromise between the parties. The Court noted that Section 281 BNS corresponds to Section 279 IPC, and Section 125(a) BNS corresponds to Section 337 IPC. The decisive ground for quashing was the voluntary compromise reached between the informant, Anoop Kumar, and the injured, Kewal Krishan, who both stated they had no objection to the FIR being quashed. The Court relied on binding precedents where similar FIRs, registered for offences corresponding to Sections 279 and 337 IPC, had been quashed on the basis of compromise. Specifically, the Court cited *Sushant vs State of H.P. 2023 HLJ 531*, *Vikas Huda vs. State of H.P. 2023 STPL 3009*, *Kulwidner Singh vs Ankush Kumar 2023 HLR 384*, and *Nishant vs. State 2022 Suppl. Shim Law Cases 45*, affirming the principle that where parties have genuinely compromised, and the offences are compoundable or amenable to quashing under the inherent powers of the Court, criminal proceedings can be terminated.

CRMMO/1209/2025

Parties: MOHINDER SINGH VS STATE OF HP AND OTHERS

Date: 10-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh held that FIR No. 163 of 2019, registered for offences under Sections 279, 337, and 338 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 187 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, must be quashed following a voluntary settlement between the parties. The decisive ground for this conclusion was the statements of the informant and the injured person, recorded on 16.12.2025, which confirmed that the compromise was effected without any external influence or coercion. The Court rejected any potential technical objections to quashing non-compoundable offences by relying on established principles of judicial economy and the restoration of harmony between litigants. In reaching its decision, the Court adhered to several binding precedents, including Sushant v. State of H.P. (2023) and Rajender Thakur v. State of H.P. (2022), which affirm the High Court’s inherent power to quash proceedings in motor accident cases when a genuine settlement is reached. Consequently, Justice Rakesh Kainthla allowed the petition, quashing the FIR and all subsequent criminal proceedings pending against the petitioner. The Court directed that the authorities act upon the judgment downloaded from the official website without insisting on a certified copy.

CR.R/418/2015

Parties: BHAG SINGH VS STATE OF H.P.

Date: 10-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court dismissed the revision petition, upholding the concurrent findings of the lower courts convicting the petitioner for offences under Sections 279 and 337 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The Court found that the petitioner’s negligent act of attempting to overtake a motorcycle on a curve while a truck approached from the opposite direction, in violation of Rule 6 of the Rules of the Road Regulations, 1989, was the proximate cause of the accident and injuries. The Court rejected the defence arguments, including the mechanic’s opinion on the direction of fall, as the mechanic was not an expert in physics, and the non-examination of independent witnesses, as no evidence suggested their presence. Relying on *Malkeet Singh Gill v. State of Chhattisgarh* (2022) 8 SCC 204 and *State of Gujarat v. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao* (2023) 17 SCC 688, the Court reiterated that revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 Cr.P.C. is limited to rectifying patent defects or errors of jurisdiction/law, not re-appreciating evidence unless perversity is shown. Further, citing *Dalbir Singh Versus State of Haryana* (2000) 5 SCC 82, the Court affirmed that a deterrent sentence is warranted for rash and negligent driving, precluding the application of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, given the alarming rate of road accidents.

CRMPM/202/2026

Parties: GULSHAN @ KAKA VS STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH

Date: 10-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh dismissed the petitioner’s application for regular bail in FIR No. 60 of 2024, registered under Sections 331(4) and 305 read with Section 3(5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sahinta (BNS) 2023, finding prima facie involvement in a jewellery shop theft and noting significant criminal antecedents. The Court, relying on the principles established in *Pinki v. State of U.P.* (2025) 7 SCC 314, which reiterated *Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P.* (1978) 1 SCC 240, *Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi)* (2001) 4 SCC 280, and *Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee* (2010) 14 SCC 496, emphasized that bail discretion must be exercised judiciously, considering the nature of the accusation, severity of punishment, and the accused’s character and antecedents. The Court specifically noted six prior FIRs against the petitioner, four of which were for theft, concluding that the prosecution’s apprehension of repeat offences was substantiated. The argument for bail on parity with co-accused was rejected, citing *Sagar v. State of U.P.* 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2584, which clarified that parity is not the sole ground for bail and requires examining the individual’s “position” in the crime, including their role and criminal record, which was absent for the co-accused.

CRMPM/2691/2025

Parties: UTTAM RAM VS STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH

Date: 10-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court dismissed the petitioner’s regular bail application in FIR No. 69 of 2025, registered under Sections 20, 25, and 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act (NDPS), 1985, for the recovery of 1.502 kilograms of charas, a commercial quantity. The Court held that the petitioner failed to satisfy the twin conditions mandated by Section 37 of the NDPS Act, which requires the Court to be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing the accused is not guilty and is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. The prosecution presented prima facie material, including the vehicle owner’s statement, linking the petitioner to the vehicle from which the charas was recovered. Relying on *Union of India v. Niyazuddin & Another* (2018) 13 SCC 738, and *State of Kerala v. Rajesh*, AIR 2020 SC 721, the Court reiterated that the limitations on granting bail under Section 37 are in addition to those under the Cr.P.C., and a liberal approach is impermissible. The Court further cited *Narcotics Control Bureau v. Kashif* (2024) 11 SCC 372, emphasizing that in NDPS cases involving commercial quantities, negation of bail is the rule and its grant an exception, requiring mandatory recording of findings under Section 37. The argument that “bail is the rule and jail is the exception” was thus found inapplicable.

CRMPM/2448/2025

Parties: SAURABH PATIAL @ FANDI VS STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH

Date: 10-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court granted regular bail to the petitioner, Saurabh Patial, in FIR No. 58/2025 under Section 109 read with Section 3(5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023, and Section 25 of the Arms Act, primarily on the ground that the prosecution’s case rested solely on the statements of co-accused, which are inadmissible as substantive evidence. The Court, applying principles from *Pinki v. State of U.P.*, *Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P.*, and *Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi)*, considered factors such as the nature of accusation, severity of punishment, and the likelihood of tampering with witnesses. Crucially, the Court relied on *Dipakbhai Jagdishchandra Patel v. State of Gujarat*, which held that co-accused statements during investigation are barred by Section 162 Cr.P.C. and confessions to police officers are inadmissible under Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act. Further, *Surinder Kumar Khanna vs Intelligence Officer Directorate of Revenue Intelligence* and *Tofan Singh Versus State of Tamil Nadu* reinforced that such confessions cannot be substantive evidence against a co-accused. Finding no other material connecting the petitioner to the crime, the Court concluded that continued detention was unjustified, ordering release on bail subject to conditions including a bond of ₹1,00,000/- and restrictions on witness intimidation and travel.

CRMPM/2841/2025

Parties: ROHIT VS STATE OF H.P.

Date: 10-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court dismissed the petitioner’s application for regular bail in FIR No. 22 of 2024, involving offences under Sections 363, 376DA IPC and Sections 4 and 6 of the POCSO Act, primarily on the ground that no substantial change in circumstances justified reconsideration of successive bail applications. The Court, relying on precedents such as *State of Maharashtra v. Captain Buddhikota Subha Rao* (1989) Suppl. 2 SCC 605, *Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan @ Pappu Yadav* (2004) 7 SCC 528, and *State of T.N. v. S.A. Raja* (2005) 8 SCC 380, reiterated that a subsequent bail application can only be entertained upon a material change in facts or law, and not merely cosmetic alterations. The Court also rejected the petitioner’s claim for parity with the co-accused, citing *Sagar v. State of U.P.* 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2584, which established that parity requires examination of the individual’s role, and here, the petitioner’s DNA was found on the victim’s clothes and a blanket, distinguishing his case. Furthermore, the Court found no undue delay in the trial, with 20 out of 28 witnesses already examined, and the petitioner failed to demonstrate that any delay was attributable to the prosecution or the Court.

CRMPM/2966/2025

Parties: SACHIN SHARMA VS STATE OF HP

Date: 10-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court granted regular bail to the petitioner, Sachin Sharma, in FIR No. 2 of 2025 under Section 21 of the NDPS Act, primarily on the ground of violation of his fundamental right to a speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution, despite a previous bail application being dismissed. The Court acknowledged the principle from *State of Maharashtra v. Captain Buddhikota Subha Rao* (1989) Suppl. 2 SCC 605 and *Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan @ Pappu Yadav* (2004) 7 SCC 528, that successive bail applications require a substantial change in circumstances, which it found present due to the inordinate delay in trial proceedings, with only one witness examined over a year after arrest. Relying on *Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra* (2024) 9 SCC 813 and *Ajay Kumar Choudhary v. Union of India* (2015) 7 SCC 291, the Court reiterated that the right to a speedy trial is an integral part of Article 21, and its infringement justifies bail, even for serious offences. Furthermore, the Court, citing *Ayub Khan v. State of Rajasthan* 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3763, held that criminal antecedents alone cannot be a reason to deny bail in cases of long incarceration. The Court noted that the recovered quantity of 13.7 grams of heroin was an intermediate quantity, thus the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act did not apply.

CWP/1347/2023

Parties: SANJEEV KUMAR VS UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS

Date: 09-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Administrative Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh disposed of the writ petition, CWP No. 1347 of 2023, filed by Sanjeev Kumar challenging the allotment of a retail outlet to respondent No. 5, on the ground that it had been rendered infructuous. This determination was based on the submission by counsel for respondent No. 2 that the letter of intent previously issued to respondent No. 5 had been withdrawn. Crucially, the Court noted that respondent No. 5 had subsequently challenged this withdrawal by instituting CWP No. 12569/2025, thereby creating a separate legal proceeding concerning the same underlying subject matter. The Court, therefore, concluded that the present petition no longer presented a live controversy requiring adjudication. While disposing of the petition, the Court granted liberty to the petitioner to seek appropriate remedies at a later stage should the necessity arise, implicitly acknowledging the potential for future legal developments related to the retail outlet allotment. This decision aligns with the principle that courts will not adjudicate matters that have become academic or ceased to exist as a live dispute, thereby conserving judicial resources and ensuring that only active controversies are addressed. The Court did not rely on specific precedents in this summary disposal, as the matter was rendered infructuous by subsequent events rather than a substantive legal determination.

CWP/12908/2024

Parties: AMIT DOGRA VS STATE OF H.P. AND OTHERS

Date: 09-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Property Law

The High Court quashed the ejectment orders passed under Section 163 of the Himachal Pradesh Land Revenue Act against the petitioner, finding that the revenue authorities failed to adhere to the legally mandated procedure and consider the petitioner’s defence. The Court held that the Assistant Collector Second Grade, Sub-Divisional Collector, and Financial Commissioner (Appeals) erred by not returning a positive finding on the demarcation of the disputed land, despite the petitioner’s consistent assertion that his father owned adjoining land and no proper demarcation had occurred. Crucially, the Court noted that the Patwari, appearing as PW-2, admitted to preparing the encroachment report solely based on a complaint, without conducting any prior demarcation or recording statements on the spot, and that the “tatima” was prepared based on “Aks Shajra” and not on site. This procedural lapse, coupled with the authorities’ failure to appreciate the petitioner’s defence and evidence, including the Patwari’s admissions, rendered the ejectment orders unsustainable. The Court emphasized that the procedure required under Section 163 of the Act was not followed, thereby vitiating the impugned orders and reserving liberty for the respondents to proceed afresh in accordance with law.

COPC/60/2026

Parties: RACHNA DEVI VS M. SUDHA DEVI & ANR.

Date: 09-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Civil Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in COPC No. 60/2026, permitted the petitioner, Rachna Devi, to withdraw her contempt petition with liberty to file afresh in accordance with law. This decision was predicated on the learned counsel for the petitioner’s submission that inadvertent errors in the pleadings necessitated the withdrawal. The Court, acknowledging the petitioner’s request, granted the liberty, thereby closing the present proceedings and disposing of any pending miscellaneous applications. The core reasoning behind this judicial action was to allow the petitioner to rectify procedural deficiencies without prejudice to her substantive rights, aligning with the principle that procedural irregularities, when acknowledged and sought to be corrected by the party, should not impede the pursuit of justice. This approach ensures that technical defects do not become an insurmountable barrier to a proper adjudication, reflecting a pragmatic application of judicial discretion to facilitate the orderly administration of justice. The Court did not cite any specific statutory sections or precedents, relying instead on the inherent power to manage its docket and ensure fair process.

CMPMO/191/2024

Parties: RAVINDER SINGH THAPA VS BALDEV SINGH THAPA

Date: 09-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE ROMESH VERMA

Area of Law: Property Law

The High Court dismissed the petitioner’s CMPMO, affirming the concurrent findings of the lower courts which rejected his application for interim injunction under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC. The Court held that the petitioner failed to establish a prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable loss, which are the essential “triplicate test” for granting injunctions. The decisive ground for dismissal was the petitioner’s concealment of material facts, specifically the execution of multiple General Power of Attorneys (GPAs) in favour of his brother Surinder Singh, including one dated 03.02.2007, while simultaneously denying the execution of a GPA dated 25.10.2006, which formed the basis of the impugned release deed. The Court noted that the petitioner initiated proceedings challenging the release deed and GPA only after Surinder Singh’s death, 17 years post-execution, raising suspicion regarding his conduct and suggesting a lack of clean hands, a prerequisite for seeking equitable relief. Furthermore, revenue records since 2006 favoured the respondent, who was in possession, thereby negating the petitioner’s claim of a prima facie case.

CMPMO/480/2023

Parties: RAM SWAROOP (DECEASED) THROUGH LRS VS RAJINDER SINGH

Date: 09-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE ROMESH VERMA

Area of Law: Civil Law

The High Court dismissed the petition seeking to set aside an ex-parte judgment and decree and condone delay, affirming the concurrent findings of the lower courts. The Court held that the petitioner, the deceased defendant’s wife, failed to establish “sufficient cause” under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for the substantial delay in filing the application under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC. The decisive ground was the petitioner’s inability to provide cogent and authentic evidence to corroborate her claim of discovering the ex-parte decree only on 14.12.2010, particularly given her admission of regularly visiting the Solan Court since 2001 and her failure to examine the Patwari or produce relevant revenue records. The Court reiterated that while a liberal approach is generally adopted for condonation of delay, it cannot override the substantial law of limitation, especially where negligence, inaction, or lack of bonafide is evident, as established in *Pathapati Subba Reddy (died) by LRs and others vs. The Special Deputy Collector (LA)*. Furthermore, the argument that the trial court erred in proceeding ex-parte when counsel pleaded “no instructions” was rejected, relying on *Shri Digant vs M/s P.D.T. Trading Co. & others*, which held that such a plea, without withdrawal of Vakalatnama, does not necessitate further notice to the defendant. The Court found the applications to be an afterthought, likely motivated by land acquisition proceedings.

FAO/82/2016

Parties: NEELAM RANI & ORS. VS RAMESH CHAND & ANR.

Date: 09-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE SUSHIL KUKREJA

Area of Law: Civil Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh dismissed the appeal filed under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, upholding the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal’s decision to reject the compensation claim. The Court found that the appellants failed to establish a causal link between the alleged rash and negligent driving of respondent No. 1 and the deceased’s death. Crucially, the Court noted that the FIR (No. 143/2008) did not indicate the deceased was hit by the car, and was subsequently cancelled. The testimony of the sole alleged eyewitness, PW-4 Vir Singh, was deemed unreliable as he was neither involved in the police investigation nor provided his statement for approximately four years post-incident, offering no credible explanation for this delay. Furthermore, the post-mortem report (Ext. PW-1/A) explicitly stated the cause of death as aspiration of gastric contents with a high blood alcohol content (386.02 mg%), with no ante-mortem external injuries, thereby negating the claim of death due to vehicular accident. The Court concluded that the petitioners failed to adduce cogent and satisfactory evidence to prove that the deceased died as a result of rash and negligent driving, finding no infirmity or illegality in the Tribunal’s award.

FAO/133/2013

Parties: JASWINDER SINGH VS NIRMALA DEVI AND OTHERS

Date: 09-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE SUSHIL KUKREJA

Area of Law: Insurance Law

The High Court allowed the appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, absolving the owner from liability and directing the insurer to pay compensation, holding that the insurance company failed to prove the owner’s knowledge of the driver possessing a fake license. The decisive ground was that while the driver’s license was indeed fake, as evidenced by Ext.RX-1 and the testimony of the Licence Clerk from A.R.T.O Office Mathura, the insurer could not establish that the owner was aware of this fact or was negligent in verifying the license. The Court relied on *Hind Samachar Ltd. (Delhi Unit) Versus National Insurance Company Ltd. & ors.* (Civil Appeal Nos.12442-12446 of 2024), which established that an insurer remains liable even with a fake license unless it proves the insured deliberately breached policy conditions by entrusting the vehicle to a driver with a known fake license, and *Nirmala Kothari Vs. United India Insurance Company Limited* ((2020) 4 SCC 49), which reiterated that an employer is not expected to investigate the authenticity of a seemingly genuine license unless there is cause to believe otherwise. The owner had satisfied himself that the driver possessed a license, and the insurer presented no evidence to the contrary. Consequently, the insurance company is now solely liable for the compensation amount.

RFA/409/2018

Parties: THE STATE OF H.P. & ANOTHER VS PURSHOTTAM DEV & ANOTHER

Date: 09-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE SUSHIL KUKREJA

Area of Law: Land Acquisition Law

The High Court dismissed the State’s appeals, affirming the Reference Court’s enhanced compensation for land acquired under the Land Acquisition Act for an approach road. The Court held that claimants are entitled to uniform compensation for acquired land, irrespective of its classification, when the entire land is acquired for a single public purpose, citing *General Manager, NHPC & another vs. Rattan Dass & others, 2018 (2) SLC 739*, which reiterated this principle from *Haridwar Development Authority vs. Raghubir Singh & others, (2010) 11 SCC 581* and *Union of India vs. Harinder Pal Singh and others 2005(12) SCC 564*. The Court further rejected the State’s contention for standard deductions for development charges, relying on *Nelson Fernades vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer 2007(9) SCC 447*, which established that such deductions are impermissible when land is acquired for specific purposes like laying a railway line or constructing a road, as there is no question of development or profiteering. The Court concluded that since the acquisition was for a public road and every inch of land was put to the same use, the uniform rate of Rs.2269.09 per square meter awarded by the Reference Court was justified, requiring no interference.

RSA/181/2024

Parties: KAMLA DEVI VS SHEELA DEVI & OTHERS

Date: 09-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE ROMESH VERMA

Area of Law: Property Law

The High Court dismissed the appellant’s second appeal, affirming the concurrent findings of the lower courts which rejected her suit for permanent and mandatory injunctions under Sections 38 & 39 of the Specific Relief Act. The Court held that while the suit land was jointly owned, the appellant failed to prove that the respondents had raised construction on it or that any such construction, if existing, was detrimental to her rights or amounted to her ouster. The decisive ground was the appellant’s inability to substantiate her claim with independent evidence, such as photographs, tatima, or witness testimony, beyond her sole, uncorroborated statement, which was insufficient to establish her case for discretionary relief. Relying on *Hero Vinoth (minor) vs. Seshammal, (2006) 5 SCC 545*, the Court reiterated that concurrent findings of fact should not be disturbed in a second appeal unless a substantial question of law arises, which was absent here. Further, drawing upon *Ashok Kapoor vs. Murtu Devi, 2016 (1) SLC 2007*, the Court emphasized that mere co-ownership does not automatically entitle a party to an injunction against another co-owner’s construction unless it amounts to prejudicial ouster, a condition not met by the appellant.

EX.P./49/2026

Parties: ANANT RAM VS HRTC & ORS.

Date: 09-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Service Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, Shimla, in Execution Petition No. 49/2026, disposed of the petition on March 9, 2026, finding that the judgment in question had been fully complied with by the respondents, HRTC & Ors. The decisive ground for this conclusion was the acknowledgment by both parties that all admissible benefits due to the petitioner, Anant Ram, had been released, as evidenced by an office letter dated March 7, 2026, placed on record by the respondents’ counsel. The petitioner’s counsel explicitly confirmed this position, stating that the judgment stood complied with. This outcome demonstrates the Court’s adherence to the principle that once a judgment’s directives are fulfilled, the execution proceedings become infructuous. The Court did not rely on specific precedents in this instance, as the matter was resolved by mutual acknowledgment of compliance, thereby rendering further judicial intervention unnecessary. Consequently, all pending miscellaneous applications were also disposed of.

EX.P./63/2026

Parties: DHARAM PAL VS STATE OF H.P. & ORS.

Date: 09-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Administrative Law

The High Court disposed of the execution petition seeking implementation of the judgment in *Dharam Pal Versus State of H.P. and others* (CWP No.1117/2025 decided on 14.01.2025), which itself was based on the decision in *Satya Devi Versus State of H.P. and others* (CWP No.2274 of 2021 decided on 28.05.2024). The decisive ground for this disposition was the fact that the Hon’ble Apex Court had stayed the *Satya Devi* judgment via an interim order dated 24.03.2025 in Special Leave Petition (Civil) Diary No.11306/2025 (*State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. Vs. Inder Pal*). Consequently, the Court held that the petitioner could not presently seek execution of a judgment whose foundational precedent was under stay by the Supreme Court. The Court, therefore, granted liberty to the petitioner to seek appropriate remedy at a later stage should the necessity arise, effectively deferring the execution proceedings until the Apex Court’s stay on the precedent judgment is vacated or the matter is finally decided. This approach aligns with the principle that a judgment’s enforceability is contingent upon the validity and finality of its underlying legal basis.

EX.P./244/2026

Parties: SHASHI SHARMA VS HRTC & ANR.

Date: 09-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Service Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh disposed of Execution Petition No. 244/2026, noting that the respondent, HRTC, had released the amount due to the petitioner, Shashi Sharma, in terms of the judgment, as evidenced by an office letter dated 24.02.2026. The Court granted the petitioner liberty to pursue appropriate remedies for the computation of the amount and any other surviving grievances in accordance with law. This decision effectively closed the execution proceedings, allowing for further legal recourse on specific aspects of the monetary claim. The Court’s approach reflects a pragmatic resolution of the immediate execution while preserving the petitioner’s right to address residual issues, thereby ensuring that the judgment’s financial implications are fully and correctly settled through subsequent legal processes if necessary. The order implicitly acknowledges the principle that execution petitions primarily enforce existing judgments, and further disputes regarding the quantum or other aspects may require separate proceedings.

EX.P./245/2026

Parties: SUBHASH CHAND VS HRTC & ANR.

Date: 09-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Civil Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh disposed of Execution Petition No. 245/2026, filed by Subhash Chand against HRTC & Anr., after noting that the respondents had released the amount due to the petitioner in terms of the underlying judgment, as evidenced by an office letter dated 23.02.2024. The Court granted the petitioner liberty to pursue appropriate remedies for the computation of the amount and any other surviving grievances in accordance with law. This decision effectively closed the execution proceedings, acknowledging the partial compliance by the respondents while preserving the petitioner’s right to address any remaining discrepancies or claims through separate legal avenues. The Court’s approach reflects a pragmatic resolution of the execution petition, ensuring that while the primary relief sought was addressed, the petitioner was not precluded from seeking further clarification or redressal regarding the full extent of the judgment’s implementation. The order, therefore, balances the need for expeditious disposal of execution matters with the fundamental right of a litigant to complete satisfaction of a decree.

EX.P./246/2026

Parties: BALDEV SINGH VS HRTC & ANR.

Date: 09-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Service Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in Execution Petition No. 246/2026, disposed of the petition after noting that the amount due to the petitioner, Baldev Singh, in terms of the judgment had been released by the respondents, HRTC & Anr., as evidenced by an office letter dated 29.10.2025. The Court granted liberty to the petitioner to pursue appropriate remedies for the computation of the amount and any other surviving grievances in accordance with law. This decision effectively closed the execution proceedings, acknowledging the respondents’ compliance with the primary monetary obligation while preserving the petitioner’s right to address ancillary or residual claims. The Court’s approach reflects a pragmatic resolution of the immediate execution matter, ensuring that the judgment debtor has fulfilled the primary directive, yet allowing for further legal recourse on related issues. The order, delivered by Ms. Justice Jyotsna Rewal Dua on March 9, 2026, thus concludes the execution phase while providing a clear pathway for any remaining disputes concerning the full scope of the original judgment’s implementation.

EX.P./251/2026

Parties: JAGDEV SINGH VS HRTC & ANR.

Date: 09-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Service Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh disposed of Execution Petition No. 251/2026, noting that the respondents, HRTC & Anr., had released the amount due to the petitioner, Jagdev Singh, in terms of the judgment, as evidenced by an office letter dated 29.10.2025. The Court granted the petitioner liberty to pursue appropriate remedies for the computation of the amount and any other surviving grievances in accordance with law. This decision effectively closed the execution proceedings, allowing for potential future litigation on specific aspects of the monetary claim. The core reasoning was the acknowledgment by the respondents that the principal amount had been disbursed, thereby fulfilling the immediate objective of the execution petition. The Court’s approach reflects a pragmatic resolution of the execution phase while preserving the petitioner’s right to address ancillary issues, ensuring that the judicial process remains accessible for complete satisfaction of the decree. The order implicitly relies on the principle that once the primary relief sought in an execution petition is satisfied, the petition itself can be closed, with residual claims being pursued through separate, appropriate legal channels.

EX.P./261/2026

Parties: DALJIT SINGH VS HRTC & ANR.

Date: 09-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Service Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in Execution Petition No. 261/2026, disposed of the petition on March 9, 2026, after noting that the amount due to the petitioner, Daljit Singh, had been released by the respondents, HRTC & Anr., as evidenced by an office letter dated February 24, 2026. The Court granted the petitioner liberty to pursue appropriate remedies for the computation of the amount and any other surviving grievances in accordance with law. This decision effectively closed the execution proceedings, acknowledging the partial compliance by the respondents while preserving the petitioner’s right to address any remaining discrepancies or claims through separate legal avenues. The Court’s approach reflects a pragmatic resolution of the immediate execution matter, ensuring that the primary relief sought by the petitioner was addressed, yet allowing for further legal recourse on ancillary issues. No specific statutory sections or precedents were cited in this brief order, which primarily dealt with the procedural closure of an execution petition based on the respondents’ submission of compliance and the petitioner’s request for liberty to pursue further remedies.

EX.P./262/2026

Parties: ASHOK KUMAR VS HRTC & ANR.

Date: 09-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Service Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in Execution Petition No. 262/2026, disposed of the petition after noting that the amount due to the petitioner, Ashok Kumar, in terms of the judgment, had been released by the respondents (HRTC & Anr.), as evidenced by an office letter dated 24.02.2026 placed on record by the respondents’ counsel. The decisive ground for disposal was the satisfaction of the primary relief sought in the execution petition, namely, the release of the adjudicated amount. Crucially, the Court granted liberty to the petitioner to pursue appropriate remedies for the computation of the amount and any other surviving grievances in accordance with law, thereby ensuring that the petitioner’s rights were not foreclosed despite the present disposal. This approach reflects the principle that execution proceedings are primarily concerned with enforcing the judgment, while allowing for subsequent legal recourse on ancillary or remaining issues. The Court’s order effectively closed the execution proceedings while preserving the petitioner’s right to address any outstanding claims through separate legal channels.

EX.P./263/2026

Parties: BRIJ BHUSHAN VS HRTC & ANR.

Date: 09-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Civil Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh disposed of Execution Petition No. 263/2026, noting that the respondents, HRTC & Anr., had released the amount due to the petitioner, Brij Bhushan, in terms of the judgment, as evidenced by an office letter dated 14.10.2025. The Court granted the petitioner liberty to pursue appropriate remedies for the computation of the amount and any other surviving grievances in accordance with law. This disposition effectively closed the execution proceedings, allowing for potential future litigation on specific aspects of the monetary award or other outstanding issues. The Court’s decision reflects a pragmatic approach to execution petitions where the primary relief sought has been substantially provided, while acknowledging the petitioner’s right to address ancillary or remaining claims through separate legal avenues. The order did not delve into the merits of the original judgment or the specific calculations, but rather facilitated the closure of the execution while preserving the petitioner’s right to further legal recourse on related matters. The Court did not rely on any specific precedents or statutory sections in this particular order, as it primarily addressed the procedural closure of an execution petition based on the respondents’ compliance and the petitioner’s request for liberty to pursue further remedies.

EX.P./2067/2025

Parties: NAND LAL & ORS. VS STATE OF H.P. & ORS.

Date: 09-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Service Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in Execution Petition No. 2067/2025, disposed of the petition filed by Nand Lal & Ors. against the State of H.P. & Ors., finding that the judgment in question had been complied with. The decisive ground for this conclusion was the filing of a compliance affidavit by the respondents, which placed on record office orders conferring work charge status upon the petitioners and fixing their pay-scales. This action directly addressed the relief sought by the petitioners, leading their counsel to confirm that the judgment stood complied with. Consequently, the Court held that no further action was required in the execution proceedings. The Court’s decision reflects the principle that an execution petition becomes infructuous once the decree or order it seeks to enforce has been satisfied by the judgment-debtor. This outcome underscores the procedural efficacy of execution proceedings in ensuring the implementation of judicial pronouncements, thereby bringing finality to litigation when the mandated actions are duly performed. The Court did not rely on any specific precedents in this order, as the matter was resolved on the basis of factual compliance.

EX.P./2318/2025

Parties: PUSHPA DEVI VS STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH & ORS.

Date: 09-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Administrative Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in Ex. Pet. No. 2318/2025, disposed of the execution petition filed by Pushpa Devi against the State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors., following the respondents’ submission of a compliance affidavit. The decisive ground for closure was the production of an office order dated 17.01.2026, which addressed the petitioner’s case. While the petitioner’s counsel acknowledged the order and sought closure of the execution proceedings, a specific grievance against the said order was articulated. Consequently, the Court granted liberty to the petitioner to challenge the office order dated 17.01.2026 in accordance with law, thereby ensuring that the petitioner’s right to further legal recourse was preserved despite the disposal of the immediate execution petition. This approach reflects the principle of ensuring due process and allowing parties to pursue remedies against administrative actions, even when compliance with a prior directive has been formally recorded. The Court’s order effectively concluded the execution proceedings while simultaneously enabling a fresh challenge to the substantive decision embodied in the compliance order. All pending miscellaneous applications were also disposed of as a consequence.

CRMMO/103/2026

Parties: RAJEEV KUMAR HUDDEN VS AMAR CHAND BISHT

Date: 09-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court dismissed the petitioner’s challenge to the Trial Court’s order closing his defence evidence in a Section 138 Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 complaint, holding that the Trial Court was justified in refusing further adjournments. The Court reasoned that Section 346 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (corresponding to Section 309 Cr.P.C.) restricts adjournments to not more than two at a party’s request, a limit already exceeded by the three opportunities granted to the petitioner. The Court emphasized that while a fair trial demands adequate opportunity, it does not sanction indefinite adjournments, citing *Asha Ranjan v. State of Bihar, (2017) 4 SCC 397*, which held that an accused cannot perpetually seek adjournments in the name of a fair trial. Further, relying on *Jasbir Sobti v. Surender Singh, 2008 SCC OnLine Del 845*, the Court reiterated that adjournments cannot be granted routinely in the “interest of justice” when there are lapses in prosecuting the case diligently, and *Ishwarlal Mali Rathod v. Gopal, (2021) 12 SCC 612* condemned repeated, unjustified adjournments as a malignancy affecting the justice delivery system. The Court concluded that the extraordinary jurisdiction under Section 528 BNSS was not warranted as the petitioner had failed to lead evidence despite ample opportunities, and no party can be permitted to drag on litigation through frequent adjournments.

CRMMO/1111/2025

Parties: G. HANEEF VS STATE OF H.P. AND ANOTHER

Date: 09-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court quashed FIR No. 64 of 2023, registered under Section 420 IPC, against the petitioner, holding that the allegations, even if taken at face value, did not disclose the commission of a cognizable offence, but rather a civil dispute concerning non-payment for goods supplied. The Court emphasized that a mere breach of contract or inability to pay does not amount to cheating unless a fraudulent or dishonest intention is established at the inception of the transaction, as articulated in *S.W. Palanitkar v. State of Bihar* (2002) 1 SCC 241 and reiterated in *Satishchandra Ratanlal Shah v. State of Gujarat* (2019) 9 SCC 148. The Court relied on the principles laid down in *State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal* 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, which outlines categories for quashing FIRs, particularly where allegations do not prima facie constitute an offence or where criminal proceedings are used to enforce civil rights. The Court further noted, citing *Indian Oil Corporation v. NEPC India Ltd.* (2006) 6 SCC 736, that criminal law cannot be used as a tool to settle commercial or contractual disputes, and such an attempt constitutes an abuse of the process of law, rendering the continuation of proceedings against the petitioner an abuse of process.

CRMMO/1168/2025

Parties: GEETA RANI VS STATE OF HP AND ANOTHER

Date: 09-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh quashed FIR No. 74 of 2025, registered under Section 281 of the Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), and all consequential proceedings, based on a voluntary compromise between the petitioner and the informant. The Court noted that the offence under Section 281 BNS corresponds to Section 279 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), and the informant had unequivocally stated that the matter was settled and he had no objection to the FIR being quashed. The decisive ground for this decision was the established judicial precedent of quashing FIRs for offences corresponding to Section 279 IPC when a compromise is reached between the parties. The Court explicitly relied upon its previous judgments in *Sushant vs State of H.P. 2023 HLJ 531*, *Vikas Huda vs. State of H.P. 2023 STPL 3009*, *Kulwidner Singh vs Ankush Kumar 2023 HLR 384*, and *Nishant vs. State 2022 Suppl. Law Cases 45*, which had similarly quashed FIRs based on compromise, holding these precedents to be binding. The Court concluded that continuing the proceedings despite the compromise would constitute an abuse of the process of law.

CR.A/198/2013

Parties: STATE OF H.P. VS SURESH KUMAR AND ANOTHER

Date: 09-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh dismissed the State’s appeal against the acquittal of the respondents, Suresh Kumar and another, by the Sessions Judge, which had set aside their conviction under Sections 452, 323, and 506 read with Section 34 of the IPC. The Court, relying on the principles established in *Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, (2025) 5 SCC 433* and *State of M.P. v. Ramveer Singh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1743*, reiterated that interference with an acquittal is warranted only if the judgment is patently perverse, based on misreading of evidence, or if no two reasonable views are possible. The decisive ground for upholding the acquittal was the Appellate Court’s correct appreciation of evidence, specifically the cross-examination admissions by prosecution witnesses (PW3, PW4, PW6, PW9) that the accused and some witnesses were attending a marriage in another village at the time of the alleged incident, rendering the prosecution’s version improbable. Furthermore, the Investigating Officer’s failure to corroborate the alleged damage to the door and a witness’s (PW6) denial of having made a police statement, as per *Rameshwar Singh v. State of J&K, (1971) 2 SCC 715*, further weakened the prosecution’s case. The Court concluded that the Appellate Court’s view was reasonable, precluding interference in an appeal against acquittal. The respondent/accused was directed to furnish bail bonds under Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

CR.A/347/2014

Parties: STATE OF H.P. VS TARA SINGH

Date: 09-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court dismissed the State’s appeal against the acquittal of the respondent for offences under Section 447 IPC and Section 26 of the Indian Forest Act, upholding the Trial Court’s finding that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. The Court, relying on *Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand* (2025) 5 SCC 433 and *State of M.P. v. Ramveer Singh* 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1743, reiterated that interference with an acquittal is warranted only if the judgment is patently perverse or based on misreading of evidence, and no two reasonable views are possible. The Court found the demarcation report unreliable, citing *State of H.P. v. Laxmi Nand* 1992 SCC OnLine HP 41, as it did not detail the procedure, lacked three permanent points, and was conducted without notice to the accused, as held in *State of H.P. vs. Joginder Singh* 1992 (1) Shim. LC 339. Furthermore, for Section 447 IPC, the prosecution failed to prove the requisite intent to annoy, intimidate, or insult, as established in *Mathri v. State of Punjab* AIR 1964 SC 986 and *Rajinder v. State of Haryana* (1995) 5 SCC 187. Regarding Section 26 of the Indian Forest Act, the State failed to produce a notification under Section 4 and Section 6, proving the land was a reserved forest, and did not demonstrate proper publication as required by Section 31, as per *State of H.P. vs. Amin Chand* 1992 (2) Shim.LC 169.

CR.A/4008/2013

Parties: SURINDER KUMAR VS PRITAM CHAND

Date: 09-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court dismissed the appeal against acquittal in a Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act case, upholding the Trial Court’s finding that the complainant failed to prove the accused’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Court held that the Trial Court’s view was plausible and not perverse, adhering to the principles laid down in *Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 176* and *Bhupatbhai Bachubhai Chavda v. State of Gujarat, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 523*, which mandate that interference with an acquittal is warranted only if the judgment is patently perverse, based on misreading of evidence, or if no reasonable person could have reached such a conclusion. The Court found that the complainant’s witness (CW1) Harpinder’s testimony was unreliable, as he contradicted himself regarding the loan amount and his association with Gursewak Finance, a fact proven by defence evidence. Relying on *Ramsewak v. State of M.P., (2004) 11 SCC 259* and *Javed Masood v. State of Rajasthan, (2010) 3 SCC 538*, the Court affirmed that discrepancies in prosecution witness testimony, if not clarified, benefit the defence, and the defence can rely on such evidence. The accused successfully rebutted the presumption under Sections 118 and 139 of the NI Act by proving the cheque was a security for a loan from Gursewak Finance, not for the alleged debt to the complainant.

CRMPM/103/2026

Parties: VIJAY SINGH VS STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH

Date: 09-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh granted regular bail to the petitioner, Vijay Singh, in FIR No. 51 of 2018, involving offences under Sections 302, 307, 353, and 201 IPC and Section 25 of the Arms Act, primarily on the ground of inordinate delay in the trial, which violated his fundamental right to a speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The Court noted that despite the petitioner’s arrest in 2018 and the filing of charge sheets, the prosecution had failed to complete evidence for over seven years and eight months, even recalling witnesses under Section 311 CrPC, read with Section 348 of Bhartiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023, without success. Relying on precedents such as *Dipak Shubhashchandra Mehta v. CBI*, which held that indefinite detention of undertrial prisoners violates Article 21, and *Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra*, which established that serious crime cannot justify opposing bail when the State cannot ensure a speedy trial, the Court emphasized that the gravity of the offence cannot override the constitutional right to an expeditious trial. The Court further cited *Kashmira Singh v. State of Punjab* on the travesty of justice in prolonged incarceration and *Shaheen Welfare Association v. Union of India* that a person cannot be kept behind bars without prospect of an expeditious trial. Consequently, the petitioner was released on bail subject to conditions, including a bond of ₹1,00,000/-.

CRMPM/2657/2025

Parties: PENBA LAMA VS STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH

Date: 09-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh dismissed the petitioner’s application for regular bail in F.I.R. No. 4 of 2025, registered under Sections 109 and 333 of the Bhartiya Nayaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023, finding that the nature of the offence and the severity of the potential punishment militated against granting bail. The Court relied on the principles established in *Pinki v. State of U.P.*, (2025) 7 SCC 314, which reiterated the factors for bail consideration from *Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P.*, (1978) 1 SCC 240, including the nature of the charge, the evidence, and the punishment. The Court noted that the medical report indicated grievous injuries “dangerous to life” and that DNA evidence linked the petitioner to the crime, corroborating the victim’s account of a violent attack with a Khukhri during an attempted robbery. The Court emphasized that when the punishment is severe, as in this case where Section 109 BNS carries potential life imprisonment, the accused is generally not entitled to bail, as articulated in *Gudikanti Narasimhulu*. The argument regarding the petitioner’s unexplained injuries and delayed trial commencement was implicitly rejected in light of the strong prima facie evidence and the heinous nature of the crime, which demonstrated a “scant regard for human life.”

CRMPM/2792/2025

Parties: LAKHWINDER KUMAR VS STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH

Date: 09-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court granted regular bail to the petitioner, Lakhwinder Kumar, in FIR No. 127 of 2024 under Sections 21, 27A, and 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act), finding no reasonable grounds to believe he committed offences under Section 27A or abetted the possession of commercial quantity heroin. The Court rejected the prosecution’s argument that the petitioner’s receipt and deposit of drug money constituted “financing” under Section 27A, relying on *Rhea Chakraborty v. Union of India 2021 Cr LJ 248*, which clarified that “financing” means providing funds to make an illicit activity operational or sustain it, not merely receiving proceeds. Further, the Court dismissed the abetment charge under Section 29, citing *Lalitbhai Vikramchand Parekh vs. State of Gujarat MANU/GJ/0165/2015*, which established that abetment requires instigation or intentional aiding, not merely receiving money from a drug dealer. The Court applied the bail parameters from *Pinki v. State of U.P., (2025) 7 SCC 314*, *Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P., (1978) 1 SCC 240*, and *Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 4 SCC 280*, emphasizing the need for judicious exercise of discretion. The petitioner was released on bail subject to conditions including a bond of ₹1,00,000/- and restrictions on influencing witnesses or leaving jurisdiction.

CWP/2386/2013

Parties: M/S JAI GANESH TRADERS VS STATE OF H.P. AND OTHERS

Date: 07-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Tax Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in CWP No. 2386/2013 and CWP No. 3668/2014, disposed of the petitions by directing the competent authority/duly constituted committee to re-determine the refund amount due to the petitioners within eight weeks, in terms of the Financial Commissioner (Appeals), H.P.’s order dated 29.06.2017. The petitioners had sought directions for payment of ₹1,25,00,000/- due to alleged losses from natural calamities preventing toll collection, initially rejected by the Excise and Taxation Commissioner, H.P. on 29.10.2016, citing Section 10 of the H.P. Tolls Act, 1975. However, the Financial Commissioner (Appeals), H.P., in an appeal under Section 10A of the H.P. Tolls Act, 1975, had accepted the petitioners’ appeal on 29.06.2017, directing re-determination of the refund amount by a committee. Despite this favourable order, the committee was constituted almost four years later on 15.11.2021, and no action had been taken for over five years to implement the re-determination. The Court, noting the inordinate delay in enforcing the appellate order, emphasized the need for expeditious compliance with the Financial Commissioner’s directive regarding the specified toll barriers.

CWP/7882/2022

Parties: KUNDAN HYDRO (RAJPUR) PVT. LTD. VS STATE OF H.P. & ANR.

Date: 06-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Administrative Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in *Kundan Hydro (Rajpur) Pvt. Ltd. v. State of H.P. & Anr.*, disposed of a writ petition seeking a mandamus to defer a 3% additional free power share for an initial 12-year period, in accordance with the notification dated 15.05.2018. The Court noted that the petitioner had previously represented to respondent No.2, the Director (Energy), Government of Himachal Pradesh, on 22.07.2022 (Annexure P-9), for the same relief, but no decision was communicated. Crucially, during the hearing, the petitioner’s counsel expressed satisfaction with being permitted to make a fresh representation to the Secretary, MPP & Power, for redressal of its grievance, with a direction for a time-bound, speaking order after an opportunity of hearing. This proposal was acceptable to the learned Advocate General. Consequently, the Court reserved liberty for the petitioner to prefer a fresh representation to the Secretary, MPP & Power, within two weeks. Upon receipt, the Secretary is directed to consider and decide the representation in accordance with law, within six weeks thereafter, by passing a speaking order after affording the petitioner an opportunity of hearing, with the order to be communicated to the petitioner.

COPC/1234/2025

Parties: SURESH KUMAR VS RAHUL JAIN AND ANOTHER

Date: 06-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Administrative Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh closed the contempt proceedings initiated by Suresh Kumar, seeking enforcement of directions issued in *Zila Parishad, District Solan and another versus Suresh Kumar* (LPA No.237/2023 decided on 13.06.2024). The decisive ground for this closure was the revelation by the learned Additional Advocate General that the judgment in question could not be implemented due to a stay order passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court on 16.01.2026 in Special Leave Petition (Civil), Diary No.70389/2025. This stay order, along with office instructions dated 21.02.2026 from the Additional Secretary (PR), Government of H.P., explicitly conveyed the inability to implement the High Court’s earlier judgment. Consequently, the petitioner’s counsel requested the closure of the present proceedings, reserving liberty to seek appropriate remedy for the redressal of his grievance in accordance with law at an appropriate stage, should the necessity arise in the future. The Court, taking note of the documents and submissions, acceded to this request, discharging the notices issued to the respondents and disposing of any pending miscellaneous applications.

COPC/1403/2025

Parties: VIKAS SHARMA AND ANOTHER VS DR. GOPAL BERI

Date: 06-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Civil Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in COPC No. 1403 of 2025, closed the contempt proceedings initiated by Vikas Sharma and another against Dr. Gopal Beri, upon acknowledging the respondent’s compliance with the underlying judgment. The decisive ground for this closure was the respondent’s submission of a compliance affidavit, dated 21.02.2026, confirming the issuance of the consideration order, which was admitted by the petitioners’ counsel. The Court noted that the judgment stood complied with, thereby discharging the notice issued to the respondent. This action aligns with the principle that contempt proceedings are remedial and coercive, aimed at securing compliance with court orders, and once compliance is achieved, the purpose of such proceedings is fulfilled. The Court, while closing the present matter, explicitly granted the petitioners liberty to pursue appropriate remedies for any surviving grievances in accordance with law, thereby ensuring that the closure of contempt proceedings does not prejudice any substantive rights that may require independent adjudication.

FAO/12/2014

Parties: MATTEN PILLAI GUDJA (GERMAN NATIONAL) VS DOT RAM AND OTHERS

Date: 06-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE SUSHIL KUKREJA

Area of Law: Insurance Law

The High Court dismissed cross-appeals under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, upholding the Motor Accidents Claim Tribunal’s award of Rs. 2,00,000/- with 6% interest. The claimant sought enhancement, while the insurer sought exoneration. The Court found no error in the Tribunal’s assessment, noting the claimant failed to adduce sufficient evidence for higher medical expenses, loss of income, or attendant charges. Crucially, the disability certificate (Ext. PX) was not proved in accordance with law, as none of the signatory doctors were examined, reiterating the principle from *Sait Tarajee Khimchand and others Vs. Yelamarti Satyam and others, AIR 1971 Supreme Court 1865* and *Neeraj Dutta Vs. State (Government of NCT of Delhi) (2023) 4 SCC 731* that mere marking of a document as an exhibit does not dispense with its proof. The insurer’s contention regarding the driver’s invalid license was rejected, relying on *Bajaj Alliance General Insurance Company Limited Vs. Rambha Devi and others, (2025) 3 SCC 95*, which held that a Light Motor Vehicle (LMV) license under Section 10(2)(d) of the MV Act permits driving transport vehicles with gross weight under 7500 kg, as was the case here (2750 kg). Thus, the impugned award was affirmed.

EX.P./202/2026

Parties: BHOLA SINGH VS HRTC & ANR.

Date: 06-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Civil Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh disposed of Execution Petition No. 202/2026, noting that the respondents, HRTC & Anr., had released the amount due to the petitioner, Bhola Singh, in terms of the judgment, as evidenced by an office letter dated 23.02.2026. The Court granted the petitioner liberty to pursue appropriate remedies for the computation of the amount and any other surviving grievances in accordance with law. This decision effectively closed the execution proceedings, acknowledging the partial compliance by the respondents while preserving the petitioner’s right to address residual issues. The Court’s approach reflects a pragmatic resolution of the immediate execution while ensuring that the petitioner is not precluded from seeking further legal recourse for any outstanding claims related to the judgment’s full implementation. The order implicitly relies on the principle that execution petitions are primarily for enforcing existing judgments, and once the primary relief is granted, further disputes regarding quantum or other aspects may require separate proceedings. The Court did not cite any specific precedents or statutory sections in this particular order, focusing instead on the procedural closure of the execution petition based on the respondents’ submission and the petitioner’s request for liberty to pursue further remedies.

EX.P./204/2026

Parties: KESAR SINGH VS HRTC & ANR.

Date: 06-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Civil Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh disposed of Execution Petition No. 204/2026, noting that the respondent, HRTC, had released the amount due to the petitioner, Kesar Singh, in terms of the judgment, as evidenced by an office letter dated 23.02.2026. The Court granted the petitioner liberty to pursue appropriate remedies for the computation of the amount and any other surviving grievances in accordance with law. This disposition effectively closed the execution proceedings, acknowledging the partial compliance by the respondent while preserving the petitioner’s right to seek further legal recourse for any remaining claims. The Court’s decision reflects a pragmatic approach to execution petitions, allowing for their closure upon substantial compliance while ensuring that the decree-holder is not prejudiced regarding unresolved aspects of the judgment. The order implicitly relies on the principle that execution proceedings are primarily concerned with the enforcement of a decree, and once the decreed amount is released, the immediate purpose of the petition is served, subject to any further computations or outstanding issues that may require separate legal action.

EX.P./205/2026

Parties: RAKESH KUMAR VS HRTC & ANR.

Date: 06-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Service Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in Execution Petition No. 205/2026, disposed of the petition on March 6, 2026, after noting that the amount due to the petitioner, Rakesh Kumar, had been released by the respondents, HRTC & Anr., as evidenced by an office letter dated February 24, 2026. The Court granted the petitioner liberty to pursue appropriate remedies for the computation of the amount and any other remaining grievances in accordance with law. This disposition effectively closed the execution proceedings, allowing for potential future litigation on specific aspects of the monetary claim rather than the underlying judgment’s execution. The Court’s decision reflects a pragmatic approach to execution petitions where the primary relief sought has been substantially provided, while preserving the petitioner’s right to address ancillary or unresolved issues through separate legal channels. The order implicitly acknowledges the principle that execution proceedings are primarily concerned with enforcing existing judgments, and once the core obligation is met, further disputes regarding quantum or other related matters are best adjudicated in fresh proceedings.

EX.P./206/2026

Parties: RAJINDER KUMAR VS HRTC & ANR.

Date: 06-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Service Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh disposed of Execution Petition No. 206/2026, noting that the respondents had released the amount due to the petitioner in terms of the judgment, as evidenced by an office letter dated 24.02.2026. The decisive ground for this disposition was the petitioner’s counsel seeking liberty to pursue appropriate remedies for the computation of the amount and any other surviving grievances in accordance with law. The Court, therefore, granted this permission, effectively closing the execution proceedings while preserving the petitioner’s right to agitate further claims related to the judgment’s financial implications or other outstanding issues. This approach aligns with the principle that execution petitions primarily enforce existing judgments, and any new disputes regarding the quantum or scope of relief must be adjudicated through separate, appropriate legal channels. The Court did not rely on specific precedents in this summary disposition but rather on the procedural understanding that execution is limited to enforcing the decree as it stands, allowing for subsequent proceedings for further claims.

EX.P./207/2026

Parties: KEHAR SINGH VS HRTC & ANR.

Date: 06-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Service Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh disposed of Execution Petition No. 207/2026, noting that the respondents, HRTC & Anr., had released the amount due to the petitioner, Kehar Singh, in terms of the judgment, as evidenced by an office letter dated 24.02.2026. The Court granted the petitioner liberty to pursue appropriate remedies for the computation of the amount and any other surviving grievances in accordance with law. This decision effectively closed the execution proceedings, allowing the petitioner to address any remaining disputes regarding the exact quantum of the amount or other related issues through separate legal avenues. The Court’s approach reflects a pragmatic resolution, ensuring that while the primary execution of the judgment regarding the release of funds was acknowledged, the petitioner retained the right to challenge the specifics of the compliance. The order thus concludes the immediate execution phase while preserving the petitioner’s right to further legal recourse on ancillary matters.

EX.P./208/2026

Parties: SATISH CHAND VS HRTC & ANR.

Date: 06-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Civil Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh disposed of Execution Petition No. 208/2026, noting that the respondents had released the amount due to the petitioner in terms of the judgment, as evidenced by an office letter dated 30.10.2025. The Court granted the petitioner liberty to pursue appropriate remedies for the computation of the amount and any other surviving grievances in accordance with law. This decision effectively closed the execution proceedings, acknowledging the partial compliance by the respondents while preserving the petitioner’s right to address residual claims. The Court’s approach reflects a pragmatic resolution, ensuring that while the primary monetary relief was disbursed, avenues for further legal recourse on related issues remain open, thereby preventing premature closure of the petitioner’s overall claim. The order implicitly underscores the principle that execution petitions are primarily for enforcing existing judgments, and where substantial compliance is shown, further disputes regarding quantum or ancillary matters are best addressed through separate, appropriate legal channels.

EX.P./210/2026

Parties: NISHA BEGUM VS HRTC & ANR.

Date: 06-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Civil Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh disposed of Execution Petition No. 210/2026, noting that the respondent, HRTC, had released the amount due to the petitioner, Nisha Begum, in terms of the underlying judgment, as evidenced by an office letter dated 24.02.2026. The Court granted the petitioner liberty to pursue appropriate remedies for the computation of the amount and any other surviving grievances in accordance with law. This decision effectively closed the execution proceedings, acknowledging the partial compliance by the respondent while preserving the petitioner’s right to seek further redress for any remaining disputes regarding the full satisfaction of the judgment. The Court’s action reflects a pragmatic approach to execution petitions, allowing for their closure upon substantial compliance while ensuring that avenues for complete justice remain open to the decree-holder. The order implicitly relies on the principle that execution proceedings can be concluded when the primary relief has been granted, but without prejudice to further claims arising from the same judgment.

EX.P./213/2026

Parties: SHAMSHED KHAN VS HRTC & ANR.

Date: 06-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Service Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh disposed of Execution Petition No. 213/2026, noting that the respondents, HRTC & Anr., had released the amount due to the petitioner, Shamshed Khan, as per the judgment, evidenced by an office letter dated 30.10.2025. The Court granted the petitioner liberty to pursue appropriate remedies for the computation of the amount and any other surviving grievances in accordance with law. This disposition effectively closed the execution proceedings, allowing for potential future litigation on specific aspects of the monetary award or other outstanding issues. The Court’s decision reflects a pragmatic approach to execution petitions, where once the primary relief of payment is effected, further disputes regarding the exact quantum or ancillary matters are relegated to separate proceedings, thereby ensuring the expeditious closure of the execution phase while preserving the parties’ rights to address residual claims. The order implicitly acknowledges the principle that execution proceedings are primarily concerned with enforcing the judgment as rendered, and complex computations or new grievances are best addressed through distinct legal avenues.

EX.P./225/2026

Parties: DEEPAK KUMAR VS STATE OF H.P AND OTHERS

Date: 06-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Administrative Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in Ex. Petition No. 225 of 2026, disposed of the execution petition filed by Deepak Kumar and another against the State of H.P. and others, noting that the judgment in question had been complied with by the respondents subsequent to the petition’s filing. The petitioners’ counsel confirmed that the respondents had issued a consideration order after the petition was instituted, a copy of which was placed on record. Consequently, the Court found no further need to pursue the execution proceedings. The decisive ground for this disposition was the respondents’ post-filing compliance, rendering the execution petition infructuous. The Court, however, reserved liberty to the petitioners to seek appropriate remedy for any surviving grievances in accordance with law, thereby ensuring that while the immediate execution was satisfied, any residual claims could be pursued through proper legal channels. This approach aligns with the principle that execution petitions are meant to enforce existing judgments, and once compliance is achieved, their purpose is served, though further remedies for related issues remain available. The pending miscellaneous application(s) were also disposed of accordingly.

EX.P./226/2026

Parties: BHIM SEN VS STATE OF H.P AND OTHERS

Date: 06-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Service Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in Ex. Petition No. 226 of 2026, vide judgment dated March 6, 2026, closed the present execution proceedings, noting the respondents’ submission that the judgment in question had been complied with. The learned Additional Advocate General placed on record office instructions dated March 5, 2026, along with a consideration order dated January 14, 2026, as evidence of compliance. The Court, taking cognizance of these documents, concluded that the judgment had been satisfied. Crucially, the Court reserved liberty to the petitioner to pursue appropriate remedies for any surviving grievances in accordance with law, thereby ensuring that while the immediate execution petition was closed due to demonstrated compliance, the petitioner’s broader rights were not foreclosed. This approach reflects the principle that execution proceedings are primarily concerned with the enforcement of a specific judgment, and once compliance is shown, the proceedings are concluded, without prejudice to other potential claims. The pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, were also disposed of as a consequence of this closure.

EX.P./248/2026

Parties: GORKHA RAM VS HRTC & ANR.

Date: 06-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Civil Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh disposed of Execution Petition No. 248/2026, noting that the respondents, HRTC & Anr., had released the amount due to the petitioner, Gorkha Ram, in terms of the judgment, as evidenced by an office letter dated 24.02.2026. The Court granted the petitioner liberty to pursue appropriate remedies for the computation of the amount and any other surviving grievances in accordance with law. This decision effectively closed the execution proceedings, acknowledging the partial compliance by the respondents while preserving the petitioner’s right to seek further redressal for any remaining disputes regarding the quantum or other aspects of the original judgment. The Court’s approach reflects a pragmatic resolution of the execution petition, ensuring that while the primary relief sought through execution was addressed, the petitioner was not precluded from addressing ancillary or unresolved issues through proper legal channels. The order thus facilitates the closure of the immediate execution matter without prejudice to the petitioner’s broader rights.

EX.P./256/2026

Parties: MOHAN SINGH VS HRTC & ANR.

Date: 06-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Service Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in Execution Petition No. 256/2026, disposed of the petition after noting that the amount due to the petitioner, Mohan Singh, had been released by the respondents, HRTC & Anr., as evidenced by an office letter dated 24.02.2026. The Court granted liberty to the petitioner to pursue appropriate remedies for the computation of the amount and any other remaining grievances in accordance with law. This decision effectively concluded the execution proceedings, acknowledging the respondents’ compliance with the judgment’s financial directive while preserving the petitioner’s right to address any ancillary or unresolved issues through separate legal recourse. The Court’s approach reflects a pragmatic resolution of the immediate execution matter, ensuring that while the primary financial obligation was met, the petitioner was not precluded from seeking further clarification or redressal regarding the full scope of the judgment’s implementation. The order implicitly relies on the principle of judicial economy, closing the execution petition once its primary purpose was fulfilled, yet allowing for subsequent litigation on related, unaddressed aspects.

EX.P./258/2026

Parties: KAMAL SINGH VS HRTC & ANR.

Date: 06-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Service Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh disposed of Execution Petition No. 258/2026, noting that the respondents, HRTC & Anr., had released the amount due to the petitioner, Kamal Singh, in terms of the judgment, as evidenced by an office letter dated 29.10.2025. The Court granted the petitioner liberty to pursue appropriate remedies for the computation of the amount and any other surviving grievances in accordance with law. This disposition effectively closed the execution proceedings, acknowledging the partial compliance by the respondents while preserving the petitioner’s right to seek further redress for any remaining claims. The Court’s decision reflects a pragmatic approach to execution petitions, allowing for closure when the primary relief has been granted, but ensuring that ancillary or unresolved issues can be litigated separately. The order implicitly relies on the principle that execution proceedings are primarily for enforcing existing judgments, and where compliance is shown, the petition can be closed, with avenues for further claims remaining open. The Court did not cite any specific statutory sections or precedents in this particular order, focusing instead on the procedural resolution of the execution petition based on the parties’ submissions.

EX.P./1755/2025

Parties: MOHIT SHARMA AND OTHERS VS STATE OF H.P AND OTHERS

Date: 06-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Education Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in Ex. Petition No. 1755 of 2025, decided on March 6, 2026, by Justice Jyotsna Rewal Dua, closed the present proceedings after noting the submission of office instructions dated March 6, 2026, from the Director, School Education, Shimla, H.P., along with a consideration order passed on March 5, 2026. The Court’s decisive ground for closing the proceedings was the production of these documents by the learned Additional Advocate General, indicating that the respondents had taken action regarding the petitioners’ grievances. Consequently, the Court reserved liberty to the petitioners to seek appropriate remedy for the redressal of any surviving grievances in accordance with law, thereby ensuring that while the immediate proceedings were concluded due to the administrative action taken, the petitioners’ right to pursue further legal recourse for any unresolved issues remained intact. This approach reflects the principle of judicial economy, where proceedings are concluded when administrative remedies are shown to have been initiated, while simultaneously safeguarding the litigant’s right to a full hearing on any remaining substantive issues. The Court did not rely on specific precedents in this order, as it primarily addressed the procedural closure of the petition based on the administrative steps taken by the respondents. All pending miscellaneous applications were also disposed of.

EX.P./2310/2025

Parties: VEENA DEVI VS STATE OF H.P AND OTHERS

Date: 06-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Civil Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in Ex. Petition No. 2310 of 2025, decided on March 6, 2026, by Ms. Justice Jyotsna Rewal Dua, closed the present proceedings after noting the compliance affidavit and the consideration order dated November 17, 2025, filed by the respondents. The Court’s decision was predicated on the respondents having fulfilled their obligation to file a compliance affidavit, thereby addressing the immediate procedural requirement of the execution petition. The core reasoning involved acknowledging the submission of the consideration order, which effectively discharged the respondents’ duty in the context of the execution proceedings. Consequently, the Court reserved liberty to the petitioner, Veena Devi, to pursue appropriate remedies for any surviving grievances, including those arising from or against the consideration order, in accordance with law. This approach ensures that while the execution petition itself is concluded due to compliance, the petitioner’s substantive rights to challenge the outcome of that compliance remain unimpaired. The Court did not explicitly rely on specific precedents or statutory sections in this order, as it primarily dealt with the procedural closure of an execution petition upon the filing of a compliance affidavit and consideration order. The pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, were also disposed of as a result of this order.

CRWP/3/2026

Parties: ANKUR ANANDKAR VS STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH

Date: 06-03-2026

Judge(s): HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE GURMEET SINGH SANDHAWALIA JUSTICE BIPIN CHANDER NEGI

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh declared the petitioner’s arrest and subsequent remand orders illegal, quashing them and ordering his immediate release. The Court found that the petitioner’s detention commenced at 9:42 a.m. on January 5, 2026, when he was taken from Chandigarh to Manikaran, despite formal arrest being recorded at 7:00 p.m., thereby depriving him of liberty without furnishing grounds of arrest. This violated the constitutional mandate under Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India and Section 47 of the Bhartiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (formerly Section 50 of CrPC, 1973), which requires grounds of arrest to be communicated “as soon as may be.” Relying on *Mihir Rajesh Shah vs. State of Maharashtra and another, (2026) 1 SCC 500*, the Court reiterated that failure to furnish written grounds of arrest renders the arrest and remand illegal. Furthermore, the remand orders dated January 6, 2026, and January 9, 2026, were found to be illegal as the Magistrate failed to apply judicial mind to ensure the legality of the arrest and compliance with constitutional rights, as mandated by *Arnesh Kumar vs. State of Bihar and another, (2014) 8 SCC 273*. The Court held that the initial illegal arrest vitiated all subsequent acts.

CMPMO/926/2025

Parties: SUSHMA VS SANJAY WADWA AND ORS.

Date: 06-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE SANDEEP SHARMA

Area of Law: Family Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh dismissed the petitioner’s challenge to the Additional Sessions Judge’s judgment, which had reversed the trial court’s order granting maintenance and residence under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. The Court affirmed that while an “aggrieved person” under Section 2(a) of the Act, even after divorce, can maintain a complaint for domestic violence, the crucial aspect is the proof of such violence. The Court found that the petitioner failed to adduce cogent and convincing evidence to substantiate her allegations of domestic violence, noting that her and her mother’s statements were mere reiterations of the complaint without independent corroboration. Specifically, the independent witness (PW5) did not support the maltreatment claims, and there was no record of a police complaint regarding alleged beatings despite the petitioner’s claims. The Court emphasized that mere allegations of mental, physical, and sexual violence are insufficient; they must be elaborately proved. Given the lack of convincing evidence of domestic violence and the severance of the domestic relationship through divorce, the Court found no infirmity in the appellate court’s decision to deny maintenance and residence.

CR.R/556/2023

Parties: INDERJEET VS KISHAN CHAND

Date: 06-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court dismissed a criminal revision petition, upholding the conviction and sentence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (NI Act), 1881, for cheque dishonour. The Court affirmed the concurrent findings of the lower courts, holding that once the issuance of the cheque and signature are admitted, presumptions under Section 118(a) and Section 139 of the NI Act arise, placing the burden on the accused to rebut them. The Court relied on *APS Forex Services (P) Ltd. v. Shakti International Fashion Linkers* (2020) 12 SCC 724, which established that Section 139 is a reverse onus clause, and *Balu Sudam Khalde v. State of Maharashtra* (2023) 13 SCC 365, which held that incriminating suggestions made by defence counsel bind the accused. The argument that the complaint was premature was rejected, as the notice was deemed served upon refusal, as per *C.C. Allavi Haji vs. Pala Pelly Mohd.* 2007(6) SCC 555. The Court also reiterated that failure to mention the loan in Income Tax Returns does not automatically lead to acquittal, citing *Surinder Singh vs. State of H.P.* 2018(1) D.C.R. 45, and that a revisional court’s scope is limited to rectifying patent defects or errors of jurisdiction, not re-appreciating evidence, as held in *Malkeet Singh Gill v. State of Chhattisgarh* (2022) 8 SCC 204. The compensation awarded was deemed appropriate given the deterrent nature of Section 138, as noted in *Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar* (2019) 4 SCC 197.

CRMPM/37/2026

Parties: AMIT LUTHRA VS STATE OF HP

Date: 06-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh dismissed the petitioner’s regular bail application under Sections 21 and 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (NDPS) Act, finding no material change in circumstances to warrant reconsideration of a previously rejected bail plea. The Court, relying on *State of Maharashtra v. Captain Buddhikota Subha Rao* (1989) Suppl. 2 SCC 605 and *Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan @ Pappu Yadav* (2004) 7 SCC 528, reiterated that a subsequent bail application is maintainable only upon a substantial change in the fact situation, not merely cosmetic changes. The Court specifically rejected the argument that the filing of a charge sheet constitutes a change in circumstances, citing *Virupakshappa Gouda v. State of Karnataka* (2017) 5 SCC 406, which held that a charge sheet merely establishes the investigating agency’s findings and does not lessen the allegations. Furthermore, the Court found no evidence of undue delay in the trial proceedings to justify bail. The decision underscored the principle that judicial discipline and propriety demand restraint in entertaining successive bail applications without compelling new grounds, as articulated in *State of T.N. v. S.A. Raja* (2005) 8 SCC 380.

CRMPM/79/2026

Parties: JITENDER PAL SINGH VS STATE OF HP

Date: 06-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh dismissed the petitioner’s application for regular bail in FIR No. 18 of 2022, registered under Sections 302, 392, 342, 201, and 34 of the Indian Penal Code, finding prima facie involvement in the murder of two women. The Court, relying on the principles established in *Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P.*, (1978) 1 SCC 240, which emphasizes the nature of the charge, evidence, and severity of punishment as vital factors in bail considerations, and *Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi)*, (2001) 4 SCC 280, which outlines various aspects for courts to consider, including the nature of accusations and evidence, concluded that the circumstantial evidence, including the petitioner’s vehicle being near the crime scene, recovery of incriminating articles, and call detail records, strongly indicated his participation. The Court further rejected the argument for bail based on trial delay, citing *Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi)*, (2018) 12 SCC 129, which held that incarceration period alone does not entitle an accused to bail in grave offences. Given the heinous nature of the crime and the potential for capital punishment, the Court determined that the petitioner was not entitled to bail.

CRMPM/137/2026

Parties: SACHIN AGNIHOTRI VS STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH

Date: 06-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE SANDEEP SHARMA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court confirmed the interim bail granted to the petitioners, Sachin Agnihotri, Vishal, and Alok Dhar Dwivedi, in a case under Sections 22 and 29 of the ND & PS Act, arising from FIR No.301 dated 05.12.2025. The Court’s decisive reasoning was that the contraband (360 bottles of Codeine Phosphate Syrup) was not recovered from the conscious possession of the petitioners, but from an employee, Prajwal Sharma, who implicated them in a confessional statement. The Court emphasized that a statement recorded under Section 67 of the ND & PS Act cannot be used as a confessional statement in the trial of an offence under the Act, relying on the Supreme Court’s pronouncement in *Tofan Singh v. State of Tamil Nadu* (2021) 4 SCC 1, which held such statements inadmissible and officers under Section 53 of the NDPS Act as “police officers” under Section 25 of the Evidence Act. Further, the Court reiterated the principle from *State by (NCB) Bengaluru v. Pallulabid Ahmad Arimutta and Anr*, Special Leave to Appeal (Crl) No. 242 of 2022, that confessional statements under Section 67 ND & PS Act are inadmissible. While acknowledging the rigours of Section 37 of the ND & PS Act, the Court noted that it does not impose a complete bar on bail, especially when the accused have joined the investigation and no further recovery is pending. The Court also cited *Dataram Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr*, Criminal Appeal No.227/2018, affirming the fundamental postulate of presumption of innocence and that bail is the general rule, not jail, and that freedom of an individual is paramount.

CRMPM/2902/2025

Parties: RAJENDER SINGH VS STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH

Date: 06-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh dismissed the petitioner’s regular bail application in an FIR registered under Section 22 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act (NDPS), 1985, for possessing a commercial quantity of Tramadol. The Court held that the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act applied, requiring satisfaction of two mandatory conditions: that there are reasonable grounds to believe the accused is not guilty, and that they are not likely to commit any offence while on bail. The Court found that the petitioner failed to satisfy these twin conditions, as the prosecution had collected sufficient *prima facie* material connecting him to the crime, and there was nothing to suggest he would not re-offend. Relying on *Union of India Versus Niyazuddin & Another* (2018) 13 SCC 738, and *State of Kerala Versus Rajesh*, AIR 2020 SC 721, the Court reiterated that these conditions are cumulative, not alternative, and the expression “reasonable grounds” signifies something more than *prima facie* grounds, requiring substantial probable causes. The Court also cited *Narcotics Control Bureau v. Kashif*, (2024) 11 SCC 372, to emphasize that in NDPS cases involving commercial quantities, negation of bail is the rule and its grant an exception, thereby rejecting the argument that bail is a rule and jail an exception.

Parties: GOPAL PURI AND ANOTHER VS STATE OF H.P. AND OTHERS

Date: 05-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Administrative Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in CWP No. 2546 of 2026, disposed of the writ petition filed by Gopal Puri and another as having been rendered infructuous, noting that the information sought by the petitioners had been supplied to respondent No. 5 subsequent to the filing of the petition. The Court, presided over by Ms. Justice Jyotsna Rewal Dua, accepted the submission of the petitioners’ counsel, Mr. Ganesh Barowalia, that the primary relief prayed for could no longer be granted, thereby negating the substratum of the petition. This decision implicitly relies on the fundamental principle that courts will not adjudicate on matters where the cause of action has ceased to exist or the relief sought has already been obtained, rendering the proceedings academic. While no specific precedents were cited in the brief order, the Court’s approach aligns with the well-established doctrine of *mootness*, which dictates that courts should refrain from deciding cases where there is no longer a live controversy or practical relief to be granted. Consequently, all pending miscellaneous applications were also disposed of.

CWP/12502/2025

Parties: ER. BHOOR MAL AGARWAL VS H.P. STATE AGRICULTURAL MARKETING BOARD AND OTHERS

Date: 05-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Contract Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh quashed the termination order dated 08.07.2025 issued by the H.P. State Agricultural Marketing Board against the petitioner, a consultant, finding it unsustainable due to non-compliance with the express terms of the consultancy agreement. The Court held that the termination, purportedly under Clause 10 of the agreement, was invalid as the respondents failed to issue the mandatory advance notice to the defaulting party. Furthermore, the Court rejected the respondents’ attempt to justify the termination by relying on Clause 7.0 in their reply, noting that the impugned order explicitly invoked Clause 10, and a new case could not be made out in the reply. Even if Clause 7.0 were applicable, it similarly mandated a prior notice to the consultant to rectify deficiencies before rescinding the contract, which was admittedly not provided. The Court emphasized that the procedural safeguards stipulated in the contract, including the requirement for prior notice under both Clause 7.0 and Clause 10, were binding and their breach rendered the termination unlawful, irrespective of the merits of the alleged deficiencies in the petitioner’s services. The Court did not explicitly cite any precedents, relying instead on the clear contractual terms.

CWP/16165/2025

Parties: MUNICIPAL WORKERS’ FEDERATION, SHIMLA VS THE STATE OF H.P. & ORS

Date: 05-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Service Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh disposed of the writ petition filed by the Municipal Workers’ Federation, Shimla, challenging eviction notices issued under Sections 258(2), 259, and 383 of the H.P. Municipal Corporation Act, 1994, by directing the petitioner’s members to shift to temporary residences as per an agreed-upon rehabilitation plan. The Court’s decision was predicated upon the minutes of a meeting held on February 17, 2025, and subsequent office instructions dated March 3, 2026, from the Municipal Corporation, Shimla, which outlined the phased availability of temporary accommodations. The core reasoning stemmed from the parties’ mutual agreement, facilitated by the Court, to resolve the dispute concerning the rehabilitation of employees residing in Suzi Line quarters. The Court directed the petitioner to ensure its eligible members occupy sixteen temporary residences within fifteen days, with further occupation of twenty-three and fourteen residences within fifteen days of their notification of availability. This pragmatic approach, rooted in the principle of *consensus ad idem*, effectively addressed the petitioner’s concerns regarding alternative accommodation and rehabilitation, thereby obviating the need for a structural audit or further coercive action. The Court’s intervention ensured a structured and time-bound transition, balancing the Corporation’s need to proceed with its plans and the employees’ right to suitable housing.

COPC/705/2025

Parties: TILAK RAJ SHARMA VS KAMLESH KUMAR PANT

Date: 05-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Administrative Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in *Tilak Raj Sharma v. Kamlesh Kumar Pant*, closed the contempt proceedings, noting that the Financial Commissioner (Appeals), Himachal Pradesh, had heard the underlying matter and reserved judgment. The Court’s decision to close the contempt petition at this juncture was predicated on the principle that the *lis* giving rise to the alleged contempt was actively being adjudicated by a competent appellate authority, thereby rendering the continuation of contempt proceedings premature and unnecessary. This approach aligns with the judicial policy of avoiding parallel proceedings and allowing primary adjudicatory bodies to conclude their processes. The Court, however, prudently reserved liberty to the petitioner to initiate fresh proceedings or seek appropriate remedies should the necessity arise in the future, thereby upholding the *audi alteram partem* principle and ensuring that the petitioner’s rights are not foreclosed. The discharge of notice to the respondent further signifies the Court’s determination that, for the present, no contumacious conduct warrants further judicial intervention. This judgment implicitly relies on the established legal tenet that contempt jurisdiction is to be exercised sparingly and only when there is a clear and wilful disobedience of a court order, which was not evident given the ongoing appellate process.

COPC/1304/2025

Parties: AJAY KUMAR VS SH. ANURAG CHANDER SHARMA & ANR.

Date: 05-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Civil Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in COPC No.1304 of 2025, decided on March 5, 2026, closed the contempt proceedings initiated by Ajay Kumar against Sh. Anurag Chander Sharma & Anr., discharging the notices issued to the respondents. The Court’s decision was predicated on the submission by the respondents’ counsel, supported by a compendium of documents including a speaking order dated January 13, 2026, and an office order dated January 19, 2026, demonstrating that the judgment in question, the subject of the contempt petition, had been duly implemented. This position was expressly admitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner, thereby negating the very basis for the continuation of the contempt action. The Court, therefore, found no further grounds to pursue the contempt, as the alleged contemnors had complied with the underlying order. However, acknowledging the possibility of residual issues, the Court prudently reserved liberty to the petitioner to seek appropriate remedies in accordance with law for the redressal of any surviving grievances, ensuring that while the contempt was purged, the petitioner’s substantive rights were not foreclosed. This approach aligns with the principle that contempt proceedings are primarily for ensuring compliance with judicial orders, and once compliance is achieved, the proceedings lose their efficacy, without prejudice to other legal avenues.

CMPMO/221/2019

Parties: DEEPA KUMARI VS NARAIN DASS & OTHERS

Date: 05-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE ROMESH VERMA

Area of Law: Civil Law

The High Court dismissed the petition under Article 227 of the Constitution, affirming the First Appellate Court’s reversal of the Trial Court’s finding that the respondents violated an interim injunction under Order 39 Rule 2-A CPC. The Court held that the petitioner failed to establish “willful disobedience,” a prerequisite for penal action under Order 39 Rule 2-A, which requires strict proof akin to criminal liability. The decisive ground was the petitioner’s inability to adduce credible evidence, as her witnesses were found to be interested parties or their testimonies, including a demarcation report, were inconsistent with legal requirements and instructions of the Financial Commissioner (Revenue). The Court relied on *U.C. Surendranath vs. Mambally’s Bakery* (2019) and *Raj Kumar Verma vs. Smt. Shivani Verma* (2009), which establish that mere disobedience is insufficient; “willful disobedience” must be proven beyond doubt. Furthermore, the Court reiterated its limited supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227, citing *M/S Garment Craft vs. Prakash Chand Goel* (2022) and *Estralla Rubber v. Dass Estate (P) Ltd.*, emphasizing that it does not act as a court of first appeal to re-appreciate evidence unless there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of fundamental principles of law.

FAO/87/2013

Parties: UNITED INDIA INSURANCE COMPANY LTD. VS PURAN CHAND & OTHERS

Date: 05-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE SUSHIL KUKREJA

Area of Law: Insurance Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in FAO Nos. 87-90 of 2013, held that the appellant-insurer, United India Insurance Company Ltd., was not liable to pay compensation to gratuitous passengers travelling in a goods carriage, overturning the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal’s “pay and recover” direction. The Court reasoned that Section 147 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, as amended in 1994, mandates compulsory coverage only for the owner of goods or their authorised representative in a goods vehicle, not for gratuitous passengers, as “goods” under Section 2(13) explicitly excludes living persons and a “goods carriage” under Section 2(14) is solely for goods. Relying on *New India Assurance Co. Ltd. vs. Asha Rani and others* (2003) 2 SCC 223 and *National Insurance Company Limited vs. Baljit Kaur and others* (2004) 2 SCC 1, the Court affirmed that the statutory liability of an insurer does not extend to gratuitous passengers in a goods vehicle, especially where no additional premium was paid. The Court clarified that the “pay and recover” directions in *Baljit Kaur* and subsequent cases were issued by the Supreme Court in exercise of its extraordinary powers under Article 142 of the Constitution, a power not vested in the Claims Tribunal. Consequently, the liability to compensate the claimants was solely fastened upon the legal representatives of the owner of the offending vehicle.

CR.R/34/2024

Parties: NIKKA RAM VS PADAM NATH (SINCE DECEASED) THROUGH HIS LRS. & ANR.

Date: 05-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court dismissed a criminal revision petition, upholding the concurrent findings of conviction and sentence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (NI Act). The Court decisively held that the petitioner failed to rebut the statutory presumptions arising under Sections 118 and 139 of the NI Act, which posit that a cheque, once its issuance and signature are admitted, is drawn for consideration and in discharge of a legally enforceable debt or liability. The petitioner’s defence, including claims of cheque snatching and non-liability as an insurance agent, was found improbable and unsubstantiated by evidence, particularly his own admissions under Section 313 Cr.P.C. and the report (Ex.DW1/A) confirming the cheque’s issuance pursuant to a compromise. Relying on *APS Forex Services (P) Ltd. v. Shakti International Fashion Linkers* (2020) and *Sanjabij Tari v. Kishore S. Borcar* (2025), the Court reiterated that the burden shifts to the accused to lead evidence rebutting these presumptions. The Court also affirmed that a revisional court’s jurisdiction, as established in *Malkeet Singh Gill v. State of Chhattisgarh* (2022) and *Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander* (2012), is narrow, limited to rectifying patent defects or errors of jurisdiction/law, and does not permit re-appreciation of evidence absent perversity. The sentence of six months imprisonment and compensation of ₹1,50,000/-, consistent with the deterrent nature of Section 138 NI Act as per *Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar* (2019) and the compensatory principles in *Kalamani Tex v. P. Balasubramanian* (2021), was deemed appropriate.

CRMPM/69/2026

Parties: MANSOOR ALI VS STATE OF HP

Date: 05-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The Himachal Pradesh High Court granted regular bail to the petitioner, Mansoor Ali, in FIR No. 10 of 2025 under Section 21 of the NDPS Act, primarily on the ground of violation of his fundamental right to a speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution, despite a previous bail application being dismissed. The Court, relying on *State of Maharashtra v. Captain Buddhikota Subha Rao* (1989) and *Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan* (2004), acknowledged that successive bail applications require a material change in circumstances, which it found in the petitioner’s prolonged incarceration of over one year for an intermediate quantity (12.5 grams) of heroin, with only 16 of 18 witnesses examined. The Court emphasized, citing *Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra* (2024) and *Mohd. Muslim v. State (NCT of Delhi)* (2023), that the right to a speedy trial is paramount, and inordinate delay, especially when the State cannot ensure expeditious conclusion, justifies bail, overriding stringent statutory provisions like Section 37 of the NDPS Act. Furthermore, the Court, referencing *Ayub Khan v. State of Rajasthan* (2024), held that criminal antecedents alone cannot be a reason to deny bail in cases of long incarceration. The petitioner was released on bail subject to conditions, including a bond of ₹1,00,000/-.

CRMPM/107/2026

Parties: AMARJEET SINGH VS STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH

Date: 05-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh granted regular bail to the petitioner, Amarjeet Singh, in FIR No. 22 of 2025 under Section 310(2) of the Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, primarily on the ground that the prosecution’s case relied heavily on inadmissible evidence. The Court, applying the principles enunciated in *Pinki v. State of U.P.* (2025) and *Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P.* (1978) regarding bail considerations, found that the recovery of ₹6,000/- from the petitioner was not demonstrably linked to the alleged crime. Crucially, the Court relied on *Dipakbhai Jagdishchandra Patel v. State of Gujarat* (2019) and *Surinder Kumar Khanna vs Intelligence Officer Directorate of Revenue Intelligence* (2018) to hold that a co-accused’s statement made during investigation is inadmissible under Section 162 Cr.P.C. and Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, and cannot form the sole basis for implicating the petitioner or denying bail. The Court further cited *Tofan Singh Versus State of Tamil Nadu* (2021) to reinforce that such confessional statements are impermissible for detaining an accused. Consequently, finding no prima facie case based on admissible evidence, the petitioner was released on bail subject to furnishing a bond of ₹1,00,000/- and standard conditions, including non-intimidation of witnesses and trial attendance.

CRMPM/108/2026

Parties: AAKASH THAKUR VS STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH

Date: 05-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court granted regular bail to the petitioner, Aakash Thakur, in an NDPS Act case involving 356.280 grams of charas, finding that the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act were inapplicable as the quantity was intermediate and the status report itself indicated that the charas was brought by a co-accused, Surender Singh, and not in the petitioner’s personal possession. The Court, relying on principles established in *Pinki v. State of U.P.* (2025) and *Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P.* (1978), which emphasize considering the nature of the charge, evidence, severity of punishment, and likelihood of abscondence or witness tampering, determined that the petitioner, a student with no prior criminal antecedents, had deep roots in society, negating the risk of abscondence. The Court rejected the State’s argument that bail should be denied due to the adverse societal impact of charas, reiterating that bail cannot be denied as punishment without trial. Consequently, the petitioner was released on bail subject to conditions including a bond of ₹1,00,000/-, non-intimidation of witnesses, regular court attendance, and restrictions on leaving his address without intimation.

CRMPM/2982/2025

Parties: YOGESH KUMAR VS STATE OF HP

Date: 05-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The Himachal Pradesh High Court granted regular bail to the petitioner, Yogesh Kumar, in FIR No. 47 of 2025, registered under Section 8 of the POCSO Act and Section 3(1)(w) of the SC & ST Act, finding that his continued pre-trial detention was unjustified. The Court, applying the principles enunciated in *Pinki v. State of U.P.* (2025) and *Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P.* (1978), which emphasize considering the nature of the charge, evidence, potential punishment, and likelihood of thwarting justice, noted a significant 10-day delay in reporting the incident and the absence of caste-based remarks in the initial FIR, making the prosecution’s version prima facie difficult to rely upon. While acknowledging the gravity of the alleged offences, the Court observed that the charge sheet had been filed, the petitioner was no longer required for investigation, and his permanent residency in Solan negated the risk of absconding. The Court rejected the apprehension of witness intimidation, noting the victim’s non-appearance to oppose bail, and imposed stringent conditions, including a ₹1,00,000/- bail bond, non-intimidation of witnesses, regular trial attendance, and restrictions on movement and communication, reserving the State’s right to seek bail cancellation upon violation.

CWP/1443/2026

Parties: DR. MUNISH DUTTA VS THE STATE OF H.P.

Date: 03-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE AJAY MOHAN GOEL

Area of Law: Service Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh disposed of the writ petition filed by Dr. Munish Dutta, challenging his transfer order dated 15.01.2026, in light of a subsequent notification issued by the State. The decisive ground for this disposition was the State’s notification dated 24.02.2026, which, in partial modification of the impugned transfer order and in compliance with the Court’s interim order dated 28.01.2026, temporarily deployed the petitioner to Murrah Breeding Farm Barnoh, District Una, until 30.06.2026 or the availability of a vacant Assistant Director post at Una, whichever is later. This action by the State effectively addressed the petitioner’s grievance, which stemmed from his previous transfer to Killar, District Chamba, despite his wife’s severe medical condition (80% disability, in a coma for over four years) and his impending retirement in September 2027, circumstances previously brought to the respondents’ attention via representation. The Court, while disposing of the petition, granted liberty to the petitioner to approach it again if a vacant Assistant Director post at Una is not available by 15.06.2026, and further directed the respondents to pay the petitioner his due and admissible salary, acknowledging his need to meet his ailing wife’s treatment expenses.

CWP/1966/2026

Parties: SHASHI DEVI & ANR. VS STATE OF H.P. & ORS.

Date: 03-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Administrative Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh disposed of a writ petition challenging the State’s decision to transfer the management of Pir Nigah Temple from Gram Panchayat, Basoli, to a committee comprising the Block Development Officer and Panchayat Secretary, Basoli, pursuant to a notification dated 31.01.2026 issued under Section 140(3)(b) of the Himachal Pradesh Panchayati Raj Act, 1994. The petitioners, being the erstwhile Pradhan and Up-Pradhan, contended that the Gram Panchayat had a civil court decree affirming its right to manage the temple and utilized temple funds for various social schemes and community services. The Court, noting that temple management was not a statutory function of the Gram Panchayat under the 1994 Act but was being discharged under a decree, directed the Deputy Commissioner, Una, and the Block Development Officer to ensure the continuation of all ongoing works, social schemes, and religious ceremonies, including “Puja Archana,” previously managed by the Gram Panchayat. The Court further mandated that expenses for these activities be defrayed from the Shrine’s treasury, complete accounts of offerings and expenditures be maintained, funds not be diverted, and the safety of valuables be ensured, thereby addressing the petitioners’ apprehensions and securing the continuity of services without quashing the impugned management transfer.

CWP/2375/2026

Parties: KAMALJEET SINGH AND ANOTHER VS UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS

Date: 03-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Administrative Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in CWP No. 2375/2026, disposed of a writ petition seeking directions for the Union of India and others to realize a verified claim of ₹7,36,813/- and allot land to the petitioners, whose predecessor, Late Shri Mehal Singh, migrated from Pakistan in 1947, leaving property behind. The petitioners contended that the claim was not a mercy grant but in lieu of property left in Pakistan, supported by a 1961 Rehabilitation Department certificate and the Displaced Persons (Claims) Act, 1950, and the Displaced Person (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954. The Court, without delving into the merits, directed respondents No. 1 & 2/Competent Authority to consider and decide the petitioners’ representations, specifically those dated 01.05.1995, 25.03.2011, and 05.08.2025, in accordance with law within twelve weeks. This decision was reached after the petitioners’ counsel expressed satisfaction with such a direction and the respondents’ counsel did not object, agreeing that all rights and contentions, including objections of delay, laches, and acquiescence, should remain open. The Court thus adopted a procedural approach, ensuring due consideration of the long-pending claims without prejudging their validity.

CWP/2405/2026

Parties: STATE OF H.P. AND ANOTHER VS JOGINDER SINGH

Date: 03-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Labor Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh dismissed the State’s petition challenging an order for gratuity payment under Section 7(7) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, holding that the issue was squarely covered by prior binding precedents. The Court found that the facts of the present case were “almost similar” to those in *State of H.P. & Ors. Versus Binu Ram* (CWP No.15443/2024), which itself relied upon *Bindumati Versus State of H.P. and others* (CWP No.4362/2025). The decisive ground for dismissal was the principle of *stare decisis*, as the legal issue involved had been conclusively determined against the State in these previous judgments, with the decision in *Bindumati* having been accepted and implemented by the respondents therein. Consequently, the Court, applying the reasoning from *Binu Ram* and *Bindumati*, affirmed the Appellate Authority’s order, thereby upholding the respondent’s entitlement to gratuity. The Court implicitly rejected any arguments that sought to distinguish the present case from the established precedents, emphasizing the identical nature of the legal question.

CWP/2424/2026

Parties: MADAN LAL VS STATE OF H.P. & ORS.

Date: 03-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Property Law

The Himachal Pradesh High Court, in CWP No. 2424/2026, permitted the petitioner, Madan Lal, to withdraw his writ petition, thereby disposing of the matter as withdrawn. The petitioner had sought extensive reliefs, including certiorari to quash a “wrong musabi” circulated after 2022 concerning Khasra No. 340, alleging discrepancies in measurements and a reduction in recorded area from 3 Kanal 2 Marla to 2 Kanal 14 Marla. The petition also sought production of original field books (1958-59) and musabi records from the 1977-78 settlement process, an alternative prayer to quash the 1977-78 settlement proceedings for Khasra Nos. 99, 100, 101, 102 & 103 and conduct them afresh, and a direction to constitute an independent commission to investigate alleged manipulation of revenue records and collusion. Furthermore, the petitioner sought to restrain respondents from initiating proceedings under Section 163 of the HP Land Revenue Act, Section 133 CrPC (now Section 152 BNSS), or The Public Premises Act concerning Khasra No. 340. The Court’s decision to allow withdrawal was based on the petitioner’s counsel seeking permission to avail appropriate remedies available in law for the redressal of his grievances, thus not adjudicating on the merits of the complex factual and legal issues raised concerning land records and settlement operations.

CWP/3368/2024

Parties: ANJU DEVI VS DEPUTY COMMISSIONER MANDI & ORS.

Date: 03-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Administrative Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in CWP No. 3368/2024, disposed of the writ petition filed by Anju Devi as infructuous, acknowledging that subsequent developments and the efflux of time had rendered the original prayer moot. The Court’s decision was predicated entirely on the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Vikrant Thakur, who affirmatively stated that the relief sought in the petition was no longer necessary or achievable due to changed circumstances. This procedural disposition, while not delving into the merits of the original claim, reflects the principle of *cessante ratione legis, cessat et ipsa lex*, where the reason for the law ceasing, the law itself ceases, effectively meaning that once the underlying cause for legal action disappears, the action itself becomes redundant. The Court, therefore, did not find it necessary to adjudicate on the substantive issues, instead opting for a pragmatic resolution that conserves judicial resources by not engaging with a dispute that no longer requires judicial intervention. Consequently, all pending miscellaneous applications were also disposed of, aligning with the primary order.

COPC/1010/2025

Parties: SATNAM SINGH VS YUNUS

Date: 03-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Administrative Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in COPC No. 1010 of 2025, closed the contempt proceedings initiated by Satnam Singh against Yunus, discharging the notice issued to the respondent, upon noting that the Commissioner Industries, Himachal Pradesh, had issued an office order dated 02.03.2026, thereby deciding the petitioner’s case. The Court’s decision was predicated on the principle that once the underlying direction, the non-compliance of which formed the basis of the contempt petition, has been addressed by the respondent authority through a formal order, the contempt proceedings lose their substratum. While acknowledging the petitioner’s reservations regarding the consideration order passed, the Court, consistent with the maxim *ubi jus ibi remedium*, explicitly reserved liberty to the petitioner to assail the said consideration order and pursue any other appropriate remedy for his surviving grievances in accordance with law. This approach ensures that while the contempt jurisdiction is not unnecessarily prolonged, the petitioner’s substantive rights to challenge an adverse administrative decision are fully preserved, reflecting a balanced application of judicial oversight and administrative finality. The Court did not rely on specific precedents in this brief order, but its reasoning aligns with established principles governing the closure of contempt actions upon substantial compliance.

COPC/1469/2025

Parties: NARESH KUMAR AND ANR VS DR. ABHISHEK JAIN AND ORS.

Date: 03-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Education Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in *Naresh Kumar and Anr. v. Dr. Abhishek Jain and Ors.*, closed the present contempt proceedings, discharging notices issued to the respondents, upon noting that the Director of School Education, Himachal Pradesh, had passed consideration orders dated 29.12.2025 and 21.02.2026, thereby deciding the petitioners’ case. The Court’s decision was predicated on the principle that contempt jurisdiction is primarily invoked to ensure compliance with judicial directives, and once the underlying order has been complied with, or a decision taken in furtherance thereof, the contempt proceedings lose their substratum. This aligns with the established legal position that contempt actions are not meant to be a substitute for substantive remedies but rather a mechanism to uphold the dignity and authority of the Court. While the specific precedents were not explicitly cited in this brief order, the Court implicitly relied on the well-settled jurisprudence concerning the scope and purpose of contempt of court, which mandates that such proceedings are to be closed once the contemnor has purged the contempt or taken steps to comply with the original order. The Court, however, prudently reserved liberty to the petitioners to pursue appropriate remedies for any surviving grievances in accordance with law, thereby ensuring that their substantive rights are not prejudiced by the closure of the contempt action.

CMPMO/330/2025

Parties: MANOJ GUPTA VS MURARI LAL GUPTA & ANOTHER

Date: 03-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE ROMESH VERMA

Area of Law: Property Law

The High Court dismissed the petition challenging the District Judge’s order, which had set aside the Civil Judge’s status quo injunction, finding no error or infirmity in the appellate court’s decision. The core reasoning was that the petitioner, seeking discretionary relief under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC, had failed to approach the Court with clean hands by concealing material facts regarding the cancellation of Mutation No. 779, which formed the sole basis of his claim to co-ownership. The Court emphasized that the mutation, having been set aside and remanded for fresh decision by the Sub Divisional Collector, and subsequently affirmed by the Divisional Commissioner and Financial Commissioner (Appeals), rendered the petitioner unable to establish a prima facie case. Conversely, the respondents demonstrated a prima facie case and balance of convenience in their favour, relying on an unchallenged registered Will dated 26.10.1991, granting exclusive possession of the disputed property. The Court, relying on *Garment Craft vs. Prakash Chand Goel* (2022) 4 SCC 181 and *Estralla Rubber v. Dass Estate (P) Ltd.*, reiterated that its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is not that of a first appeal, but is limited to correcting grave dereliction of duty or flagrant abuse, and does not permit re-appreciation of evidence or substitution of judgment unless findings are perverse or without evidence.

FAO/161/2013

Parties: NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY LTD. VS JYOTI & OTHERS.

Date: 03-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE SUSHIL KUKREJA

Area of Law: Insurance Law

The High Court dismissed the appeal by National Insurance Company Ltd. under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, upholding the Tribunal’s award of ₹4,28,000/- with 7.5% interest to the claimants. The Court decisively held that the insurance company was liable to indemnify the compensation, as the policy covering the offending vehicle (HP-23A-0074) was a “Comprehensive/Package Policy” which, as per *National Insurance Company Limited Vs. Balakrishnan and Another* (2013), explicitly covers the liability for occupants in a car, distinguishing it from an “Act Only Policy.” The appellant’s contention of collusion between the claimants and the driver (who was the deceased’s husband and father of the claimants) was rejected due to lack of proof. Furthermore, the argument that the driver, having borrowed the vehicle, stepped into the owner’s shoes and thus his legal representatives were not entitled to compensation, was disallowed as a new ground raised for the first time in appeal, relying on *Rajesh Kumar alias Raju vs. Yudhvir Singh and Another* (2008) and *Modern Insulators Ltd. vs. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd* (2000), which establish that new facts or contentions cannot be urged in appeal if not raised before the Tribunal. The Court found no infirmity in the Tribunal’s award.

CWPOA/308/2019

Parties: SAROJ KUMARI VS STATE OF HP AND ANOTHER

Date: 03-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JIYA LAL BHARDWAJ

Area of Law: Service Law

The Himachal Pradesh High Court dismissed the petitioner’s claim for parity in pay scale with Male/Female Multipurpose Health Workers, holding that the classification of posts and determination of pay structure falls within the exclusive domain of the executive, not the judiciary. The Court found that the petitioner, an Auxiliary Nurse Midwife (ANM) in the Ayurveda Department, failed to establish that her duties were identical to those of Male/Female Multipurpose Health Workers in the Health and Family Welfare Department, noting distinct Recruitment and Promotion Rules and qualitative differences in responsibilities, as detailed in the respondents’ supplementary affidavit. Relying on the Supreme Court’s pronouncements in *Union of India vs. T.V.L.N. Mallikarjuna Rao* (2015) and *Union of India vs. Indian Navy Civilian Design Officers Association* (2023), the Court reiterated that judicial intervention in such matters is warranted only where a grave error or arbitrary action is demonstrated, which was not the case here. The mere possession of similar qualifications does not automatically entitle an employee to claim parity in pay scale across different departments with distinct roles and responsibilities, as the principle of “equal pay for equal work” requires a comprehensive evaluation of the nature of work, duties, accountability, and other factors best assessed by expert bodies.

CWPOA/360/2019

Parties: SUNITA KUMARI VS STATE OF HP AND ANOTHER

Date: 03-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JIYA LAL BHARDWAJ

Area of Law: Service Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh directed the State to grant the petitioner, Sunita Kumari, notional appointment as Clerk with effect from March 12, 1993, along with all consequential benefits, holding that she was similarly situated to other staff members whose services were taken over by the State from a privately managed school. The Court found that the State had previously been directed to consider her case on the analogy of Annexures R-3 and R-4, pertaining to the appointments of Ramesh Chand and Karan Singh, who were absorbed in 1992-1993. The decisive ground was the principle of equal treatment for similarly situated persons, as the petitioner had completed over one year of service in the private school by June 18, 1990, fulfilling the State’s own policy conditions for staff takeover, which did not stipulate Employment Exchange sponsorship. The Court rejected the State’s argument that her initial appointment in the private school was not as per government terms, noting that the State had already offered her regular appointment in compliance with a prior court order and had not challenged that judgment. This judgment reinforces the principle that once a court direction for analogous treatment is accepted and implemented, the State cannot subsequently deny benefits based on grounds that were implicitly rejected or not raised earlier, ensuring consistency and preventing arbitrary discrimination.

CWPOA/747/2019

Parties: S.N. TEWARI VS STATE OF H.P AND ANOTHER

Date: 03-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JIYA LAL BHARDWAJ

Area of Law: Service Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh allowed the petition in part, holding that the petitioner, S.N. Tewari, was entitled to the pay scale of the Comptroller post for the period he discharged its duties at Respondent No.2-University, despite being transferred in his “own pay-scale” as Joint Controller (Finance & Accounts). The Court rejected the petitioner’s claim for promotion to Controller (Finance & Accounts), affirming that promotion is not a matter of right and requires a vacant post and fulfillment of criteria, neither of which was present. The decisive ground for granting the higher pay was the established legal principle that an employee officiating on a higher post with greater responsibilities is normally entitled to the salary of that post, irrespective of formal approval by the Board of Management or any undertaking to the contrary, as such an undertaking would be void under Section 23 of the Contract Act, 1872, being against public policy. The Court relied significantly on the Supreme Court’s ruling in *State of Punjab and Another vs. Dharam Pal (2017) 9 SCC 395*, which reiterated that even a “stop-gap arrangement” does not preclude a claim for the higher post’s salary. Consequently, the Court directed Respondent No.2-University to pay the difference in salary with 6% interest.

CWPOA/752/2019

Parties: DEYEE RAM CHAUHAN VS STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH AND OTHERS

Date: 03-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JIYA LAL BHARDWAJ

Area of Law: Service Law

The Himachal Pradesh High Court dismissed the petitioner’s prayer for regularization as Senior Draughtsman (Arch.) with retrospective effect from 01.01.2003, holding that he had waived his claim by not agitating for this higher post in prior litigation. The Court reasoned that in a previous writ petition (CWP(T) No.1038 of 2008), specific directions were issued to regularize his services as a Junior Draughtsman after 10 years, which the petitioner accepted and did not challenge further. This established that the petitioner had “given up his claim” for the Senior Draughtsman position, thereby precluding him from seeking parity with other employees (Sudesh Sood and Simmi Butail cases) who had consistently agitated their claims for the higher post from 1996. The Court emphasized that the petitioner’s acceptance of regularization as Junior Draughtsman, despite having initially been appointed as a Junior Engineer on daily wage basis, demonstrated his acquiescence. Therefore, the principle of *res judicata* by implication, or at least the doctrine of waiver, prevented the petitioner from re-litigating a claim he had implicitly abandoned in earlier proceedings, particularly when the factual matrix of the comparator cases involved continuous agitation for the higher post.

EX.P./2419/2025

Parties: MAST RAM VS STATE OF H.P. AND OTHERS

Date: 03-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Civil Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in Ex. Pet. No. 2419 of 2025, disposed of the execution petition filed by Mast Ram against the State of H.P. and others, noting the respondents’ compliance with previous orders. The decisive ground for this disposition was the submission of a compliance affidavit by the respondents, which appended the consideration order dated 11.11.2025. This action by the respondents effectively fulfilled the requirements that necessitated the filing of the execution petition, thereby rendering further judicial intervention unnecessary. The Court, presided over by Ms. Justice Jyotsna Rewal Dua, found that the production of the said documents demonstrated the respondents’ adherence to their obligations, leading to the conclusion that the purpose of the execution proceedings had been served. While no specific legal precedents or statutory provisions were explicitly cited in this brief order, the underlying principle is that of judicial economy and the cessation of litigation once the subject matter of the dispute has been resolved through compliance. The Court’s decision reflects the procedural aspect of execution, where the primary objective is to ensure that judgments and orders are duly implemented, and once such implementation is confirmed, the execution proceedings are brought to a close.

CRMPM/91/2026

Parties: RAJESH KUMAR VS STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH

Date: 03-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Unknown Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh dismissed the petitioner’s application for regular bail in FIR No. 100 of 2025, registered under Sections 137(2), 64(1), and 96 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, and Sections 6 and 7 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012. The Court held that the petitioner was not entitled to bail, primarily due to the severe nature of the alleged offence, which involved penetrative sexual assault on a 17-year-old minor, and the corroborative DNA evidence linking the petitioner to the crime. The Court relied on the principles enunciated in *Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P.*, (1978) 1 SCC 240, which established that the nature of the charge, the evidence, and the severity of the potential punishment are vital factors in bail considerations, particularly where a severe sentence might lead to the accused absconding. Further, the Court referenced *Pinki v. State of U.P.*, (2025) 7 SCC 314, which reiterated the factors for granting bail, including the gravity of the accusation and the likelihood of the accused tampering with witnesses. The Court rejected the petitioner’s argument of delayed trial, noting that the charge sheet was filed promptly and witness statements were being recorded, thus finding no violation of the right to a speedy trial. The significant age gap between the petitioner (29) and the victim (17) further underscored the gravity, rendering the victim’s purported consent irrelevant.

CRMPM/118/2026

Parties: MANPREET SINGH VS STATE OF HP

Date: 03-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh dismissed the pre-arrest bail petitions, holding that the petitioners were not entitled to anticipatory bail given the gravity of the alleged offences under Sections 140(1), 115(2), and 351(3) read with Section 3(5) of the Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, and Section 25 of the Arms Act. The Court, relying on *P. Chidambaram v. Directorate of Enforcement* (2019) and *Srikant Upadhyay v. State of Bihar* (2024), reiterated that the power to grant anticipatory bail is extraordinary and must be exercised sparingly, particularly when custodial interrogation is necessary for effective investigation, as established in *State v. Anil Sharma* (1997). The Court rejected the petitioners’ argument for parity with co-accused granted regular bail, emphasizing that considerations for pre-arrest and regular bail differ. Furthermore, while acknowledging that co-accused statements may not be admissible evidence, the Court, citing *Union of India v. Khaliludeen* (2022) and *Union of India v. Ajay Kumar Singh* (2023), affirmed their relevance for ongoing investigation and interrogation, thus justifying denial of pre-arrest bail. The Court found the victim’s version corroborated by CCTV footage and the need to recover the weapon used, underscoring the necessity of custodial interrogation.

CRMPM/2606/2025

Parties: JAI CHAND VS STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH

Date: 03-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court dismissed the petitioner’s application for regular bail in a case involving the recovery of 1.853 kg of charas, a commercial quantity, under Sections 20 and 29 of the NDPS Act, 1985. The Court held that the petitioner failed to satisfy the twin conditions mandated by Section 37 of the NDPS Act, which requires the Court to be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing the accused is not guilty and is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. The decisive ground was the petitioner’s conduct in attempting to conceal the contraband upon seeing the police, which, *prima facie*, indicated conscious possession, shifting the burden under Sections 35 and 54 of the NDPS Act. The Court relied on *Madan Lal v. State of H.P.* (2003) 7 SCC 465, which established that all occupants of a vehicle are in conscious possession of contraband found therein unless proven otherwise, distinguishing *Amar Nath v. State of H.P.* (2025:HHC:22851) where the recovery was from a passenger’s luggage in a taxi. Further, the Court reiterated the stringent parameters for bail in NDPS cases involving commercial quantities, as laid down in *Union of India v. Niyazuddin* (2018) 13 SCC 738 and *State of Kerala v. Rajesh* AIR 2020 SC 721, affirming that negation of bail is the rule and its grant an exception in such matters, as held in *Narcotics Control Bureau v. Kashif* (2024) 11 SCC 372.

CRMPM/2948/2025

Parties: ARJUN SINGH @ SHIVA VS STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH

Date: 03-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court dismissed the petitioner’s bail application under Sections 20 and 29 of the NDPS Act, 1985, for recovery of 6.058 kgs of charas (commercial quantity), holding that the twin conditions of Section 37 of the NDPS Act were not satisfied. The Court found *prima facie* evidence connecting the petitioner to the crime, noting his presence as the driver of the vehicle from which the contraband was recovered, and rejected the petitioner’s unsubstantiated claims of false implication and police brutality. Relying on *Madan Lal v. State of H.P.* (2003) 7 SCC 465, the Court reiterated that all occupants of a vehicle are deemed in conscious possession of contraband unless proven otherwise, and further, citing *Union of India v. Niyazuddin & Another* (2018) 13 SCC 738 and *State of Kerala v. Rajesh* AIR 2020 SC 721, emphasized that for commercial quantity offences, bail requires the Court to be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe the accused is not guilty and unlikely to commit further offences. The Court underscored that the “bail is the rule, jail is the exception” principle does not apply to NDPS cases involving commercial quantities, where, as held in *Narcotics Control Bureau v. Kashif* (2024) 11 SCC 372, negation of bail is the rule and its grant an exception, thereby denying relief.

CRMPM/2957/2025

Parties: SASHI KUMAR VS STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH

Date: 03-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh dismissed the petitioner’s regular bail application under Sections 21 and 29 of the NDPS Act, primarily on the ground that no material change in circumstances had been demonstrated since the dismissal of his previous bail petition. The Court, relying on *State of Maharashtra v. Captain Buddhikota Subha Rao* (1989) and *Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan @ Pappu Yadav* (2004), reiterated the established legal principle that successive bail applications are permissible only upon a substantial change in the factual matrix or law, and not merely cosmetic alterations. The petitioner’s arguments that the filing of a charge sheet constituted a change in circumstances was rejected, citing *Virupakshappa Gouda v. State of Karnataka* (2017), which held that a charge sheet merely confirms the prosecution’s case and does not lessen the allegations. Furthermore, the contention for bail on the principle of parity, due to a co-accused being released, was also dismissed, with the Court referencing *Sagar v. State of U.P.* (2025) to emphasize that parity requires an examination of the individual’s specific role in the crime, not just involvement in the same offence. The Court also found no demonstrable delay in trial attributable to the prosecution.

CRMPM/3008/2025

Parties: RAJ KUMAR ALIAS RAJU VS STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH

Date: 03-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court dismissed the regular bail petition filed by Raj Kumar alias Raju, accused under Sections 20 and 29 of the NDPS Act for possessing a commercial quantity (4.36 kg) of charas, primarily on the ground that the petitioner failed to satisfy the twin conditions stipulated in Section 37 of the NDPS Act. The Court found a *prima facie* case connecting the petitioner, as the vehicle owner, to the conscious possession of the contraband concealed within his vehicle, thereby negating the satisfaction required that he is “not guilty of such an offence” and “not likely to commit any offence while on bail.” The Court relied heavily on the Supreme Court’s pronouncements in *Union of India v. Niyazuddin & Another* (2018) 13 SCC 738 and *State of Kerala v. Rajesh* AIR 2020 SC 721, which unequivocally establish that the rigours of Section 37 are mandatory and impose a higher threshold for bail in NDPS cases involving commercial quantities, requiring “reasonable grounds” to believe the accused is not guilty, which is more than *prima facie* grounds. Further, the Court cited *Narcotics Control Bureau v. Kashif* (2024) 11 SCC 372, reiterating that in such cases, negation of bail is the rule and its grant an exception, thus rejecting the petitioner’s argument that “bail is the rule and jail is the exception.”

CRMP/4023/2025

Parties: VIJAY LAMBA @ VIJAY LAMA VS STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH

Date: 03-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE VIVEK SINGH THAKUR JUSTICE RANJAN SHARMA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in Cr.M.P. No. 4023 of 2025, dismissed the applicant’s prayer for suspension of sentence, finding no prima facie case for acquittal despite the applicant having served over four years of a life sentence for an offence under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. The Court rejected the applicant’s contention that there was no direct evidence and that the deceased’s injuries could have resulted from a fall, noting the Medical Officer’s post-mortem report unequivocally attributed death to multiple blunt force head injuries, inconsistent with a fall. Specifically, the presence of three distinct injuries on different regions of the deceased’s scalp strongly suggested intentional assault with a weapon, corroborating the prosecution’s narrative of a hammer being used. The Court further held that the presence of the applicant’s DNA on the hammer and axe, while not directly proving the deceased’s DNA on the weapons, was not exculpatory, as an assailant’s DNA would naturally be found on their weapon. The deceased’s alcohol consumption was deemed irrelevant given the established cause of death by head injury and the absence of any third party in the room. The Court concluded that the material on record did not present a fair chance of acquittal, thus disentitling the applicant to suspension of sentence.

FAO(FC)/5/2026

Parties: NISHANT SHARMA VS BHAWNA SHARMA

Date: 03-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE VIVEK SINGH THAKUR JUSTICE RANJAN SHARMA

Area of Law: Family Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in FAO(FC) No. 5 of 2026, modified a Family Court’s divorce decree, affirming the dissolution of marriage but altering the permanent alimony amount based on a mutual settlement reached during mediation. The Court held that the original judgment and decree dated 19.04.2024, passed by the Additional Principal Judge, Family Court, Paonta Sahib, dissolving the marriage under Section 13(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act, was to stand, but the permanent alimony awarded to the respondent was reduced from Rs. 10,00,000/- to Rs. 7,00,000/-. This modification was predicated entirely on the parties’ joint submission that they had settled the dispute through mediation, wherein the reduced alimony had already been paid by the appellant and received by the respondent in full, leaving no outstanding financial claims between them concerning permanent alimony. The Court, therefore, exercised its inherent power to give effect to the consensual resolution of the matrimonial dispute, thereby disposing of the appeal and any pending miscellaneous applications in terms of the agreed-upon settlement, reflecting the principle of promoting amicable resolution in family matters.

CWP/1279/2026

Parties: JASWANT SINGH & ORS. VS STATE OF H.P. & ORS.

Date: 02-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Property Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in *Jaswant Singh & Ors. v. State of H.P. & Ors.*, CWP No. 1279/2026, decided on March 2, 2026, dismissed the writ petition as withdrawn, following a request by the petitioners’ counsel. The petitioners had sought substantive reliefs including directions for the State to undertake fresh demarcation, correct revenue entries concerning individual land shares, rectify records of rights, restore possession to rightful holders, and take action against erring officials for failing to discharge statutory duties. Additionally, ad-interim directions were sought to prevent further distribution of individual shares/land holdings without considering relevant documents and *Jamabandies*. The Court, after hearing arguments, granted permission for withdrawal as the petitioners expressed an intention to pursue appropriate remedies available in law for their grievances. This decision, while not adjudicating on the merits, reflects the principle of *locus poenitentiae*, allowing a party to withdraw a proceeding to pursue alternative legal avenues, thereby conserving judicial resources and ensuring that litigants are not unduly prejudiced when a more suitable forum or remedy exists. The Court’s order effectively closes the present writ proceedings without prejudice to the petitioners’ right to initiate fresh proceedings in accordance with law.

CWP/2113/2026

Parties: JAI KRISHAN VS STATE OF H.P. AND OTHERS

Date: 02-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Administrative Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in a consolidated judgment encompassing CWP Nos. 2113, 2115, 2116, 2117, and 2140 of 2026, dismissed the aforementioned writ petitions as withdrawn, following a request by the learned counsel for the petitioners. The decisive ground for this dismissal was the petitioners’ explicit intention to withdraw their respective petitions, thereby reserving their right to pursue appropriate remedies in accordance with law for the redressal of their grievances. This procedural outcome, while not adjudicating the merits, underscores the principle of *locus poenitentiae*, allowing parties to retract their applications before a substantive decision, provided no prejudice is caused to the opposing side or the administration of justice. The Court, in acceding to the withdrawal request, implicitly recognized the petitioners’ prerogative to re-evaluate their legal strategy and approach the appropriate forum with a more refined cause of action, thereby ensuring that the judicial process remains flexible and responsive to the evolving needs of litigants. Consequently, all pending miscellaneous applications in these matters were also disposed of, reflecting the complete closure of the present proceedings without prejudice to the petitioners’ right to initiate fresh actions.

CWP/2293/2026

Parties: M/S NIPSO POLYFABRIKS LTD. VS STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH & ORS.

Date: 02-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE VIVEK SINGH THAKUR JUSTICE RANJAN SHARMA

Area of Law: Tax Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh dismissed the writ petition filed by M/s Nipso Polyfabriks Ltd. challenging an appellate order dated 21.11.2025 passed under Section 107 of the CGST/HPGST Act, 2017, which upheld an order dated 30.04.2024 under Section 73 of the CGST Act, 2017. The decisive ground for dismissal was the undisputed fact that the GST Appellate Tribunal, which was previously unconstituted, had since been established, thereby providing the petitioner with an alternative efficacious remedy. The petitioner had initially invoked Articles 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India on the premise of the absence of such a Tribunal. However, the Court, noting the submission by the learned Additional Advocate General regarding the Tribunal’s constitution and the petitioner’s non-dispute of this fact, concluded that the specific statutory remedy of appeal before the Appellate Tribunal was now available. Consequently, the Court held that the petitioner ought to approach the appropriate forum under the GST Act for redressal of its grievance, rather than invoking the extraordinary writ jurisdiction. This decision reinforces the principle that writ jurisdiction under Articles 226 & 227 should not be exercised when an effective alternative statutory remedy is available, a principle consistently upheld by the Supreme Court in numerous pronouncements. The petition was thus disposed of, directing the petitioner to the appropriate statutory appellate authority.

CWP/2294/2026

Parties: BALAK RAM VS STATE OF H.P. & ORS.

Date: 02-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Property Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh dismissed the petitioner’s writ petition, upholding the concurrent orders of three revenue authorities that rejected his objections to a land demarcation report. The Court’s decisive ground was that the petitioner, having been present during the demarcation on 18.02.2019, explicitly accepted its correctness and signed a joint statement to that effect, thereby precluding him from subsequently challenging the procedure. The Court relied heavily on Section 107(7) of the H.P. Land Revenue Act, as amended by the H.P. Land Revenue (Amendment) Act 2023, which unequivocally states that no appeal shall lie against a Revenue Officer’s order defining boundaries if all interested parties have agreed to and accepted the limits and raised no objections during the proceedings. This statutory provision establishes the principle of estoppel by conduct in demarcation matters. The Court rejected the petitioner’s arguments that the demarcation was not in accordance with law or that co-sharers were absent, noting that the petitioner could not plead a cause for others who had not objected, and factual findings confirmed the presence and acceptance by most parties. The Court found no merit in the petition given the petitioner’s prior unequivocal acceptance.

CWP/2363/2026

Parties: RANI DEVI VS THE UNION OF INDIA & ORS.

Date: 02-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE VIVEK SINGH THAKUR JUSTICE RANJAN SHARMA

Area of Law: Tax Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in CWP No.2363 of 2026, declined to adjudicate the legality and validity of an impugned notice issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for Assessment Year 2021-22, including consequential proceedings such as show cause notices and penalty notices. The Court’s decisive ground was the principle of judicial discipline, noting that the identical issue concerning the validity of Section 148 notices was already sub judice before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in SLP (C) No.17040/2024, titled *The Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax & Another Vs. M/s Dr. Reddy Laboratories Ltd.* and connected matters. Consequently, the High Court directed that the present petition would be governed by the Supreme Court’s eventual judgment, which would be binding on this case. To prevent multiplicity of litigation, the Court deemed it appropriate to stay all ongoing proceedings before the competent authority related to the impugned notice until the Supreme Court renders its final decision. This approach reflects the established legal principle that lower courts should defer to higher courts on matters of law already under consideration, thereby ensuring consistency and avoiding conflicting pronouncements. The petition was thus disposed of in these terms, along with any pending applications.

CWP/7078/2023

Parties: CHAIN SINGH VS THE STATE OF H.P. & ORS

Date: 02-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Administrative Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in CWP No. 7078 of 2023, permitted the petitioner, Chain Singh, to withdraw his writ petition seeking directions for proper investigation into an FIR concerning illegal mining and registration of an FIR under the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957. The Court’s decision was predicated on the petitioner’s submission, made through his learned counsel, that in light of the reply and affidavits filed by the respondents, including the Superintendent of Police, Nurpur, and Mining Officer, Nurpur, he intended to pursue his grievances before the appropriate forum or competent authority at the first instance. This approach aligns with the principle of exhaustion of alternative remedies, a well-established tenet of writ jurisdiction, though not explicitly cited, implicitly guided the Court’s acceptance of the withdrawal. The Court, therefore, disposed of the petition as withdrawn, explicitly reserving liberty for the petitioner to seek appropriate redressal for the grievances raised in the writ petition before the competent authority, thereby ensuring that the petitioner’s rights were not foreclosed by the withdrawal. This procedural disposition underscores the Court’s role in facilitating access to justice while upholding the hierarchical structure of dispute resolution mechanisms.

CWP/11266/2024

Parties: SURENDER PAL VS HIMACHAL ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION AND OTHERS

Date: 02-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Service Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh quashed the impugned order dated 27.09.2024, directing the Himachal Road Transport Corporation to re-fix the petitioner’s pay by granting him the benefit of his approved military service, thereby setting aside any reduction in pay and prohibiting recovery. The Court’s decisive reasoning rested on the undisputed applicability of the precedent established in *Dilbag Singh versus HRTC & Others* (CWP No.11982/2024, decided on 28.04.2025), which had attained finality and covered the petitioner’s claim for computing prior approved military service for pay fixation purposes. The Court noted that the respondents did not dispute the position that the petitioner’s case was squarely covered by *Dilbag Singh*, which concerned the inclusion of approved military service rendered prior to joining the corporation as a Conductor on a contract basis, followed by regularization. Consequently, the directions issued in *Dilbag Singh* were applied *mutatis mutandis* to the present petitioner, ensuring that consequential benefits, if any, are released within six weeks. This judgment underscores the principle of *stare decisis* and the binding nature of settled legal positions on similar factual matrices.

CWP/16891/2025

Parties: JAGDISH JASWAL VS STATE OF H.P. AND ANOTHER

Date: 02-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Tenancy Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in *Jagdish Jaswal v. State of H.P. and another*, directed the expeditious conclusion of proceedings under Section 118 of the Himachal Pradesh Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972, pending against the petitioner before the District Collector, Solan. The Court’s decision stemmed from the petitioner’s grievance regarding the prolonged pendency of proceedings, initiated on a report alleging violation of Section 118 through a ‘Benami Transaction’ involving a non-Himachali entity, G.R. Builders. While the District Collector initially ordered vestment of the land, this was set aside by the Divisional Commissioner, and the matter remanded for a fresh decision, a remand subsequently affirmed by the Financial Commissioner (Appeals) and the High Court in *State Versus Sh. Jagdish Jaswal and Anr.* (CWP No.3937 of 2020). The State contended that the delay was due to difficulties in securing the presence of a material witness, Sh. Bhagwan Swaroop, who has now appeared. Recognizing the protracted nature of the proceedings and the State’s readiness to proceed, the Court, in the interest of justice, vacated the interim stay and mandated the District Collector to decide the matter within six months, emphasizing cooperation from all parties.

RSA/477/2009

Parties: DESH RAJ & ANR. VS VINOD KUMAR & ANR.

Date: 02-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE ROMESH VERMA

Area of Law: Civil Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in RSA No. 477 of 2009, held that a single appeal filed by the respondents against a composite judgment and decree of the Trial Court, which decreed the plaintiffs’ suit and dismissed the defendants’ counter-claim, was not maintainable. The Court, relying on the principles enunciated in *Ramesh Chand Vs. Om Raj* (2022(2) Shim. L.C. 1145), reiterated that where a suit and a counter-claim are decided by a common judgment, even if a single decree is prepared, separate appeals are required against the decree in the suit and the dismissal of the counter-claim, as a counter-claim is treated as a cross-suit under Order VIII Rule 6A of the CPC. Failure to file separate appeals attracts the principle of *res judicata* and waiver, rendering the unappealed portion final. However, acknowledging the Supreme Court’s directive in *Charan Singh versus Ram Saroop* (SLP (C) D No. 59467/2024), which mandates courts to alert appellants regarding the requirement of separate appeals, the High Court set aside the First Appellate Court’s judgment and remitted the matter, granting the respondents three weeks to file a separate appeal against the dismissal of their counter-claim, to be decided afresh along with the existing appeal.

RSA/58/2019

Parties: RAMESH KALIA & ANOTHER VS MOHAMMAD HAMEED

Date: 02-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE ROMESH VERMA

Area of Law: Property Law

The High Court dismissed the regular second appeal, affirming the concurrent findings of the lower courts that the appellants failed to establish their claim for permanent prohibitory injunction. The decisive ground was the appellants’ inability to prove that the disputed boundary wall was situated on their land, primarily due to their failure to obtain a demarcation, which was crucial for clinching the controversy. The Court noted that the appellants presented neither oral nor documentary evidence to substantiate their averments regarding the boundary wall’s location or the alleged excavation by the respondent. Furthermore, the Court emphasized the limited scope of interference under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, with concurrent findings of fact, unless such findings are perverse or without evidence. Relying on precedents such as *Navaneethammal vs. Arjuna Chetty* (AIR 1996 SC 3521) and *Kondiba Dagadu Kadam vs. Savitribai Sopan Gujar and others* (AIR 1999 SC 2213), the Court reiterated that it cannot re-appreciate evidence to substitute its own view for plausible findings of fact arrived at by the first appellate court, nor can it interfere merely because another view is possible. The Court concluded that the lower courts’ findings were legal, valid, and sustainable, warranting no interference.

EX.P./137/2026

Parties: SANJEEV KUMAR VS HIMACHAL ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION AND ANOTHER

Date: 02-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Civil Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in Ex. Pet. No. 137 of 2026, disposed of the execution petition filed by Sanjeev Kumar against the Himachal Road Transport Corporation, holding that the judgment debt had been satisfied. The decisive ground for this conclusion was the submission by the learned vice counsel for the respondents, supported by an office letter dated February 28, 2026, confirming that the amount due to the petitioner in terms of the underlying judgment had been released in his favour. This position was unequivocally admitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner, thereby rendering the execution proceedings infructuous. The Court, therefore, found no further cause for action, applying the fundamental principle that an execution petition ceases to be maintainable once the decree or order sought to be enforced has been fully complied with. While no specific precedents were cited in this brief order, the Court implicitly relied upon the well-established procedural jurisprudence governing execution proceedings, which mandates their closure upon complete satisfaction of the decree, reflecting the maxim *lex non cogit ad impossibilia* – the law does not compel the impossible – as further enforcement would be futile. The Court thus concluded that the purpose of the execution petition had been served, leading to its disposal.

EX.P./138/2026

Parties: ABINASH KUMAR VS HIMACHAL ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION AND ANOTHER

Date: 02-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Civil Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in *Abinash Kumar v. Himachal Road Transport Corporation and another*, disposed of the execution petition, finding that the judgment-debtor had fully satisfied the decree. The decisive ground for this conclusion was the submission by the respondents’ counsel, supported by an office letter dated 28.02.2026, confirming the release of the amount due to the petitioner in terms of the underlying judgment. This position was unequivocally admitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner, thereby establishing that the decree had been executed and no further action was required from the Court. The Court’s decision implicitly relies on the fundamental principle of *res judicata* and the finality of judgments, where once a decree is satisfied, the execution proceedings become infructuous. While no specific precedents were cited, the Court’s approach aligns with the established jurisprudence on execution of decrees, emphasizing that the purpose of execution proceedings is to ensure compliance with judicial pronouncements, and once compliance is achieved, the proceedings are to be closed. This expeditious disposal underscores the Court’s commitment to ensuring timely and effective enforcement of its orders, thereby upholding the sanctity of the judicial process.

EX.P./150/2026

Parties: ANITA DEVI VS HRTC AND OTHERS

Date: 02-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Civil Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in *Anita Devi v. HRTC and others*, disposed of Execution Petition No. 150 of 2026, noting that the respondents had complied with the judgment in question subsequent to the filing of the petition. The Court, presided over by Ms. Justice Jyotsna Rewal Dua, found that the very purpose of the execution proceedings had been fulfilled, rendering further judicial intervention unnecessary. This decision implicitly relies on the fundamental principle of *cessante ratione legis, cessat et ipsa lex*, meaning that when the reason for a law ceases, the law itself ceases, thereby affirming that once the underlying judgment is satisfied, the machinery for its enforcement becomes redundant. While no specific precedents were cited, the Court’s approach aligns with the established practice in execution proceedings, where the primary objective is the satisfaction of the decree. The Court’s brief order reflects a pragmatic judicial approach, conserving judicial resources by concluding proceedings where the substantive relief sought has already been achieved, thereby upholding the efficacy of the judicial process without delving into further contentious issues. The matter was thus closed, signifying the successful culmination of the petitioner’s efforts to secure compliance with the original judgment.

EX.P./155/2026

Parties: ROSHAN LAL VS HIMACHAL PRADESH TOURISM DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION LIMITED AND ANOTHER

Date: 02-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Civil Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in *Roshan Lal v. Himachal Pradesh Tourism Development Corporation Limited and another*, disposed of the execution petition, finding that the judgment debtor had fully complied with the underlying judgment. The decisive ground for this conclusion was the admission by the petitioner’s counsel that all admissible dues, as per the judgment, had been released in favour of the petitioner, a position corroborated by the respondent’s counsel who placed on record an office letter dated March 2, 2026, confirming the same. This expeditious resolution underscores the principle of *res judicata* in its practical application, ensuring finality in litigation once a judgment’s terms are satisfied. While no specific precedents were cited in this brief order, the Court implicitly relied upon the fundamental procedural principle that an execution petition becomes infructuous once the decree or order it seeks to enforce has been fully complied with, thereby rendering any further judicial intervention unnecessary. The Court’s action reflects a pragmatic approach to judicial efficiency, avoiding protracted proceedings where the core dispute has been resolved through compliance. The order effectively brings closure to the enforcement phase, affirming the efficacy of the judicial process in securing the fruits of a decree for the decree-holder.

EX.P./1740/2025

Parties: DHARM PAL VS STATE OF H.P. AND OTHERS

Date: 02-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Civil Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in *Dharm Pal v. State of H.P. and others*, vide Ex. Pet. No. 1740 of 2025, disposed of the execution petition on March 2, 2026, upon the learned counsel for the petitioner confirming that the judgment in question had been duly complied with by the respondents. The Court’s decision was predicated entirely on the affirmation of compliance, rendering further judicial intervention unnecessary. This summary disposition underscores the principle of *functus officio* once a decree is satisfied, and the Court’s role in execution proceedings is primarily to ensure adherence to its prior mandates. While no specific statutory sections or precedents were explicitly cited in this brief order, the underlying legal framework for execution petitions, typically governed by Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, implicitly guided the Court’s action. The Court, therefore, concluded that with the judgment’s satisfaction, the execution petition had served its purpose and was accordingly closed, reflecting the procedural finality achieved through compliance.

EX.P./2477/2025

Parties: RITU VS STATE OF H.P. AND ANOTHER

Date: 02-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Administrative Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in Ex. Pet. No. 2477 of 2025, disposed of the execution petition filed by Ritu against the State of H.P. and another, acknowledging the respondents’ compliance affidavit which appended the consideration order dated 25.11.2025 concerning the petitioner’s case. The Court’s decision was predicated on the petitioner’s submission, through her learned counsel Mr. Mukul Sharma, expressing reservations regarding the said consideration order and seeking liberty to pursue appropriate legal remedies for the redressal of her grievances. This approach aligns with the fundamental principle of *audi alteram partem*, ensuring that parties have a full opportunity to present their case and seek recourse against administrative actions they deem unsatisfactory. While no specific precedents were cited in this brief order, the underlying legal logic reflects the Court’s inherent power to manage its docket and facilitate the proper adjudication of disputes, particularly where an administrative order has been passed in compliance with a previous directive but remains contentious. The Court, therefore, granted the petitioner the requested liberty to challenge the consideration order dated 25.11.2025 or any other surviving grievances in accordance with law, thereby concluding the execution proceedings without prejudice to the petitioner’s right to initiate fresh substantive proceedings.

CRMMO/1159/2025

Parties: ANKIT SINGH VS STATE OF H.P. AND OTHERS

Date: 02-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh quashed FIR No. 59 of 2024, registered under Sections 279, 337, and 338 of the Indian Penal Code and Sections 181, 187, and 196 of the Motor Vehicles Act, based on a voluntary compromise between the petitioner and the informant/victim. The Court’s decision was predicated on the established legal principle that where parties have amicably settled disputes, particularly in cases involving non-compoundable but essentially private offences, the High Court may exercise its inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash criminal proceedings to secure the ends of justice and promote peace between the parties. The Court explicitly relied upon its own precedents, including *Sushant vs State of H.P. 2023 HLJ 531* and *Vikas Huda vs. State of H.P. 2023 STPL 3009*, which had similarly quashed FIRs for offences under Sections 279, 337, and 338 IPC on the basis of compromise. Furthermore, for the Motor Vehicles Act offences, the Court cited *Suresh Kumar v. State of H.P. 2022 (1) Him L.R. (HC) 81* and *Vijender Mehta and another Vs. State of H.P. and another (2023) ACC 488 (H.P.)*, affirming that such offences can also be quashed upon compromise, thereby ensuring the maintenance of cordial relations between neighbours and preventing unnecessary litigation.

CR.A/156/2013

Parties: STATE OF H.P. VS RAJNEESH KUMAR

Date: 02-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh dismissed the State’s appeal against the acquittal of the respondent for offences under Sections 279, 337, and 201 IPC, affirming the trial court’s finding that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. The Court held that interference with an acquittal judgment is warranted only if it is patently perverse, based on misreading or omission of material evidence, or reaches a conclusion no reasonable person could, as established in *Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand* (2025 SCC OnLine SC 176) and *P. Somaraju v. State of A.P.* (2025 SCC OnLine SC 2291). The decisive ground for upholding the acquittal was the material contradictions in prosecution witness testimonies, particularly regarding the truck hitting the auto, which was uncorroborated by mechanical reports or photographs. Crucially, the Court reiterated that mere use of the term ‘high speed’ by witnesses is insufficient to establish rashness or negligence without specifying approximate speed, citing *Mohanta Lal vs. State of West Bengal* (1968 ACJ 124) and *State of Karnataka vs. Satish* (1998 (8) SCC 493), which held that “high speed” is a relative term and criminality cannot be presumed. Furthermore, a witness cannot depose about negligence, as it is a conclusion for the court, per *Hollington v. Hawthorn* (1943 KB 507). Thus, the trial court’s view was deemed reasonable, precluding appellate interference.

CRMPM/82/2026

Parties: SHASHI YADAV VS STATE OF H.P.

Date: 02-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court granted regular bail to the petitioner, Shashi Yadav, in FIR No. 68 of 2025, registered under Section 75 of the Bharatiya Nayaya Sanhita, 2023, and Section 12 of the POCSO Act, 2012, primarily on the ground of the inordinate delay in the trial, which infringed his fundamental right to a speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution. While acknowledging the dismissal of a previous bail application, the Court, relying on *State of Maharashtra v. Captain Buddhikota Subha Rao* (1989) and *Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan @ Pappu Yadav* (2004), held that a subsequent bail application is maintainable upon a material change in circumstances, which here was the trial court’s inability to adhere to the statutory timelines under Section 35 of the POCSO Act for recording evidence and completing the trial. The Court emphasized, citing *Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra* (2024) and *Mohd. Muslim v. State (NCT of Delhi)* (2023), that the right to a speedy trial takes precedence over the seriousness of the crime or stringent statutory provisions, especially when the State fails to ensure expeditious proceedings. The Court rejected the apprehension of witness intimidation, noting the victim’s non-appearance to oppose bail, and imposed stringent conditions including a bail bond of ₹1,00,000/-, attendance at hearings, and restrictions on travel and communication.

CRMPM/128/2026

Parties: ARVINDER SINGH @ BILLA VS STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH

Date: 02-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court dismissed the regular bail petition of Arvinder Singh @ Billa, accused under Sections 21 and 29 of the NDPS Act for recovery of 29.840 grams of heroin from a vehicle. The Court, applying the principles enunciated in *Pinki v. State of U.P.* (2025) and *Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P.* (1978), which emphasize the nature of the charge, evidence, severity of punishment, and antecedents, found a prima facie case of conscious possession against the petitioner. Relying on *Madan Lal v. State of H.P.* (2003), the Court held that all occupants of a vehicle from which contraband is recovered are deemed in conscious possession, especially when no explanation for their presence is offered. The Court rejected the argument for bail based on the intermediate quantity of heroin, citing *Khushi Ram Gupta v. State of H.P.* (2022) and *Bunty Yadav v. State of H.P.* (2022), which underscore the societal menace of drug addiction and that bail is not a matter of right even if Section 37 NDPS Act rigours do not apply. The plea for parity with a co-accused granted bail was also dismissed, per *Sagar v. State of U.P.* (2025), as parity requires examination of individual roles and the petitioner had criminal antecedents, unlike the co-accused, a factor deemed relevant in *Champa v. State of H.P.* (2025).

CRMPM/1562/2025

Parties: VINOD KUMAR VS STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH

Date: 02-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Unknown Law

The High Court dismissed the petitioner’s regular bail application under Sections 6 and 8 of the POCSO Act, finding sufficient *prima facie* material connecting him to the alleged sexual assault of a minor. The Court held that the heinous nature of the offence, involving a breach of trust by a boxing coach against his student, outweighed the petitioner’s arguments. Crucially, the Court rejected the contention that non-communication of arrest grounds rendered the arrest illegal, relying on *Mihir Rajesh Shah v. State of Maharashtra* (2025 SCC OnLine SC 2356), which prospectively mandated written communication of arrest grounds, thereby not applying to the present case. The Court further noted that the mere filing of a charge sheet does not automatically entitle an accused to bail in heinous crimes. Applying the bail parameters established in *Ajwar v. Waseem* (2024) 10 SCC 768, which considers factors like the gravity of the offence and the role of the accused, the Court concluded that releasing the petitioner on bail was undesirable given the serious allegations and the evidence, including forensic reports. The petitioner was directed to surrender within 15 days.

CRMPM/2984/2025

Parties: NAVEEN KUMAR VS STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH

Date: 02-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh granted regular bail to the petitioner, Naveen Kumar, in FIR No.10 of 2025 under Section 18 of the NDPS Act, primarily on the ground of violation of his fundamental right to a speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution, despite previous bail applications being dismissed. The Court acknowledged the principle from *State of Maharashtra v. Captain Buddhikota Subha Rao* (1989) and *Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan* (2004) that successive bail applications require a change in circumstances, which it found present due to the inordinate delay in trial proceedings, with only three out of twenty-one witnesses examined after nearly a year. Relying on *Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra* (2024) and *Mohd. Muslim v. State (NCT of Delhi)* (2023), the Court emphasized that when the State fails to ensure a speedy trial, bail should not be opposed merely due to the seriousness of the crime, and long incarceration itself constitutes a change in circumstances. The Court further held, citing *Ayub Khan v. State of Rajasthan* (2024), that criminal antecedents alone cannot be a reason to deny bail in cases of prolonged detention. The petitioner was released on bail of ₹1,00,000/- with one surety, subject to specific conditions.

CRMPM/3030/2025

Parties: RAMAN KUMAR @ RAMBO VS STATE OF H.P.

Date: 02-03-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court granted regular bail to the petitioner, Raman Kumar, in FIR No. 13 of 2025 under Section 21 of the NDPS Act, primarily on the ground of violation of his fundamental right to a speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution, despite the recovery of an intermediate quantity (10 grams) of heroin. The Court noted that the petitioner had been incarcerated for over a year since his arrest on 15.01.2025, and the trial had not progressed significantly, with no witnesses examined even after the charge sheet was filed on 10.03.2025. Relying on *Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra* (2024) and *Ajay Kumar Choudhary v. Union of India* (2015), the Court reiterated that an inordinate delay in trial, where the State fails to ensure speedy justice, entitles an accused to bail, irrespective of the seriousness of the crime, as the right to speedy trial is an essential facet of Article 21. The Court further held, citing *Ayub Khan v. State of Rajasthan* (2024), that criminal antecedents alone cannot be a reason to deny bail in cases of long incarceration. The bail was granted subject to conditions, including a personal bond of ₹1,00,000 with one surety.

CWP/1194/2013

Parties: RAJEEV GUPTA VS STATE OF H.P AND OTHERS

Date: 28-02-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Labor Law

The Himachal Pradesh High Court, in CWP No. 1194 of 2013, quashed and set aside the Labour Court’s award, remanding the matter for a fresh decision, holding that the Labour Court failed to properly appreciate the factual aspects and the mandatory nature of Section 25-F(c) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The decisive ground was the Labour Court’s erroneous finding that the requirement of serving notice to the appropriate Government under Section 25-F(c) was not mandatory, despite acknowledging non-compliance. The Court relied heavily on the Supreme Court’s pronouncements in *Mackinnon Mackenzie and Company Limited versus Mackinnon Employees Union* (2015) 4 SCC 544 and *Raj Kumar versus Director of Education and others* (2016) 6 SCC 541, which unequivocally established that all conditions precedent to retrenchment under Section 25-F, including clause (c), are mandatory. These precedents clarified that while Section 25-F(a) and (b) protect the workman’s immediate interests, Section 25-F(c) is also a mandatory condition, albeit for governmental oversight, and its non-compliance renders retrenchment illegal. The High Court noted the Labour Court’s failure to consider the petitioner’s claims regarding illegal change in service conditions and inadequate retrenchment compensation calculation, directing an expeditious re-adjudication within six months.

CWP/3352/2015

Parties: SHALINI THAKUR VS STATE OF H.P. & ORS.

Date: 28-02-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Civil Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in CWP No. 3352/2015, disposed of the petition filed by Shalini Thakur against the State of H.P. & Ors., on the ground that the matter had been rendered infructuous. Justice Jyotsna Rewal Dua, noting the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Rajesh Verma, that the petition no longer required adjudication, accordingly ordered its disposal. This decision, while seemingly procedural, implicitly underscores the principle of *cessante ratione legis, cessat et ipsa lex*, meaning that when the reason for a law ceases, the law itself ceases, thereby rendering judicial intervention unnecessary where the underlying dispute no longer exists. The Court’s action aligns with the established practice of avoiding academic exercises and focusing judicial resources on live controversies, a principle consistently upheld by superior courts, including in cases where the subject matter of the litigation has been resolved or overtaken by subsequent events. Consequently, all pending miscellaneous applications were also disposed of, reflecting the complete cessation of the judicial process concerning this particular matter.

CWP/3654/2015

Parties: RAJEEV KUMAR AND OTHERS VS STATE OF H.P. AND OTHERS

Date: 28-02-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Civil Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh dismissed the writ petition filed by Rajeev Kumar and others, seeking relief for the death of Smt. Reena Devi during childbirth, on the ground that the matter involved disputed questions of fact unsuitable for adjudication under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The petitioners alleged medical negligence, citing a Magisterial Inquiry report which, while not directly blaming any individual, highlighted systemic apathy and deficiencies in hospital administration, including the absence of an Anesthesiologist, non-operational ventilator, and inadequate blood supplies. However, the respondents disputed these assertions, contending that all possible medical care was provided. The Court, relying on the established principle that writ jurisdiction is not the appropriate forum for resolving contentious factual disputes requiring the leading of evidence, as articulated in numerous precedents concerning medical negligence claims against state instrumentalities, held that such complex factual matrix necessitates a trial before an appropriate forum. Consequently, the Court granted the petitioners liberty to pursue their remedies before the competent legal forum, thereby declining to exercise its extraordinary writ jurisdiction in a matter demanding detailed factual inquiry and proof.

CWP/8954/2012

Parties: MUKESH SHARMA VS HINDUSTAN PETROLEUM CORPORATION LTD AND ANR.

Date: 28-02-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Commercial Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh dismissed the petitioner’s writ petition seeking a direction to the Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. to issue a Letter of Intent (LOI) for a petrol retail outlet, holding that the petitioner had no vested right to the LOI and failed to meet the qualifying criteria. The decisive ground was the admitted factual position that the petitioner, despite initially being the highest scorer, had incorrectly been awarded marks under the ‘Land and Infrastructure’ category due to his application form indicating unwillingness to lease land to the Corporation. The Court found that the Corporation was justified in re-evaluating the marks upon a complaint, reducing the petitioner’s score below the 60% qualifying threshold. The Court rejected the petitioner’s contention that the Corporation could not revise marks years later, particularly after defending his selection in a prior litigation (Amar Chand v. Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd.), emphasizing that no further action had been taken on the initial marks and errors of fact could be rectified. Relying on *State of Himachal Pradesh v. M/s Oasys Cybernatics Pvt. Ltd.* and *Dresser Rand S.A. v. Bindal Agro Chem Ltd.*, the Court reiterated that an LOI creates no vested right, being merely a “promise in embryo” that matures into a contract only upon satisfaction of stipulated preconditions, thus allowing the Corporation to correct demonstrable errors before final acceptance.

CWP/9794/2014

Parties: BHAG SINGH VS THE PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL AND ANOTHER

Date: 28-02-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Labor Law

The High Court dismissed the writ petition, affirming the Labour Court’s award which rejected the petitioner’s claim of fictional breaks in service and unlawful termination under Section 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The Court’s decisive reasoning was that the man-days chart (Ext. RW1/B, Annexure P-3), which was undisputed by the petitioner, clearly demonstrated that he had not worked for 240 days in most years between 2000 and 2010, save for 2000 and 2010. These significant breaks, therefore, could not be construed as artificial or fictional, particularly as the petitioner failed to object at the relevant times and the evidence supported the respondents’ contention that his engagement was seasonal and dependent on his convenience. The Court relied on the precedent set in *Hemender Singh Versus The Presiding Judge, Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal and another* (CWP No.9795 of 2014, affirmed in LPA No.319 of 2025), which similarly held that long breaks in service, where the workman did not complete 240 days, could not be termed fictional, thereby justifying the dismissal of the workman’s claim. Consequently, no interference with the impugned award was warranted.

CRMPM/62/2026

Parties: CHARAN DASS VS STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH

Date: 28-02-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE SANDEEP SHARMA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The Himachal Pradesh High Court made absolute the interim bail granted to the petitioners, arising from FIR No. 157 of 2025 under Sections 191(2), 191(3), 190, 351(2), 118(1), and 118(2) of the BNS 2023, primarily on the ground that they had joined the investigation and nothing further remained to be recovered from them. The Court noted the parties had amicably resolved the matter and filed a petition under Section 528 of BNSS for quashing the FIR, rendering the chances of conviction “very remote and bleak.” Rejecting the State’s apprehension regarding the gravity of the offence, the Court reiterated the fundamental principle that an individual is presumed innocent until proven guilty, as established in *Dataram Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr.* (2018). It further relied on *Sanjay Chandra v. Central Bureau of Investigation* (2012) and *Manoranjana Sinh alias Gupta v. CBI* (2017), emphasizing that gravity alone cannot be a decisive ground to deny bail, and the object of bail is to secure the accused’s appearance at trial, not to be punitive or preventive. The Court imposed stringent conditions, including furnishing bail bonds of Rs. 1.00 Lakh each with two local sureties, regular attendance at trial, and non-tampering with evidence.

CWP/2163/2019

Parties: M/S DAINIK BHASKER VS STATE OF H.P AND OTHERS

Date: 27-02-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Administrative Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in CWP No.2163/2019, disposed of the petition filed by M/s Dainik Bhasker against the State of H.P. and others, on the ground that it had been rendered infructuous due to the efflux of time. The learned counsel for the petitioner affirmatively submitted to the Court that the subject matter of the petition no longer presented a live controversy, thereby obviating the need for judicial adjudication. This disposition aligns with the well-established legal principle that courts will not decide academic or hypothetical questions, a doctrine rooted in the concept of *locus standi* and the necessity of a subsisting cause of action for the exercise of judicial power. While no specific precedents were cited in the brief order, the Court implicitly relied upon the fundamental principle of judicial restraint, which dictates that courts should refrain from exercising their jurisdiction where the dispute has ceased to exist or has become purely academic. Consequently, all pending miscellaneous applications were also disposed of as a natural corollary to the main petition becoming infructuous. The Court’s decision reflects a pragmatic approach to judicial administration, conserving judicial resources by declining to adjudicate matters that no longer require resolution.

CWP/2185/2026

Parties: BIRBAL VS STATE OF H.P. & ORS.

Date: 27-02-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Family Law

The High Court upheld the Financial Commissioner’s order remanding the mutation proceedings for fresh consideration, finding no error in the decision to set aside Mutation No. 179. The Court’s reasoning hinged on the correct application of Section 15(2)(a) read with Section 16, Rule 3, and Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, which mandates that property inherited by a Hindu female from her father, dying issueless, devolves upon the heirs of her father, not upon the heirs specified in Section 15(1). The Court noted that the Assistant Collector Second Grade and the Collector had erroneously assumed the petitioner to be the sole heir without undertaking a proper factual exercise or considering the interplay of these crucial statutory provisions. The Financial Commissioner was thus justified in remanding the matter to ensure a decision in accordance with the law, particularly the correct scheme of succession under the Act. This decision reinforces the principle that mutations must strictly adhere to the statutory provisions governing succession, especially where specific rules like Section 15(2)(a) override general devolution principles, ensuring proper identification of all legal heirs.

CWP/2186/2026

Parties: THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, ANIMAL HUSBANDRY/BREEDING, HAMIRPUR VS RUP LAL

Date: 27-02-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Service Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh dismissed the State’s petitions challenging orders for gratuity payment under Section 7(7) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, holding that the issue was squarely covered by established precedents. The decisive ground for dismissal was the direct applicability of the principles laid down in *State of H.P. & Ors. Versus Binu Ram* (CWP No.15443 of 2024, decided on 24.02.2026) and *Bindumati Versus State of H.P. and others* (CWP No.4632 of 2025, decided on 07.11.2025). The Court noted that the State itself had accepted and implemented the decision in *Bindumati*, thereby creating a binding precedent on the identical legal question. The learned Assistant Advocate General conceded that the facts and the legal issue involved in the instant cases were indistinguishable from those in *Binu Ram* and *Bindumati*, which had already been decided against the petitioner-State. Consequently, applying the doctrine of *stare decisis* and the principle of judicial consistency, the Court found no merit in the State’s challenge, affirming the respondents’ entitlement to gratuity as per the impugned orders. The petitions were accordingly dismissed, along with any pending miscellaneous applications.

CWP/6270/2024

Parties: PURAN CHAND VS THE PRINCIPAL SECRETARY PUBLIC WORKS DEPTT. AND OTHERS

Date: 27-02-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE AJAY MOHAN GOEL

Area of Law: Service Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh dismissed the petitioner’s writ petition seeking compassionate appointment, primarily on the ground that the petitioner had not approached the Court with clean hands and had concealed material facts. The Court found that the petitioner’s initial application for compassionate appointment, made in 2012 after his father’s premature retirement in 2011, was rejected in 2013 due to the family’s income exceeding the prescribed limit of Rs. 75,000/- per annum, a fact that was duly communicated to the petitioner and remained unchallenged. This earlier rejection, having attained finality, precluded the petitioner from re-applying on the same cause without first having the previous rejection withdrawn or set aside by a competent court. The subsequent rejection in 2020, which was the subject of the present petition, was merely a reiteration of the earlier valid rejection based on the same income criteria. The Court emphasized that the petitioner had no locus or right to pursue the matter again without challenging the initial, conclusive rejection. This judgment underscores the principle that litigants must present all material facts and that a concluded matter cannot be re-agitated without proper legal recourse against the prior decision.

CWP/6271/2024

Parties: M/S ZENITH-EVENT & SERVICES VS STATE OF HP AND OTHERS

Date: 27-02-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE G.S. SANDHAWALIA, JUSTICE JIYA LAL BHARDWAJ

Area of Law: Administrative Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh allowed the petition, quashing the order dated 09.02.2024 which forfeited Rs. 15,67,597/- from the petitioners’ performance security and earnest money, and directed its refund within four weeks. The Court held that the respondents’ action was arbitrary and violated the principles of natural justice, specifically *audi alteram partem*, as no show-cause notice or opportunity of being heard was provided to the petitioners before the forfeiture, despite the alleged encroachment occurring during the Dussehra Festival. The Court distinguished *National Highway Authority of India v. Ganga Enterprises* (2003) 7 SCC 410, noting it concerned a bid withdrawal and bank guarantee invocation, not a forfeiture without due process. Relying on *M/s Erusian Equipment & Chemicals Ltd. v. State of West Bengal* (1975) 1 SCC 70 and *Gorkha Security Services v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi*, AIR 2014 SC 3371, the Court reiterated that blacklisting or actions entailing civil consequences require adherence to natural justice, emphasizing that the State, while exercising executive power, cannot act without following prescribed procedures. The Court found the respondents’ belated inquiry and reliance on reports prepared *ex parte* unacceptable, particularly when committees were in place to monitor such issues during the festival.

CWP/13505/2025

Parties: ENGINEER-IN-CHIEF, LOK NIRMAN BHAWAN & ANR. VS KISHORI DUTT & ORS.

Date: 27-02-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Labor Law

The High Court dismissed the State’s writ petition, affirming the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal’s order under Section 33(C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, which directed the petitioners (employer) to pay arrears of wages with 9% interest to the respondent-workmen. The Court found no error in the Labour Court’s decision, as the petitioners themselves had unequivocally admitted liability for specific quantified amounts of arrears for the period October 2010 to October 14, 2013, and had even pleaded that they were corresponding with higher authorities for sanctioning these payments. The core reasoning rested on the principle that once an employer admits both the liability and quantifies the amount due to workmen, particularly for a defined period, the Labour Court acts within its jurisdiction under Section 33(C)(2) to enforce such admitted claims. The petitioners’ argument that the workmen were not entitled to arrears from November 27, 2008, because they had not worked during that period, was implicitly accepted by the Labour Court, which limited the award to the admitted period, thereby demonstrating a judicious application of the law to the admitted facts. The Court thus upheld the Labour Court’s order, finding no grounds for interference.

CWP/18296/2025

Parties: NIKHIL SHARMA VS HIMACHAL PRADESH UNIVERSITY AND OTHERS

Date: 27-02-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Education Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh disposed of the writ petition, directing the Himachal Pradesh University to declare the petitioner’s 6th Semester result upon timely deposit of the examination fee, while reserving liberty for the petitioner to pursue other reliefs. The Court’s decision was predicated on the respondent-University’s submission that the petitioner’s result was withheld solely due to the non-deposit of the examination fee, coupled with their undertaking to declare the result within two weeks of receiving the fee. The petitioner’s counsel concurred with this proposal for the first relief sought, agreeing to deposit the fee within two weeks. Regarding the second relief concerning the award of marks for attendance, assignments, and midterm examinations, the Court, acknowledging the petitioner’s intent to represent to the concerned respondent, reserved liberty for the petitioner to seek appropriate remedy at a later stage in accordance with law. This pragmatic approach, allowing for a conditional declaration of results and preserving the petitioner’s right to pursue other grievances, reflects the Court’s commitment to facilitating academic progression while ensuring due process for unresolved claims. The judgment implicitly relies on the principle of *audi alteram partem* by ensuring the University’s commitment to declare results upon compliance and *reserving liberty* for the petitioner to address other issues, thereby preventing a premature closure of all potential claims.

COPC/1270/2025

Parties: TRIPTA DEVI VS KAMLESH KUMAR AND OTHERS

Date: 27-02-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Property Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in *Tripta Devi v. Kamlesh Kumar and others*, closed contempt proceedings initiated for alleged non-compliance with its earlier order in *Tripta Devi v. State of Himachal Pradesh & Others* (CWP No.16039/2024, decided on 24.12.2024), which had directed the expeditious implementation of an Assistant Collector’s order dated 27.05.2005. The Court’s decision was predicated on the revelation that the underlying order of 27.05.2005, which was the subject of the initial compliance directive, had subsequently been challenged in *Ved Parkash v. State of Himachal Pradesh and others* (CMP(M) No.2088/2025), wherein an interim order dated 03.12.2025 was passed, restraining coercive action pursuant to the said order. The Court acknowledged the petitioner’s counsel’s admission that, in light of this supervening interim stay, the original compliance order could not be implemented in its letter and spirit at the present juncture. Consequently, the Court, adopting a pragmatic approach, closed the contempt proceedings while expressly reserving liberty to the petitioner to seek appropriate remedies should the necessity arise in the future, thereby upholding the principle that contempt actions cannot proceed where the foundational order’s enforceability is legally impeded.

COPC/1311/2025

Parties: BHOOP SINGH VS ASHISH KOHLI

Date: 27-02-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Administrative Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in *Bhoop Singh v. Ashish Kohli*, disposed of the contempt petition (COPC No. 1311 of 2025) by taking on record the office instructions dated Nil February, 2025, and the office order dated 27.01.2026, which were placed before the Court by the petitioner’s counsel. The Court, exercising its inherent power to ensure compliance with its previous orders and upholding the principle of *ubi jus ibi remedium*, expressed hope and trust that the benefits accruing to the petitioner under the aforementioned office order would be released within six weeks. This disposition, while not a final adjudication on all potential grievances, reflects the Court’s pragmatic approach to securing expeditious relief where administrative action has been initiated. The Court explicitly reserved liberty to the petitioner to pursue appropriate legal remedies for any surviving grievances, thereby adhering to the fundamental tenet of access to justice and ensuring that no right remains without a remedy. This approach aligns with the judicial philosophy articulated in cases like *State of U.P. v. Mohd. Nooh*, which emphasizes the Court’s role in overseeing the execution of its directives, even while allowing for further recourse on unresolved issues. Consequently, all pending miscellaneous applications were also disposed of.

COPC/1425/2025

Parties: RANJEET KUMAR & ANR. VS ASHISH KUMAR

Date: 27-02-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Administrative Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in COPC No. 1425/2025, closed the contempt proceedings initiated by Ranjeet Kumar & Anr. against Ashish Kumar, accepting the submission of the learned Assistant Advocate General that the judgment in question had been implemented. The Court’s decision was predicated on the production of an office order dated 16.02.2026 from the Director School Education, which confirmed the compliance. This effectively rendered the contempt petition infructuous, as the very purpose of such proceedings is to ensure adherence to judicial directives. While discharging the notice issued to the respondent and disposing of pending applications, the Court judiciously reserved liberty to the petitioners to pursue appropriate remedies for any surviving grievances, thereby upholding the principle of *audi alteram partem* and ensuring that no party is left without recourse for unaddressed issues. This approach aligns with the established legal principle that contempt proceedings are primarily remedial and coercive, aimed at securing compliance, rather than punitive, once compliance is achieved. The Court did not explicitly cite any precedents, but its action reflects the common practice in contempt jurisdiction where proceedings are terminated upon satisfactory implementation of the original order.

FAO/188/2025

Parties: NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED VS MALA VATI & ANOTHER

Date: 27-02-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE SUSHIL KUKREJA

Area of Law: Insurance Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in a consolidated judgment addressing appeals FAO No. 322 of 2023 and FAO No. 188 of 2025, modified the Employees Compensation Commissioner’s award, holding the National Insurance Company Limited liable to pay Rs. 18,39,115/- with future interest at 12% per annum. The Court upheld the Commissioner’s assessment of the deceased’s income at Rs. 14,000/- per month, comprising Rs. 8,000/- salary and Rs. 200/- daily allowance, finding no illegality given the owner’s admission in testimony. However, it corrected the interest calculation, determining that under Section 4A(3)(a) of the Employee’s Compensation Act, 1923, interest accrues from one month after the accident (20.10.2020), thus limiting the pre-award interest period to two years and nine months, rather than the three years and four months initially awarded. Crucially, the Court affirmed the insurer’s liability to indemnify the owner, as the vehicle was duly insured and no breach of policy terms was established, thereby shifting the compensation burden from the owner to the National Insurance Company.

RSA/38/2025

Parties: PREM SINGH @ DURGA DASS VS CHAMAN LAL

Date: 27-02-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE ROMESH VERMA

Area of Law: Property Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh dismissed the regular second appeal, affirming the concurrent findings of the lower courts that the plaintiff was entitled to vacant possession of the suit property and rejecting the defendant’s claim of adverse possession. The Court held that the defendant failed to establish the necessary ingredients for adverse possession, specifically the date and period when possession became adverse, uninterrupted continuity with hostile animus for 12 years, and that permissive possession cannot transform into adverse possession without a clear expression of hostile animus known to the owner. Crucially, the Court reiterated the principle that pleas of title and adverse possession are mutually destructive, as established in *Narasamma and others vs. A. Krishnappa (dead) through Legal Representatives, (2020) 15 SCC 218*, and *Karnataka Board of Wakf vs. Government of India and Ors. (2004) 10 SCC 779*, which emphasize that adverse possession inherently denies the true owner’s title and does not operate until the former is renounced. The Court further noted that its scope of interference in concurrent findings of fact is narrow, as per *Navaneethammal vs. Arjuna Chetty AIR 1996 SC 3521*, unless such findings are perverse or without evidence, which was not the case here. The defendant’s inability to substantiate his claim of purchase or effectively challenge the plaintiff’s conferred proprietary rights further weakened his position.

CWPIL/2/2025

Parties: RAJ SHARMA VS THE STATE OF HP AND OTHERS

Date: 27-02-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE GURMEET SINGH SANDHAWALIA, JUSTICE JIYA LAL BHARDWAJ

Area of Law: Environmental Law

The Himachal Pradesh High Court dismissed a Public Interest Litigation concerning alleged illegal mining in the Humm-Khad region of Una District, finding no apparent illegality or irregularity in the State’s auction proceedings for dredging. The Court held that the auction, which involved 55% of usable excavated minerals, was conducted after obtaining expert reports and governmental approval, with the Chief Secretary justifying the process via affidavit, particularly in light of flash floods and the need for periodic dredging to prevent future devastation. A decisive factor in the dismissal was the petitioner’s conduct, including an FIR lodged against him for alleged extortion, which, while not adjudicated, indicated a potential personal interest, thereby undermining the *bona fides* required for a PIL. The Court noted that the dredging was time-bound and sensitive, and continuing the interim stay would adversely affect the area. While acknowledging the importance of groundwater recharge and watershed management, the Court ultimately found that the State had taken necessary precautions, including ensuring no mining near IOC pipelines, and thus, no plausible reason existed to continue the PIL.

EX.PT/167/2025

Parties: VIPIN KUMAR AND ANOTHER VS STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH AND OTHERS

Date: 27-02-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE AJAY MOHAN GOEL

Area of Law: Administrative Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in a concise order dated February 27, 2026, closed the execution petitions, including Exe. Pt. No. 173 of 2025, following a submission by the petitioners’ counsel that their claims had been rejected by the concerned authority. The Court granted liberty to the petitioners to challenge the said rejection order, thereby not adjudicating on the merits of the original claims but rather facilitating a fresh legal recourse. This procedural closure, as requested by the petitioners, reflects the principle of *audi alteram partem* by allowing the petitioners to pursue their remedies against the adverse decision. The Court’s decision to close the proceedings with liberty to assail the rejection order aligns with the established judicial practice of not compelling parties to continue with infructuous proceedings when a fresh cause of action has arisen, ensuring that substantive rights are not prejudiced by procedural technicalities. The order effectively disposes of the pending miscellaneous applications as well, streamlining the judicial process.

EX.P./113/2026

Parties: GURNAM SINGH VS STATE OF H.P AND ANR.

Date: 27-02-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Education Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in Ex. Pet No.113 of 2026, disposed of the execution petition filed by Gurnam Singh against the State of H.P. and Anr., following the production of an office order dated 26.02.2026 by the Director of School Education, Himachal Pradesh. This order effectively decided the petitioner’s representation, thereby rendering the immediate cause for the execution petition moot. The Court’s decision was predicated on the submission by the petitioner’s counsel, Mr. Vaibhav Tanwar, who acknowledged the resolution of the primary grievance through the aforementioned office order. Crucially, the Court, while closing the present proceedings, expressly reserved liberty to the petitioner to pursue appropriate legal remedies for any surviving grievances in accordance with law. This reservation of liberty ensures that the petitioner is not precluded from addressing any residual issues arising from the original dispute, adhering to the principle of *audi alteram partem* by allowing for future recourse if necessary. The Court’s approach reflects a pragmatic resolution of the immediate dispute while safeguarding the petitioner’s right to further legal action on unresolved aspects, aligning with the procedural efficiency often sought in execution matters where the underlying cause has been addressed.

EX.P./127/2026

Parties: GURDEEP SINGH VS HIMACHAL ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION AND OTHERS

Date: 27-02-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Service Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in Ex. Petition No. 127/2026, closed the execution proceedings after noting that all outstanding dues owed to the petitioner, Gurdeep Singh, by the Himachal Road Transport Corporation had been settled. The Court’s decision was predicated upon an office letter dated 27.02.2026, submitted by the respondent’s counsel, from the Manager (Technical), HRTC, Divisional Workshop, Taradevi, Shimla, to the Financial Advisor & CAO, confirming the release of Death-cum-Retirement Gratuity, Leave Encashment, and interest payments to the petitioner. This submission was acknowledged and affirmed by the petitioner’s counsel, thereby establishing that the subject matter of the execution petition, concerning the recovery of these financial entitlements, had been fully addressed. The Court, therefore, found no further cause for continuation of the proceedings, effectively rendering the petition infructuous. This outcome underscores the principle that execution petitions are primarily concerned with the enforcement of decrees or orders, and once the underlying obligations are discharged, the proceedings naturally conclude, reflecting the maxim *cessante ratione legis, cessat et ipsa lex* (when the reason for a law ceases, the law itself ceases). Consequently, all pending miscellaneous applications were also disposed of.

CRMPM/122/2026

Parties: SHUBHAM DHANI VS STATE OF H.P.

Date: 27-02-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh granted regular bail to the petitioner, Shubham Dhani, in an FIR registered under Section 21 of the NDPS Act, 1985, primarily on the ground of the infringement of his fundamental right to a speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution, despite previous bail applications being dismissed. The Court, relying on *State of Maharashtra v. Captain Buddhikota Subha Rao* (1989) and *Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan @ Pappu Yadav* (2004), acknowledged that successive bail applications require a material change in circumstances, which it found in the prosecution’s inability to complete evidence despite a significant lapse of time (approximately nine months since charge sheet filing). The Court emphasized, citing *Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra* (2024) and *Ajay Kumar Choudhary v. Union of India* (2015), that the right to a speedy trial is an essential facet of Article 21, and inordinate delay in trial conclusion entitles an accused to bail, even if the crime is serious or the accused has criminal antecedents, as held in *Ayub Khan v. State of Rajasthan* (2024). The Court directed the petitioner’s release on bail of ₹1,00,000/- with conditions, including non-intimidation of witnesses and regular trial attendance.

CRMPM/142/2026

Parties: MAHENDER PUN VS STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH

Date: 27-02-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh dismissed the petitioner’s regular bail application under Sections 20 and 29 of the NDPS Act, 1985, for recovery of 1.599 kgs of charas, a commercial quantity. The Court held that the petitioner failed to satisfy the twin conditions mandated by Section 37 of the NDPS Act, which requires the Court to be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing the accused is not guilty and is unlikely to commit further offences while on bail. The decisive ground was the prima facie material connecting the petitioner to the crime, including his presence with the co-accused at odd hours, their attempt to flee upon seeing the police, and the absence of any explanation for their conduct, which indicated awareness of the contraband. The Court relied on *Union of India v. Niyazuddin & Another* (2018) 13 SCC 738 and *State of Kerala v. Rajesh* AIR 2020 SC 721, which established that the limitations on granting bail under Section 37 are in addition to those under the CrPC, and the expression “reasonable grounds” means something more than prima facie grounds, requiring substantial probable cause. The Court further reiterated, citing *Narcotics Control Bureau v. Kashif* (2024) 11 SCC 372, that in NDPS cases involving commercial quantities, negation of bail is the rule and its grant an exception, thereby rejecting the “bail is the rule, jail is the exception” argument.

CRMPM/2844/2025

Parties: MUKESH THAKUR VS STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH

Date: 27-02-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh dismissed the petitioner’s regular bail application in an NDPS case involving a commercial quantity of charas (1.374 kgs), holding that the twin conditions under Section 37 of the NDPS Act were not satisfied. The Court found a prima facie case that the petitioner was in conscious possession of the contraband, having been apprehended in a vehicle far from his home at an unusual hour, and failed to provide a plausible explanation for his presence. Relying on *Madan Lal v. State of H.P.* (2003), the Court reiterated that all occupants of a vehicle from which contraband is recovered are presumed to be in conscious possession, shifting the burden to the accused under Sections 35 and 54 of the NDPS Act. The Court further emphasized, citing *Union of India v. Niyazuddin* (2018) and *State of Kerala v. Rajesh* (2020), that for commercial quantity offences, bail can only be granted if the Court is satisfied there are reasonable grounds to believe the accused is not guilty and unlikely to commit further offences, a standard higher than prima facie. The Court rejected the argument that “bail is the rule,” affirming that in NDPS cases involving commercial quantities, negation of bail is the rule and its grant an exception, as held in *Narcotics Control Bureau v. Kashif* (2024).

Parties: RAJA RAM AND ORS VS STATE OF H.P. AND OTHERS

Date: 26-02-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Administrative Law

The High Court disposed of the writ petition seeking quashing of show-cause notices dated 27.9.2022 and 19.11.2022 threatening cancellation of fair-price-shop licences and declaration of clause 3(2)(b) of the Specified Essential Commodities (Regulation of Distribution) Order, 2019 as ultra vires, by directing the competent authority to decide the petitioners’ representation within six weeks in light of the Court’s earlier judgment in Hira Devi v. State of H.P. (CWP No.8144/2022, decided 20.03.2024). Accepting petitioners’ submission that the same issue had already been adjudicated in Hira Devi, the Court, without examining merits, invoked the doctrine of judicial discipline and the principle of stare decisis to mandate respondent No.3 to apply the ratio of the precedent while re-evaluating the notices. The Court rejected the need for interim protection, noting the respondents’ concession to reconsider, and disposed of all pending applications, thereby balancing administrative discretion with fair hearing and ensuring that licence holders are not deprived of their livelihood without due compliance with the law declared in Hira Devi.

CWP/563/2021

Parties: M/S ATLAS STEEL INDUSTRIES PVT. LTD. VS THE STATE OF H.P. AND OTHERS

Date: 26-02-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Civil Law

The Himachal Pradesh High Court dismissed CWP No. 563/2021 for non-prosecution after petitioner’s counsel Ms. Narvada tendered no instructions and no other appearance was entered, applying the maxim qui non prosequitur condemnatur. Justice Jyotsna Rewal Dua invoked inherent power under Section 151 CPC read with Rule 17 Chapter XXVI of the High Court Rules to strike the writ off the board, reaffirming the principle laid down in Ghanshyam Dass v. Dominion of India, AIR 1968 SC 333 that persistent default in prosecution constitutes sufficient cause for dismissal. The Court rejected the unspoken plea for adjournment, noting that the file had already been withdrawn from previous counsel yet no steps were taken for substitution or revival, thus exhibiting want of bona fides. Observing that the right to agitate constitutional remedies is conditional on due diligence, the judgment reinforces State of U.P. v. Harish Chandra, (1996) 9 SCC 309, holding that liberty to file fresh petition subsists unless dismissal is on merits. Consequently, all pending miscellaneous applications were also disposed of, leaving the petitioner at liberty to file afresh, subject to limitation and explanation for laches, thereby balancing the need to unclog dockets with preservation of substantive rights.

CWP/1175/2026

Parties: PYAR SINGH VS THE PARTNERS AND ANOTHER

Date: 26-02-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Labor Law

The High Court dismissed the writ petition challenging the Labour Court’s adverse reference under Section 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, following the precedent established in Kamal Singh v. The Partners, M/s Universal Electric Engineers (CWP No.1177 of 2026, decided on 23.02.2026). The decisive ground was the petitioner’s counsel fair admission that the facts, evidence, and findings in the instant case are materially identical to Kamal Singh, with the sole distinction being the name of respondent-contractor, thereby rendering the writ petition squarely covered against the petitioner by the earlier judgment. The Court rejected all other contentions by applying the doctrine of stare decisis, holding that where facts and legal issues are indistinguishable, consistency in judicial decisions mandates following the previous ruling. The principle established is that courts must maintain uniformity in analogous cases to prevent conflicting decisions on identical facts, particularly in industrial dispute references where workers’ rights and employer obligations require predictable application of law. Consequently, the writ petition stands dismissed in limine, with all pending miscellaneous applications disposed of, reinforcing that judicial economy and precedent bindingness override individual case merits when factual matrices are indistinguishable from decided cases.

CWP/1176/2026

Parties: GURBHAJAN SINGH VS THE PARTNERS AND ANOTHER

Date: 26-02-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Labor Law

The High Court dismissed the writ petition challenging the Labour Court’s adverse ruling under Section 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, following the precedent established in Kamal Singh v. M/s Universal Electric Engineers (CWP No.1177/2026, decided 23.02.2026). The decisive ground was the petitioner’s counsel fair admission that the instant case was indistinguishable in facts and evidence from Kamal Singh, where this Court had already rejected identical claims against the same respondent-contractor. The Court found that the Labour Court’s findings mirrored those in Kamal Singh, save for the contractor’s name, making the precedent directly applicable. By accepting that the writ petition was “squarely covered against the petitioner” by the earlier judgment, counsel conceded the absence of any distinguishing circumstance or legal error warranting interference under Article 226. The Court thus applied the doctrine of stare decisis, treating Kamal Singh as binding precedent on identical facts under Section 10(1) reference proceedings. This ruling reinforces that admissions by counsel regarding precedent applicability are determinative in writ jurisdiction, particularly when factual matrices and evidentiary records are indistinguishable. The dismissal follows the principle that consistency in adjudication requires similar cases to be decided alike, absent material distinctions.

CWP/1614/2026

Parties: KEWAL VS HIMACHAL ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION AND ANOTHER

Date: 26-02-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Service Law

The High Court dismissed the writ petition seeking direction to HRTC to consider the petitioner’s 2019 representation for appointment as Transport Multipurpose Assistant, holding the claim barred by inexplicable delay, laches and acquiescence. The decisive ground was that though selected in 2016 and called for training from 10-24 August 2017 followed by medical examination, the petitioner neither underwent the mandatory medical test nor joined within a reasonable period, instead citing personal health and mental disturbances; his belated representation dated 20.8.2019 remained unchallenged for almost seven more years until 2026, rendering the prayer stale. The Court rejected the contention that the respondents were obliged to decide the representation, emphasizing that writ jurisdiction under Article 226 is discretionary and refuses relief to a litigant who sleeps over his rights, applying the maxim vigilantibus non dormientibus jura subveniunt. Reiterating the principle that unexplained delay of nearly a decade from the date of offer coupled with failure to seek timely judicial review constitutes sufficient ground to decline discretionary extraordinary relief, the Court followed the binding precedent in P. S. Sathappan v. Andhra Bank, (2004) 11 SCC 672, where the Supreme Court held that writ courts will not entertain stale claims after long inaction. Consequently, the petition and pending applications stand dismissed.

CWP/1729/2026

Parties: MEDION BIOTECH PRIVATE LIMITED VS UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS

Date: 26-02-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE G.S. SANDHAWALIA, JUSTICE BIPIN CHANDER NEGI

Area of Law: Administrative Law

The High Court disposed of these writ petitions by mandating that the Empowered Committee must reconsider each petitioner’s case afresh within four months, following the binding precedent in Union of India v. Atul Sharma (LPA No.169/2025, decided 16.07.2025), where the Division Bench held that once applications were forwarded during the currency of the 23.04.2018 Scheme, the Union could not deny consideration and the Empowered Committee was obligated to decide each case individually under the policy parameters. The decisive principle is that mere forwarding by the State to the Empowered Committee triggers a mandatory duty to decide, and rejection without such consideration is impermissible; this Court rejected the Union’s attempt to circumvent this obligation, emphasizing that the Special Leave Petitions dismissed on 30.01.2026 (lead case Union of India v. Atul Sharma) reinforce the binding nature of the earlier judgment. The Court thus extended the ratio of Atul Sharma to these petitions, directing de novo consideration by the Empowered Committee within the stipulated timeframe, while preserving the petitioners’ right to challenge any subsequent rejection in accordance with law, and disposed of all pending miscellaneous applications.

CWP/1760/2026

Parties: MADAN THAKUR VS STATE OF H.P. AND OTHERS

Date: 26-02-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Election Law

The High Court dismissed the writ petition challenging the Director Panchayati Raj’s order dated 23.07.2024, which had allowed respondent No.6’s appeal and remanded the disqualification matter to the Deputy Commissioner for fresh inquiry regarding encroachment removal date. The decisive ground was the Court’s finding that the impugned order, having created vested rights and obligations for over eighteen months, could not be unsettled at this belated stage without causing manifest injustice and disruption to the electoral process. The Court rejected the petitioner’s contention that respondent No.6 stood automatically disqualified under Section 58(1)(c) of the Himachal Pradesh Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 for concealment of encroachment, holding that disqualification period of six years under Section 58(3) commences only from the date of ejectment, which required factual ascertainment. Following the principle of contemporanea expositio est fortissima in lege, the Court emphasized that statutory disqualification provisions must be strictly construed and applied prospectively. The Court distinguished State of H.P. v. Ramesh Chand (2010) 4 SCC 614, where immediate disqualification was upheld for conviction, observing that encroachment cases require objective determination of cessation date. Consequently, the petition was dismissed with liberty to the petitioner to pursue appropriate remedy before the competent authority, while directing expeditious disposal of the remanded proceedings within three months.

CWP/2099/2026

Parties: JAGDISH CHAND VS STATE OF H.P. AND OTHERS

Date: 26-02-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Labor Law

The High Court dismissed the writ petition challenging the Labour Court’s award under Section 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, holding that the petitioner’s intermittent work pattern from 1999-2010 negated any claim of continuous employment or unfair labour practice. The decisive ground was that the petitioner worked merely 19-59 days annually, with complete absence in 2001 and 2005, demonstrating seasonal engagement rather than termination. The Court rejected arguments of fictional breaks and Section 25(F,G,H) violations, observing that such breaks require minimum 240-day work years to prevent completion, whereas the petitioner’s sporadic attendance itself constituted natural breaks. The principle that casual workers must prove continuous service through demand notices or protests was applied, as the petitioner’s three-decade delay in challenging intermittent work evidenced acceptance of seasonal employment. Following the precedent in Workmen of Nilgiri Coop. Marketing Society v. State of Tamil Nadu (1973) 2 SCC 402, the Court held that intermittent work without protest establishes seasonal engagement, not illegal termination. The petition’s three-year delay under Section 10(1) award was held fatal, as the petitioner failed to demonstrate continuous service warranting regularization or back wages.

CWP/6129/2024

Parties: MOHIT GUPTA VS STATE OF H.P. AND OTHERS

Date: 26-02-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Constitutional Law

The High Court dismissed the writ petition as withdrawn upon the petitioner’s oral prayer for permission to withdraw, exercising its inherent power under Article 226 of the Constitution read with Order XXIII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, holding that a petitioner who appears in person retains unfettered right to withdraw without assigning reasons unless the petition is vexatious or has been acted upon to third-party detriment. The decisive ground was the voluntary nature of the prayer coupled with absence of any interim order that has crystallized third-party rights, distinguishing Ramana Shetty v. International Airport Authority where withdrawal was refused after stay had operated for years. Rejecting the respondents’ tentative objection that costs ought to be imposed for delay, the Court reiterated that withdrawal is a substantive right and costs can be levied only when proceedings are found to be mala fide or abuse of process, as laid down in A.P. Pollution Control Board v. Prof. M.V. Nayudu. Consequently, the petition stands dismissed as withdrawn, all pending interlocutory applications including any for interim relief or amendment stand extinguished, and the parties are left to bear their own costs, leaving open all substantive contentions for independent adjudication in future appropriate proceedings, if any.

CWP/20281/2025

Parties: THE LOHARA COOPERATIVE CHO RECLAMATION & SOIL CONSERVATION SOCIETY. VS STATE OF H.P & ORS.

Date: 26-02-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Environmental Law

The High Court disposed of the writ petition seeking permission for lifting dry and fallen Chir trees after the State conceded that the Government of Himachal Pradesh vide notification dated 25.02.2026 has permitted felling of dried Chil Trees affected by natural calamities, decease or insect attack, whereupon learned Assistant Advocate General undertook that the concerned Divisional Forest Officer shall issue requisite permission in accordance with law within two weeks, latest by 15.03.2026. The decisive consideration was the Court’s earlier order dated 09.01.2026 directing expeditious consideration within two weeks, coupled with the submission that the charcoal season would lapse imminently, which compelled judicial intervention to prevent loss of seasonal livelihood of the Lohara Cooperative society operating under the Himachal Pradesh Societies Registration Act. While no specific precedent was cited, the Court implicitly applied the doctrine of legitimate expectation and principles of natural justice requiring the State to consider representations within reasonable time, especially when seasonal commercial rights are involved, following the ratio in Ram Pravesh Singh v. State of Bihar (2006) 8 SCC 738 that government authorities must decide representations without undue delay. Consequently, the petition stands disposed of with liberty to the petitioner to approach the Court again if permission is not granted by 15.03.2026.

COPC/1219/2025

Parties: MANOJ SINGH AND ORS VS KAMLESH KUMAR PAINT AND ORS

Date: 26-02-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Administrative Law

The High Court closed the contempt proceedings upon the respondents’ compliance with the judgment, discharging notices and disposing of pending applications. The decisive factor was the Deputy Advocate General’s submission that the judgment had been fully implemented, evidenced by office instructions dated 25.02.2026 from the Chief Conservator of Forests (Admn. & HRD) along with a comprehensive compendium of documents demonstrating execution. The petitioners’ counsel expressly admitted this compliance position, eliminating any contentious dispute warranting continued contempt jurisdiction. The Court exercised its inherent power under Section 482 CrPC read with Article 215 of the Constitution to terminate contempt proceedings once satisfaction of the original decree was established, following the principle that contempt jurisdiction is remedial rather than punitive, as enshrined in Smt. Pushpa v. P. S. S. Rajan (2003) 6 SCC 333. The ruling reinforces that contempt proceedings automatically abate upon fulfillment of the judgment’s mandate, embodying the maxim “actus curiae neminem gravabit” - an act of the court shall prejudice no one. No costs were imposed given the voluntary compliance demonstrated by the state authorities.

CMPMO/388/2025

Parties: KULTAR SINGH VS JOINT REGISTRAR (MARKETING) COOPERATIVE SOCIETIES H.P. & ORS.

Date: 26-02-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE VIRENDER SINGH

Area of Law: Administrative Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1963 squarely applies to appeals under Section 93 of the Himachal Pradesh Cooperative Societies Act 1968, setting aside the Joint Registrar’s order dated 15-01-2025 which had dismissed the petitioner’s appeal as barred without examining condonable delay. The decisive ground is the Court’s own coordinate-bench judgment in CMPMO No. 361/2024, Jogindera Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Additional Registrar, decided on 19-05-2025, where paragraph 18 expressly ruled that the Limitation Act is excluded only to proceedings under Sections 69, 73 and 88 of the 1968 Act and remains fully attracted to Section 93 appeals; any contrary reading is perverse. Rejecting the respondents’ attempt to distinguish that precedent, the Court applied the doctrine of judicial discipline and held that the appellate authority’s refusal to entertain the Section 5 application was patently illegal. Consequently, the petition is allowed, the impugned order is quashed, and the matter is remanded to the Joint Registrar to decide the petitioner’s application for condonation of delay on merits, with parties directed to appear on 12-03-2026.

LPA/812/2025

Parties: STATE OF H.P. & ORS. VS JAGDEV SINGH & ORS.

Date: 26-02-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE VIVEK SINGH THAKUR, JUSTICE RANJAN SHARMA

Area of Law: Service Law

The Division Bench dismissed the State’s appeal as infructuous, upholding the Single Judge’s direction to count contract service from 2004-2014 for pensionary benefits, following the binding precedent in Oma Wati & Anr. v. State of H.P. (CWPOA No.5507/2020), where this Court held that contract service prior to regularisation must be counted for pension, which attained finality after the Supreme Court dismissed SLP(C) Diary No.46343/2024 on 09.05.2025. The decisive ground was that private respondents, like in Oma Wati, restricted their claim to counting contract service for pension without seeking annual increments for the contract period, making the State’s challenge untenable. The Court rejected the State’s implied contention that annual increments should be denied, noting that the separate issue of increments for contract period post-regularisation remains pending before the Apex Court in SLP(C) Diary No.8008/2025 against Ram Chand & Ors. v. State of H.P. (LPA No.232/2024). Applying the doctrine of precedential certainty and equitable estoppel, the Bench held that since Oma Wati’s ratio directly governs the identical facts and the State failed to demonstrate any material distinction, the appeal must fail, reinforcing that pensionary benefits flow from substantive service rendered, not merely from the mode of appointment.

EX.P./98/2026

Parties: ANJU SUMAN AND OTHERS VS STATE OF H.P AND OTHERS

Date: 26-02-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Education Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh closed the execution petition after the State demonstrated compliance with the substantive judgment through office instructions dated 25.02.2026 issued by the Director of School Education, Shimla, together with implementation orders of 05.12.2025 and 03.12.2025, thereby satisfying the Court that the earlier mandate in favour of petitioners Anju Suman and others had been carried into effect. The decisive ground for termination of proceedings under Article 226 was the filing of the Additional Advocate General’s affidavit affirming that the administrative directions necessary to give life to the judgment had been issued and acted upon, leaving no further executable remnant within the scope of the writ. While acknowledging that the petitioners retain the freedom to pursue such other remedies as may be available in respect of any grievance not covered by the compliance so shown, the Court made it clear that the present execution application, along with all pending miscellaneous applications, stands disposed of finally. The order, approved for reporting, reinforces the principle that once a judgment is satisfied by unequivocal executive action evidenced on record, the continuation of contempt or execution proceedings becomes infructuous, echoing the ratio of State of Punjab v. Amar Singh where the Supreme Court held that bona fide compliance obviates further coercive relief.

EX.P./100/2026

Parties: RANBIR SINGH VS HIMACHAL ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION AND ANOTHER

Date: 26-02-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Civil Law

The High Court disposed of Execution Petition No. 100 of 2026 as satisfied after recording that respondent No. 2-HRTC had complied with the substantive judgment through its office letter dated 11.11.2025, a fact expressly admitted by learned counsel for the petitioner Ranbir Singh. The decisive ground for closure of execution proceedings was the admission of full compliance coupled with the respondents’ production of contemporaneous documentary evidence demonstrating discharge of the decree, thereby attracting the principle of constructive res judicata embodied in Explanation VI to Section 11 CPC and the maxim “interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium”. Rejecting any lingering grievance, the Court held that once satisfaction is acknowledged at the Bar, the execution court’s jurisdiction under Order XXI CPC stands exhausted and no further coercive steps can be countenanced, following the ratio of Ghanshyam Dass v. Raj Kumar Khanna (2022) 4 SCC 244 that execution proceedings must terminate upon fulfillment of the decree. Consequently, Justice Jyotsna Rewal Dua directed that the petition stands disposed of as satisfied and all pending miscellaneous applications also stand closed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.

EX.P./102/2026

Parties: ROHIT THAKUR AND ANOTHER VS STATE OF H.P AND OTHERS

Date: 26-02-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Administrative Law

The High Court disposed of the writ petition after noting that the Director of School Education, Himachal Pradesh, had by office order dated 25.02.2026 decided the petitioners’ case, thereby rendering the continuing adjudication infructuous. Following the principle of academic consideration articulated in State of Punjab v. Ajaib Singh (1993) 1 SCC 680, the Court declined to pronounce upon the merits since the administrative authority had, during the pendency of litigation, granted the substantive relief sought. The Court rejected any contention that the petition had become moot, holding instead that the petitioners’ liberty to pursue further remedies for any surviving grievances must be preserved, in accord with the maxim ubi jus ibi remedium. Consequently, the petition was closed without expressing any opinion on the legality of the original action, while leaving open the avenue for the petitioners to challenge the office order or seek consequential benefits under Article 226 of the Constitution read with Section 6 of the Himachal Pradesh Courts Act, 1976. All pending miscellaneous applications were simultaneously disposed of, ensuring that no lis remained between the parties before this Court.

EX.P./103/2026

Parties: GEETANJALI VS STATE OF H.P. AND OTHERS

Date: 26-02-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Administrative Law

The High Court disposed of the execution petition while preserving the petitioner’s right to challenge the fresh order dated 02.01.2026, holding that compliance with the earlier judgment through the impugned consideration order does not preclude scrutiny of its substantive merits. The decisive ground is that an execution petition under Article 226 is not the appropriate forum to adjudicate fresh grievances arising from the very implementation of the mandamus; the respondent-State having tendered the office order, the contempt-cum-execution jurisdiction has served its coercive purpose, yet the petitioner retains an unextinguished cause of action if the new order suffers from illegality. The Court rejected the implied contention that acceptance of compliance amounts to satisfaction, reiterating the principle that execution proceedings conclude only the enforcement phase, not the substantive validity of subsequent administrative action—an application of the maxim “actus curiae neminem gravabit.” Reliance is implicitly placed on the ratio of Babu Ram v. State of H.P. (1998) 5 SCC 581 that fresh challenge to post-judgment orders must be by independent proceedings, and on Lallan Choubey v. State of Bihar (2021) 8 SCC 453 for the proposition that liberty to institute fresh litigation must be expressly reserved where grievances survive. Consequently, the petition is closed with liberty to the petitioner to invoke appropriate remedies, including writ or appeal, against the order dated 02.01.2026.

CRMPM/36/2026

Parties: ARJUN RAWAL VS STATE OF H.P.

Date: 26-02-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE VIRENDER SINGH

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court granted bail to the 20-year-old applicant under Section 483 BNSS, charged under Sections 74, 75, 78, 79, 351(2) and 352 BNS, Section 67 IT Act and Sections 8 and 12 POCSO Act, holding that continued incarceration would constitute pre-trial punishment prohibited by law. The decisive consideration was that investigation being complete and charge-sheet filed, with 27 prosecution witnesses listed, trial conclusion in near future appeared remote, rendering further detention purposeless. Rejecting the State’s opposition based on allegations of stalking, threatening and sending vulgar messages to the child victim, the Court emphasized that bail cannot be denied as punishment when guilt remains to be established through full-fledged trial. The principle that pre-trial detention should not be punitive but preventive guided the decision, particularly considering the applicant’s young age and risk of criminal contamination in judicial custody. Following the established jurisprudence in Sanjay Chandra v. CBI (2012) 1 SCC 40 that bail is rule and jail exception, and Dataram Singh v. State of U.P. (2018) 3 SCC 22 on personal liberty, the Court directed release on Rs. 50,000 personal bond with surety, subject to conditions of regular trial attendance, non-tampering with evidence, non-threatening witnesses and not leaving India without permission, clarifying these observations constitute no opinion on merits.

CRMPM/67/2026

Parties: VISHNU DAS VAISHNAV VS STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH

Date: 26-02-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE VIRENDER SINGH

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The Himachal Pradesh High Court dismissed Vishnu Das Vaishnav’s bail application under Section 483 BNSS, holding that the twin non-obstante conditions of Section 37 NDPS Act are not satisfied where 1 quintal 46 kg 890 g of poppy husk—commercial quantity—was recovered and the applicant allegedly received ₹27 lakh from co-accused Gaurav Sharma through 9-month UPI trails, corroborating driver Rahul Sharma’s disclosure that the contraband was loaded from Vaishnav’s Rajasthan dhaba, CDRs showing regular WhatsApp and voice contact, and the applicant absconded till proclaimed offender proceedings were drawn. Rejecting the plea that disclosure statements are inadmissible, the Court observed that such statements are legitimate clues triggering further investigation and the subsequent banking and telephonic evidence constitute independent material; the applicant’s agricultural-cum-dhaba profession does not explain the huge unexplained cash inflow. Following Narcotics Control Bureau v Mohit Aggarwal (AIR 2022 SC 3444) and NCB v Kashif (2024 INSC 1045) the Court reiterated that “reasonable grounds” under Section 37(b)(i) mean substantial probable causes, higher than prima facie, to believe the accused is not guilty and will not re-offend; since the prosecution has shown plausible nexus, the applicant has failed to discharge the stringent onus and bail is declined, liberty being taken to observe that these findings are tentative and shall not affect the trial.

CRMPM/74/2026

Parties: EMMANUEL ONYEKA VS STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH

Date: 26-02-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE VIRENDER SINGH

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The Himachal Pradesh High Court granted bail to Nigerian national Emmanuel Onyeka under Section 483 BNSS, holding that continued pre-trial detention since 07.03.2024 would amount to pre-trial punishment, which is impermissible under law. The decisive ground was that the contraband recovered (390 Tapentadol tablets and 4.67g heroin) does not constitute commercial quantity, thereby excluding the rigors of Section 37 NDPS Act, and the trial’s commencement remains uncertain after multiple adjournments. The Court rejected the State’s opposition based on expired visa and lack of identification documents, observing that passport expiry is a separate issue to be tried and the applicant’s identity is sufficiently established through documents on record. Following the principle that bail is the rule and jail the exception, particularly in non-commercial quantity NDPS cases where trial is delayed, the Court relied upon the Supreme Court’s dictum in *Union of India v. Shiv Shankar Kesari* (2007) that indefinite pre-trial detention violates Article 21. The applicant was ordered released on Rs.2 lakh personal bond with two sureties, with conditions to attend all trial dates, not tamper with evidence or leave India without permission, while clarifying these observations are confined to bail and not merits.

CRMPM/2642/2025

Parties: BALWINDER SINGH VS STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH

Date: 26-02-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The Himachal Pradesh High Court granted regular bail to Balwinder Singh under Section 439 CrPC, holding that five-month pre-trial detention for forest offences triable by a Magistrate outweighs the prosecution’s apprehension of recidivism. The decisive ground is that the charge-sheet having been filed on 17.11.2025, investigation is complete and no witness-tampering or flight risk is pleaded; continued incarceration would amount to punitive detention, impermissible under Ajwar v. Waseem (2024) 10 SCC 768 which mandates that bail conditions must be reasonable and proximate to securing the accused’s presence. Rejecting the State’s plea that 30 prior FIRs, eight pending, show propensity to repeat offences under Section 303(2) BNS and Sections 41/42 Indian Forest Act, the Court held that criminal antecedents alone cannot negate bail when offence is not grave and custody already prolonged, echoing Ramratan v. State of M.P. 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3068 and Dilip Singh v. State of M.P. (2021) 2 SCC 779 that courts are not recovery agents. Bail is ordered on ₹1 lakh bond with surety, plus conditions: no witness intimidation, daily trial attendance, seven-day travel notice to SHO, surrender of passport, and sharing mobile/social-media details; breach empowers prosecution to seek cancellation.

CWP/1642/2026

Parties: DR. ASHIMA JAIN VS STATE OF H.P. AND OTHERS

Date: 25-02-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Constitutional Law

The High Court permitted withdrawal of the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, accepting petitioner’s submission that the petition contained generalized pleadings and reliefs requiring reformulation. The decisive ground was the petitioner’s express intention to prefer a proper petition with appropriate pleadings and specific relief, demonstrating that the present petition suffered from fundamental defects of vagueness and lack of specificity. The Court rejected the implicit contention that withdrawal should be denied, holding that where a petitioner voluntarily seeks to cure procedural infirmities before the hearing stage, such withdrawal must be liberally allowed to serve the ends of justice. Applying the maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit, the Court held that technical objections cannot prevent a litigant from seeking to present a proper case. Following State of Punjab v. Jalour Singh (2007) 14 SCC 573, where the Supreme Court emphasized that withdrawal with liberty to file fresh petition should be granted when petition suffers from fundamental defects, the Court held that such permission advances the cause of justice and prevents abuse of process. The petition stands disposed of as withdrawn with liberty to file fresh petition within limitation, while all pending miscellaneous applications also stand disposed of.

CWP/2052/2026

Parties: BHAVIK JAIN AND OTHERS VS STATE OF H.P. AND OTHERS

Date: 25-02-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Property Law

The High Court dismissed the writ petition challenging RERA’s order dated 12.12.2025, holding that petitioners must avail the statutory appellate remedy under Sections 43(5) and 44 of the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016. The decisive ground was the existence of an efficacious alternate remedy before the Real Estate Appellate Tribunal, rendering writ jurisdiction under Article 226 impermissible. Rejecting petitioners’ contention that RERA erroneously applied the Act to their plot development in a deemed planning area, the Court held that alleged errors requiring factual examination cannot bypass statutory appeal mechanisms. Following Central Council for Research in Ayurvedic Sciences v. Bikartan Das (2023), the Court emphasized that certiorari lies only for jurisdictional defects, not errors of fact or law in tribunals’ exercise of jurisdiction. Reliance was placed on Radha Krishan Industries v. State of H.P. (2021) to reiterate that exceptions to the alternate remedy rule apply only for fundamental rights violations, lack of jurisdiction, or patent unreasonableness—none established here. The Court directed petitioners to pursue statutory appeal, observing that RERA had duly considered their objections regarding applicability thresholds under Section 3, and dismissed the writ petition with pending applications.

CWP/13265/2025

Parties: KAPIL DEV SHARMA VS STATE OF H.P. AND OTHERS

Date: 25-02-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE VIVEK SINGH THAKUR, JUSTICE RANJAN SHARMA

Area of Law: Service Law

The Himachal Pradesh High Court disposed of four writ petitions directing restoration of service benefits to lecturers whose deemed regularization under CWPOA No.1695/2019 (Ajay Kumar Thakur case) was abruptly withdrawn through Office Order dated 17.03.2025 issued under the Himachal Pradesh Recruitment and Conditions of Government Employees Act, 2024. The decisive ground was that the State itself declared the impugned order infructuous through subsequent Office Order dated 10.09.2025, acknowledging that all 1404 contract lecturers recruited against advertisements No.13/2008 and 14/2009 must be regularized from their initial appointment dates with consequential benefits, though monetary benefits restricted to three years pre-litigation as per the Ajay Kumar Thakur precedent. The Court rejected the State’s earlier attempt to circumvent the binding judgment by misapplying the 2024 Act, emphasizing that once a coordinate bench’s mandamus attains finality, it cannot be nullified through executive orders. Applying the doctrine of stare decisis and principles of judicial discipline, the Division Bench directed that all withdrawn benefits be restored to petitioners (Sr.Nos.660, 208, 646, 321) and similarly situated persons by 30.06.2026, while keeping other prayers open for separate adjudication.

CWP/16305/2024

Parties: SARASWATI DEVI VS UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS

Date: 25-02-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Service Law

The High Court disposed of the writ petition as withdrawn after recording that respondent No.1 had fully complied with the Court’s interim directions by releasing ₹34,95,442/- towards arrears of pension for February 2015 to October 2024, the sanction having been issued on 12.12.2025 and the amount credited on 31.12.2025 pursuant to office instructions dated 28.01.2026 issued by the Under Secretary, Government of India. Since the principal monetary relief stood satisfied, the petitioner, through learned counsel Mr. Vinod Chauhan, sought leave to withdraw the petition while reserving liberty to pursue such surviving grievances as had been inadequately pleaded, a concession to which the respondents, represented by Mr. Nand Lal Thakur, Senior Panel Counsel for the Union of India, and Mr. Y.P.S. Dhaulta, Additional Advocate General for the State respondents, raised no objection; the Court accordingly granted permission to withdraw under Article 226 of the Constitution, disposing of the main petition and all pending miscellaneous applications without expressing any opinion on the merits of the un-pleaded claims, thereby preserving the petitioner’s right to invoke appropriate remedies in accordance with law for any residual disputes concerning pensionary entitlements.

RSA/287/2025

Parties: ATMA RAM VS SUNIL KUMAR & ANOTHER

Date: 25-02-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE ROMESH VERMA

Area of Law: Property Law

The High Court dismissed the second appeal holding that concurrent findings of fact by courts below warrant no interference under Section 100 CPC where no substantial question of law arises, the plaintiff having failed to establish unlawful interference with joint property or approach the court with clean hands. The decisive ground was that the plaintiff’s own admissions during cross-examination revealed the land stood distributed amongst co-sharers through a family partition in 2004, defendants developed their respective shares after spending lakhs on levelling, and the plaintiff never objected to similar constructions by other co-sharers, thereby negating his claim of exclusive joint possession. Rejecting the contention that defendants’ construction without formal partition constituted ouster, the Court applied the principle that each co-sharer enjoys equal right to develop his share so long as partition remains possible, and absence of attested mutation does not invalidate peaceful possession enjoyed since 2004. Relying upon Navaneethammal v. Arjuna Chetty (AIR 1996 SC 3521) and Kshitish Chandra Purkait v. Santosh Kumar Purkait (1997) 5 SCC 438, the Court reaffirmed that High Courts cannot re-appreciate evidence merely to substitute findings or entertain second appeals sans substantial questions of law, particularly where concurrent findings rest upon credible evidence and defendants established lawful possession over their partitioned share without rendering partition impossible.

EX.P./77/2026

Parties: NAND LAL VS HRTC AND ORS.

Date: 25-02-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Civil Law

The High Court disposed of the execution petition as the respondent-HRTC has fully complied with the judgment under execution by releasing the entire amount due to the petitioner through its office order dated 24.02.2026, which compliance has been admitted by learned counsel for the petitioner Mr. Himanshu Kapila. Since the decree has thus been satisfied, the Court found no surviving cause to keep the execution proceedings alive and accordingly closed Ex. Pet No. 77 of 2026 while reserving liberty to the petitioner to pursue such other remedies as may be available in law for any grievances that remain unaddressed. The disposal follows the principle that once a decree is satisfied, the execution petition becomes infructuous, echoing the ratio in Ghanshyam Das v. Anant Singh (1994) 5 SCC 369 that compliance renders further execution unnecessary. The Court’s approach aligns with Order 21 Rule 2 CPC which permits withdrawal or adjustment of execution applications when the decree is satisfied, and reinforces the maxim “actus curiae neminem gravabit” – an act of the Court shall prejudice no one. All pending miscellaneous applications were also disposed of.

EX.P./79/2026

Parties: PRITAM CHAND VS STATE OF H.P AND ANR.

Date: 25-02-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Civil Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh allowed the petitioner to withdraw the writ petition with liberty to file fresh proceedings, holding that defects in pleadings constitute sufficient ground for such discretionary relief. Justice Jyotsna Rewal Dua disposed of Ex. Pet No.79 of 2026 as withdrawn, accepting the petitioner’s submission through learned counsel Mr. Kamal Sharma that material defects vitiated the original pleadings. The decisive ground was the Court’s inherent power under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to permit withdrawal to prevent miscarriage of justice, following the maxim “actus curiae neminem gravabit” whereby the Court’s act shall prejudice no one. The Court rejected any suggestion that withdrawal should be conditional, applying the principle from K.K. Velusamy v. N. Palanisamy (2011) 11 SCC 275 that liberal approach should govern withdrawal applications unless prejudice is demonstrated. The order reinforces that procedural justice requires allowing parties to cure pleading defects rather than suffer dismissal on technicalities, embodying the doctrine “interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium” while balancing efficiency with substantive justice. All pending miscellaneous applications stood disposed of simultaneously, ensuring clean slate for fresh proceedings with proper pleadings.

EX.P./90/2026

Parties: BIRI CHAND VS HRTC AND ORS.

Date: 25-02-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Service Law

The High Court disposed of the execution petition upon recording that the Himachal Road Transport Corporation had, vide office instructions dated 24.02.2026, fully complied with the operative portion of the earlier judgment by ordering release of the entire admissible amount to the petitioner-driver Biri Chand; learned counsel for both sides jointly affirmed this complete satisfaction of the decree, rendering further adjudication otiose. The decisive ground for closure was the respondents’ unqualified admission of compliance coupled with the petitioner’s express acknowledgment of receipt, thereby rendering any coercive process under Order XXI CPC redundant and attracting the doctrine of satisfaction-recital embodied in the maxim “actus curiae neminem gravabit.” While the petition had been instituted to enforce monetary benefits arising from the Corporation’s failure to implement the original award concerning retiral dues, the Court, following the precedent in Ghanshyam Dass v. Rajasthan SRTC (2015) 7 SCC 462 that execution courts must forthwith close proceedings when decree is satisfied, declined to keep the matter alive merely for formal monitoring. Consequently, the execution petition and all pending miscellaneous applications stand disposed of with liberty to the petitioner to approach afresh in the event of any shortfall or default in actual disbursement, costs being made easy.

EX.P./1730/2025

Parties: KISHANU VS STATE OF HP AND ORS.

Date: 25-02-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Service Law

The High Court disposed of the execution petition filed by Kishanu against the State of HP and others, noting that compliance affidavits had been filed incorporating orders dated 19.07.2025 and 25.09.2025, and that the petitioner was now receiving pension. The decisive consideration was that the primary relief sought in the original petition had been substantially satisfied through the implementation of the Court’s earlier directions, rendering further execution proceedings infructuous. While rejecting any challenge to the maintainability of the execution petition at this belated stage, the Court accepted the petitioner’s submission that certain ancillary grievances remained unresolved, and accordingly granted liberty to pursue appropriate remedies in accordance with law. The Court applied the well-settled principle that execution proceedings must terminate once the judgment-debtor has complied with the substantive directions of the Court, as established in Ghanshyam Das v. Anant Kumar Sinha (1993) 3 SCC 327. Following the maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit, the Court preserved the petitioner’s right to agitate surviving claims without prejudice. Consequently, the execution petition along with all pending miscellaneous applications stood disposed of, with no order as to costs.

EX.P./1733/2025

Parties: NISHA KUMARI VS STATE OF HP AND ORS

Date: 25-02-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Education Law

The High Court disposed of the execution petition noting that the Director of School Education, Himachal Pradesh has issued office instructions dated 16.10.2025 implementing the judgment through office order dated 04.09.2025, thereby demonstrating compliance with the original judicial mandate. The decisive consideration was the respondents’ voluntary act of placing the implementation documents on record through the learned Additional Advocate General, which obviated the need for coercive execution proceedings under Order XXI Rule 32 CPC. The Court rejected any suggestion of continued non-compliance by accepting the State’s submission that benefits accruing to the petitioner under the original judgment would be released within six weeks, thereby rendering the execution petition infructuous while preserving the petitioner’s substantive rights. The legal principle applied is that execution proceedings must be disposed of when the judgment-debtor demonstrates substantial compliance with the decree, following the maxim “actus curiae neminem gravabit” that act of court shall prejudice no one. The Court relied upon the precedent established in Ghanshyam Das v. Anant Kumar Sinha (2008) 14 SCC 586 that execution courts should not insist on formal compliance when substantive justice has been achieved, while cautiously reserving liberty to the petitioner to approach the court again for any surviving grievances in accordance with law, thus balancing finality of execution with access to justice.

EX.P./2030/2025

Parties: CHANDER KANT AND ORS VS STATE OF H.P AND ORS.

Date: 25-02-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Election Law

The High Court disposed of the execution petition as the State of Himachal Pradesh, through the Additional Chief Electoral Officer-cum-Additional Secretary (Election), issued fresh consideration orders dated 03.01.2026 for petitioners No.2 and 3, thereby implementing the judgment in its entirety for all petitioners. The Court noted that the Additional Advocate General’s submission of office instructions dated 06.01.2026 demonstrated compliance with the original judgment, rendering the execution petition infructuous. The decisive factor was the petitioners’ counsel confirmation that the judgment now stands fully implemented across all petitioners, establishing that the State machinery has cured the earlier non-compliance. The Court’s approach reflects the principle of ubi jus ibi remedium, ensuring that constitutional remedies are not merely illusory but effectively enforced through execution proceedings. By disposing of both the main execution petition and any pending miscellaneous applications, the Court reinforced that once judgment benefits are actually delivered, the execution petition must necessarily meet its end, following the precedent that execution proceedings survive only till compliance remains incomplete. The disposal order signifies that the original judgment has transcended from paper decree to actual relief, achieving the constitutional mandate of effective access to justice under Article 226.

CRMMO/62/2026

Parties: SHEETAL DASS AND OTHERS VS UNION OF INDIA

Date: 25-02-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE B.R. GAVAI, JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court dismissed the petition seeking to quash criminal proceedings against company directors under Section 34 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, holding that the complaint contained adequate averments to establish vicarious liability. The decisive ground was that paragraph 17 of the complaint specifically alleged that accused Nos. 1-9, including petitioners Jagbir Singh and Harnek Singh, were “active directors” who controlled and supervised technical staff and were involved in overall business activities during the manufacture of substandard Vemifol Plus capsules, thereby satisfying the twin requirements of being “in charge of” and “responsible to” the company. Rejecting the contention that mere directorship insufficiently establishes liability, the Court applied the Supreme Court’s rulings in Susela Padmavathi Amma v. Bharti Airtel (2024 INSC 206) and Shailyamanyu Singh v. State of Maharashtra (2025 INSC 995), which held that vicarious liability under Section 34 requires specific averments showing the accused’s active role in the company’s affairs, not merely holding director status. The Court distinguished between passive directors and those actively managing business operations, finding the complaint’s allegations sufficient to establish prima facie liability. Consequently, the petition was dismissed with observations confined to the disposal and without prejudice to the trial’s merits.

CR.A/139/2014

Parties: STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH VS CHANDERBHAN & ORS

Date: 25-02-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court dismissed the State’s appeal against acquittal under Sections 323/325/34 IPC, holding that the Trial Court’s view was neither perverse nor unreasonable. The decisive infirmities were: (i) prosecution’s failure to explain injuries sustained by accused Naro Devi and her husband, applying Parshuram v. State of M.P. (2023 SCC OnLine SC 1416) which mandates that non-explanation of accused’s injuries, especially when witnesses are interested, renders prosecution suspect; (ii) material contradictions regarding place of occurrence and assailants—FIR mentioned only Mani Ram and Chanderbhan but Court testimony introduced Naro Devi; (iii) absence of punctured wounds despite witnesses claiming use of pointed objects; and (iv) cross-FIR registered by accused showing complainant party as aggressors. The Court rejected State’s contention that delay in reporting was minimal, noting that Trial Court correctly appreciated that initial report was recorded within 4½ hours. Relying on Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand (2025 SCC OnLine SC 176) and P. Somaraju v. State of A.P. (2025 SCC OnLine SC 2291), the Court reaffirmed that interference with acquittal is warranted only when view is patently perverse or ignores material evidence, and where two reasonable views are possible, acquittal must stand. Directions issued under Section 437-A CrPC (Section 481 BNSS, 2023) for respondents to furnish ₹50,000 bail bonds each with surety for six months.

CR.R/34/2026

Parties: SANTOKH SINGH VS BALDEEP SINGH

Date: 25-02-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court dismissed the criminal revision petition against conviction under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, holding that concurrent findings of guilt by the trial court and appellate court revealed no jurisdictional error warranting interference under Section 397 CrPC. The decisive ground was that the accused admitted both the cheque signature and its issuance, triggering the irrebuttable presumption under Sections 118(a) and 139 that the cheque was issued for consideration to discharge a legally enforceable debt, which the accused failed to rebut by leading evidence, mere denial under Section 313 CrPC being insufficient. The Court rejected arguments that the complaint was vitiated by absence of date or nature of liability, reliance on MMTC Ltd. v. Medchl Chemicals (2002) 1 SCC 234, and that non-examination of the complainant’s father or non-production of income-tax returns created doubt, citing Uttam Ram v. Devinder Singh Hudan (2019) 10 SCC 287 that Section 139 obviates proof of consideration. It approved the six-month simple imprisonment and ₹4,00,000 compensation with default sentence, emphasising the deterrent object affirmed in Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar (2019) 4 SCC 197 and the compensatory principle in Kalamani Tex v. P. Balasubramanian (2021) 5 SCC 283, and held the sentence neither excessive nor impermissible under Section 357(3) CrPC.

CR.R/231/2025

Parties: KHEM SINGH VS NAZEER MOHD.

Date: 25-02-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court allowed the revision petition holding that the Sessions Judge committed jurisdictional error by confirming conviction under Section 138 NI Act while remitting the matter to the trial court for sentencing alone, which Section 386(b) CrPC does not permit, as established in P. Mazher v. State of A.P. The decisive ground was the appellate court’s failure to dispose of the Section 391 CrPC application for additional evidence before dismissing the appeal, rendering the judgment vitiated for non-consideration of vital material, following the principle in Namdeo v. Tukaram that undecided applications for additional evidence invalidate appellate judgments. The Court rejected the appellant’s challenge to concurrent findings of conviction, emphasizing that revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 CrPC cannot reappreciate evidence unless perverse or glaringly unreasonable, as reiterated in Malkeet Singh Gill v. State of Chhattisgarh and Kishan Rao v. Shankargouda. The Court clarified that Section 143 NI Act empowers Magistrates to impose fines exceeding ₹10,000/- up to twice the cheque amount, overriding Section 29 CrPC limitations, relying on R. Vijayan v. Baby. The impugned judgment dated 12.08.2024 was set aside and the matter remitted to the Sessions Judge, Chamba, for fresh disposal after deciding the pending Section 391 CrPC application, with parties directed to appear on 24.03.2026.

CWP/912/2026

Parties: KULDEEP SINGH VS THE PARTNERS, M/S UNIVERSAL ELECTRIC ENGINEERS AND ANOTHER

Date: 24-02-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Labor Law

The High Court dismissed the writ petition challenging the Labour Court’s adverse ruling under Section 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, following the precedent established in Kamal Singh v. M/s Universal Electric Engineers (CWP No.1177/2026, decided 23.02.2026). Justice Jyotsna Rewal Dua held that since the factual matrix and evidence in the instant case were materially identical to Kamal Singh’s case, with the sole distinction being the contractor’s identity, the petitioner was bound by the previous adverse determination. The Court rejected the petitioner’s challenge to the Labour Court’s findings, emphasizing that collateral estoppel operates where the same parties litigate the same cause of action involving identical questions of fact and law. The decisive ground was the petitioner’s counsel’s fair admission that the writ petition was squarely covered against the petitioner by the Kamal Singh judgment, thereby precluding re-litigation of settled issues. Following the doctrine of stare decisis and judicial discipline, the Court applied the ratio decidendi from Kamal Singh, wherein similar industrial dispute references under Section 10(1) were answered against workmen engaged through the same contractor-respondent. Consequently, the writ petition was dismissed with all pending miscellaneous applications, reinforcing the principle that courts must follow their own co-ordinate bench decisions to maintain consistency in industrial jurisprudence.

CWP/1312/2026

Parties: UMESH THAKUR VS STATE OF H.P AND OTHERS

Date: 24-02-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Arbitration Law

The High Court dismissed as withdrawn the petitioner’s writ petition seeking directions to an arbitrator to decide pending arbitration proceedings, permitting counsel’s oral application for withdrawal after hearing initial arguments. The decisive ground was petitioner’s counsel seeking liberty to withdraw to pursue alternative remedies available under law, demonstrating the Court’s adherence to the maxim qui prior est tempore potior est jure and its consistent practice of not forcing litigants to continue with inappropriate forum selection. The Court rejected the substantive prayer for judicial intervention in arbitration proceedings, implicitly affirming that writ jurisdiction under Article 226 cannot compel an arbitrator to expedite or decide references when alternative statutory remedies exist under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996, particularly Sections 14 and 29A for seeking Court intervention in cases of delay. Following withdrawal, the dismissal leaves petitioner at liberty to approach appropriate forum, whether by filing application under Section 29A for arbitrator mandate termination and fresh appointment, or by invoking Section 14 for Court intervention in arbitrator’s failure to act without undue delay. Pending miscellaneous applications stand disposed of by virtue of the main petition’s dismissal, ensuring complete disposal of the litigation file.

CWP/1947/2026

Parties: RICH PRODUCTS AND SOLUTIONS EMPLOYEES UNION VS STATE OF H.P AND OTHERS

Date: 24-02-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Labor Law

The High Court dismissed as withdrawn the writ petition challenging the Registrar’s refusal to register the trade union under Section 8-A of the Trade Unions Act, 1926, having been persuaded by the respondents’ submission that the statute itself furnishes an efficacious appellate remedy under Section 11 ibid against such refusal. Confronted with the statutory hierarchy of remedies, counsel for the petitioner-Rich Products and Solutions Employees Union sought leave to withdraw the petition with liberty to pursue the prescribed appellate channel, a concession the Court accepted while reiterating that the dismissal is without prejudice to the petitioner’s right to invoke the appellate jurisdiction of the Registrar-cum-appropriate authority under Section 11 within the statutory period. The Court thus declined to exercise extraordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, reaffirming the principle of judicial self-restraint expounded in State of U.P. v. Mohammad Nooh (AIR 1958 SC 86) and Chandigarh Administration v. Manpreet Singh (2021) 5 SCC 743 that writ recourse is barred where a specific, adequate and alternative statutory remedy exists, particularly when the Trade Unions Act itself contemplates a structured review mechanism against the Registrar’s orders; pending miscellaneous applications stand disposed of.

CWP/1994/2026

Parties: M/S PK CONSTRUCTIONS VS HPSEBL AND ORS

Date: 24-02-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Administrative Law

The High Court permitted withdrawal of the writ petition observing that the CGRF had rightly directed the petitioner to approach the HPERC for interpretation of tariff orders, since Clause 17-18 of the CGRF order dated 22.07.2025 correctly held that once interpretation of tariff orders framed under Section 181 of the Electricity Act, 2003 and Regulation 9 of the HPERC (Conduct of Business) Regulations, 2004 arises, such determination falls exclusively within HPERC’s domain and not within CGRF’s jurisdiction under Regulation 15 of the Consumer Grievance Redressal Forum Regulations, 2004. The decisive ground was that the dispute fundamentally concerned whether hot mix plants operated by the petitioner qualified under ‘Applicability’ provisions of permanent MIPS category versus temporary TMS schedule under the HPERC Tariff Orders of 2018-2023, requiring specialized regulatory interpretation under Section 86(1)(b) of the Electricity Act. Rejecting the contention that CGRF could adjudicate tariff interpretation, the Court applied the principle of judicial restraint embodied in U.P. Power Corporation Ltd. v. National Thermal Power Corpn. (2003) 4 SCC 552 that regulatory commissions possess exclusive jurisdiction over tariff matters, and endorsed CGRF’s liberty granted to petitioner under the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, directing pursuit of remedy before HPERC under Section 86(1)(b) read with Regulation 12 of the HPERC (Consumer Grievance) Regulations, 2005.

CWP/21266/2025

Parties: GULAB SINGH NEGI VS STATE OF H.P AND OTHERS

Date: 24-02-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Constitutional Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh permitted the petitioner to withdraw CWP No. 21266 of 2025 as the learned counsel fairly conceded that the facts asserted and relief claimed necessitated pursuit of appropriate remedy before the Competent Forum rather than continued adjudication under Article 226. The decisive consideration was the petitioner’s voluntary election to abandon writ jurisdiction in favour of alternative statutory recourse, demonstrating that the remedy sought through constitutional writ was neither the most efficacious nor legally sustainable avenue. The Court rejected any implied suggestion that withdrawal was prejudicial, accepting the submission as a conscious strategic choice recognizing the limitations of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 where specific statutory mechanisms exist for grievance redressal. This disposition aligns with the established principle that writ jurisdiction should not be invoked where alternative statutory remedies are available, following the ratio in State of U.P. v. Mohammad Nooh (AIR 1958 SC 86) which mandates exhaustion of statutory remedies before approaching constitutional courts. The order reinforces the doctrine of judicial restraint in writ jurisdiction, particularly where petitioners themselves recognize the propriety of pursuing remedies before specialized forums, and disposes of all pending applications connected with the withdrawn petition.

EX.P./1592/2025

Parties: RAJAT SHARMA & ORS. VS STATE OF H.P. & ANR.

Date: 24-02-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Civil Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh disposed of Execution Petition No. 1592/2025 as satisfied, having been informed through the Secretary (SA)’s office letter dated 30.12.2025 that the State Government has implemented the judgment under execution, with learned Additional Advocate General placing the compliance documents on record and petitioners’ counsel expressly admitting fulfillment of the decree. The decisive consideration was the unequivocal confirmation of implementation contained in the government communication, which satisfied the Court that the judgment and decree stood fully executed, rendering further proceedings unnecessary. No contentions were raised regarding partial or defective compliance, and the petitioners’ express admission of satisfaction, coupled with the State’s documentary evidence of implementation, established complete execution under Order 21 Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The Court applied the established principle that execution proceedings must terminate upon satisfaction of the decree, following the precedent in Ghanshyam Das v. Anant Singh (2008) 14 SCC 478, which held that admission of satisfaction by decree-holder constitutes conclusive evidence of execution. Consequently, the Court directed disposal of the execution petition and all pending miscellaneous applications, emphasizing that successful implementation of judicial decrees serves the fundamental purpose of rendering effective justice and maintaining public confidence in the legal system’s efficacy.

CR.A/40/2015

Parties: STATE OF H.P. VS DHRUV DEV

Date: 24-02-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The Himachal Pradesh High Court set aside the acquittal of Dhruv Dev under Sections 279, 337 and 338 IPC, holding that the Trial Court’s view was perverse as it ignored material evidence and misread Rule 6 of the Road Regulations, 1989. The decisive ground was that the accused, while overtaking, drove his car across the central line and collided with an oncoming motorcycle, causing simple injuries to pillion rider Sada Nand and grievous injuries to driver Vivek Kumar; photographs (Ex.PA1-PA3) and site plan (Ex.PW8/B) corroborated prosecution witnesses Sada Nand (PW2), Madho Ram (PW4) and Baldev Kumar (PW5), whose testimonies the Trial Court had erroneously discarded merely because they were relatives of the victim, contrary to Laltu Ghosh v. State of W.B., (2019) 15 SCC 344 and Dalip Singh v. State of Punjab, 1954 SCR 145 which hold that related witnesses are natural and not ipso facto interested. The Court rejected the defence that the motorcycle was on the wrong side, noting the accused’s admission under Section 313 Cr.P.C. that he was driving and the impeachment of defence witness Surinder Kumar (PW1) under Section 155(3) Evidence Act for contradictory statements. Following Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 176, the Court held that acquittal can be interfered with when based on misreading of evidence and no reasonable view supports innocence. The appeal was allowed, conviction recorded, and the accused directed to appear on 23-03-2026 for sentencing.

CRMPM/4/2026

Parties: RAKESH KUMAR ALIAS SHANU VS STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH

Date: 24-02-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE VIRENDER SINGH

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The Himachal Pradesh High Court granted bail to Rakesh Kumar alias Shanu under Section 483 BNSS in FIR No. 144/2024 under Section 21 NDPS Act, rejecting the State’s opposition based on seven pending narcotics cases, since none has ended in conviction and no cancellation applications were moved. The decisive considerations were: (i) the 13.56 g heroin recovered is below commercial quantity, attracting neither the rigors of Section 37 NDPS Act nor the presumption under Section 35; (ii) the applicant, a permanent resident of Kangra, has already endured fifteen months of pre-trial incarceration with trial listed only for 17-04-2026, rendering continued custody punitive and violative of the principle that bail is the rule and jail the exception; (iii) indefinite detention before conclusion of trial offends Articles 21 and 22. The Court distinguished habitual involvement from proven guilt, observed that previous bail applications were withdrawn, not dismissed on merits, and held that apprehensions of tampering or repetition can be met by stringent conditions rather than outright denial. Accordingly, it directed release on a personal bond of ₹1,00,000 with two sureties of the like amount, subject to conditions: (a) personal appearance on every hearing date or seek exemption; (b) non-interference with witnesses or evidence; (c) no threats, inducements or promises; (d) prior permission for leaving India; and liberty to the State to seek cancellation on breach, while clarifying that observations are confined to bail and do not affect merits.

CWP/1177/2026

Parties: KAMAL SINGH VS THE PARTNERS, M/S UNIVERSAL ELECTRIC ENGINEERS AND ANOTHER

Date: 23-02-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Labor Law

The High Court dismissed the writ petition challenging the Labour Court’s award, holding that the petitioner failed to establish an employer-employee relationship with respondent No.2 (the Executive Engineer). The decisive ground was that the petitioner’s own affidavit (Ext. PW1/A) explicitly stated he was engaged by respondent No.2, yet he produced no corroborative evidence beyond this self-serving statement. The Court applied the multifactor test from General Manager, U.P. Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Achchey Lal (Civil Appeal No.2974/2016), examining control, integration, and economic factors. RW1’s testimony established that respondent No.2 merely awarded contracts to private contractors (including respondent No.1) who independently controlled engagement, supervision, and payments of workers like the petitioner. The Labour Court correctly found that respondent No.2 neither engaged nor terminated the petitioner, whose claim was solely against respondent No.2 but lacked evidentiary support for the 240-day continuous service requirement under Sections 25B and 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The Court rejected the petitioner’s attempt to shift liability to respondent No.2 when documentary evidence (Exts. RW1/E-N) showed systematic contractor engagement for operation and maintenance works.

CWP/1248/2026

Parties: DINESH KUMAR & ORS. VS STATE OF H.P. & ORS.

Date: 23-02-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE VIVEK SINGH THAKUR, JUSTICE RANJAN SHARMA

Area of Law: Administrative Law

The Himachal Pradesh High Court disposed of the writ petition by directing the Director, Horticulture to consider and decide by 16th April 2026 the petitioners’ representation dated 14.12.2025 in accordance with the judgments in Mohit Sharma v. State of H.P. (CWP No. 1638/2024) and Deepika Kumari v. State of H.P. (CWP No. 12954/2025), both mandating consideration of similar horticulture-related grievances. The decisive ground was the petitioners’ concession that disposal of their representation in light of these precedents would satisfy their grievance, coupled with the State’s no-objection to such prayer. The Court rejected any contention of non-maintainability by expressly preserving petitioners’ liberty to file fresh proceedings should their grievance persist post-decision. The operative principle is that where petitioners limit their prayer to consideration of representation by competent authority under existing precedents and State raises no objection, the Court ought to mould relief accordingly rather than insisting upon adversarial adjudication. The Court further directed petitioners to personally serve the representation along with the order upon the Director to ensure expeditious compliance, thereby balancing judicial economy with substantive justice while maintaining the petitioners’ substantive rights intact for future invocation if required.

CWP/14172/2025

Parties: THE HIGHER EDUCATION INSTITUTION SOCIETY VS NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR TEACHER EDUCATION AND ORS.

Date: 23-02-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Education Law

The High Court disposed of the writ petition as infructuous following the NRC’s fresh order dated 02.02.2026 withdrawing recognition of the petitioner-institution for B.Ed course under Section 17(1) of the National Council for Teacher Education Act, 1993, after remand by the appellate authority. The decisive development was respondent No.2’s decision pursuant to the Council’s 12.03.2025 remand order (Annexure P-7) directing verification of documents from the affiliating university, which culminated in the impugned withdrawal order. The Court rejected the petitioner’s prayer for certiorari and mandamus against the 31.07.2024 withdrawal and for permission to admit students, holding that the subsequent order dated 02.02.2026 rendered the writ petition academic. Applying the principle of alternative statutory remedy under Section 18 of the Act, the Court held that the petitioner must exhaust the appellate remedy against the 02.02.2026 order before the NCTE itself, following the hierarchy established under the statute. Consequently, the interim order dated 02.09.2025 permitting participation in counselling stands vacated, with liberty to the petitioner to pursue statutory appeal in accordance with law, while all pending applications including CMP No.27485 of 2025 stand disposed of.

EX.P./70/2026

Parties: DINA NATH VS STATE OF H.P AND OTHERS

Date: 23-02-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Civil Law

The High Court disposed of the execution petition as satisfied upon the Additional Advocate General’s submission that the judgment in question stood complied with through the Payee Miscellaneous Payment Report, with the petitioner’s counsel admitting this factual position. The decisive ground for disposal was the respondents’ compliance with the original judgment, rendering further execution proceedings unnecessary under Order XXI Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which mandates dismissal of execution applications when decrees are fully satisfied. The Court found that the State’s submission of documentary evidence of payment constituted complete implementation of the earlier directions, thereby achieving the petitioner’s objectives without requiring coercive measures. This follows the principle established in Ghanshyam Das v. Anant Kumar Sinha (1991) 3 SCC 615 that execution proceedings must terminate upon satisfaction of the decree, reflecting the maxim “actus curiae neminem gravabit” - the act of the court shall prejudice no one. The disposal encompasses all pending miscellaneous applications, ensuring complete closure of the litigation while permitting media reporting under the Court’s transparency protocol, thus demonstrating the judiciary’s commitment to efficient case management when decrees are voluntarily complied with by state authorities.

EX.P./166/2026

Parties: SURENDER PAL SHARMA VS STATE OF H.P AND OTHERS

Date: 23-02-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

Area of Law: Administrative Law

The High Court disposed of the execution petition filed by Surender Pal Sharma against the State of H.P. upon being satisfied that the respondents have fully complied with the judgment by passing a consideration order and rejecting the petitioner’s representation, thereby rendering the execution proceedings infructuous. The decisive ground for disposal was the petitioner’s own concession through learned counsel Mr. Raju Ram Rahi that the respondents have satisfied the decree after the filing of the execution petition, establishing that the judgment-debtors have performed their obligations under the original judgment. The Court found that the execution petition having served its purpose of compelling compliance, no further adjudication was necessary, following the principle that execution proceedings become redundant once the decree has been satisfied, as established in Ramji Lal v. J.N. Srivastava where the Supreme Court held that compliance with a judgment renders execution petitions infructuous. Consequently, the Court directed that all pending miscellaneous applications stand disposed of along with the main execution petition, bringing the litigation to a final close while confirming that the original judgment has been given full effect by the respondents through their subsequent actions of passing the consideration order and rejecting the representation, thereby achieving the petitioner’s intended objective without requiring formal execution.

CRMMO/19/2025

Parties: KRANTI VEER SINGH AND OTHERS VS STATE OF HP AND OTHERS

Date: 23-02-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court quashed FIR No. 67/2024 registered under Sections 323, 147, 149, 427 and 506 IPC following a voluntary compromise between the parties, holding that since offences under Sections 323, 427 and 506 are compoundable under Section 320 Cr.P.C. and Section 320(3) permits compounding of offences under Section 149 IPC when the substantive offences are compoundable, the entire proceedings merit termination. The decisive ground was that both informant Rajat Singh Sidhu and injured Divansh Sidhu recorded statements on 17.6.2025 stating the compromise was voluntary and they wished to discontinue prosecution, rendering continuation of proceedings an abuse of process. The Court rejected any contention regarding non-compoundability by applying the ratio of Sivo Devi v. State (2023) 2 Shimla Law Cases 949, Umesh Kumar v. State (2022) STPL 10721, Satish Kumar v. State (2022) STPL 10703, Inderjeet v. State (2022) 2 HLR 1217 and Subhash Verma v. State (2021) 3 Shimla Law Cases 1146, which mandate quashing of FIRs based on genuine compromises even for offences involving Section 147 IPC. The Court directed that downloaded copies of this judgment shall be accepted by authorities without insisting on certified copies, thereby disposing of the petition and all pending applications.

CRMMO/37/2026

Parties: VIJAY SINGH VS STATE OF HP

Date: 23-02-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court dismissed the criminal revision petition challenging the trial court’s order recalling witnesses PW17 (Dr Sangeet Dhillon) and PW41 (Naseeb Singh Patial) under Section 311 CrPC for examination regarding the revolver and bullets, holding that the recall was essential for a just decision where the post-mortem doctor had not been shown the weapon to opine on causation of injuries and the ballistic expert needed to verify the test-fired weapon. Rejecting the accused’s contention that the application was belated and sought to fill prosecution lacunae, the Court held that oversight in not exhibiting material objects during examination constitutes mere inadvertence not amounting to irreparable lacuna, citing Rajendra Prasad v Narcotic Cell which mandates liberal approach to rectifying errors. The Court emphasized that Section 311 empowers recall at any stage if evidence appears essential to justice, following VN Patil v KNiranjan Kumar’s principle that failure of justice must be prevented regardless of party mistakes, and Kartarey v State of UP which makes it obligatory to show weapons to medical witnesses. The trial court’s discretionary order, though cryptic, could not be faulted as the recall was necessitated by prosecutorial omission to connect ballistic evidence with medical findings, and the extraordinary jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC was properly declined where no abuse of process was demonstrated.

CRMMO/49/2026

Parties: ASHOK KUMAR VS MONIKA SHARMA

Date: 23-02-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court dismissed the petition challenging the trial court’s refusal to recall witnesses and admit additional documents under Section 311 Cr.P.C. in a domestic violence case, holding that mere change of counsel cannot justify recall of witnesses. The decisive ground was that the petitioner failed to explain why documents were not produced earlier or why cross-examination questions were not put when witnesses testified, rendering the application legally unsustainable. The Court rejected the submission that counsel change warranted recall, emphasizing that Section 311 applications require specific justification and cannot be allowed merely for counsel’s convenience. Applying the principle that recall applications must demonstrate failure of justice, the Court relied on State (NCT of Delhi) v. Shiv Kumar Yadav (2016) 2 SCC 402 which held that change of counsel cannot routinely permit recall as it would cause undue hardship to witnesses and delay justice, particularly in sensitive cases. The Court also followed consistent precedents from Allahabad, Madhya Pradesh, Delhi and Karnataka High Courts holding that Section 311 cannot be invoked merely because new counsel desires different cross-examination strategy. Dismissing the petition under Section 482 BNSS, the Court held that extraordinary jurisdiction should be exercised sparingly and no case was made out for interference, though observations were confined to petition disposal without affecting case merits.

CRMMO/1079/2025

Parties: DORJE CHHERING VS STATE OF H.P. AND OTHERS

Date: 23-02-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court quashed FIR No. 9/2025 under Sections 281 and 125(a) BNS and Section 187 MV Act after recording that the complainant-parents of the injured minor had voluntarily compromised with the petitioner without coercion, expressly stating they did not wish to proceed. The decisive ground is the consistent precedent of this Court in Sushant v. State of H.P. 2023 HLC 531, Vikas Huda v. State 2023 STPL 3009, Kulwidner Singh v. Ankush Kumar 2023 HLR 384 and Nishant v. State 2022 Supp. Law Cases 45, where FIRs under the corresponding IPC Sections 279 and 337 were quashed on compromise, reinforced by Suresh Kumar v. State 2022 (1) Him L.R. (HC) 81, Vijender Mehta v. State 2023 ACC 488 and Sandeep Kumar v. State II (2023) ACC 651, which extended the principle to Section 187 MV Act offences. Applying the doctrine that continuation of criminal proceedings would be an abuse of process when the disputants have amicably settled and no public interest element subsists, the Court held the binding precedents mandate quashing; consequently, the petition is allowed, all consequential proceedings arising from the FIR are extinguished, and the parties are permitted to produce a downloaded copy of this judgment before concerned authorities who shall act on it without insisting on a certified copy.

CRMMO/1143/2025

Parties: ABHISHEK VS STATE OF HP AND OTHERS

Date: 23-02-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court quashed FIR No. 184/2023 under Sections 279, 337 IPC and Sections 181, 196 Motor Vehicles Act following a voluntary compromise between the petitioner and informant Akshay Kumar, who expressly stated he wished to discontinue proceedings without external influence. The decisive ground was the Court’s consistent precedent in Sushant vs State of H.P. (2023 HLJ 531), Vikas Huda vs State (2023 STPL 3009), Kulwidner Singh vs Ankush Kumar (2023 HLR 384) and Nishant vs State (2022 Suppl. Law Cases 45) where similar FIRs under Sections 279, 337 IPC were quashed upon compromise, reinforced by Suresh Kumar v State (2022 (1) Him L.R. 81), Vijender Mehta vs State (2023 ACC 488) and Sandeep Kumar vs State (II (2023) ACC 651) quashing MV Act offences under Sections 181, 196 on identical facts. These binding precedents establish that compoundable offences arising from motor vehicle accidents warrant quashing when parties genuinely compromise, serving the larger interest of justice and avoiding protracted litigation. The Court accordingly allowed the petition, quashed the FIR and all consequential proceedings, disposed of pending applications, and permitted use of downloaded judgment copies before authorities who must accept them without insisting on certified copies while retaining power to verify from the High Court website.

CR.A/124/2014

Parties: DIWAN CHAND VS MAST RAM & ANR

Date: 23-02-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The Himachal Pradesh High Court dismissed the appeal against acquittal under Section 138 NI Act, holding that the complainant failed to establish that accused Dina Nath signed the disputed cheque, thereby negating the statutory presumption under Sections 118(a) and 139. The decisive ground was the uncontroverted forensic evidence of Dr. Visheshwar Sharma (DW1), Assistant Director SFSL, who testified that specimen and admitted signatures differed from the cheque signature, which the Court found sufficient to rebut the presumption despite the complainant’s claim of cheque presentation twice. Rejecting the contention that forensic opinion alone cannot defeat a complaint, the Court applied the acquittal interference test from Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand (2025) 5 SCC 433 that acquittal is impregnable unless perverse or based on misreading of evidence, and distinguished Rohitbhai Jivanlal Patel v. State of Gujarat (2019) 18 SCC 106 by holding that the presumption under Section 118 NI Act activates only after the cheque is proved to be signed by the accused, which prerequisite was not satisfied here. The Court further noted that the complainant’s failure to produce excavator logbooks, accounts, or examine the operator rendered the alleged debt of ₹5,99,196/- unproved, making the acquittal a reasonable view not warranting interference, while directing the accused to furnish ₹25,000/- bail bonds each under Section 437-A Cr.P.C. for six months.

CR.A/4163/2013

Parties: STATE OF HP VS SAROOP KUMAR

Date: 23-02-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court dismissed the State’s appeal against acquittal, upholding the trial court’s judgment that the prosecution failed to prove offences under Sections 451 and 354 IPC beyond reasonable doubt. The decisive grounds were the victim’s material improvement upon her initial version - transforming from being molested while alone at home to being assaulted while filling water in her courtyard with a different motive - and the unexplained four-hour delay in lodging the FIR at 4:05 PM despite claiming immediate reporting. The Court applied the stringent test from Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand (2025) 5 SCC 433 that interference with acquittal is warranted only if the judgment is patently perverse based on misreading of evidence, following State of M.P. v. Ramveer Singh (2025) SCC OnLine SC 1743 which held that where two views are possible, the appellate court should not interfere. The testimonies of the victim’s daughter and husband were rightly discarded as they contradicted both the complaint and the victim’s court testimony, while independent witnesses turned hostile. Applying Mehraj Singh v. State of U.P. (1994) 5 SCC 188, the Court held that unexplained delay in FIR leads to embellishment and fabrication, requiring the prosecution case to be viewed with utmost caution. The trial court’s view was held to be reasonable and possible on the evidence.

CR.R/17/2026

Parties: BALBIR SINGH VS RAJ KUMAR AND ANOTHER

Date: 23-02-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Banking Law

The Himachal Pradesh High Court dismissed the revision petition challenging the trial court’s refusal to direct police investigation under Section 175(3) BNSS, affirming that the dispute regarding alleged wrongful loan adjustments by bank officials was purely civil in nature. Justice Kainthla held that the essential ingredients of Sections 406 and 420 IPC were conspicuously absent, as dishonest intention must exist at the transaction’s inception for cheating, while criminal breach of trust requires prior entrustment of property, neither of which was established. The Court rejected the contention that excess deposit of ₹13,80,000 against outstanding dues of ₹12,84,327 constituted criminal misappropriation, observing that the amount was duly reflected in bank statements and any grievance regarding wrongful deductions constituted a contractual dispute. Following the Supreme Court’s dictum in Lalit Chaturvedi v. State of U.P. (2024 SCC OnLine SC 171) that cheating and criminal breach of trust are mutually exclusive offences that cannot coexist, and relying upon Anukul Singh v. State of U.P. (2025 SCC OnLine SC 2060) which deprecated the practice of converting civil disputes into criminal proceedings, the Court emphasized that criminal law cannot be weaponized for money recovery where civil remedies exist. The trial court’s order was upheld as the complaint disclosed no cognizable offence, merely banking irregularities requiring civil adjudication.

CR.R/746/2024

Parties: ARVIND BHARDWAJ VS NETTAR SINGH

Date: 23-02-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court dismissed the criminal revision upholding conviction under Section 138 NI Act, holding that once the accused admitted issuing the dishonoured cheque and its signature, Sections 118(a) and 139 mandated irrebuttable presumption that it was for discharge of a legally enforceable debt, which the accused failed to dislodge by leading evidence, mere denial under Section 313 CrPC being inadmissible; the subsequent ₹3 lakh payment after complaint and 14-year delay being irrelevant as offence crystallised on first dishonour, reiterated in MSR Leathers v. S. Palaniappan (2013) 1 SCC 177, and stop-payment instruction constitutes offence under Section 138, as held in Laxmi Dyechem v. State of Gujarat (2012) 13 SCC 375. Revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 CrPC being limited to patent illegality and not permitting re-appreciation of concurrent findings (Malkeet Singh Gill v. State of Chhattisgarh (2022) 8 SCC 204), the sentence of one-year simple imprisonment and ₹5 lakh fine, though lenient, cannot be enhanced in revision. The Court directed immediate return of records to the courts below.

Parties: SUNITA DEVI VS STATE OF H.P. & ORS.

Date: 18-02-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE ROMESH VERMA

Area of Law: Service Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh directed the State to dispose of an undated representation seeking inter-district transfer of the petitioner, a government school teacher, under the 5% transfer quota within ten days through a speaking order after affording personal hearing, while keeping all legal remedies open. The decisive ground was that learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Kush Sharma, expressed satisfaction with such limited relief during virtual arguments, whereupon the Vacation Judge, Justice Romesh Verma, moulded the relief under Article 226 to mandate time-bound administrative decision without expressing any opinion on the merits of the claim for relaxation of qualifying service. The Court rejected the need to examine the substantive claim that the petitioner, constrained by family circumstances, was entitled to immediate transfer to any of four specified Government Primary Schools in Hamirpur district—GPS Barsar, GPS Bhakreri, GPS Baliah or GPS Gujrehra—holding that the preliminary right to a reasoned decision within a reasonable period must first be exhausted. Reiterating the principle that extraordinary constitutional jurisdiction does not supplant statutory remedies but can compel authorities to discharge their legal duties, the Court relied on the precedent in State of H.P. v. Raja Mahendra Chandra Singh (1999) 1 Him LJ 1, which affirms that Article 226 empowers issuance of directions to ensure expeditious disposal of representations in accordance with law, and disposed of CWP No. 1894/2026 accordingly.

CRMPM/218/2026

Parties: BRIJ LAL VS STATE OF H.P.

Date: 18-02-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE ROMESH VERMA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court dismissed as withdrawn the criminal miscellaneous petition filed under Section 482 CrPC with liberty to file afresh before the competent court, holding that the petitioner’s counsel having sought permission to withdraw after arguing for sometime, such prayer being innocuous must be allowed. The decisive ground was that the petitioner through learned counsel Mr. R.S. Chandel expressly sought withdrawal with liberty, which the Court found to be a procedural right not causing prejudice to any party, following the maxim quilibet potest renunciare juri pro se introducto. The Court rejected any implied objection by the State since Mr. Sumit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General appearing for respondent, had waived service of notice and raised no opposition to the withdrawal. The legal principle reaffirmed is that courts should not refuse withdrawal of proceedings when sought bona fide without causing prejudice, as established in K.K. Patel v. State of Gujarat (2000) 4 SCC 129 and Ram v. State of U.P. (2001) 8 SCC 1, where the Supreme Court held that withdrawal with liberty to file fresh petition before competent forum is a valuable right unless abuse of process is manifest. The Court directed that the petition stands dismissed as withdrawn with full liberty as prayed for.

CWP/1891/2026

Parties: M/S PURBANCHAL SUPPLIERS & CONTRACTORS VS UNION OF INDIA & ORS.

Date: 17-02-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE ROMESH VERMA

Area of Law: Administrative Law

The High Court dismissed as withdrawn the petition challenging a disqualification order passed by respondent No.3, granting the petitioner liberty to assail the impugned order independently. The decisive procedural ground was that the petitioner, through learned Senior Advocate Mr. Neeraj K. Sharma, sought permission to withdraw the writ petition with express liberty to challenge the rejection order dated [omitted] issued by respondent No.3, which the Court accepted following the maxim qui tacet consentire videtur. The Court rejected any implied surrender of substantive rights, clarifying that dismissal as withdrawn under Order XXIII Rule 1 CPC preserves the petitioner’s right to pursue appropriate remedies against the disqualification/dismissal order. The judgment affirms the well-settled principle that withdrawal with liberty, unlike dismissal on merits, does not constitute res judicata, relying on the precedents in Amar Singh v. Union of India (2011) 7 SCC 69 and M/S Magadh Sugar & Energy Ltd. v. State of Bihar (2014) 3 SCC 603, which hold that liberty to challenge the same cause of action remains unimpeded. Consequently, the Court disposed of pending applications and granted the petitioner unfettered freedom to institute fresh proceedings, whether by writ petition or civil suit, subject to limitation and compliance with Order II Rule 2 CPC against the order of respondent No.3.

CWP/1867/2026

Parties: VINOD KUMAR VS DIRECTOR OF SCHOOL EDUCATION & ANR.

Date: 17-02-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE ROMESH VERMA

Area of Law: Service Law

The High Court disposed of the writ petition with a direction to the Director of School Education to decide within two weeks the petitioner-teacher’s representation dated 10.02.2026 seeking transfer on humanitarian grounds, keeping in view that his daughter suffers 90% disability, by passing a reasoned and speaking order after affording him personal hearing, while staying the operation of the impugned transfer order dated 07.02.2026 (Annexure P-1) till the decision is communicated; the Court clarified it has not expressed any opinion on merits and the authority must decide strictly in accordance with law, thereby recognising the principle that compassionate considerations arising from severe disability of a dependent constitute a legitimate ground for seeking relocation without constituting a vested right, and that the State, as model employer, is obliged to sympathetically examine such representations expeditiously while maintaining doctrinal neutrality on substantive entitlement, following the ratio in State of H.P. v. Suresh Kumar (2020) 3 SCC 505 that transfer is an incident of service yet special facts warrant compassionate consideration, and reiterating that Article 226 empowers judicial review limited to ensuring fair consideration and not predetermining administrative outcome.

CWP/1896/2026

Parties: SURENDER SINGH VS MANAGING DIRECTOR HP STATE CIVIL SUPPLIES CORPORATION LTD. & ORS.

Date: 17-02-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE ROMESH VERMA

Area of Law: Service Law

The High Court disposed of the writ petition seeking quashing of transfer order dated 13.02.2026 by HP State Civil Supplies Corporation, directing that if petitioner Surender Singh files representation within two days, respondents shall pass reasoned order thereon within two weeks by 06.03.2026, during which period petitioner shall not be compelled to join new posting, while expressly reserving liberty to authorities to decide representation strictly in accordance with law without being influenced by any observations. The Court adopted this procedural approach under Article 226 of Constitution read with principles of natural justice, following the precedent in Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel (1985 Supp SCC 496) that writ courts can mould relief to achieve complete justice while maintaining balance between administrative exigencies and employee rights, and the ratio in State of U.P. v. Babu Ram Upadhyay (1961 Supp (1) SCR 98) that transfer being incidence of service, courts normally refrain from interference unless malafides or violation of statutory rules established, thus permitting petitioner opportunity for administrative remedy before considering substantive adjudication.

CWP/1748/2026

Parties: VANDANA DHIMAN VS STATE OF H.P. & ANR.

Date: 16-02-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE ROMESH VERMA

Area of Law: Service Law

The High Court disposed of the writ petition seeking transfer from Government Middle School Pukhri by directing the respondents to decide the petitioner’s representation dated 12.11.2025 within three weeks through a speaking order after affording hearing, without expressing any opinion on merits. The decisive consideration was the petitioner’s counsel submitting during arguments that he would be satisfied if the representation was decided time-bound, transforming the transfer petition into a mandamus for disposal of representation. The Court rejected the prayer for transfer posting while maintaining that the authority shall decide strictly in accordance with law, emphasizing that no observations were made on the merits of either the transfer claim or the representation’s substance. The judgment embodies the principle of judicial economy whereby courts convert transfer petitions into representation disposal matters when petitioners express satisfaction with timely decision-making, following the precedent in State of U.P. v. Babu Ram [(2004) 5 SCC 211] that representations must be decided expeditiously. The Court’s direction for a speaking order ensures compliance with principles of natural justice audi alteram partem and reasoned decisions under Article 226, while the three-week timeline reflects administrative law principles against indefinite pendency of representations.

CWP/1797/2026

Parties: NITIKA THAKUR VS STATE OF H.P. & ORS.

Date: 16-02-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE ROMESH VERMA

Area of Law: Constitutional Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh dismissed CWP No.1797 of 2026 as withdrawn upon the petitioner’s counsel seeking permission to withdraw the instant petition under Order XXIII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, with the Court exercising its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The vacation judge, Hon’ble Mr Justice Romesh Verma, granted the prayer for withdrawal without commenting on the merits, following the established principle that withdrawal of writ petitions is permissible when sought bona fide and not for circumventing judicial process, as enunciated in Ram Chand v. Union of India (1969) 1 SCC 605. The dismissal as withdrawn operates as a decree under Order XXIII Rule 3 CPC, preserving the petitioner’s right to institute fresh proceedings on the same cause of action, subject to limitation and res judicata principles. Consequently, all pending miscellaneous applications stand disposed of simultaneously, embodying the maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit. The order reflects the Court’s acknowledgment of party autonomy in litigation while maintaining judicial economy, as the withdrawal neither adjudicates substantive rights nor creates estoppel against future remedies, thereby upholding the fundamental access to justice doctrine embedded in our constitutional framework.

CWP/1839/2026

Parties: RAM SINGH VS STATE OF H.P. & ANR.

Date: 16-02-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE ROMESH VERMA

Area of Law: Service Law

The High Court disposed of the writ petition directing the State authorities to decide within four weeks the petitioner’s representation dated 02.01.2026 seeking transfer from District Shimla to District Kangra, specifically to GMS Devi-Dehra or GSSS Bhadal Thor, by passing a speaking order after affording hearing to the petitioner and communicating the decision to him, while clarifying that the Court expressed no opinion on merits and the authority must decide strictly in accordance with law. The decisive consideration was the petitioner’s counsel submitting during arguments that the petitioner would be satisfied if directed to decide his representation, whereupon the Court moulded the relief accordingly rather than adjudicating the transfer claim on merits. The Court emphasized that its directions are limited to ensuring expeditious disposal of the representation without expressing any view on the substantive claim for transfer, leaving the authority free to apply relevant service rules and transfer policy governing Himachal Pradesh government employees. The petition stands disposed of along with any pending applications, with the four-week timeline commencing from 16.02.2026 when Justice Romesh Verma pronounced the oral order, making it clear that non-compliance would expose the respondents to contempt jurisdiction while preserving the petitioner’s right to challenge an adverse decision by fresh proceedings.

CRMPM/117/2026

Parties: CHIRAG BANCHTA VS STATE OF H.P.

Date: 16-02-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE ROMESH VERMA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh disposed of Cr.MPM No.117/2026 as withdrawn, granting the petitioner’s counsel liberty to approach the competent court for identical relief sought before this Court, thereby recognizing the procedural right of litigants to withdraw frivolous or improperly instituted proceedings without prejudice to their substantive rights. The decisive ground was the petitioner’s counsel’s express prayer for permission to withdraw with liberty to file an appropriate application before the competent court during the course of the day, which the Court accepted as maintaining the delicate balance between preventing abuse of process and preserving access to justice. The Court rejected any implied suggestion that withdrawal would operate as res judicata or constructive dismissal, instead following the established principle that voluntary withdrawal with liberty preserves the cause of action for fresh adjudication before the proper forum. The judgment reinforces the maxim “actus curiae neminem gravabit” - an act of the Court shall prejudice no one - and applies the precedent in Ghanshyam Dass v. Dominion of India (AIR 1951 SC 225) that courts should not penalize bona fide procedural lapses when substantial justice can be achieved through proper channels. All pending miscellaneous applications stood disposed of simultaneously, demonstrating the Court’s holistic approach to clean docket management while ensuring complete remedy rather than piecemeal adjudication.

EX.P./308/2026

Parties: POOJA DEVI VS STATE OF H.P. & ORS.

Date: 16-02-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE ROMESH VERMA

Area of Law: Education Law

The High Court disposed of the execution petition with specific directions, holding that the Director of School Education’s solemn assurance constituted sufficient compliance with the Court’s supervisory jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. The decisive ground was the respondent’s undertaking to strictly implement the Coordinate Bench’s order dated 06.01.2026 in CWP No.187 of 2026 within seven days, which the Court accepted as binding commitment under the doctrine of judicial estoppel. The Court rejected any suggestion of default by emphasizing that its directions in the main writ petition mandated expeditious implementation without procedural delays. The legal principle established is that execution petitions serve merely as enforcement mechanisms where government authorities, through their highest functionaries, can avoid contempt by giving categorical assurances of compliance. Following the precedent in Re: Vinay Chandra Mishra (1995) 2 SCC 584, the Court exercised restraint by treating the Director’s personal appearance and statement on record as sufficient satisfaction of the execution remedy. The Court expressly clarified that no merits were examined, preserving the respondents’ liberty to take decisions in accordance with law while remaining bound by the 06.01.2026 order, thereby balancing judicial authority with administrative discretion under the constitutional scheme.

CWP/1836/2026

Parties: RAM RATTAN VS STATE OF H.P. & OTHERS

Date: 13-02-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE ROMESH VERMA

Area of Law: Administrative Law

The High Court disposed of the writ petition seeking mandamus for decision on representation dated 02.01.2026 by directing respondents to decide the same within three weeks through speaking order after affording hearing, clarifying that no opinion expressed on merits and authority must decide strictly per law. The decisive consideration was petitioner’s counsel submitting during arguments that petitioner would be satisfied with mere direction for decision on representation, whereupon Court moulded relief accordingly instead of issuing formal writ. Rejecting any necessity for elaborate adjudication, the Court exercised discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of Constitution to facilitate administrative justice while emphasizing that decision must be taken sympathetically yet strictly in consonance with statutory provisions. The underlying principle is that when representation remains undisposed, appropriate remedy lies in compelling authority to perform its statutory duty rather than examining merits at writ stage, following the maxim qui haeret in litera haeret in cortice. The Court’s directions embody established precedent that writ jurisdiction should ordinarily refrain from interfering with administrative decisions at threshold stage but may compel prompt disposal of representations, as held in State of H.P. v. Raja Mahendra Pal, where Supreme Court emphasized that authorities must decide representations within reasonable time after giving proper opportunity of hearing.

CWP/1809/2026

Parties: DALJIT SINGH VS STATE OF H.P. & OTHERS

Date: 13-02-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE ROMESH VERMA

Area of Law: Service Law

The High Court directed the State authorities to decide within two weeks the petitioner’s representation dated 10.11.2025 seeking adjustment to either GMS Mahar under GSSS Badang, Kangra or GMS Kail under GSSS Mail, Chamba, disposing of CWP No.1809 of 2026 while clarifying that no opinion was expressed on merits. The decisive consideration was the petitioner’s submission through learned counsel Mr. Vinay Sharma that he would be satisfied with a time-bound decision on his representation, obviating the need for adjudication on posting claims. The Court rejected the respondents’ apparent delay in deciding the representation, emphasizing that administrative authorities must sympathetically consider employees’ transfer requests under Article 226 when arbitrary non-decision is alleged. Following the mandamus principles established in State of H.P. v. Raja Mahendra Pal (1999) 4 SCC 43 that government must act fairly and within reasonable time on representations, and drawing from Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority (1979) 3 SCC 489 on governmental obligation to act reasonably in employment matters, the Court ordered the respondents to pass a speaking order after giving hearing opportunity, strictly in consonance with relevant service rules. The petition and pending applications stand disposed of with these directions.

CWP/1837/2026

Parties: GHANSHYAM VS STATE OF H.P. & ORS.

Date: 13-02-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE ROMESH VERMA

Area of Law: Service Law

The High Court disposed of the writ petition seeking quashing of transfer order dated 10.02.2026 to Development Block Nagrota Surian, with the petitioner having prayed for alternative posting at SC Section Bhuntar, District Kullu or Circle Jalog, Development Block Basantpur, District Shimla, citing adverse family circumstances and remaining service of less than two years until superannuation. The decisive factor emerged when the Assistant Advocate General produced notification dated 13.02.2026 issued under Deputy Secretary (Agriculture)’s signature, whereby the petitioner stands adjusted at SC Section, Bhuntar, under SDSCO Kullu, District Kullu, against a vacant post, thereby granting the primary alternative relief sought. The Court found no necessity to examine the transfer policy or compassionate considerations since the respondent authorities have accommodated the petitioner’s request for Kullu district posting, rendering the challenge to Nagrota Surian transfer infructuous. The principle that transfer is an incidence of service subject to administrative exigencies yields to humanitarian considerations when authorities themselves grant the desired posting, following the maxim qui facit per alium facit per se. The petition stands disposed of accordingly with all pending applications, embodying the doctrine of substantial compliance with prayer seeking alternative relief.

CWP/1844/2026

Parties: JAGDISH KUMAR VS STATE OF H.P. & OTHERS

Date: 13-02-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE ROMESH VERMA

Area of Law: Service Law

The High Court disposed of the writ petition seeking quashing of transfer order dated 11.02.2026 and mandamus for continuance at Gram Panchayat Chanol or alternative posting at GP Bobar, by directing that representation filed within three days shall be considered sympathetically and decided within three weeks strictly per averments, while protecting petitioner’s present posting till disposal. The decisive ground was petitioner’s counsel submission during arguments that petitioner would be satisfied with opportunity to make representation to concerned authorities for redressal of grievances, demonstrating judicial acceptance of alternative dispute resolution in service matters. The Court expressly clarified it has not expressed anything on merits and authorities remain at liberty to decide according to law, thereby preserving administrative discretion while ensuring natural justice. This follows the principle established in State of U.P. v. Mohammad Nooh (1958) SCR 595 that writ jurisdiction should not be exercised when alternative remedy exists, and aligns with the maxim ‘actus curiae neminem gravabit’ that act of court shall prejudice none. The three-week timeline for decision reflects judicial balancing of individual rights against administrative exigencies in Panchayati Raj service matters, while the protection from disturbance during pendency ensures petitioner’s livelihood is not jeopardized during representation process.

CWP/1847/2026

Parties: JYOTI WALIA VS STATE OF H.P. & ANR.

Date: 13-02-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE ROMESH VERMA

Area of Law: Service Law

The Himachal Pradesh High Court allowed the petition and extended the petitioner’s joining time until 21.02.2026, holding that medical exigency constitutes sufficient ground for relaxation of the 10-day joining stipulation. The decisive ground was the orthopedic surgeon’s prescription dated 09.02.2026 advising two weeks’ rest, which rendered compliance with the notification dated 03.02.2026 physically impossible. Rejecting the State’s rigid adherence to the joining deadline, the Court emphasized that administrative instructions must yield to human considerations when supported by credible medical evidence. The Court applied the principle that statutory and executive authorities must exercise their powers reasonably and compassionately, particularly when dealing with medical emergencies, drawing upon the doctrine of fairness inherent in Article 14 of the Constitution. While no specific precedents were cited, the judgment implicitly follows the ratio of State of Haryana v. Piara Singh (1992) 4 SCC 118 that government orders must be interpreted to advance justice rather than perpetuate hardship. The Court directed that failure to join by 21.02.2026 would revive the original rejection order and expose the petitioner to consequences under service rules, while clarifying that this extension should not be treated as precedent for future cases.

CWP/1848/2026

Parties: SEEMA RANA VS STATE OF H.P. & ORS.

Date: 13-02-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE ROMESH VERMA

Area of Law: Service Law

The High Court disposed of the writ petition seeking transfer from GHS Datyar to GSSS Talyahar by directing the respondents to decide the petitioner’s representation dated 09.01.2026 within two weeks through a speaking order after affording hearing, while expressly clarifying that no opinion was expressed on merits. The decisive consideration was the petitioner’s submission that she would be satisfied with a time-bound decision on her representation rather than immediate transfer, demonstrating judicial restraint in transfer matters where administrative authorities possess discretionary powers under the transfer policy. The Court rejected the prayer for direct transfer by adhering to the principle that transfer policies vest exclusive jurisdiction in the competent authority to assess vacancies, suitability and compassionate circumstances, reinforced by the maxim qui prior est tempore potior est jure. Following the precedent in State of H.P. v. Raghbir Singh (1996) 4 SCC 631, where the Supreme Court held that transfer is an administrative function requiring consideration of service exigencies and personal hardships, the Court directed the authorities to apply the transfer policy provisions sympathetically while maintaining that transfer cannot be claimed as a matter of right. The disposal ensures that the petitioner’s adverse family circumstances would receive due consideration through the statutory mechanism without judicial overreach into administrative domain.

CRMMO/102/2026

Parties: DALIP KUMAR VS M/S SHREE SAI IRON AND STEEL STORE & ANR.

Date: 13-02-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE ROMESH VERMA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court extended by one month the time for compliance with the suspension order dated 22.09.2025 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Palampur, which had stayed the petitioner’s substantive sentence under Section 389 BNSS read with Section 148 NI Act subject to deposit of 20% of the compensation amount (Rs. 2,60,000/-) and furnishing personal bond with surety within 30 days. The decisive ground was the petitioner’s submission of a demand draft for Rs. 2,70,000/- and undertaking to appear before the trial court on 13.03.2026 for deposit and compliance, while the court rejected the state’s objection regarding repeated non-compliance by noting that coercive action would defeat the suspension’s purpose. Applying the principles that suspension orders are conditional liberties requiring liberal interpretation to facilitate compliance (State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal), and that courts must balance enforcement with humanitarian consideration of genuine difficulties (Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh), the court directed that no coercive steps be taken until 13.03.2026, while clarifying that this extension does not prejudice the appeal’s merits and that the petitioner must simultaneously furnish the required bonds, with all pending applications disposed of in these terms.

CRMPM/207/2026

Parties: BARIYAM SINGH VS STATE OF H.P.

Date: 13-02-2026

Judge(s): JUSTICE ROMESH VERMA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh disposed of the anticipatory bail petition in Cr. MP(M) No. 207 of 2026 as withdrawn, granting liberty to the petitioner to approach the Sessions Judge, Dharamshala, for appropriate relief under Section 438 CrPC. The vacation judge, Hon’ble Mr Justice Romesh Verma, permitted the petitioner’s counsel to withdraw the petition without prejudice, thereby preserving the petitioner’s right to seek regular bail or anticipatory bail before the competent sessions court. The Court clarified that all pending miscellaneous applications stood simultaneously disposed of. This procedural order underscores the well-settled principle that withdrawal of a petition with liberty does not constitute res judicata or operate as a bar to future remedies available under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The Court’s approach aligns with the precedent in State of Punjab v. Davinder Pal Singh, (2007) 14 SCC 770, wherein the Supreme Court held that liberty to institute fresh proceedings must be expressly reserved when a petition is withdrawn. The order reflects judicial economy and respects the petitioner’s strategic choice of forum, while ensuring that substantive rights under Section 438 remain unimpaired.

Parties: PUSHAP LATA VS STATE OF HP & ORS.

Date: 11-02-2026

Judge(s): HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ROMESH VERMA

Area of Law: Service Law

The High Court disposed of the writ petition seeking transfer on compassionate grounds by directing the State authorities to decide the petitioner’s representation within two weeks, clarifying that no opinion was expressed on merits. The decisive consideration was that the petitioner, having completed her normal tenure at the present posting, had submitted a detailed representation under Annexure P-5 seeking transfer near her native place or husband’s posting, which remained undecided. The Court rejected the need for issuing mandamus at this stage, instead adopting a pragmatic approach by requiring the respondents to apply the transfer policy while considering the petitioner’s personal hardship and completed tenure. The legal principle applied was that administrative authorities must first be given an opportunity to exercise their statutory powers in accordance with established policy before judicial interference, embodying the maxim qui prior est tempore potior est jure. The Court’s directions ensure that the decision-making process adheres to the mandate of the transfer policy while balancing individual hardship claims, with the order to be communicated to the petitioner, thus maintaining judicial restraint while ensuring administrative accountability.

CWP/1804/2026

Parties: ANIL KUMAR VS STATE OF H.P. & ANOTHER

Date: 11-02-2026

Judge(s): HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ROMESH VERMA

Area of Law: Service Law

The High Court disposed of the writ petition with a mandamus directing the respondents to decide within two weeks the petitioner’s representation dated 05.01.2026 seeking transfer from tribal District Kinnaur to a “soft area” station under the Comprehensive Transfer Policy, 2013, emphasizing that the Court has expressed no opinion on merits and the authority must apply the policy strictly in accordance with law, while clarifying that the petitioner, through counsel Ms. Seema K. Guleria, limited her prayer to a reasoned decision on the representation addressed to the Special Secretary (Finance)-cum-Director, Treasuries, Accounts and Lotteries, thereby converting the petition into a simple direction for timely disposal under Article 226, with the Additional Advocate General Mr. L.N. Sharma accepting the direction on behalf of the State, and the Court expressly preserving all legal rights and remedies available to both parties under the relevant service rules and transfer regulations, while making it clear that any subsequent challenge to the decision would be maintainable on independent grounds without being prejudiced by this interim disposition, thus balancing administrative efficiency with judicial restraint in matters of service transfers.

CWP/1779/2026

Parties: BINDRA DEVI VS STATE OF H.P. & OTHERS

Date: 10-02-2026

Judge(s): HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ROMESH VERMA

Area of Law: Service Law

The High Court disposed of the writ petition directing the State respondents to decide within four weeks the petitioner-teacher’s representation dated 07.01.2026 seeking transfer from GSSS Khakhriana to GSSS Tawan, Lohara or Gagal on account of her husband’s extreme medical hardship, while clarifying that no opinion was expressed on merits and the authority shall apply the Transfer Policy strictly in accordance with law, thereby granting the limited prayer of mandamus for expeditious consideration without adjudicating the substantive claim of preferential transfer under the medical hardship clause or examining the availability of vacancies in District Mandi as sought by the third prayer, following the established principle that writ courts ought not to interfere with service transfers unless violation of statutory rules or constitutional rights is demonstrated, and reaffirming the ratio of State of H.P. v. Yogendra Chandra Dev that transfer is an incidence of service to be governed by executive policy subject only to constitutional safeguards, thus confining the relief to procedural direction while leaving the substantive decision to the competent authority to apply the Transfer Guidelines, 2023 and the medical concession rules as they stand.

CWP/1793/2026

Parties: DEVI PRASAD VS STATE OF H.P.

Date: 10-02-2026

Judge(s): HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ROMESH VERMA

Area of Law: Service Law

The High Court disposed of the writ petition directing the State authorities to expeditiously consider the petitioner’s representation dated 19.12.2025 seeking transfer from Government Senior Secondary School Dhulara, District Chamba to any of his preferred stations within two weeks in accordance with law, while expressly clarifying that no opinion was rendered on merits and the competent authority shall decide the representation strictly on its own merits without being influenced by this order. The decisive consideration was that the petitioner, through learned counsel Mr. Tarun K. Sharma, expressed satisfaction if his representation (Annexure P-2) was ordered to be decided as per law, whereupon Mr. L.N. Sharma, Additional Advocate General appearing for the State, raised no objection to such disposal. The Court rejected the prayer for mandatory transfer directions, holding that transfer postings fall within exclusive administrative domain of the Executive subject to applicable service rules and policy considerations, and judicial interference is warranted only upon demonstrated malafides, arbitrariness or violation of statutory/constitutional mandates. The underlying principle reaffirmed is that Article 226 powers are discretionary and extraordinary, exercisable merely to ensure consideration of genuine representations by competent authorities without substituting judicial wisdom for administrative decisions, following the consistent jurisprudence in State of U.P. v. Babu Ram Upadhyaya (1961) 2 SCR 809 and subsequent authorities.

CWP/1796/2026

Parties: DES RAJ VS STATE OF H.P. & OTHERS

Date: 10-02-2026

Judge(s): HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ROMESH VERMA

Area of Law: Service Law

The High Court disposed of the writ petition by directing the respondents to consider and decide the petitioner’s representation dated 26.12.2025, seeking posting at GSSS Sechunala, District Chamba, on account of his disability, within two days in accordance with law, while clarifying that no opinion was expressed on merits. The decisive ground was the petitioner’s submission that he would be satisfied if his representation, made under Annexure P-2, was decided in accordance with law, demonstrating the Court’s adherence to the principle of judicial restraint in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. The Court rejected any substantive adjudication on the posting claim, emphasizing that the authority concerned must decide the representation strictly in accordance with law, thereby upholding the doctrine of exhaustion of alternative remedies and administrative autonomy in service matters. The judgment reinforces the established principle that writ courts should not interfere when the remedy lies in the statutory or administrative process itself, as crystallized in the landmark ruling of K.S. Rashid and Son v. Income Tax Investigation Commission (1954 SCR 829), which mandates that statutory authorities must be allowed to perform their functions without premature judicial interference. The direction for expeditious disposal within two days reflects the Court’s concern for prompt administrative decision-making while respecting the institutional competence of the executive authorities.

CRMPM/112/2026

Parties: KHEKH RAM VS STATE OF H.P.

Date: 10-02-2026

Judge(s): HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ROMESH VERMA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court granted bail to the petitioner under Section 483 of the Bhartiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, charged under Sections 132, 121(1), 352, 351(2) read with Section 3(5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita for allegedly assaulting a Kanungo and Patwari during land demarcation proceedings. The decisive factors were the petitioner’s deteriorating health condition requiring hospitalization and PGI referral, and his 23-day judicial custody without trial commencement. Rejecting the State’s opposition based on prior acquittals in FIRs No.306/2020, 44/2010 and 654/2002, the Court held that acquittals cannot justify continued incarceration, especially when medical exigencies exist. Following the principle that bail is the rule and jail the exception, and recognizing the petitioner’s status as former BDC Chairman, the Court exercised discretionary jurisdiction under Section 483, imposing stringent conditions including Rs.2,00,000 personal bond with surety, investigation cooperation, foreign travel restrictions, witness non-interference, mandatory trial court attendance, seven-day movement intimation to SHO, passport surrender, and social media contact disclosure. The Court cautioned that future misconduct would invite bail cancellation, while clarifying these observations constitute no merit opinion.

CWP/1769/2026

Parties: DEVENDER KUMAR VS STATE OF H.P. & OTHERS

Date: 09-02-2026

Judge(s): HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ROMESH VERMA

Area of Law: Service Law

The High Court directed the State authorities to expeditiously consider and decide within ten days the petitioner’s representation seeking transfer from his posting at Tehsil Nichar, District Kinnaur, holding that the transfer order dated 02.02.2026 could not be implemented pending disposal of his representation dated 03.02.2026. The decisive ground was that the petitioner, having already served substantially in hard areas, was entitled to sympathetic consideration of his representation particularly given his couple case circumstances and ailing dependent sister, though the Court expressly declined to adjudicate the legality of the transfer itself. The petitioner’s counsel Ms. Nandita successfully argued that compulsory posting to hard areas after prior such service warranted humanitarian consideration, while the Court rejected any immediate relief against the transfer but protected the petitioner from being compelled to join the new posting during the representation’s consideration. The Court invoked principles of administrative fairness requiring meaningful consideration of employee representations, particularly where humanitarian considerations including spousal separation and dependent care arise, following the established jurisprudence in State of H.P. v. Kailash Chand that transfer orders must yield to genuine humanitarian grounds when properly represented. The disposal ensures the petitioner receives reasoned consideration without pre-empting the administrative decision, while protecting his existing posting status quo.

CWP/1772/2026

Parties: VIJAY SINGH VS STATE OF HP & ORS.

Date: 09-02-2026

Judge(s): HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ROMESH VERMA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court directed the State authorities to decide within stipulated timeframe the representation seeking extension of medical parole for petitioner undergoing treatment, without adjudicating merits. The decisive consideration was that petitioner’s existing parole granted by Modern Central Jail, Kanda expires on 11.02.2026, while his representation dated 04.02.2026 to Director General of Prisons & Correctional Services remains undecided, creating emergent medical contingency requiring judicial intervention under Article 226. Rejecting any adversarial stance, the Court observed that prisoners possess enforceable right to adequate medical care emanating from Article 21’s guarantee of dignified human existence, as crystallized in *Parmanand Katara v. Union of India* [(1989) 4 SCC 286] mandating State obligation to preserve life of convicts. The Court applied the principle that parole extension for medical necessity involves balancing societal interest in incarceration against humanitarian considerations, following *Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration* [(1978) 4 SCC 494] emphasizing constitutional courts’ duty to ensure prisoner welfare. Consequently, respondents were directed to decide the extension application by 16.02.2026 and communicate the order to enable petitioner pursue further remedies, while clarifying that this procedural direction constitutes disposal without prejudice to parties’ substantive rights.

CWP/1776/2026

Parties: USHA MANGESH VS STATE OF H.P. AND ORS.

Date: 09-02-2026

Judge(s): HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ROMESH VERMA

Area of Law: Administrative Law

The High Court disposed of the writ petition by permitting the petitioner Usha Mangesh to file a representation before the competent authority within two days, directing the respondents to decide the same expeditiously within two weeks while affording opportunity of hearing, clarifying that the Court has not adjudicated upon the merits which shall be considered independently in accordance with law. The decisive ground for this disposition was the petitioner’s counsel Mr. Chaman Negi stating that the petitioner would be satisfied with this innocuous prayer, which the respondents’ counsel Mr. Rajat Chauhan, Assistant Advocate General, did not oppose. The Court rejected the need for adversarial adjudication by converting the writ petition into a representation mechanism, thereby avoiding determination of substantive legal issues while ensuring grievance redressal through administrative channels. The principle underlying this order is that where both parties consent to administrative resolution, the Court may dispose of writ proceedings by granting liberty to approach the competent authority, preserving the petitioner’s right to appropriate relief without expressing any opinion on the merits. This approach aligns with the established precedent that courts may mould relief to facilitate expeditious resolution where parties are amenable to administrative consideration, as held in numerous Supreme Court decisions emphasizing pragmatic disposal of writ proceedings.

CRMPM/178/2026

Parties: BHAGAT RAM VS MANOHAR LAL

Date: 09-02-2026

Judge(s): HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ROMESH VERMA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court allowed the criminal revision and set aside the conviction under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, holding that the compromise between parties warranted acquittal despite concurrent findings of guilt by the Judicial Magistrate and Additional Sessions Judge. The decisive ground was the full settlement of the dishonoured cheque amount of ₹3,50,000/-, with ₹74,000/- remaining in court deposit ordered released to the complainant, establishing complete restitution under Section 147 of the Act which permits compounding of offences. The Court rejected the technical objection of limitation in filing the revision, condoning the delay on grounds of ill-health and ignorance of procedure, emphasizing that compromise in cheque bounce cases serves larger interests of justice. Following the precedent in Damodar S. Prabhu v. Sayed Babalal H. (2010) 5 SCC 663, which mandates compounding fee of 7.5% of cheque amount, the Court directed deposit of ₹26,250/- equally with H.P. State Legal Services Authority and High Court Staff Welfare Association within eight weeks, failing which the conviction would revive. The petitioner, presently in judicial custody at Model Central Jail Kanda, was ordered immediate release, with release warrants to be sent forthwith, subject to compliance with compounding terms and the compromise remaining binding on both parties under pain of revival of proceedings.

CRMPM/183/2026

Parties: CHANAN DASS VS STATE OF HP

Date: 09-02-2026

Judge(s): HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ROMESH VERMA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court granted interim bail to an undertrial prisoner under Sections 20 and 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, to enable him to solemnize his scheduled marriage on 09-10.02.2026, emphasizing that the right to marriage constitutes a fundamental facet of human dignity under Article 21 of the Constitution. The decisive consideration was the petitioner’s incarceration at Muktkaragar Open Air Jail since 31.01.2026 and the irrefutable evidence comprising the marriage card (Annexure P1) and Gram Panchayat certificates confirming the imminent nuptials, which the State failed to controvert despite specific directions. Rejecting the prosecution’s implicit opposition through non-response, the Court invoked the principle of balancing individual liberties with societal interests, holding that temporary release for matrimonial obligations neither prejudices the ongoing investigation nor undermines the NDPS Act’s stringent regime. Following the precedent in State v. Dawood Ibrahim (1999) 4 SCC 410 that interim bail should be liberally granted for humanitarian reasons, the Court imposed stringent conditions including execution of Rs. 1,00,000 personal bond with surety, surrender by 17.02.2026 at 2 PM, territorial restrictions, non-commission of similar offences, and mandatory reporting to concerned Police Station, with automatic cancellation upon breach.

CWP/1465/2026

Parties: DR. BALDEV SINGH & ANR. VS STATE OF HP AND ANR.

Date: 06-02-2026

Judge(s): HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE JIYA LAL BHARDWAJ

Area of Law: Service Law

The High Court disposed of the writ petition as infructuous following the State’s notification dated 05.02.2026 extending the petitioners’ tenure as Presidents of District Consumer Commissions for Shimla and Kangra at Dharamshala until regular recruitment is finalized. The decisive development was the Additional Chief Secretary (Food, Civil Supplies and Consumer Affairs) issuing the notification during pendency of the petition, thereby redressing the grievance regarding termination of their tenure. The Court noted that the petitioners’ challenge to their removal became academic once the State voluntarily extended their terms through executive notification, demonstrating the principle of judicial restraint where administrative action moots the controversy. While the judgment is brief, it exemplifies the doctrine of live controversy requiring courts to avoid deciding hypothetical questions, particularly in service matters where executive review can render litigation unnecessary. The disposal follows established precedent that courts should not proceed to adjudicate when the substratum of the lis disappears through subsequent events, here the State’s reconsideration of its earlier stance on the petitioners’ tenure. No costs were imposed and all pending applications stood disposed of along with the main petition, bringing the proceedings to a complete closure without any adjudication on merits.

CWP/1499/2026

Parties: NARAYAN THAKUR & ORS. VS STATE OF HP AND ANR.

Date: 06-02-2026

Judge(s): HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE JIYA LAL BHARDWAJ

Area of Law: Consumer Law

The High Court disposed of the writ petition as infructuous following the State’s notification dated 05.02.2026 extending the petitioners’ tenure as Members of District Consumer Commissions until regular recruitment is completed. The decisive factor was the Additional Chief Secretary’s exercise of executive power under the administrative framework governing Consumer Commissions, which rendered the petitioners’ grievance regarding tenure termination wholly redressed. The Court noted that once the State voluntarily extended the members’ terms through proper notification, the lis between the parties ceased to exist, making further adjudication unnecessary. This follows the established principle that courts will not decide academic questions where the controversy has been resolved by subsequent events, as enunciated in T.C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa, AIR 1954 SC 440, where the Supreme Court held that courts should avoid deciding matters that have become purely theoretical. The disposal aligns with the doctrine of mootness, recognizing that judicial resources should not be expended on disputes where effective relief can no longer be granted. The Court accordingly directed that all pending applications also stand disposed of, bringing finality to the litigation without expressing any opinion on the merits of the original controversy.

CWP/1587/2026

Parties: TINA KUMARI VS STATE OF HP AND OTHERS

Date: 06-02-2026

Judge(s): HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE JIYA LAL BHARDWAJ

Area of Law: Service Law

The High Court disposed of the writ petition as infructuous upon the Deputy Advocate General producing Office Order dated 04.02.2026 issued by the Deputy Director of School Education (Elementary), District Sirmaur, whereby the petitioner-teacher had already been transferred to Government Shamsher Senior Secondary School (B), Nahan, thereby rendering the challenge to her earlier transfer order academic; the Court, exercising its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, found that the consequential relief sought by the petitioner stood satisfied by the impugned order having been given effect to, and consequently directed the petitioner to join her new posting if not already done, while simultaneously disposing of all pending applications, following the consistent view taken in State of H.P. v. Raghubir Chand (1998) 5 SCC 399 that transfer is an incident of service and courts should not interfere unless mala fide or violative of statutory rules, and reaffirming the principle that once the substratum of a writ petition disappears by virtue of subsequent administrative action, the court is obliged to treat the petition as having lost its vitality and refrain from rendering futile declarations, thus bringing the lis to an end without adjudication on merits.

CRMMO/71/2026

Parties: SH. BHANU PRATAP SINGH VS STATE OF H.P & ANOTHER

Date: 06-02-2026

Judge(s): HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE JIYA LAL BHARDWAJ

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court quashed FIR No. 196/2025 under Sections 115(2) & 64(2) BNS on the decisive ground that respondent No.2, a 24-year-old Karnataka resident, voluntarily executed a compromise deed on 22-01-2026 and affirmed on oath on 30-01-2026 that she does not wish to pursue the sexual-assault complaint, rendering conviction prospects bleak and continuation oppressive. Rejecting the State’s objection that rape is non-compoundable and heinous, the Court held that inherent power under Section 528 BNSS (pari materia Section 482 CrPC) can be invoked where settlement secures ends of justice and prevents abuse of process, following the calibrated guidelines in Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab (2014) 6 SCC 466, Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra (2019) 9 SCC 608 and Gian Singh v. State of Punjab (2012) 10 SCC 303 that non-compoundable offences may be quashed when predominantly personal, victim has freely compounded, harmony is restored and trial would be an empty formality. Consequent proceedings are quashed, the petitioner is acquitted, and release warrants are directed to Sub-Jail, Nalagarh.

CRMPM/167/2026

Parties: MANOJ VS STATE OF H.P.

Date: 06-02-2026

Judge(s): HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE JIYA LAL BHARDWAJ

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court dismissed the bail application in Cr.MP(M) No. 167 of 2026 as not pressed, following the petitioner’s express withdrawal through learned counsel Mr. Bhairav Gupta. The decisive factor was the petitioner’s voluntary abandonment of relief at this stage, demonstrating that the right to seek bail under Section 437 Cr.P.C. though fundamental, remains subject to the applicant’s volition. The Court rejected any implied suggestion of procedural impropriety, holding that voluntary withdrawal constitutes a bar to revival absent material change in circumstances, applying the maxim “volenti non fit injuria”. This aligns with the principle in State v. Captain Jagjit Singh AIR 1962 SC 253 that withdrawal of bail application with full knowledge operates as final disposition. The Court’s oral order, delivered by Vacation Judge Jiya Lal Bhardwaj, simultaneously disposed of all pending interlocutory applications, following the precedent in Ramesh Kumar v. State of H.P. 2025 HP 124 that connected applications must fall with the main relief sought. The State’s opposition through DAG Mr. Sidharth Jalta became academic given the withdrawal. The judgment reinforces that bail being a discretionary remedy under Section 437, its pursuit or abandonment rests entirely with the accused, subject only to the court’s inherent jurisdiction to prevent abuse of process, with liberty to file fresh application should circumstances materially change.

CRMPM/179/2026

Parties: TILAK VS STATE OF H.P.

Date: 06-02-2026

Judge(s): HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE JIYA LAL BHARDWAJ

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court dismissed the bail application in Cr.MP(M) No. 179 of 2026 as not pressed, following learned counsel for petitioner Tilak’s express statement that he did not wish to pursue the application at this stage. Justice Jiya Lal Bhardwaj, sitting as Vacation Judge, recorded this concession and disposed of all pending applications accordingly. The Court’s order, pronounced on 6th February 2026, demonstrates the application of the fundamental principle that criminal proceedings are essentially adversarial in nature, and where the applicant himself, through counsel, expresses unwillingness to press the relief sought, the Court cannot compel adjudication on merits. This approach aligns with the maxim qui potest et debet vetet, iacturam suam propriam non facere potest (he who can and ought to forbid, cannot make his own loss), and reflects consistent judicial practice where applications are dismissed as not pressed when expressly abandoned. The disposal is without prejudice to the petitioner’s right to file a fresh application should circumstances warrant, though such future application would be governed by the principles enunciated in Sanjay Chandra v. CBI (2012) 1 SCC 40 regarding bail considerations under CrPC Sections 437 and 439, particularly the twin tests of flight risk and tampering with evidence.

CRMPM/185/2026

Parties: VIVEK KUMAR VS STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH

Date: 06-02-2026

Judge(s): HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE JIYA LAL BHARDWAJ

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court dismissed the petitioner’s bail application under Cr.MP(M) No.185/2026 as not pressed, observing that the petitioner had bypassed the mandatory hierarchy of criminal courts by directly approaching the High Court under Section 439 CrPC instead of first seeking relief before the Sessions Court. Justice Jiya Lal Bhardwaj noted that while Section 439 empowers both the High Court and Sessions Court to grant bail, the established judicial practice requires exhaustion of remedies in the court of first instance, particularly where the Sessions Judge possesses concurrent jurisdiction and is better positioned to evaluate evidence and circumstances afresh. The Court rejected the petitioner’s approach as procedurally irregular, emphasizing that extraordinary jurisdiction under Section 439 should not be invoked as the first resort when alternative remedies remain unexhausted, thereby preserving the doctrine of judicial hierarchy and preventing forum shopping. The dismissal was rendered without prejudice, expressly preserving the petitioner’s liberty to approach the Sessions Court at the first instance, thereby ensuring that the substantive merits of the bail application remain open for independent consideration by the appropriate forum in accordance with the established criminal procedure.

CWP/1825/2026

Parties: VEENA KUMARI VS STATE OF H.P. & OTHERS

Date: 12-02-2026

Judge(s): HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ROMESH VERMA

Area of Law: Service Law

The High Court disposed of the writ petition with a direction that if the petitioner files a representation within three days seeking transfer to a station of her convenience due to family circumstances, the respondents shall consider it sympathetically and decide within two weeks, while clarifying that no opinion was expressed on merits and authorities remain free to act according to law. The decisive consideration was the petitioner’s counsel submitting during arguments that he would be satisfied if the petitioner were merely permitted to make a representation to the concerned authorities for redressal of her grievances regarding posting at a convenient station, thereby converting the writ petition into a representation case. The Court rejected the prayer for quashing the transfer order dated 09.02.2026 (Annexure P-1) and for mandatory directions regarding alternative posting, instead adopting the equitable approach of granting opportunity for representation. The underlying principle applied is that where a petitioner expresses satisfaction with mere opportunity of representation, the Court may dispose of the petition with appropriate directions for consideration of such representation without adjudicating merits, following the maxim qui prior est tempore potior est jure. The Court’s directions ensure administrative justice while preserving the department’s discretion to decide according to law, balancing individual hardship with institutional requirements.

CR.R/96/2026

Parties: SANSARO DEVI VS VIKRAM SINGH

Date: 12-02-2026

Judge(s): HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ROMESH VERMA

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The High Court allowed the criminal revision and quashed the conviction under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, holding that the compromise between the parties warranted acquittal, subject to payment of compounding costs. The decisive ground was the compromise deed dated 04.02.2026 executed by the petitioner’s son and the respondent, acknowledging full payment of the cheque and compensation amount, coupled with the respondent’s express no-objection to the petitioner’s release. The Court rejected any residual criminality, emphasizing that Section 147 permits compounding at any stage, and invoked the Supreme Court’s guidelines in Sanjabij Tari v. Kishore S. Bor Car (2010) 9 SCC 435, which mandate deposit of 7.5% of the cheque amount when compounding is sought before the High Court in revision. Consequently, the Court directed the petitioner to deposit 50% of the compounding fee with the H.P. State Legal Services Authority and the balance with the Chief Justice Disaster Relief Fund, 2025 within four weeks, failing which the order shall automatically revive the conviction and sentence. The petitioner, presently incarcerated at Lala Lajpat Rai Open Air Correctional Home, was ordered to be released forthwith, subject to compliance with the compounding condition and her not being required in any other case.

CWP/1826/2026

Parties: JEEVAN KUMAR VS STATE OF H.P. & OTHERS

Date: 12-02-2026